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Introduction  
In 2013, William Easterly, a professor at the New York University and former World 
Bank economist, published a book titled “The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dicta-
tors, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor”. Therein, he condemns aid agencies for 
maintaining the ‘technocratic illusion’ that expertise will solve the problems of the de-
veloping world; in his view, the advice of technocrats has helped to oppress the people 
rather than to free them from poverty (Easterly 2013). While certainly taking one of the 
strongest positions, Easterly has not been the first critic of expert advice as a tool of 
development aid.1 In 1989, Richard Jolly, at that time Assistant Secretary General of the 
United Nations, stated that “the vast bulk of technical experts and expertise at present 
provided by the UN and donor system has outlived their usefulness” (Jolly 1989: 21). A 
few years later, Edward V.K. Jaycox, the World Bank’s former Vice President for Afri-
ca, described the use of expatriate advisors as “a systematic destructive force which is 
undermining the development of capacity in Africa” (Jaycox 1993).  
The aid community has reacted to the persistent critique of one of its main devices by 
routinely commissioning studies on the impact of technical assistance under which ex-
pert advice is commonly subsumed (see, for instance, Forss et al. 1988; Berg 1993; 
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway &  Asplan Analyse 1994; Williams et al. 
2003; World Bank 2005a; DFID 2006; ECDPM & ACE Europe 2006; Land 2007; JICA 
2008; OECD 2008; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2008; Morgan 2010). 
Though varying in terms of focus, scope and methodology, many of these evaluations 
yielded similar findings; to give just a few examples:   
Looking at the 900 man years of assistance we must conclude that the institutional 
framework that should lead to a transfer of knowledge was non-existent or crippled. 
(Forss et al. 1988: ii)  
Technical cooperation has not produced the national capacity necessary for self-reliance. 
(Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway &  Asplan Analyse 1994: 9)  
A significant proportion of current technical assistance is ineffective (…). (Greenhill 
2006: 24) 
It is only in a minority of the cases reviewed that a capacity development impact can be 
identified. (DFID 2006: xiv) 
                                                          
1
  Doubts about the impact of expert support have been broached early on. Already in 1968, an 
economist at the Washington State University published an article headed “Why Overseas Tech-
nical Assistance is Ineffective” (Loomis 1968). 
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It is notable that almost without exception the reports commonly share the same struc-
ture: First, they identify the obstacles which impeded ‘capacity building’; finally, they 
come up with recommendations on how to improve the practice of technical assistance 
in order to increase its ‘effectiveness’ in future.  
The intention of this book is not to provide another study of this type. Although it also 
deals with the intricacies of expert advice in the context of aid, it will not close with 
suggestions on how to overcome the existing difficulties. The reason why we refrain 
from proposing solutions is that we see fundamental problems pertaining to knowledge 
transfer to young democracies which concern issues of legitimacy and sovereignty ra-
ther than merely flaws of implementation. Aside from generally questioning the efficacy 
of external advice for the ‘development’ of countries, we deem the vested interests and 
dependencies which despite all rhetoric of ‘partnership’ underlie aid relations to be in-
trinsic constraints that thwart the claimed objective of foreign support, namely helping 
recipients to become self-reliant. Quite the contrary, the persistent interference by out-
side actors in our view undermines the emergence of strong democracies as it puts 
governments at risk of losing control over their own policy agendas. 
Various scholars concerned with political science, international relations, and develop-
ment studies have established the fact that donors continue to exert significant influence 
on policy decisions in recipient states, even though aid ‘conditionality’ has formally 
been abandoned in the post-structural adjustment era (see, for instance, Helleiner 2000; 
Gould & Ojanen 2003; Harrison 2004; Wangwe 2004; Dijkstra 2005; Holtom 2007; 
Pender 2007; Mkandawire 2010; Ear 2013). The new emphasis on national ‘leadership’ 
and ‘ownership’, many argue, makes things worse since it talks up the agency of benefi-
ciaries while masking the pervasive involvement of external funders. Focusing 
particularly on the World Bank’s role in Africa, Harrison (2004) revealed how the inno-
vation of mechanisms such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)2 and Sector-
Wide Approaches (SWAps)3 has legitimated “intense and routine donor involve-
ment” (p. 88) in recipient countries’ policy space. Dijkstra (2005) who analysed the 
formulation processes of PRSPs in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua found that these 
                                                          
2
  In 1999, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank made the formulation of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers a requirement for multilateral debt relief under the Highly-Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and for access to concessional lending. In many aid receiving 
countries, PRSPs have replaced earlier national development plans and have become govern-
ments’ overriding policy frameworks.  
3
  In international aid circles, the concept of SWAps came up in the late 1990s when the traditional 
project approach was increasingly criticised for being donor-driven and leading to duplication 
and fragmentation. This should be avoided by adopting a SWAp under which the recipient gov-
ernment takes the lead and owns a sector-wide programme which external partners jointly 
support. The Inter-Agency Group on Sector-Wide Approaches and Development Cooperation 
which elaborated the concept defined a SWAp in the following way: “All significant funding for 
the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure programme, under government leader-
ship, adopting common approaches across the sector, and progressing towards relying on 
government procedures to disburse and account for all funds” (Foster et al. 2000: 1). 
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were “written because donors want them to be written” (p. 462), that the elected parlia-
ments were barely involved, and that donor-organised ‘dialogue’ with civil society 
served as a ‘cosmetic’ element rather than being a serious effort to enhance participa-
tion. Holtom (2007) and Pender (2007) drew a similar conclusion for the PRSP process 
in Tanzania, whereby the latter inferred that the new ‘partnership’ with donors “in-
volves more, not less, domination” (p. 117). One of the most recent and comprehensive 
publications on contemporary aid and power relations has been provided by Whitfield 
(2009b).4 Adopting a political economy perspective, the authors of the volume exam-
ined to what extent aid receiving governments in Africa have been able to retain control 
over policy agendas, and why some have been more successful than others. The eco-
nomic, political, ideological and institutional conditions of states were deemed decisive 
in this regard since they heavily influenced governments’ strategies for dealing with 
donors.  
Whitfield (2009b) provided us with a rich source of ideas and findings which we were 
able to draw on when conceptualising and carrying out our own research. Yet, this book 
is not merely a sequel of the former insofar as it differs in terms of its focus. While 
Whitfield and other authors investigated aid as a matter of negotiation, we look at it 
primarily as a problem of (imposed) expert advice which, as will be argued, invariably 
carries vested interests and perpetuates existing dependencies in donor-recipient rela-
tions.  
Aim and Structure of the Book 
This book sets out to reveal the complexities of expert advice in the aid context and to 
delineate its impact on policymaking in young democracies. It seeks to do so by using 
findings from new empirical research carried out in South Africa and Tanzania, two 
African countries which over the past decades have received lavish donor support for 
system reforms in almost all fields of governance.5 Our study concentrates on the areas 
of education, health and environment on the grounds that a) they are high on the devel-
opment agendas of both states; b) they have been focus areas of external engagement; 
and c) they rely on different types of expertise and ‘evidence’ for policy legitimation. 
By conducting sector analyses in two different countries, we hoped to accomplish a 
twofold task, namely to detect general intricacies of aid-related expert advice which 
exist irrespective of the particular setting, and to assess the relevance of structural con-
ditions for recipients’ strength in retaining control over their agendas.  
                                                          
4
  The research referred to above was carried out under the auspices of the Negotiating Aid project 
(2005–2007) based at the Global Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford. The 
country studies included Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Zambia. Full findings have been published in Whitfield (2009b); central results are summarised 
in Whitfield and Fraser (2010).  
5
  For a more detailed justification of South Africa and Tanzania as sites of empirical investigation, 
see chapter 3.  
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The book is structured into three parts. The first one consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 
sets the scene by unfolding the theoretical framework based on considerations from the 
theory of democracy and the sociology of science. This is followed by an outline of the 
empirical approach (chapter 2), an introduction of South Africa and Tanzania as sites of 
investigation (chapter 3), and a delineation of actors and interests in aid (chapter 4).  
The second part (chapter 5) dwells on the obstructive preconditions of expert advice in 
development assistance: The linkage between aid and politics, it will be argued, makes 
advice volatile, conditional and supply-oriented insofar as it becomes driven by shifting 
fads, legitimation and accountability pressures (sub-chapter 5.1). Moreover, the chapter 
will show structural flaws pertaining to the use and employment of external experts by 
donor agencies which hamper knowledge transfer and ‘mutual’ learning (sub-chapter 
5.2). Beyond that, it will elucidate how the unequal relationships between actors in aid 
are reinforced through knowledge hierarchies that devaluate experts in recipient coun-
tries, and increase the discursive power of agents working for international 
organisations (sub-chapter 5.3).  
The various constraints outlined in chapter 5 explain why expert advice in the context of 
aid largely fails to achieve its main objective, namely to increase the capacity of recipi-
ents to an extent which would make them independent from outside assistance. As a 
result, governments run the risk of ending up in a perpetual cycle of being advised by 
external experts who potentially (and illegitimately) gain significant influence in the 
policy space. Under which conditions recipients are able to defend their decision-
making autonomy in such a setting will be analysed in the third part of the book consist-
ing of chapter 6.  
The chapter begins with an assessment of South Africa’s and Tanzania’s strength re-
garding three factors which we considered decisive for dealing with external advice: 
finances, administrative capacity, and the local knowledge base (i.e. science communi-
ty) in the respective fields. As outlined in sub-chapter 6.1, there are significant 
variations not only between the two countries, but also across the different sectors. The 
six case studies presented in the following (sub-chapter 6.2) examine to what extent aid 
recipients in South Africa and Tanzania have been able to retain agenda-setting control 
in the respective areas. Starting with a brief outline of sectorial challenges, governance 
structures and donor presence, each case study provides detailed reconstructions of past 
and present policy processes, with a particular focus on how external experts were in-
volved herein and to what degree they were able to shape decisions. Sub-chapter 6.3 
presents a synthesis of findings that can be drawn from taking a comparative view on 
the empirical accounts.  
The book closes with chapter 7 which summarises main results and reflects to what ex-
tent our initial arguments have been substantiated (or rebutted) by our research in South 
Africa and Tanzania. As mentioned earlier, we will not conclude with suggesting how 
to make expert advice in development assistance more ‘effective’. Instead, we provide 
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some thoughts on what kind of support might better help young democracies to grow 
their own knowledge bases and, thus, to become independent from external expertise.  
Notes on Normative Assumptions and Terminology 
Doing research and writing about aid means to enter a highly politicised terrain covered 
with ideological booby traps concerning terminology. Authors are easily pigeonholed 
not only on the basis of arguments but also because of the wording they use.6 This is 
why a few remarks concerning the terminology and the scholarly perspective adopted in 
this book are in place. Our argumentation implies some normative assumptions drawn 
from political science: In line with Bickerton et al. (2007), we deem the right of states to 
govern themselves and to define their own policies a core aspect of sovereignty.7 A loss 
of control over the agenda in our view amounts to a loss of democratic legitimacy.8 
Therefore, we see the interference of external actors in the policy space of young de-
mocracies as highly problematic, irrespective of the intentions they may have.     
As to the issue of terminology: We are aware that speaking about ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ 
experts, or referring to ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ implies a generalisation which in a way 
oversimplifies reality and disregards contextual differences. Post-structuralist scholars 
would further criticise that by using such notions we reproduce the hierarchical classifi-
cations and unequal power relations which are objects of our study, and would not be 
satisfied with the remark that this is far from our intention.9 In fact, we agree with the 
stance that “it makes a fundamental difference whether we describe reality in one way 
or another” (Ziai 2011: 2). Being conscious about the significance of language, it is also 
true that language alone does not change political realities. If we deliberately draw on a 
rather conventional vocabulary in writing about aid, this is because the ‘reality’ we en-
countered was and still is characterised by asymmetries and boundaries. Replacing the 
conceptual pair of ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ with alternative terms (as done, for instance, 
by Eriksson Baaz 2005 who substituted the latter with ‘partners’) would mask persisting 
dependencies instead of helping to reveal them. Moreover, we noted that although much 
wording in the written aid discourse has changed, the actors affected on either side still 
resort to the ‘old’ terminology when giving account of their experiences. This is why we 
                                                          
6
  Easterly (2013: 12–13) pointed out the hazard of ‘code words’ for the perception of development 
writers by stating: “Mention markets and you are presumed to favor a world with zero govern-
ment. Mention liberty too often and you are presumed to be in favor of some extreme right-wing 
ideology (…). If you mention colonialism, racism, or imperialism too often (…), you risk being 
seen as a leftist ideologue.” 
7
  In our view, Brown’s distinction between the sovereignty of a country and the control over its 
political agenda is splitting hairs. He argues that the loss of the latter, although not uncommon, 
does not entail loss of the former (Brown 2013). We disagree by regarding self-determination a 
fundamental device of sovereign states.   
8
  Speaking about the public control over the agenda as a fundamental requisite of democracy, 
Robert Dahl in an interview for the Annual Review of Political Science rhetorically asked: “If 
somebody else is controlling the agenda, what’s it all about?” (Dahl & Levi 2009: 5).  
9
  For reflections on the relevance of discourse for the construction of reality, see Ziai (2011). 
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refrain from using alternative constructs which are seemingly more impartial but often 
remain vague and confusing. We hope to provide the reader with a clear language, try-
ing to be as precise as possible in describing the complexity of expert advice in aid. 
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1 Knowledge Transfer to Young Democracies: 
Issues of Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and Efficacy 
The Role of Knowledge in Democracy 
Since the fathers of the American Constitution it is generally accepted that knowledge 
or rather education in general is a safeguard for democracy. Education, and thus the 
acquisition of systematic knowledge, prevents (or is supposed to prevent) citizens from 
populist or ideological temptations and protects the political process from the irration-
alities that come with them. The assumption underlying this model is that the citizens 
reach decisions and consensus through enlightened deliberation and, in the process, ac-
commodate their respective interests with the factual possibilities (technical and 
material resources) to realise them. The counter model is the liberal pluralistic one. In 
this model decisions are reached among citizens whose interests are assumed to be fixed 
and which can only be accommodated by the search for compromise. These two differ-
ent notions of democracy, if taken as the endpoints of a continuous spectrum, are to be 
found in a multitude of combinations.  
One dimension of the role of knowledge in democratic regimes concerns the degree of 
participation of the citizenry in decision-making. Here the spectrum reaches from the 
‘mere’ choice of leadership which is the rationale of ‘representative’ parliamentary sys-
tems, to ‘direct’ participation. The US Federalists distrusted the wisdom of the 
electorate so much that they introduced an additional tier, the electoral college, that 
chooses the President and may, in the extreme case, contradict the popular vote. The 
Swiss democracy allows its citizens to decide ‘directly’ certain purportedly fundamental 
issues. At least in the European democracies one may recently observe a somewhat 
strengthened movement towards more direct participation in reaction to an alienation of 
the citizenry from the ‘professionalised’ political class (Crouch 2005). But this move-
ment is met with the well-known and justified warnings of populist decisions implied in 
direct participation which can only be avoided by having a layer of ‘representatives’. 
Central to these variants – although often implicit – is the role of knowledge whether in 
terms of the general level of education and/or as the use of specialised technical advice 
by policymakers. Given the quest for rational, informed decision-making, the latter has 
become a central tool of democratic rulers. The governance, administration and regula-
tion of modern societies have become so complex, thus the discourse, that policymakers 
depend on academically trained specialists who provide expertise for the formulation 
and execution of policies.  
What is generally overlooked in such diagnoses is that this increased reliance on spe-
cialised (scientific) knowledge on the part of governments, at least insofar as they are 
democratic regimes, amounts to a shift toward technocracy. The more intense the al-
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leged dependency of governments on scientific knowledge the more pronounced the 
conflict between politicians and experts becomes. This conflict reaches deep into the 
fabric of democratic societies because it emanates from contradicting types of legitima-
cy: politicians are legitimated by popular vote and are supposed to represent the 
interests and preferences of their respective voters. Scientific experts are legitimated by 
their specialised knowledge which is supposed to provide answers to factual problems. 
In other words the logics of politics and science do not coincide, they may be contradic-
tory.  
All modern states have developed institutional arrangements to regulate the use of 
knowledge in the political process. These arrangements address, in various ways, the 
problem of the underlying conflict between governments’ dependency on knowledge, 
i.e. its instrumental function on the one hand, and the potential loss of control over deci-
sion-making to technocratic experts on the other:  
Both variability and convergence can be seen as an expression of the potential threat that 
any advice poses to the legitimacy of governments and, likewise, that politicisation poses 
to the authority of scientists, i.e. the reciprocal interest to control the advisory process and 
outcome (…). All advisory bodies and their procedural rules are situated somewhere on a 
continuum whose endpoints are dominated by one or the other: dependence of the advis-
ers and their politicisation on one hand, and independence or autonomy of the advisers 
and the technocratic shaping of politics on the other. (Lentsch & Weingart 2011: 10) 
In what are now termed ‘knowledge societies’ it is taken as a given that knowledge is a 
central resource in both the political and the economic system for which it has become 
an even more important factor than industrial production. When in 1999, the World 
Bank issued its World Development Report and likewise UNESCO its ‘Declaration on 
science and the use of scientific knowledge’, both organisations addressed the inequality 
of knowledge between nations (UNESCO 1999; World Bank 1999c). The reference was 
primarily scientific knowledge even though the World Bank distinguished between sci-
entific and technical knowledge on the one hand and knowledge about attributes, e.g., 
the quality of goods on the other. The assumption underlying these declarations is that 
scientific knowledge is a, if not the, crucial factor responsible for development identi-
fied with economic well-being (Weingart 2006: 164). This assumption, whether true or 
not, is in line with the rhetoric of the ‘knowledge society’ that has informed the science 
and innovation policies of the Western countries. One is tempted to conclude from the 
respective declarations that since the end of the last millennium the policies and pro-
grammes of donors toward the ‘developing’ countries in general and in Africa in 
particular would focus on the strengthening of scientific knowledge production in these 
countries in order to cope with the development problem at its roots instead of tamper-
ing with symptoms. Yet, the dominant approach used by aid agencies has been to send 
advisors and consultants supposed to transfer and share their ‘expert knowledge’ with 
counterparts in recipient governments. In contrast to the World Bank’s optimistic (or 
cynical?) declaration that “knowledge is like light” and “can easily travel the world” 
(World Bank 1999c: 1), however, the reality is much more complicated. We suggest in 
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this study that with the shift of the analytical focus to the transfer of ‘knowledge’ as the 
subject of aid the arrangements of advisory processes at the science – politics interface 
should serve as the model because only they reveal the complexities of the transfer of 
knowledge.     
Risks of Aid by Knowledge Experts for Young Democracies 
The contradiction between expert knowledge and the political formation of opinion and 
decision-making has particular significance for young democracies like South Africa 
and Tanzania that are the objects of this study. To appreciate that a short detour to the 
issue of conceptual implications of ‘development’ is in place. In the discourse on ‘de-
velopment’ the very concept has been identified as implying a eurocentered technocratic 
and depoliticising view of the countries in the South, an expert knowledge about the 
deficits of ‘underdeveloped’ countries and their people as well as of the necessary 
means to bring them up to the standard of the countries in the North. ‘Development’ 
also legitimates the execution of measures deemed to serve the general welfare while, in 
fact, they are not agreed by the respective population. ‘Development’, thus, inevitably 
entails an authoritarian approach (Ziai 2010: 26). Although the discourse has changed 
somewhat insofar as in response to the criticism of the technocratic development para-
digm concepts like ‘sustainability’, ‘participation’, ‘civil society’, ‘good governance’, 
‘ownership’ etc. have become influential, the actual strategies and operations of the or-
ganisations that provide aid are still more or less the same (see Ziai 2010: 28). This is 
not surprising since the ‘new’ development discourse with its seemingly more demo-
cratic, egalitarian and ecology oriented rhetoric is still largely based in the North and 
conceptualised by ‘experts’ in the North. One way to escape the implications of the 
technocratic paternalism of development policy is to draw the most radical consequence 
and withdraw from it altogether. Short of this improbable step the answer is to be highly 
sensitive to the nature of the disparities between North and South, to the alternative 
paths leading to poverty reduction and to the implicit meanings and interests transported 
with expert advice that prevent the recipients of such advice from being able to identify 
and pursue their own interests.  
The major threat to young democracies is that they lose control over setting their own 
political agenda. Obviously, the ability of a citizenry to elect their representatives into 
political office where they can design policies that reflect the electorate’s wishes and 
interests and reach compromises with their opponents is the core element of any demo-
cratic system. It is the principle of self-determination. This principle is undermined if 
decision-making is primarily following the demands of external agents instead of being 
responsive to those of the country’s constituency. Young democracies are particularly 
vulnerable to this threat posed by donors in the form of aid programmes and expert ad-
vice due to their internal weakness: their governments’ legitimacy with their electorates 
is often tenuous, their institutions are still fragile, and their knowledge bases (i.e. their 
scientific communities) are usually small which makes them dependent on knowledge 
from outside. This translates into an asymmetry between donor and recipient countries 
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insofar as the former do not match the Western democracies be it in terms of institution-
al stability, sophistication of administrative infrastructure and staff, juridical and 
governance systems, higher education and research systems in terms of volume, level of 
education, research output and absorptive capacity. This is regardless of the vast differ-
ences between countries within Africa (see chapter 6.1.3).  
The consequence of such asymmetry, thus our thesis, is that governments of countries 
that are recipients or at least addressees of aid programmes come under influence from 
outside to varying degrees which may impede their ability to determine their own politi-
cal agendas. If this is the case these governments run the risk of losing legitimacy with 
their own citizenry. This issue is an object of a broad debate especially among observers 
of the international aid policy and analysts from the aid community itself. In the follow-
ing, we focus first on the nature of legitimacy as what is being threatened, then on the 
aspects we consider crucial for recipient control over political agenda setting: financial 
strength, administration and its ability to critically absorb knowledge from external ex-
perts (absorptive capacity), and the ‘local’ knowledge base. 
Legitimacy 
The acceptance of a political system by its citizenry and, thus, its legitimacy, depends 
on both, the institutional arrangements on the input side and the actual effectiveness of 
governmental institutions, most obvious in the provision of socio-economic benefits but 
also in the rule of law on the output side. The concept of ‘legitimacy’ in theories of de-
mocracy has several meanings. A common distinction is that between ‘input legitimacy’ 
and ‘output legitimacy’ (Scharpf 2005). This suggests that not only the institutions 
which allow for the participation of the electorate, political parties, interest groups, 
NGOs and the media in framing political decisions but also the institutions that guaran-
tee the quality of the decisions and their implementation constitute legitimacy. The 
combination of ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy is particularly pertinent for this study as 
it points to the various factors shaping the relationship between recipient and donor 
governments, and to assess the impact of knowledge transfer ‘from outside’.  
In young democracies, the specific threat to legitimacy from external experts, it can be 
hypothesised, will most likely come from a displacement of accountability of govern-
ments, the open or implicit denial of ‘voice’, i.e. participation, in shaping and making 
decisions, in particular about the political agenda. This is underscored by the exemplary 
and frequently quoted statement from President Paul Kagame of Rwanda:  
To realize our development vision, we in Africa must substitute external conditionality – 
that is, what the donors tell us to do – with internal policy clarity – that is, knowing our-
selves what we need to do and articulating this clearly and consistently to our people and 
our development partners (…). This requires that, among other things, we need to learn to 
‘say no’ to donors whenever their priorities do not align with domestic objectives and 
agenda. (Kagame 2007: 5) 
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In order to capture the potential threat to the legitimacy of recipient governments posed 
by donor engagement it has been suggested to look at the “aid negotiation process as 
including the full policy cycle: agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, 
evaluation, and revision” with special emphasis “on the agenda-setting and policy for-
mulation stages because these stages involve the strongest forms of recipient 
government control over its national development strategy and policies” (Whitfield & 
Fraser 2009: 39–40). By taking this analytical perspective both partners in the negotia-
tion process come into view and are taken seriously as having each their interests and 
strategies in this process. More than that it also points to the particular conditions under 
which each party enters the process such as governments’ dependence on aid.  
When looking at young democracies and their particular sensitivity to knowledge trans-
fer from outside the crucial point is that both donors and recipients are subject to 
legitimacy issues. Donors depend on public opinion ‘back home’, on the criteria and 
conditions of giving aid that are formulated by their parliaments, on the paradigms of 
the aid policy that may change with each new government. Likewise the recipient gov-
ernments depend on the public consent of their respective citizenry to the various aid 
projects which add up to their aid policy. This dual orientation to each one’s source of 
legitimacy makes the negotiation between the two parties very sensitive. Mkandawire 
also points to this dual accountability when he writes:  
The more accountable a donor is to its own voters, the more onerous and invasive will be 
its intervention in the receiving economy and the more likely it is to undermine the recip-
ient democratic government’s accountability to its own voters. (Mkandawire 2010: 1168)  
In particular, it makes aid programmes that in many, if not most cases require time to 
show the desired effects, subject to frequent and sudden changes, thus putting an addi-
tional burden on governments’ credibility with the public. 
Financial Strength 
A fundamental condition of political sovereignty, it would appear, is financial inde-
pendence. As Pender (2007: 112) writes, it is  
the idea of material capacity to act which blurs the lines between sovereignty and eco-
nomics. Power always depends on material strength, and sovereignty has always implied 
some degree of autonomy from, and control over, economic processes. 
Governments that have enough financial means to run their own affairs do not depend 
on financial aid from outside and consequently do not have to accept advice that poten-
tially interferes with their own agenda setting. This is so self-evident that it hardly needs 
to be discussed. The reverse argument is that governments in need of foreign funding 
have a weaker position in negotiating with donors over political objectives and priori-
ties. In the extreme, the price they pay for securing aid is a loss of policymaking 
autonomy which threatens their legitimacy if decision-making becomes more respon-
sive to external demands than to public preferences.  
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Yet, there are some considerations that suggest a more differentiated view on the effect 
of finances. Findings from recent studies indicate that there is no direct correlation be-
tween aid dependency as measured in terms of foreign funding as a share of national 
budgets or gross national income, and the extent of external influence. Whitfield 
(2009a), for instance, has shown that countries like Ethiopia and Rwanda show high 
degrees of control over their policy agendas in spite of being highly dependent on aid, 
as they are able to derive negotiating capital from favourable political and ideological 
conditions, amongst others.10 This challenges the assumption that countries which suffer 
from lack of funds must accept donor interference. It also indicates that ‘lack of funds’ 
is a relative figure that has to be seen in reference to the economic power of the recipi-
ent country, but also to its political ambitions and objective needs. The onslaught of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, for example, has imposed financial burdens on various African 
countries that were unanticipated and have threatened their economic well-being to dif-
ferent degrees.  
It is more instructive therefore to look at the ratio outside funds constitute as a percent-
age of budgets available for certain policy fields. Then financial dependency becomes 
more concrete: political agenda setting usually applies to sectors represented by line 
ministries. It is on that level that the range of political options is narrowed by advice 
from outside. On this level interference with policy agendas is most direct and damag-
ing a government’s authority and legitimacy.    
Administrative Capacity  
Modern democracies rely heavily on efficient administrations for both the preparation 
and implementation of political decisions taken by their legislatures. The administration 
of health care or education systems and the regulation of the labour market, to take just 
these examples, depend on systematic and reliable knowledge. The quality of bureau-
cracies has a strong influence on the quality of governments and their policies. With a 
constantly growing share of public administration being knowledge based bureaucracies 
have to have well educated professional staffs which also connect them with their re-
spective academic communities and allow them to gain some independence from the 
various lobby groups around them trying to gain influence over their decisions. Control 
of the political agenda and accountability are thus an issue if bureaucracies are being 
confronted with expert advice they are not able to absorb properly, for lack of capable 
personnel or because – in the worst case – they are inefficient and corrupt. Then they 
are less likely to be competent parties in negotiations with donors than those that have a 
                                                          
10
  According to Whitfield (2009a: 333–341), the favourable political and ideological conditions in 
Ethiopia and Rwanda include their geostrategic importance for the West, the existence of clear 
development visions and a strong confidence of the governments in their authority relative to 
donors which they derive from their respective country histories. Ethiopia, for instance, had nev-
er been colonised as most other Sub-Saharan states, and thus shows a strong sense of its own 
equality with donor countries; Rwanda is able to use the legacy of the genocide to de-legitimise 
external interference in domestic affairs.   
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high level of professionalisation and well trained staff. The perception that ‘their’ ad-
ministrations are fit to deal with donors in a way that safeguards the local interests, and 
guarantees operations and performance that benefit society, will also gain a higher de-
gree of trust from their constituency. Thus, the quality of bureaucracies in terms of their 
knowledge related absorptive capacity is a crucial factor determining their ‘strength’ or 
‘weakness’, respectively, and an important element of a government’s output legitima-
cy. The significance of absorptive capacity lies in its function to enable governments of 
developing countries to retain the control over their own political agendas. If this con-
trol is closely related to legitimacy in (new) democracies it is a very important political 
resource. 
The precondition for strengthening the absorptive capacity and, thus, for gaining inde-
pendence from and control over foreign experts lies obviously in an education system 
that provides the respective governments with well-educated manpower. Although most 
African states now have elaborate education programmes and policies in place their 
actual implementation ‘on the ground’ is a recurrent topic of complaint.11 Many lack the 
means and the competence to set up functioning education systems although the quality 
varies greatly among them. Perhaps with the exception of South Africa the education 
systems of many African states are not well developed and consequently the ‘absorptive 
capacity’ of these countries is comparatively low. As a result they are severely con-
strained in receiving the donors’ experts with their own critical assessment of the 
information they are being given, and in doing their part of translating the expertise into 
their respective political, cultural and social contexts. 
Local Knowledge Base 
To a considerable extent the absorptive capacity of a country is also determined by the 
relative strength of its own science system. Although scientific knowledge is supposedly 
international and the scientific community is a global network of communication the 
differences between countries, the North and the South in particular, are considerable. 
Compared to the leading ‘scientific nations’ such as the United States, the United King-
dom, Germany, France and since recently China many African countries do not have the 
means to support a science system that can sustain internationally competitive research. 
Strictly speaking it is not necessary for a country to compete at the frontiers of research 
– and practically none can afford to do this in every field. But in order to tap that 
knowledge which is freely available and to adapt it to local conditions a country needs a 
scientific community (and the requisite institutions) that is able to ‘absorb’ this 
knowledge. It is only then that knowledge can be converted to ‘expertise’, i.e. 
knowledge that is to be applied to solve practical problems. Only then will a roster of 
local experts be created, recruited from the national scientific community.  
The difference between ‘local’ and ‘foreign’ expertise is an issue because the interna-
tional community of experts has its own identity, its own culture, its own ideology and 
                                                          
11
  See, for instance, Kisting (2012); Ndlovu (2013); Ayo (2013).  
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its own interests. The configurations of this community have been assigned different 
concepts over the last decades, from ‘strategic groups’ (Evers et al. 1988) to ‘(global-
ised) epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992; Evers et al. 2009). These conceptualisations 
reflect to an extent the theoretical (and ideological) positions of their authors. But they 
also mirror the experience and the evidence gathered in numerous studies about the ac-
tivities of foreign experts, their impact and their failures. The main point is that these 
groups or networks or communities of experts, even if they come from different disci-
plines and act on behalf of different governments or donor agencies, share a common 
set of qualities that Haas has characterised  as being  
(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based ra-
tionale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are 
derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of prob-
lems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple 
linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of va-
lidity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating 
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is, 
a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional 
competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be en-
hanced as a consequence. (Haas 1992: 3) 
As vague as the delineation of these ‘communities’ is, the analytical significance of the 
concept is the thesis that they represent certain views which they successfully transfer 
into politics. The mechanism of influence, as Haas sees it, is such that members of these 
communities may identify interests for decision makers or illuminate dimensions of an 
issue 
from which the decision makers may then deduce their interests. The decision makers in 
one state may, in turn, influence the interests and behaviour of other states, thereby in-
creasing the likelihood of convergent state behaviour and international policy 
coordination, informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the epistemic 
community. (Haas 1992: 4)  
In other words, although on the surface one is made to believe that knowledge, scientific 
knowledge in particular, is universal and therefore neutral towards parochial interests 
and cultural contexts that assumption is naïve. That is why the distinction between ‘lo-
cal’ and ‘foreign’ expertise makes a difference. 
Given the endemic weakness of the education and science systems of the African coun-
tries their governments are at the mercy of the international donor community – again 
with considerable differences between countries. The realisation that this dependence is 
threatening their national and cultural identities beyond posing a danger to their demo-
cratic institutions where they exist has led to the appeal to ‘indigenous knowledge’. The 
United Nations declared the period 1995–2004 as the ‘International Decade of the 
World’s Indigenous People’ which has been extended, as the second decade, to 2015. 
South Africa’s National Research Fund established the interface of indigenous 
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knowledge (IK) and Western science as a research focus. This emphasis on IK is clearly 
motivated by a quest for cultural and national identity; it implies a paradigm shift inso-
far as it places knowledge at the centre of development strategies, and recognises the 
importance of ‘local’ knowledge and participation (see Weingart 2006: 184).12 Some 
authors have propagated IK as an alternative to Western science. That is the most con-
crete suggestion but it is also the least realistic option because it would isolate the 
countries that would follow this course from the global community, apart from the fact 
that the knowledge base would be far too small to allow full scale sustainable develop-
ment. However, as Girvan (2007: 40) points out, the more realistic option to obtain a 
degree of independence is not to take the road into intellectual isolation but to set up 
local and regional knowledge centres in order to strengthen the respective science bases. 
The real importance of ‘local expertise’ rests elsewhere. Experts who have been social-
ised and educated in the respective country at stake are representatives of the ‘local’ 
culture and the values that are being shared by its citizens, they speak the language. 
They have firsthand knowledge of the country’s problems and needs and how to meet 
them. Educated both in the respective country and often also abroad as many of the lo-
cal academic elite are, they are able to absorb knowledge, i.e. function as critical 
interpreter. All these qualities allow them not only to be equal partners in the negotia-
tion of projects with ‘foreign experts’ from donor organisations but it also makes them 
ideal agents of knowledge transfer as they are in command of both languages, that of 
their own country’s expert community and of the international one. Finally, belonging 
to the recipient country’s expert community is a crucial condition for having credibility 
with local policymakers and the public at large because it is assumed that primary alle-
giance is to the own country. 
‘Capacity Building’ and Foreign Experts  
In response to the perceived weakness of the local knowledge bases in developing coun-
tries the concept of ‘capacity building’ has been used to circumscribe a prime objective 
of aid programmes. In fact, the notion of ‘capacity building’ goes back to the end of the 
1960s when it had become apparent that the transfer of knowledge embodied in tech-
nology required, apart from an economic infrastructure, an education base. Already then 
it had become clear that the copying of knowledge alone was not sufficient but that an 
‘absorptive capacity’ had to be built, meaning an indigenous base of knowledge produc-
tion. The UN Economic and Social Council stated already in its 1969 ‘World Plan’:  
It is difficult for a developing country without a science and technology capacity of its 
own, and particularly without the trained people involved, to know what useful technolo-
gy exists elsewhere, to understand it, to select it, to adapt, to absorb, to repair and 
maintain, to operate. (United Nations Economic and Social Council 1971: 102)  
                                                          
12
  In Tanzania, the significance of indigenous knowledge was already highlighted by the country’s 
first post-colonial leader Julius K. Nyerere in his ‘education for self-reliance’ policy (Nyerere 
1967); for details, see chapter 6.2.1.  
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It thus considered it “a fundamental necessity to build up indigenous scientific capabil-
ity in the developing countries” (United Nations Economic and Social Council 1971: 
102). 
If the problem of absorption is addressed here with reference to the transfer of technolo-
gy it has become even more acute since aid programmes have since shifted to more 
abstract issues: governance in general, administration and accounting procedures in par-
ticular, therefore involving not only natural science knowledge but also economic, 
social and political science knowledge. ‘Capacity building’ as it is being used by the 
World Bank, for example, includes increasing the “effectiveness of the states in design-
ing and managing public policies and programs; in implementing regulatory 
frameworks; in delivering public services; and in promoting accountability and trans-
parency in economic, financial and administrative governance” (World Bank 2010a).13 
Thus, the term itself has become inflated and rather than addressing the issue of creating 
specifically a capacity for absorbing knowledge refers more generally to improving 
governance and financial management capabilities.  
This is related to the kinds of experts that are engaged from ‘outside’. Knack and Rah-
man (2007: 194) state that donors should be careful not to disturb the market for skilled 
labour by bringing in expensive expatriates (usually because they are well trained 
abroad) because not only may this “prevent valuable learning-by-doing on the part of 
local staff” but also “those same benefits could be obtained, without the negative conse-
quences, from using the funds to increase salaries of underpaid civil servants, or through 
general budget support”. The provision of advice as the dominant form of knowledge 
transfer is a process whose success hinges on mutual trust between advisor and his/her 
counterpart and on the ability of the latter to receive the advice with the competence to 
assess its value in the context of his/her problems and to apply and develop it further. 
Where these conditions are not met advice is inevitably the imposition of the advisor’s 
interests and values on the recipient. The extensive use of experts from developed coun-
tries rests on the donors’ perception that the administrations in developing countries are 
not meeting their standards. Their interest in obtaining visible results as fast as possible 
thus pushes them to rely on ‘external’ experts rather than to improve the competence of 
local ones. In a sense the legitimacy pressures on the donors override the need for legit-
imacy on the recipients’ side.  
The Intricacies of Knowledge Transfer 
As we will show later in some detail (see chapter 5.2.1) donor organisations rarely have 
precise concepts about knowledge transfer, about the nature of the knowledge to be 
transferred (i.e. whether it is based on evidence or more loosely on experience), about 
what it entails on the recipients’ side to actually absorb the knowledge offered and to 
                                                          
13
  This is taken from a World Bank project information document related to its African Capacity 
Building Foundation (ACBF) Regional Capacity Building Project (Project ID P122478) running 
from 2011–2017. 
1 Knowledge Transfer to Young Democracies: Issues of Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and Efficacy 17 
 
build on it locally in a sustained fashion. Aid programmes are almost without exception 
targeted to operational problems such as the improvement of health care or the introduc-
tion of advanced accounting practices etc. but they do not reflect on the conditions of 
the transfer process itself. Providing aid is an activity that is ruled by criteria such as 
time constraints, efficiency and efficacy, it is oriented to achieving set objectives. In 
addition, the ‘experts’ that are being sent by the donor organisations or represent them 
act on their own and/or their organisation’s behalf (see chapters 4.2 and 4.3). Reflecting 
on the conditions of knowledge transfer is not one of their concerns, and even if it were, 
the realities of organisations prove to be dominating.  Hüsken (2006: 246) states in his 
analysis of knowledge management among the experts within the German GTZ (now 
GIZ) that the “collection, evaluation and the exchange of knowledge between headquar-
ter, country bureaus and projects is unsystematic, and it is subject to conflicts of 
interests and power” (translated by authors). This does not even refer to the knowledge 
transfer by GTZ experts to their counterparts in developing countries.        
Describing the changing paradigms of aid Brown (2013: 263) states:  
Over the past three decades, Western aid policies towards Africa have been dominated 
by, in roughly chronological and cumulative sequence, economic conditionalities around 
structural adjustment programmes; political conditionalities around respect for human 
rights and governance; and ‘partnership’ policies involving intensive and extensive rede-
signing of policy formation and budgetary processes in recipient countries. 
Several authors have argued that these programmes amount to “intrusions by outside 
agencies” (Plank 1993: 408). But regardless of whether analysts and critics believe that 
the actual control of nations over agenda setting and outcomes may be threatened or if 
they regard modern aid programmes as a continuation of colonialism there can be little 
doubt that development experts as representatives of aid organisations and government 
officials of recipient countries enter a relationship which is characterised by potentially 
conflicting interests and inequality of control and discretionary powers. Even if the 
rhetoric of ‘conditionality’ has been abandoned, donors can and factually do determine 
which conditions the recipient has to meet in order to obtain aid. The power differential 
remains and – contrary to the World Bank’s assessment – is even more difficult to es-
cape when the chief currency of aid is knowledge. Also in contradiction to common 
belief the transfer of supposedly universal and value free knowledge is a highly com-
plex matter. The knowledge in question such as about financial and project 
management, regulation of markets, rules of ‘good governance’ and the like is far from 
certain. It is subject to fads like ‘new public management’ and it comes with cultural 
contextualities. Even seemingly ‘objective knowledge’ like the evidence of the 
HIV/AIDS link has been contested for political reasons. How much more likely it is that 
‘soft’ knowledge like economics and political science get politicised.  
If these circumstances are not difficult enough the transfer situation between African 
and Western democracies is complicated additionally by the imbalance of power or, 
more specifically, what one could call the vulnerability of the former’s agenda setting 
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control as well as by the duality of references of accountability. Paradoxically, the legit-
imacy of the young democracies is threatened by expert advice even if that is no one’s 
intention.
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2 Accessing the World of Development Aid: Study 
Design and Field Work   
Questioning the ‘knowledge is like light’ assumption which prevails in international 
donor circles, this study set out to explain the intricacies of expert advice in the aid con-
text by developing a generalised description of underlying mechanisms and conditions. 
Gläser and Laudel (2013) point out two requirements for such an enterprise: first, the 
availability of “rich descriptions of empirical phenomena” that can be analysed, and 
second, a variance in data which “can be obtained by comparative case studies”. Thus, 
we decided to investigate the matter by carrying out qualitative research: Our empirical 
study is based on 73 semi-structured expert interviews conducted in South Africa and 
Tanzania during four field trips in the years 2011, 2012 and 2013. A standardised back-
ground questionnaire distributed to informants and a comprehensive body of documents 
produced by government authorities and aid agencies were used to complement and 
contextualise the interview material.  
As sociologists of knowledge have shown, results gained through academic research are 
always products of constructive processes rather than a detection of facts (Schütz 1953; 
Knorr-Cetina 1981; Knorr-Cetina 1984). In the following, we delineate the creative as-
pects of our empirical work and unfold experiences made ‘in the field’ which inevitably 
affected the interpretation of findings.  
Tools of Data Generation: Expert Interviews, Questionnaire and Document Analysis  
Our study aimed to explore the impact of expert advice on policy processes in develop-
ing democracies. Thus, the focus of research was not on the technical content of policies 
as such, but rather on the processes through which they were developed. In order to re-
construct the latter, we decided to approach the decisive actors involved therein, using 
expert interviews as the main method of investigation.14  
                                                          
14
  A policy analysis based on documents might have had the potential to trace external influences 
to some extent, e.g., by scrutinizing national policy documents for their references to global con-
ventions or normative guidelines of the international community. This approach, however, would 
have fallen short of revealing how external influences come into play, by whom they are en-
forced, and how they are dealt with. One could argue that participant observation would have 
allowed a more direct insight into negotiation processes between the different actors in the realm 
of policymaking. However, in our study, this method would neither have been feasible nor would 
it have been the most appropriate one. Apart from the difficulty to get direct access to policy ne-
gotiations and advisory situations as a researcher, the long-term character of policy processes 
would have been a major obstacle given the time-frame of the study. It would also not have been 
possible to directly observe processes in three sectors and two countries, which would have 
meant that we lacked the variance of data required for comparison.   
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In recent years, the expert interview as a method of qualitative research and as a distinct 
form of an interview has increasingly received attention, particularly within the Ger-
man-speaking social science community (Littig 2008; Bogner et al. 2009; Gläser & 
Laudel 2010).15 The term ‘expert’ in this context is used as a relational concept decou-
pled from the professional roles or formal occupational status of interviewees (Meuser 
& Nagel 2009: 24–25). What constitutes an individual as an ‘expert’ is his or her exclu-
sive knowledge on the researcher’s object which derives from the expert’s privileged 
position in the social context under study (Littig 2008). It is particularly his or her 
knowledge and interpretation of the social situation – the process and interpretative di-
mension of expert knowledge – that is relevant for reconstructing social objects the 
researcher is not able to observe directly.16 Applying this concept to our research pro-
ject, the ‘expert status’ has been ascribed to those who play a major role in policymak-
policymaking in South Africa and Tanzania, and, given their direct participation therein, 
possess exclusive knowledge on how and to what extent decisions are influenced by 
external advice.  
Suitable protagonists in this regard were found in government bodies, donor agencies, 
and partly in academia and civil society. The variety of their roles and functions re-
quired a flexible use of the interview guidelines that were designed to ensure 
comparability by focusing the interviews on specific major topics.17 In the course of 
field work, we used the guidelines more as a memo than as a pre-fixed list of questions. 
A rather open interview approach was instructive insofar as it provided room for inter-
viewees to “report cases of decision-making for reconstructing the supra-individual, 
field-specific patterns of expert knowledge” (Meuser & Nagel 2009: 31). Such reports 
and narratives about specific episodes, conflicts and problem solutions in the expert’s 
professional activity are considered key points of reference for tapping “the tacit aspects 
of expert knowledge, which she or he is not fully aware of and which, on the contrary, 
become noticed only gradually in the course of the narration” (Meuser & Nagel 2009: 
32). Narrative interview passages became particularly useful when interviewees seemed 
to provide more of an official answer rather than actual experience, hesitant to directly 
criticise prevailing practices or unwilling to disclose their expert knowledge for other 
                                                          
15
  Littig (2008) provides an analysis of commonalities and differences regarding the discussion of 
expert and elite interviews in the German and English literature.  
16
  Bogner and Menz (2009) deconstruct expert knowledge into three dimensions: technical, process 
and interpretative knowledge. The first is closely related to the specialised knowledge the expert 
has accumulated in a particular technical area through formal qualification and training. Process 
knowledge, in contrast, is mainly gained through experience and relates to “sequences of actions, 
interaction routines, organizational constellations, and past or current events” (Bogner & Menz 
2009: 52) in which the expert was involved through his/her practical activity. Interpretative 
knowledge as a third dimension includes “the expert’s subjective orientations, rules, points of 
view and interpretations” (Bogner & Menz 2009: 52).  
17
  The three slightly modified interview guidelines for aid experts, government officials and aca-
demics/activists are attached in Appendix A.  
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reasons. Letting interviewees report about concrete cases often brought forward implicit 
patterns of social action and interpretation that were not explicitly formulated.  
Focusing on the “how of decision-making and acting” (Meuser & Nagel 2009: 34) also 
helped to lessen interaction effects such as social desirability in responses. As other 
forms of interviews, the dynamics of an expert interview is inevitably shaped by “ex-
pected expectations”, mutual perceptions and the “experience of communication as it 
takes place during the interview itself” (Bogner & Menz 2009: 57).18 From our perspec-
tive as interviewers, for instance, the experience of communication very much differed 
when an interview took place in an air-conditioned, quiet conference room or, in con-
trast, a busy office with open doors and frequent interruptions; when the interviewee 
seemed interested or disinterested in our questions; when we perceived the answers as 
upfront or defensive. On the side of the interviewee, the perception of the interviewers’ 
roles, competences, and assumed intensions impacts on his/her way of responding 
(Meuser & Nagel 2009: 57). For example, our nationality as Germans led a few inter-
viewees to emphasise their ‘good experiences’ with German development cooperation, 
so that we felt it was important to underline the strictly academic background of our 
research. Hence, we explicitly informed the interviewees about our research interests 
and, particularly in the last round of interviews, were open about our impressions gained 
so far. Providing preliminary assumptions and hypotheses was particularly instructive to 
obtain experts’ reactions and interpretations that pointed to underlying patterns and 
principles of acting in advisory situations.  
For assessing “the meaning and significance” of interview statements, it is crucial to 
take the “institutional-organizational context within which the expert’s position is em-
bedded” (Meuser & Nagel 2009: 35) into account. The standardised questionnaire was 
one tool which helped to define the different contexts of interviewees in the sample. It 
covered a maximum of 30 questions grouped into blocks on the personal and profes-
sional background, the cooperation with partners, and the access to and management of 
knowledge.19 The questionnaire was distributed online prior to meeting the interview-
ees; however, the majority of them completed it after the interview was done, either 
online or the paper version. Overall, we received a response rate of 82%.20 It is im-
portant to emphasise, however, that the questionnaire was not designed to gain data 
which claim statistical significance as done in quantitative research. Instead, it is used to 
describe our sample and to illustrate patterns with regard to qualifications, experiences 
                                                          
18
  For a typology of interaction situations and interview strategies, see Bogner and Menz (2009: 
68–69).   
19
  The questionnaires for aid experts, government officials and academics/activists as distributed on 
paper are provided in Appendix B (B1-B3). The number of questions in the different versions 
varies for two reasons: First, some questions were not applicable for all groups of interviewees 
(e.g., preparation for working in South Africa/Tanzania is only relevant for experts from abroad); 
second, the questionnaire was slightly revised and shortened during the course of research.  
20
  60 out of 73 interviewees approached fully completed the questionnaire. For a statistical over-
view of questionnaire responses, see Appendix B4.  
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and routine practices of the participants’ professional activity. The data generated by the 
survey thus complement the qualitative findings taken from the interview material.  
In order to contextualise the latter, an extensive corpus of documents related to relevant 
advisory and policy processes was gathered. The collection included a variety of text 
types such as project and programme reports disclosed by international organisations, 
job descriptions, evaluation studies, sector reviews, policy documents and official gov-
ernment publications. Juxtaposing the interview statements with ‘natural’ text generated 
in the field of the interviewees’ professional activity not only helped to embed narra-
tions in a broader ‘story’, but also to compare, confirm or contrast representations of 
processes the interviewees were part of. Contradictions that emerge through this ap-
proach are not treated as irregularities or distortions of the findings; instead, they reveal 
different patterns of legitimation and thereby crucial aspects of the research objective.  
The Sample: Development Experts, Government Officials, Academics and Activists 
As outlined above, the aim of the expert interview is to access the exclusive knowledge 
of experts in order to be able to reconstruct social situations and processes in which they 
participated (Gläser & Laudel 2010: 12). Thus, the main criteria for selecting potential 
interviewees in our study was their engagement in one of three policy areas we were 
interested in, namely health, education and environment. 
In order to identify relevant actors on donor side, we contacted country offices, embas-
sies and ‘development partner’ secretariats in South Africa and Tanzania, screened 
documents such as minutes of policy meetings, joint sector reviews, progress and evalu-
ation reports of major projects and programmes which usually list participants or 
responsible staff. While the names of the current health specialist or an education advi-
sor in a particular donor agency were found relatively easily, in some cases by mere 
online research, it was far more complicated to identify their ‘counterparts’ in govern-
ment authorities, i.e. the Tanzanian or South African officials they interact with. 
Gaining contact details of policymakers and technical staff from abroad proved chal-
lenging for a number of reasons: Compared to donor websites, the online presence of 
ministries and departments is often rudimentary and not up to date regarding office 
holders, phone numbers or email addresses. This appeared to be connected with a high 
staff turn-over in these organisations. Calling operators did not always help along. Last-
ly, being less familiar with formal organisational structures and informal power 
relations, it was difficult for us in the beginning to figure out the pivotal people within 
the bureaucracies who do have a say in policy decisions.  
In this regard, recommendations of a few key actors with years of experience on gov-
ernment or donor side was extremely useful and often functioned as a door opener for 
arranging meetings with high level role-players. To give just one example: A German 
health expert who had spent around eight years in Tanzania allowed us to refer to his 
person when contacting his former partners. Doing so evoked a surprising turn-around 
of reaction in many cases. After hearing his name, Tanzanian officials who were first 
2 Accessing the World of Development Aid: Study Design and Field Work 23 
 
hesitant to meet now warm-heartedly invited us to visit them, sending best wishes to 
their ‘colleague’ and ‘friend’ – one even responded: “People in Tanzania will never 
forget what he has done for our country. You are most welcome!” This anecdote points 
to the high importance of personal relationships in the realm of development coopera-
tion which we not only experienced during research but which also came up as a major 
issue in the interviews. The fact that we arrived at a point where we were given no new 
names but congruent recommendations of whom to meet from different people (refer-
ring us to the ones who had suggested them) hints at a marked feature of governance 
particularly in Tanzania, namely that policymaking power is held by a rather small 
group of protagonists.  
During the second rounds of interviews in South Africa and Tanzania, we came to a 
point where we felt to have reached ‘saturation’ in the sense that interviews didn’t re-
veal new aspects or perspectives on the topic, but reconfirmed statements and 
legitimation patterns. Altogether, we conducted 73 interviews which took place in Dar 
es Salaam, Pretoria, Johannesburg and Berlin.21 The sample consists of a fairly hetero-
geneous group of interviewees who can broadly be grouped into three categories:  
Experts working for bi- and multilateral organisations: Experts working for bi- and 
multilateral organisations are deployed in the field in various different positions (see 
chapter 4.3), hence the titles of our interviewees were manifold: amongst others, we 
spoke to senior (technical) advisors, programme managers, first secretaries, counsellors, 
team leaders, sector specialists, professional officers, attachés, and consultants. The 
variety of functions and relevance of positions result from the fact that donor and recipi-
ent countries organise the management of aid in very different ways.22 The majority of 
interviewees from this group ranked themselves as being a senior staff member or at 
medium level in the hierarchy of their organisation.23 One third of them had between 21 
and 30 years of experience in development cooperation, roughly fifty per cent between 
11 and 20 years, and a smaller number less than ten years.24 While eighteen interview-
ees in this group were foreigners coming from Europe or North America, nine were 
‘local internationals’, i.e. Tanzanians and South Africans working for an international 
organisation. As many of them had prior experience in working for their governments 
                                                          
21
  For a full list of interview partners including details on dates as well as the respective numerical 
references used in the following, see Appendix C.   
22
   For details on aid management structures in South Africa and Tanzania, see chapter 3.  For an 
overview of different organisational types on donor side, see chapter 4.2. 
23
  The allocation of questionnaire answers related to the level of seniority in detail: head of organi-
sation/mission: 3,7%; high ranking manager (e.g., vice-president, vice-chairperson, director): 
3,7%; senior member of staff (e.g., head of department, team leader): 59,3%; medium level of 
seniority (e.g., attaché, advisor, project manager): 29,6%; other: 3,7% (no missings).  
24
  The allocation of questionnaire answers related to the work experience of external experts in 
detail: 1–5 years: 7,4%; 6–10 years: 7,4%; 11–20 years: 51,9%; 21–30 years: 33,3%; 31 and 
more years: 0% (no missings).  
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and thus were knowledgeable of the problems and pressures on both the recipient and 
donor side, they had a particularly interesting perspective on the topic.  
Government officials in recipient authorities: The second critical group of interviewees 
in our sample is made up of the ones who constitute the main target group for external 
policy advice: the cadre of senior government officials who are the designated ‘counter-
parts’ of aid experts. Entering national ministries, departments and other government 
bodies, we spoke to permanent secretaries, deputy director-generals, heads of govern-
ment agencies, directors and programme officers who regularly interact with donor 
staff. Asked for the number of years of experience in development cooperation, answers 
ranged from two to thirty years. Among those with decades of experience, some were 
already retired from the government service. Their statements based on years of dealing 
with donors were particularly fruitful for gaining a long-term perspective on develop-
ments both in the respective sector and the aid community. Having a more distant view 
on day-to-day politics, the senior interviewees provided valuable reflections on chang-
ing relationships, paradigm shifts and the overall impact of external advice on sector 
policies over time. While retired interviewees were able to speak frankly about conflicts 
and failures, government officials still in service seemed more cautious in their assess-
ments, although we guaranteed anonymity with regard to the use of the material. Yet, 
we felt that most of them were quite honest in speaking about current policy processes 
and the involvement of external actors therein, with some being outspoken in their criti-
cism, others putting their messages through in between the lines.  
Academics and civil society activists: Academics and leading civil society activists 
make up the smallest group of interviewees in our study. Including them in the sample 
was instructive insofar as their experience of being or not being consulted by govern-
ments or donors was an important aspect of our research. Their assessment of who pulls 
the strings in policymaking complemented the picture painted by external experts and 
government officials with a third perspective. Moreover, they provided useful com-
ments on preliminary hypotheses, argumentation lines and impressions that came up 
during the field trips.    
On average, the interviews took around one hour. While some appointments were ar-
ranged in hotel lobbies or other venues suggested by interviewees, we usually met them 
at their workplace. It is worth to make a side note on the experience these visits provid-
ed; in Tanzania, we got the impression that the status difference between donors and 
recipients is in the truest sense of the word cemented in the buildings of government 
authorities, country offices and embassies.   
A Note on Interview Locations 
Scheduling meetings with aid experts in Dar es Salaam turned out to be relatively easy 
in that sense that except for the compound of the United States, a high security fort in 
the northern district, most foreign embassies and country offices of international organi-
sations are located within a radius of three square kilometres in the city centre. Due to 
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sophisticated registration and security check procedures, entering these often impressive 
architectural eye-catchers took often longer than expected. Once inside, we found our-
selves in shining, air-conditioned entrance halls or foyers. After a fluently-English 
speaking (usually Tanzanian) receptionist had informed the interview partner about our 
arrival, we were picked up and guided to an office properly equipped with modern fur-
niture and ICT as it is standard in Western countries.  
The contrast between the setting we found in donor edifices and the conditions in gov-
ernment buildings was striking. The facilities available for officials in ministries and 
departments are not comparable to the ones of foreigners working in the country in 
terms of both their outside appearance and the interior. Piles of paper stored on ledges 
and handwritten notes loosely stacked on desks were a common picture in Tanzanian 
offices which often lacked not only technological equipment but also basic office sup-
plies such as shelves and files. The fact that it seemed easier to arrange appointments 
with government officials by phone (using private mobile numbers) than by email was 
not surprising anymore given the fragile power supply and network infrastructure at 
their workplace.   
In South Africa, the contrast between donor and government buildings was certainly 
less extreme, but still existing. What we want to point out with this anecdotal descrip-
tion of the field we encountered, is that local and foreign actors in the aid context 
obviously operate in two realities. Meeting our interviewees in their respective profes-
sional environment reinforced the impression of a rather unequal setting for cooperation 
between ‘partners’.  
Steps of Analysis: Coding, Interpretation and Data Consolidation   
The findings of this study were produced through an iterative process of data collection 
and analysis as proposed by the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss 1967). 
After each phase of field work, the respective interviews were transcribed and subject to 
an inductive process of coding, i.e. indexing themes in the text in order to structure the 
material.25 Deriving the codes from the empirical data, the coding system was constant-
ly refined until a set of categories was developed that represented a first step of 
empirical generalisation.26 The information base constructed through the process helped 
us to selectively retrieve the text in search for patterns and causal explanations which 
were finally integrated into “a systematic, theoretically embedded explanation” (Gläser 
& Laudel 2013). Compiling the findings, we supplemented them with additional materi-
al taken from the collection of documents and the results of the questionnaire where 
suitable.  
                                                          
25
  For coding the interview material, we used the software Maxqda Version 11.  
26
  A screen shot of the final code system used to structure the interview material is provided in 
Appendix D. 
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Inevitably, all phases of interpreting material in qualitative research are affected by the 
researchers’ subjective perspective. Yet, we can claim that our interpretations are based 
on a systematic, rule-based analytical process in which we tried to avoid subconscious 
deductions and to remain open to unanticipated results, thus adhering to the main prin-
ciples of qualitative research (Gläser & Laudel 2013).  
Reflecting Results: Feedback Workshop  
In October 2013, we presented the preliminary findings of this study to a group of pre-
viously interviewed experts, government members and academics who we invited for a 
workshop held at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies in South Africa. The 
delegates provided critical comments on the results of the research which were instruc-
tive for scrutinising the relevance and strength of arguments. Their contributions helped 
to reflect and control the findings for biased interpretations. The feedback received in 
the course of the workshop discussions thus proved itself valuable for the subsequent 
process of writing.      
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3 South Africa and Tanzania: Two Different Types 
of ‘Donor Darlings’  
South Africa and Tanzania have been selected as the sites of our empirical research for 
a number of reasons. Both countries represent young African democracies which for the 
past twenty years have been undergoing profound transformation processes affecting 
basically all fields of governance.27 The policy reforms carried out in this context have 
to significant extents been supported by the international community which aside from 
money supplied expertise in the form of policy advice and technical assistance. What 
makes a comparison of South Africa and Tanzania interesting is that they have adopted 
very different ways of dealing with and positioning themselves towards donors which 
primarily results from the fact that the two countries vary considerably in terms of gen-
eral conditions. In order to understand current aid relationships, it is instructive to take a 
look at the setting in which these have emerged. In this chapter, we thus briefly glance 
at the significance of aid for South Africa and Tanzania, and sketch out their history as 
recipients of official development assistance, elucidating why, despite all differentials, 
both have at times been ‘donor darlings’ in a distinct sense.  
The Significance of Aid for South Africa and Tanzania 
Comparing the significance of aid for national finances, the discrepancy between the 
two countries under investigation is striking: while in South Africa, aid amounts to less 
than 1% of the budget, it accounts for around 40% in Tanzania (Economic and Social 
Research Foundation 2010: 12; WYG International Limited 2011: 10). To give an idea 
of the dimension of aid volumes, we provide some absolute numbers: In 2012, Tanzania 
received US$ 2 832 million net official development assistance (ODA) (equivalent to 
US$ 59 per capita) of which US$ 205 million were used for technical cooperation; 
South Africa’s volume of ODA comprised US$ 1 067 million (equivalent to US$ 20 per 
capita), including 179 million for technical cooperation (World Bank 2014b).28 
                                                          
27
  We call South Africa and Tanzania ‘young democracies’ on the grounds that they have formally 
introduced this form of governance only about twenty years ago. South Africa’s first non-racial 
election which marked the end of the apartheid regime took place in 1994 (see, for instance, 
Johnson & Schlemmer 1996); Tanzania held its first multi-party general elections which official-
ly terminated the era of the single-party hegemony under the socialist leader Nyerere in 1995 
(see van Cranenburgh 1996).  
28
  The data are taken from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank which 
provides the following definitions: “Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of dis-
bursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by 
official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilat-
eral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in 
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As illustrated by Figure 1, aid flows to Tanzania in the period 1992–2012 have not only 
been constantly higher than in South Africa but also more erratic. In a low-income 
country for which aid is a pivotal element of the budget, such fluctuations have a no-
ticeable impact on the government’s scope of action.  
 
Figure 1: Aid flows to Tanzania and South Africa 1992–2012 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014d). 
For South Africa as a relatively resource-rich middle-income country, in contrast, ODA 
is not essential in financial terms, although some line departments and provincial au-
thorities consider it an important source of additional income.29 Instead, as will be 
shown later in this book, its value lies in its leveraging effect, its relevance as a tool of 
foreign policy, and particularly in the knowledge capital which comes with aid.   
Evolving Aid Relations in Tanzania  
Tanzania has been receiving aid since its independence in 1961. The country’s first 
post-colonial leader, Julius K. Nyerere, successfully promoted his vision of African so-
cialism based on the principles of self-reliance and familyhood (‘Ujamaa’), and 
established close relations particularly with the Scandinavian states, Canada, West 
Germany and even the World Bank whose ‘growth with equity’ policy was concordant 
with Tanzania’s economic strategy (Wangwe 2004: 393–394). From the outset, donors 
provided not only loans and grants for investment projects but also supplied technical 
                                                                                                                                                                          
countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant element 
of at least 25 percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent).” – “Technical cooperation 
includes both grants to nationals of aid recipient countries receiving education or training at 
home or abroad and payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel as well as teachers 
and administrators serving in recipient countries (including the cost of associated equipment)” 
(World Bank 2014b).     
29
  This point will further be elucidated in chapter 6.1 and the case studies of chapter 6.2.  
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assistance in order aim to “fill vacant posts until Tanzanians had been trained to take 
over” (Economic and Social Research Foundation 2010: 51).30  
While the enormous amounts of aid flowing into the country during the 1960s and 
1970s helped the government to realise key elements of its policies especially in social 
sectors (e.g., free primary education), it became more and more dependent on this 
source of foreign finance. From 1964 to 1980, the share of aid in central government 
expenditures rose from about 22% to 46% (Tanzania budget figures and World Devel-
opment Indicators, as cited in Radetzki 1973: 172 and Bigsten & Danielson 2001: 25, 
respectively). The risk the reliance on aid implied became evident when the economic 
crisis emerging in the mid-1970s led many Northern countries to reduce their funding 
volumes and induced a change pertaining to the climate of giving. Hitherto, Tanzania’s 
supporters had pretty much refrained from interfering in policy decisions; now, donor 
countries led by conservative, market-oriented governments, most notably the US, the 
UK and West Germany, started to push for the adoption of extensive neo-liberal reforms 
as recommended by the Bretton Woods institutions (Wangwe 2004: 394). After years of 
resistance by Nyerere, the Tanzanian government under the new President Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi in 1986 eventually bowed to pressure and accepted the Economic Recovery 
Programme prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
This step and the following structural adjustment of macroeconomic and social policies 
leveraged immense resource flows from the aid community; Tanzanian leaders, howev-
er, soon realised that they had lost their policy autonomy to external actors which now 
directed decision-making. 
Relations deteriorated when donors in the early 1990s became increasingly upset about 
deficient counterpart commitment and irregularities regarding the use of funds 
(Wangwe 2004: 400–402). The tense situation escalated when in 1994 a massive scan-
dal of financial mismanagement involving the Minister of Finance became public and 
led to an aid freeze (Harrison & Mulley 2009: 275). To overcome this impasse, Den-
mark commissioned an independent group of local and international experts to assess 
the crisis in aid relations and to propose strategies to restore mutual confidence. The 
review which became known as ‘Helleiner Report’ (named after the team’s chairman, 
the Canadian Professor Gerald Helleiner) faulted the weak guidance exercised by the 
government but also sharply criticised the high degree of donor interference which had 
eroded local ‘ownership’ (Helleiner et al. 1995).  
Based on the report’s recommendations, the government and donors formulated a set of 
‘agreed notes’ which sketched out fundamentals of future cooperation (Government of 
Tanzania 2002). Emphasising country leadership, transparency, mutual accountability 
and efficiency in aid delivery, it pre-empted the principles of the Paris Declaration en-
                                                          
30
  During the 1960s, the Tanzanian government interestingly carried out the procurement process 
of technical assistants itself via international advertisement and a recruitment office in the UK; 
with increasing aid volumes, donors started to bring in experts from abroad according to their 
own regulations (Economic and Social Research Foundation 2010: 51).   
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dorsed at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and taken up in the Joint 
Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) of 2006 (OECD 2005; United Republic of 
Tanzania 2006b).31 The national policy framework for aid management embraced the 
upcoming rhetoric of ‘development partnership’, provided for the establishment of joint 
policy dialogue and promoted general budget support (GBS) as the government’s pre-
ferred channel of support. For the international donor community, Tanzania became a 
role model of its partnership paradigm, and “a forerunner in and major laboratory for 
experimentation with new modalities” (Gould & Ojanen 2003: 41).  
While the new forms of cooperation aimed at restoring the government’s leading role in 
the policy space, they at the same time institutionalised donor engagement therein. The 
terms agreed for general budget support and basket funding included regular interaction 
between high-level officials and aid experts through working groups and coordination 
forums at various levels. Instead of ‘micro-managing’ projects, donors were now ex-
pected to participate in policy discussions and advise the government on issues related 
to the implementation of Tanzania’s National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of 
Poverty (popularly known as MKUKUTA), and sectoral reforms. As opposed to previ-
ously, they should provide their views in a coherent manner through the ‘Development 
Partners Group’ which had been formed to increase collaboration and thereby “to im-
prove effectiveness and quality of development assistance” (Development Partners 
Group Tanzania 2010b: 2).32   
Since the new arrangements have been put in place, the international community gladly 
presents Tanzania as “as a prime example of ‘ownership’” (Harrison & Mulley 2009: 
283). Critical scholars, however, have early on raised doubts about the validity of this 
claim (see, for instance, Gould & Ojanen 2005; Pender 2007; Harrison & Mulley 2009). 
In 2010, an evaluation conducted by the Independent Monitoring Group which since 
1994 regularly assesses aid relations in Tanzania found “signs of slippage in ownership” 
(Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania Working Group &  Independent Monitoring 
Group 2010: 8) and came to the conclusion that trust, confidence and the quality of dia-
logue between the government and ‘development partners’ had considerably decreased. 
After years in which Tanzania served as the “poster child of the new partnership model 
of aid” (Harrison & Mulley 2009: 271), it seems as if relations have changed again.  
                                                          
31
  The principles include: strengthening national ownership, aligning external support to govern-
ment priorities and systems, harmonizing government and donor processes, focusing on 
measurable results and ensuring mutual accountability of government and development partners 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2006a: 5). 
32
  The Development Partners Group was formally established in 2004; as of 2014, it comprised 17 
bilateral and 5 multilateral (UN counted as one) aid agencies engaged in Tanzania (Development 
Partners Group Tanzania 2014c). Members commit themselves to respect the agreed division of 
labour and “to represent a common DPG position once agreed (unless inability to be part of the 
consensus was made clear at the time of decision) (…)” (Development Partners Group Tanzania 
2010b: 2). 
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Evolving Aid Relations in South Africa  
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, South Africa – in contrast to Tanzania 
and many other African states – has never been dependent on external finances; given 
its relatively solid state budget and comparatively strong administration, it has always 
been a somewhat “paradoxical recipient” of official development assistance (WYG In-
ternational Limited 2011: 6). Nonetheless, aid has played “a rather special role” (WYG 
International Limited 2011: 9) in the country’s recent history, especially during the 
years of democratic transition.   
Foreign aid began to flow into South Africa already in the 1980s when donors from all 
over the world backed the anti-apartheid movement in its fight against the ruling re-
gime. While the National Party government was diplomatically isolated by the 
international community, civil society organisations received a considerable amount of 
assistance in the form of funding but also in the form of scholarships and programmes 
set up to provide the oppressed population with opportunities of education and intellec-
tual exchange. Major institutions which thereby served as conduits for channelling aid 
included the South African Council of Churches, the Kagiso Trust, and the United 
Democratic Front; the state, in contrast, was widely bypassed (Bratton & Landsberg 
2000: 262–265).  
Only in the early 1990s when there were clear signs of commitment to political change, 
funding streams began to shift. Following the first non-racial elections in 1994 (for 
which donors, amongst others, sponsored an independent commission and electoral ob-
servers), the new Government of National Unity led by the charismatic President 
Mandela became the major recipient of ODA. The international community rewarded 
South Africa generously for its peaceful transition, pledging more than US$ 6 billion for 
the first five-year period of democracy (Bratton & Landsberg 2000: 270). The willing-
ness to give financial and technical assistance to a middle-income country which 
actually didn’t qualify for aid at all can be explained with the strategic interests on do-
nor side: Not only were they eager to associate themselves with the new-born ‘rainbow 
nation’ and its unique success story of abolishing a system of racial oppression by 
means of negotiation. They also saw their chance to shape the fabric of the young de-
mocracy which promised to become the political and economic powerhouse on the 
African continent.  
The new South African leaders, however, encountered the aid community with a strong 
sense of preserving agenda-setting autonomy. From the outset, they made plain that 
donors were expected to support the priorities of the national Reconstruction and De-
velopment Programme (RDP).33 Many of those who had newly moved into government 
                                                          
33
  A former government member who worked for the RDP office at that time stated in this regard: 
“South Africa being a new democratic country [was] very sexy (…). Everybody wanted to throw 
money at us. And the big issue was: Yes, you can throw money at us, but against our agenda, not 
your agenda.” (Interview 24)  
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departments were “well aware that elsewhere in Africa and the developing world, the 
policy conditionality of aid had proved extremely controversial”, and were thus “anx-
ious to ensure that the policy development process remained firmly in South African 
hands” (King 1999: 262). Hence, while external assistance was principally welcomed, 
not all offers were accepted. Concessional loans were widely rejected since the govern-
ment took “the view that it does not need to give up its freedom, and mortgage its future 
to embrace potentially debilitating debt dressed up as development aid” (Soni 2000: 
133).  
South African actors were not only fairly clear about what type of aid they favoured, but 
also how it should be managed. Until 1996, all in-flows were centrally channelled 
through the RDP fund and the respective office was made the focal point for donors; 
later on, the responsibility for coordinating aid was shifted to the International Devel-
opment Cooperation Unit (IDC) unit in the National Treasury. While all agreements 
needed to pass through this unit, the authority to negotiate aid remained with the respec-
tive implementing agencies, i.e. national departments, and provincial and local 
authorities which were given a high degree of autonomy in soliciting support (see Inter-
national Development Cooperation Unit 2003).  
Faced with a recipient who seemed reluctant to be imposed with external rules and pref-
erences, donors largely responded to South Africa’s requests, directing assistance 
especially to the priority areas of education, democracy and governance, agriculture, 
business development, health and housing (Bratton & Landsberg 2000: 276). Initially, 
large parts of aid in these areas focused on the reformulation of policies and legislative 
frameworks, and the creation of new institutional arrangements and governance struc-
tures (Soni 2000: 50); post 1999, the focus gradually shifted to strengthening systems 
for implementation and service delivery. While aid helped to accelerate the pace of re-
forms insofar as it leveraged funding, the money as such was not substantial for their 
realisation. The main surplus of ODA for South Africa was the access to knowledge 
resources it facilitated. Putting in place new policies and legislation in basically all 
fields governance was a huge challenge for an administration which had not only been 
re-structured but also staffed with new, often unexperienced (though committed) per-
sonnel (Bird 2001: 266). Many line departments thus extensively drew on advisors and 
consultants provided by the aid community to assist in elaborating the technicalities of 
reforms.  
For donors, South Africa appeared as perfect case for presenting themselves as 
‘knowledge partners’ rather than ‘money-givers’. In its 1999 country assistance strategy 
for South Africa, the World Bank declared:  
Since the 1994 elections, South Africa has provided the Bank with a unique opportunity 
to pilot our evolving role as a “knowledge bank”. For South Africa, gaining access to in-
ternational expertise and knowledge is at least as important as providing financial capital, 
and the Bank has operated as a clearinghouse and sounding board for international ex-
perts and best practice (…). In the future, we will continue to emphasize the Bank 
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Group’s role in contributing knowledge to development issues in South Africa. (World 
Bank 1999b) 
The majority of donors have adopted a similar approach for their engagement in South 
Africa, focussing assistance on the provision of expertise, ‘up-stream’ policy advice and 
the facilitation of knowledge exchange.  
In contrast to Tanzania, the modes of cooperation in South Africa have little changed 
over the years; although the volume of sector budget support has increased (see WYG 
International Limited 2011 #1148: 36}), projects still constitute the predominant aid 
modality in the country.34 While in recent years, mechanisms such as an annual Devel-
opment Partners’ Consultative Forum have been set up to improve coordination and 
coherence, South Africa has not established dialogue structures as found in Tanzania 
and other countries. Aside from the absence of general budget support which usually 
requires such arrangements, it seems that the government also deliberately refrained 
from creating joint forums for more ‘harmonised’ assistance. The preference to interact 
with partners on a one-to-one basis partly results from the conviction that negotiating 
aid individually provides recipients with a greater leeway for manoeuvring than dealing 
with a “united donor front” (Harrison & Mulley 2009: 275). Broadly speaking, South 
Africa condones problems of aid fragmentation for the benefit of keeping control over 
development cooperation.  
In recent years, aid relations have undergone change insofar as a couple of donors (e.g.,  
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) have started to scale down or phase out official devel-
opment assistance (see Tjønneland et al. 2008); in 2013, DFID, hitherto a key partner 
particularly in the fields of health and business development, announced to terminate its 
aid programme by 2015 with the intension to base the relationship “on sharing skills 
and knowledge, not on development funding, in recognition of the progress South Afri-
ca has made over the last two decades” (DFID 2013).35, 36 The fact that South Africa is 
currently in the process of establishing its own development agency (see Besharati 
2013) is certainly seen as a sign that the country’s role in the international arena is shift-
                                                          
34
  A 2011 country evaluation of aid to South Africa found: “As of late 2009, there were at least 33 
different development agencies implementing or preparing around 100 projects – this has esca-
lated quite significantly with, for example, about twenty five of some eighty EU ‘Green 
Economy’ commitments beginning in 2010” (WYG International Limited 2011: 55).  
35
  DFID’s decision to end its aid programme for South Africa evoked harsh criticism both by UK 
MPs who blamed DFID for political expediency and disregard of recommended review proce-
dures (Tran 2014) and on the part of the South African government which declared that the 
“unilateral announcement no doubt will affect how our bilateral relations going forward will be 
conducted” (Smith 2013).  
36
  A DFID advisor placed in the South African Department of Health commented on this decision 
as follows: “If things go as we hope they would go and the government’s beginning to do the 
right things. our support is about catalysing change, it’s not about telling government to do the 
right thing – they know what to do, it’s making change happen quickly. Now once that started, 
they won’t need DFID to help do that, and so we have a clear line by our current government 
that in four to five years’ time, we will be starting to exit from this sort of work.” (Interview 1)  
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ing. Yet, this doesn’t mean that donors generally prepare themselves to close their Pre-
toria offices. Quite the contrary, several have begun to increasingly use them as a focal 
point for regional programmes and triangular cooperation agreements.37 Hence, while 
traditional aid is currently declining, new arrangements with a focus on institutional and 
economic cooperation are on the rise. For the international community, South Africa 
remains an attractive counterpart: it represents both a strategic gateway to the continent 
and a prime example for a knowledge partnership which has yielded best practice and 
innovation.  
Concluding Remark  
As outlined above, the two countries which serve as the empirical fields of this study 
had different points of departure as recipients of aid and thus have adopted different 
approaches of dealing with donors. For the purpose of our research, the dissimilarity of 
South Africa and Tanzania is a crucial asset: It allows us to identify general intricacies 
of expert advice which are intrinsic to the aid context in the sense that they exist irre-
spective of the particular country setting (see chapter 5). At the same time, it enables us 
to investigate how different conditions delimit the extent to which recipients are able to 
absorb and use external expertise for advancing their own development visions (see 
chapter 6). Before we do so, however, we first present the actors involved in aid and 
dwell on their multiple interests related to development assistance (see chapter 4). 
                                                          
37
  Germany, for instance, together with the National Treasury and other government departments 
has set up a Trilateral Cooperation Fund with the aim to carry out regional activities and foster 
South-South cooperation (GIZ 2007). 
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4 Actors and Interests in Aid 
We, Heads of State, Ministers and representatives of developing and developed countries, 
heads of multilateral and bilateral institutions, representatives of different types of public, 
civil society, private, parliamentary, local and regional organisations meeting here in 
Busan, Republic of Korea, recognise that we are united by a new partnership that is 
broader and more inclusive than ever before, founded on shared principles, common 
goals and differential commitments for effective international development. 
(Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 2011: 1) 
In December 2011, about 3 000 delegates from governments, aid agencies, civil society 
and private sector institutions met at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
in South Korea to assess the current state of aid relations, and to define a future agenda. 
The event culminated in the signing of the Busan Partnership agreement whose intro-
ductory statement proclaims a “new partnership that is broader and more inclusive than 
ever before” based on “shared principles” and “common goals” (Fourth High Level Fo-
rum on Aid Effectiveness 2011: 1, see quotation above).  
The partnership rhetoric prevailing in the contemporary aid discourse usually disguises 
the fact that aid is an arena of multiple, often competing interests. Figure 2 schematical-
ly displays major interests on donor and recipient side at the level of governments, 
organisations and individual actors:   
 
Figure 2: Actors and interests in aid 
Source: Authors’ own illustration.  
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Invariably, schematic models oversimplify and are limited in their scope. Figure 2 rep-
resents an abstraction which focuses on donor and recipient governments, their 
respective authorities and actors. It doesn’t claim to capture all particular interests exist-
ing at the different levels and excludes other players such as non-governmental 
organisations, foundations, lobby groups, academia and elites.38 While being incom-
plete, Figure 2 indicates that the web of interests comprises political and economic 
objectives of states, organisational concerns of donor and recipient bureaucracies, and 
individual incentives of government members and development experts. In the follow-
ing, we dwell on these diverse interests, first concentrating on the recipient side (chapter 
4.1), and then shifting to donors (chapter 4.2). We finally put the spotlight on a group of 
actors who are part of the donor system, but pursue distinct goals as knowledge brokers, 
namely the epistemic community of development experts (chapter 4.3). The last sub-
chapter (chapter 4.4) summarises the preceding observations, concluding that the link-
age of aid and interests provides a complicated setting for advisory processes.   
4.1 Recipient Governments and Bureaucracies 
While sourcing additional resources certainly is a primary purpose of recipient govern-
ments under pressure to cope with underfinanced budgets, they do pursue other interests 
in receiving assistance. As will be elucidated below, development projects potentially 
increase the public popularity of their leading heads, and bring along material rewards 
for the officials in charge. Moreover, aid is a strategic tool used in foreign relations, 
even by countries dependent on external support.    
Financial Resources  
Naturally, financial shortages are the driving force behind entering aid negotiations on 
the side of recipient governments. In low-income countries, external funding makes up a 
substantial share of the budget, in some cases up to 50%. It is a crucial amount for de-
velopment expenses used for expanding road infrastructure, improving water supply or 
building schools and hospitals, amongst others (Ministry of Finance 2012: 7).39 Given 
that governments of development nations often spend a large proportion of their budget 
on recurrent costs, many investment projects can only be realised with donor funding, 
even in relatively resource-rich countries like South Africa (Bond 2001: 26). Especially 
authorities in areas such as environment which receive a lower share of domestic re-
sources depend on external financing to carry out programmes.40 In countries like 
                                                          
38
  For an attempt to illustrate the multiplicity of interests in German aid, see Nuscheler (2005: 435). 
39
  In contrast to the development budget, the recurrent budget is absorbed by operational expenses 
including salaries and wages for civil servants, the purchases of goods and services, and pay-
ments on national debts (Ministry of Finance 2012: 7).  
40
  The Cape Action for People and the Environment (CAPE) initiative in South Africa’s Cape Flo-
ristic Region, for instance, very much gained from GEF funding which at times amounted to half 
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Tanzania where even priority sectors are heavily underfinanced, donor money immense-
ly expands line ministries’ scope of action.     
Public Popularity 
Opening a new construction site, inaugurating a day care centre or taking a power plant 
into operation are opportune events for policymakers to demonstrate their efforts and 
achievements to the public. Aside from expanding the financial scope of governments, 
aid contributes to increasing the popularity of political actors. In Tanzania, pulling off 
aid is framed as a commendable merit. Government websites proudly advertise new 
international aid agreements with pictures showing ministerial leaders shaking hands 
with donor representatives. In the media, development cooperation activities are omni-
present. Rarely one day goes by without at least one newspaper article covering a 
donor-funded project implemented by the government. The tenor of reports is usually 
very positive; negative effects of aid are seldom addressed. Considering their reputation, 
policymakers in Tanzania thus have an incentive to keep the status quo in terms of using 
foreign funding, although the government officially seeks to reduce its budgetary de-
pendence (Tanzania Ministry of Finance 2013). As a retired government official 
commented about politicians in his country:  
They don’t want to cut aid. We are all afraid of using the polls. And that is something 
which is going to hurt us in the long run. (Interview 64)   
Individual Rewards 
Not only high-level politicians, but also staff in ministries and departments individually 
benefit from aid. Particularly among senior government cadres, donor-funded activities 
are considered as “potentially lucrative and status enhancing” (Chêne 2009) since they 
make available tangible rewards to the functionaries in charge. As a Tanzanian civil 
society actor pointed out, monetary and non-monetary benefits constitute primary incen-
tives for government members to engage with donor representatives:  
I sit and talk with you because I think, maybe I’ll get a study tool for capacity building 
and I’ll get my allowances or, you know, maybe through you I’ll get a scholarship for my 
daughter to go to university or there’s a tender to order something and I will get my 
commission. That’s what it becomes, it becomes an opportunity for rent seeking.          
(Interview 70)  
Extra payments for government officials involved in aid activities are common practice 
in most recipient countries. Donors have co-created “per diem and allowance regime[s]” 
(Chêne 2009) which are well entrenched, particularly in countries where the public ser-
                                                                                                                                                                          
of the overall budget (Global Environment Facility Evaluation Office 2008: 87). For details, see 
chapter 6.2.6.  
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vice is severely underpaid.41 In many African states, government wages have been de-
clining as a result of fiscal adjustment policies, with the consequence that salaries not 
only at lower levels hardly suffice to make a living. Receiving extra pay in the form of 
per diems and allowances has become “one of the most popular coping strategy for 
compensating for low public sector wages in the developing world” (Chêne 2009). Ac-
cording to a survey among public servants in Tanzania and Uganda, the large majority 
of them (77%) considered allowances as equally important as their basic salary, some 
(13%) assessed extra pay even much more important than the latter (Therkildsen & 
Tidemand 2007: 49). While allowances were actually introduced to reimburse officials 
for real expenses (e.g., due to travels), they have become a central second pillar of their 
income. The fact that they are relatively high compared to basic wages makes them 
even more attractive. A study conducted by the Tanzanian Policy Forum made the fol-
lowing calculation with data from the year 2009: A middle level officer could earn 
about a third of his monthly salary (TSh 384 850, government scale TGS D) within 
three days by attending a workshop outside Dar es Salaam for which he receives a per 
diem of TSh 35 000 (Policy Forum 2009: 5). As rates for foreign travels are even high-
er, “a civil servant going on a 5-day trip abroad easily doubles his or her salary, even if 
this is the highest paid civil servant around” (Policy Forum 2009: 6).  
Participating in events outside their offices pays off for government staff. Donor-funded 
workshops, trainings or conferences have become coveted extra-ordinary duties. Com-
peting for key public officials, aid agencies in some cases even offer “attractive 
international daily rates” (Chêne 2009) to bring them to their events. For them, the per 
diem system helps meeting their own targets insofar as the number of participants is 
commonly used as a performance indicator (Hepworth 2009, as cited in Policy Forum 
2009: 7; Søreide et al. 2012: 86). While paying allowances ensures attendance, salary 
top-ups paid to ministry officials concerned with donor projects aims to secure com-
mitment on the counterpart side. As anecdotal evidence shows, this can make up to 40% 
increase in salary for the civil servants in charge (Rubin 2012: 12).  
In Tanzania, cash incentives have become a decisive element in the interaction between 
donors and government officials. A World Bank expert who at the time of the interview 
was relatively new in the country commented:   
In Tanzania, if you have a meeting, you’re expected to pay people to show up and if you 
don’t pay them to show up, if they don’t care about it – which usually they don’t, cause 
usually it’s something that’s cared about by someone else, imposed upon them – then 
they don’t show up. So (…) everybody lines up at the back of these meetings to get little 
brown envelopes and it’s shocking to me to see that happen – shocking. (Interview 46)  
                                                          
41
  In Tanzania, donors fund around ten different types of allowances, such as per diems, honoraria 
or extra-duty top-ups. For an overview and details on what these allowances cover, see Rubin 
(2012).  
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The institutionalisation of this practice has profound consequences not only for devel-
opment cooperation, but also for the organisational culture in developing countries’ 
bureaucracies. Several studies have pointed out how the allowance regime creates room 
for fraud and corruption (Smith 2003; Ridde 2010; Vian et al. 2013), encouraging “op-
portunistic behaviour ‘to get a piece of the cake’” (Søreide et al. 2012: xiv).42 The 
individual benefits affiliated with aid activities lead government members to accept un-
necessary support, to attend trainings irrespective of their ‘capacity building’ use and to 
prolong processes in order to get projects extended (Chêne 2009; Vian et al. 2013).43 A 
natural resources expert working for a Nordic donor in Tanzania explained the delays in 
her programme on counterpart side as follows:  
I think it’s deliberate that they were only able to use half of the money that we were giv-
ing them for two years – they used it in three and a half years. And you know, somehow 
in my mind is the idea that if it lasts for six, seven years, it’s easier to get more daily al-
lowances, all these per diems, discussion workshops organised and so on. So it kind of 
dilutes the whole thing. (Interview 36)  
Although donors have repeatedly claimed to tackle the self-made incentive problem by 
setting an end to extraordinary payments, the latter are still common practice and some-
times just termed differently. A study on donor compensations in Tanzania, Malawi and 
Ethiopia cites a senior staff member of a UN organisation saying:  
UN organisations are now using all kinds of words to avoid the term ‘sitting allowance’ 
while in reality, they continue the practice. Very often, a cash payment of around TZS 
80,000 is offered on top of ‘the meeting package’ – which includes accommodation and 
meals. In addition, they get a transport allowance – and this is an arrangement that can 
easily be manipulated. If they don’t get paid well they just leave – even if they have ar-
rived at a hotel and have shown interest in the topic. (Søreide et al. 2012: 35) 
The policies and practices related to allowances certainly vary among aid agencies and 
across countries. While in Tanzania, individual rewards constitute a strong incentive on 
recipient side to engage with donors, the situation is different in South Africa where 
                                                          
42
  In 2013, donors in Tanzania withdrew their support to the Local Government Reform Pro-
gramme after an audit revealed the misuse of funds, amongst others for “excessive and 
unjustified per diem allowances and fees” (Mosoba & Mugarula 2013).  
43
  The misuse of allowances particularly in the context of capacity building activities has been 
documented several times. A study on donor support for water resource management in East Af-
rica found that “during a two year period of working alongside East African practitioners it 
became apparent that there were numerous discrete training and workshop based capacity build-
ing initiatives run by donors and external support agencies covering the same or similar material. 
An example is provided by an agency of an East African government who over a period of two 
years were engaged in three separate residential training courses which covered the same topics, 
were attended largely by the same people, each workshop being organised and funded, with per 
diems and expenses, by a different source from within the donor community” (Hepworth 2009, 
as cited in Policy Forum 2009: 7). 
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public sector wages are comparably high, and allowances are not an issue affecting do-
nor–recipient cooperation.  
Foreign Relations  
In countries in which the financial assets of aid play less a role for both a government’s 
budget and for actors involved, its non-monetary value as a strategic element of politics 
comes to the fore. This has particularly been emphasised by South African government 
officials; a director in the Department of Health stated in this regard:   
ODA [official development cooperation] is all about what? It is all about foreign policy 
issues. It is all about strengthening our international relations. (Interview 18)  
South Africa has never been financially dependent on foreign aid (see chapter 3 and 
6.1.1). A strong motivation of the government for becoming a recipient of official de-
velopment assistance in 1994 was to re-build relationships after years of isolation by the 
international community. Obtaining financial and technical assistance was seen as a tool 
which would not only help economic development, but also foster political bonds and 
international trade.44 Until today, development cooperation is deemed a central element 
of bi- and multilateral relations. Strengthening relationships with strategic partners is a 
main interest underlying aid which manifests in the fact that decisions on entering 
agreements for support are guided by directives from the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, as a senior official in the health department explained:   
They prioritize those governments and their relationships. So for example, if an interest is 
around, just an example, China, it may not be so, you know: If China is one of the coun-
tries on our list, (…) whatever that they will provide or that they will give, whether we 
have resources on it or not, we have to make sure that we negotiate as to how we want to 
work together in the health sector. (Interview 18)               
The acceptance of aid is thus not solely dependent on actual needs, but strategic consid-
erations related to foreign policy priorities, trade or other interests. This is not only the 
case in a resource-rich country like South Africa, although it may have a more comfort-
able bargaining position than others. As shown in Wright (1999), even poorer African 
states like Benin, Kenya and Zimbabwe consider foreign policy interests when deciding 
whom to approach for assistance and whose offers to accept. A recent study which in-
vestigated how recipients deal with traditional and new aid providers reports that 
Ethiopia “treats different donors in different ways and adapts its language and strategy 
accordingly” (Greenhill et al. 2013: 28). The fact that the Ethiopian government utilises 
aid relations in a very deliberate way is corroborated by foreign policy documents and 
statements which emphasise the close linkage between development cooperation and 
                                                          
44
  This is outlined in an influential article published in 1993 under Nelson Mandela’s name which 
set out the direction of South Africa’s foreign policy under an ANC-led government (Mandela 
1993).  
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diplomacy (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2002; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2013). The case of Ethiopia illustrates that even highly aid-dependent countries adopt a 
strategic approach in securing assistance, taking its significance for foreign relations 
into account.  
4.2 Donor Countries and Aid Organisations 
Donor governments provide aid not out of altruism or generosity. They engage in de-
velopment cooperation not (only) for the sake of development, but because it serves 
multiple purposes for their own countries (Easterly 2002; Browne 2006; Shikwati 2006; 
Lancaster 2007). While the extent to which aid is tied to such purposes varies, it is a 
general pattern that political, economic and organisational interests are driving forces of 
aid on donor side.  
Political and Economic Interests of Donor Governments  
If aid was given for the aim of helping those in the greatest need, the poorest countries 
would receive the bulk of assistance. As statistics show, this is not the case. Among the 
top ten recipients of aid between 1980 and 2011 were states like Iraq, India and China, 
as ranked in Table 1:  
Table 1: Top ten recipients of aid worldwide based on net ODA received 1980–2011 
Rank Recipient country Net ODA received 1980–2011 in US$ million 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Iraq  
Egypt  
India 
China 
Bangladesh 
Pakistan 
Afghanistan  
Ethiopia 
Tanzania 
Indonesia 
66 909 
59 247 
58 631 
51 189 
44 731 
44 593 
43 347 
41 295 
41 257 
40 917 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank 2014d).45 
Despite the international community’s claim to focus on poverty reduction, an OECD 
survey of 2012 found a significant shift in aid allocations from least developed countries 
towards middle-income countries in the Far East and South and Central Asia (OECD 
2013b). Various scholars, notably in the field of development economics, have shown 
                                                          
45
  The indicator “Net official development assistance received (current US$)” includes loans and 
grants disbursed by DAC and non-DAC countries and multilateral institutions. Data were re-
trieved on 03.12.2014. 
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that historical, economic and political ties decisively shape the direction of aid flows: 
Former colonial powers such as the United Kingdom or France still provide substantial 
amounts of aid to their ex-colonies, irrespective of the ruling regime or economic sys-
tems (Alesina & Dollar 2000; Berthélemy & Tichit 2004; Nunnenkamp & Thiele 
2006).46, 47 Trade linkages have a significant impact on aid allocation, with donors tar-
geting assistance preferably to their most important trading partners in the developing 
world (Berthélemy & Tichit 2004; Berthélemy 2006; Nunnenkamp & Thiele 2006; 
Younas 2008; Hoeffler & Outram 2011). The significance of political allegiance for aid 
is reflected by UN voting patterns: Donor countries tend to give more aid to countries 
who vote in line with them (Alesina & Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003; Dreher et al. 2009; 
Hoeffler & Outram 2011; Pincin 2012). All these findings indicate that donor govern-
ments select recipients not primarily on the basis of poverty rankings, but out of 
strategic considerations.48  
When official development assistance emerged after the Second World War, it was pri-
marily legitimated with political interests. In the United States, President Truman in 
1947 justified his request for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey with the 
risk that without assistance, both countries would fall under the influence of the Soviet 
Union. He introduced his speech to the Congress stating that “the foreign policy and the 
national security of this country [the United States] are involved” (Truman 1947). Dur-
ing the Cold war era, aid was widely used as a diplomatic instrument in order to win and 
keep allies, and thereby influence the geopolitical balance of power (Adamson 2006).  
Other countries such as Japan and Germany began to provide aid as a means of export 
promotion (Lancaster 2007: 29–30). Development as a declared priority of aid came of 
age only over the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, shifting the focus on economic 
growth and (at a later stage) poverty reduction in the developing world (Lancaster 2007: 
39–40).  
Comparing legitimation patterns prevailing today, governments can broadly be divided 
into two groups: The first frames development cooperation as an instrument for safe-
guarding foreign policy and economic interests; the second acknowledges general 
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  In the period 1980–2004, 71% of the UK aid and 51% of aid provided by France went to their 
respective former colonies (Hoeffler & Outram 2008: 23). Alesina and Dollar (2000: 55) found 
that “a non-democratic former colony gets about twice as much aid as a democratic non-colony”. 
47
  In our study, interviewees in both South Africa and Tanzania highlighted the fact that donors 
preferably channel aid to regions in which they have historic ties. A South African official en-
gaged in the education sector told us that when donors entered the country at the dawn of 
democracy, “they knew exactly where and who they want to support, where their missionaries 
were before, and now they were closely related to those geographic areas” (Interview 21).  
48
  While development economists’ calculations generate evidence in form of measurable results 
often presented as ‘hard facts’, we are cautious of some interpretations drawn from these find-
ings insofar as they tend to include causal explanations which cannot be derived from the 
statistics produced. From our view, for instance, using only the correlation of UN voting patterns 
and aid flows as evidence for political interests in aid allocation is deficient insofar as it doesn’t 
distinguish cause and effect.  
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interests, but emphasises the obligation of giving aid as an act of solidarity and shared 
responsibility. Exemplary justifications of aid in policy documents and statements of 
major donors are compiled in Table 2:  
Table 2: Rationales legitimating aid in donor policies 
Political and economic interests   Solidarity/responsibility  
United States, Presidential Policy Directive on 
Global Development (22. September 2010):  
“The directive recognizes that development is 
vital to U.S. national security and is a strategic, 
economic, and moral imperative for the United 
States.  It calls for the elevation of development 
as a core pillar of American power and charts a 
course for development, diplomacy and defense 
to mutually reinforce and complement one anoth-
er in an integrated comprehensive approach to 
national security.” 
 
The Netherlands, Letter to the House of Repre-
sentatives outlining development cooperation 
policy (2010):  
“The Netherlands has a direct interest in interna-
tional stability and security, energy and resource 
security, a well-functioning international legal 
order and a level playing field, with all the neces-
sary rules. Development cooperation is therefore 
an integral part of a broad foreign policy.” 
 
Germany, Coalition Agreement (2009):  
“In pursuing our objectives in development policy 
our values and interests are on par (…) Foreign 
trade and development co-operation must build 
upon each other and be integrated in a seamless 
fashion. Development policy decisions must take 
sufficient account of the interests of German 
economy, particularly the needs of small and 
medium-sized companies.” 
Norway, White Paper on Development Policy 
(Report No. 13, 2008–2009, to the Storting): 
“The central aim of our foreign policy is to safe-
guard Norwegian interests. In development 
policy, the focus is on poor countries’ interests 
(...). An approach that includes an emphasis on 
common interests can further enhance under-
standing of and support for an active foreign and 
development policy, and can open up opportuni-
ties for new forms of cooperation. (…) However, 
the focus on safeguarding common interests and 
seeking to strengthen global public goods does 
not mean that the Government wishes to use de-
velopment policy to further Norwegian economic 
interests or any other form of Norwegian self-
interest. The objective of Norway’s development 
policy is to reduce poverty and to promote human 
rights.” 
 
Sweden, Global Challenges – Our Responsibility: 
Communication on Sweden’s policy for global 
development (2008):  
“The fight against poverty in its various forms not 
only remains the overriding goal of Swedish de-
velopment cooperation but is also a central point 
of departure for the Government’s overall devel-
opment policy. Although the primary 
responsibility for poverty reduction and develop-
ment lies with the governments of the developing 
countries, Sweden can and will contribute to equi-
table and sustainable global development. We 
must do so out of a sense of solidarity and be-
cause we share a responsibility for the future of 
the world. Assuming that responsibility, moreo-
ver, is in our own interests.” 
Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2008a: 6–7); CDU et al. (2009: 64); Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (2009: 10); White House (2010); Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010: 1). 
Table 2 displays contrasting rationales used by donors to legitimate aid, with one side 
referring primarily to self-interests and the other to humanitarian motivations. This divi-
sion is in a way stylised since, as will be shown later, even in countries which 
emphasise the primacy of development in giving aid, other interests come into play. 
Yet, as van der Veen (2011: 5) points out, the “frames” governments use to justify aid 
“shape the overall organization and quality of aid programmes” and “affect specific 
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features, such as the total size of the aid budget, or the geographical allocation of aid”.49 
Donors who foreground self-interests are likely to select recipients by their strategic 
importance and to design programmes from which they potentially profit. 
The decisive role of political and economic interests in giving aid is manifest in the case 
of South Africa. When the country turned into a democracy in 1994, a plethora of do-
nors stood in a queue offering assistance although “by the usual criteria South Africa 
was too wealthy to qualify for much support” (Barber 2004: 149). Nevertheless, with 
US$ 5 billion pledged from 1994 to 1999, donors offered “an enormous sum compared 
to other (more desperate) African countries” (Bond 2001: 25). The main rationale of the 
funders, with the European Union, the United States and Japan at the fore, was to re-
build relations with the most powerful country and economic hub of the African conti-
nent. The new ‘rainbow nation’ became a ‘sexy’ recipient, and “everybody wanted to be 
seen as ‘we are assisting South Africa to rebuild itself’” (Interview 22). The fact that the 
supporters presumed political rewards from their new partner became obvious in situa-
tions in which South Africa acted against their expectations. The Taiwanese 
government, for instance, faced such a conflict. Aiming at retaining South African offi-
cial recognition of Taiwan instead of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it presented 
itself as a generous friend to the ANC already prior to the first elections (Bond 2001: 
27–28). When in 1996, South Africa reversed its position by recognising the PRC, “the 
furious Taiwanese foreign minister John Chang suspended grants to South Africa worth 
[US]$ 80 million and loans worth [US]$ 50 million” (Bond 2001: 28).  
While Taiwan failed to ‘buy’ South Africa’s solidarity with aid, the United States se-
cured itself more influence. In 1997, President’s Clinton warning to withdraw all aid to 
South Africa as a reaction to the South African Cabinet’s approval of arms sales to Syr-
ia – viewed as a ‘terrorist state’ by the US – showed the desirable effect (Barber 2004: 
104):  
Although Mandela replied in March 1997 that it was immoral to abandon countries that 
had supported the ANC in the anti-apartheid fight ‘on the advice of countries that were 
friends of the apartheid regime’ (i.e. the US), Defence Minister Joe Modise confirmed 
that a marketing permit was issued for the arms but that, in the wake of the US warning, 
‘We did not tender, as no documentation was received from Syria.’ (Bond 2001: 29) 
There are plenty of similar incidents across the developing world where aid (or the sus-
pension of aid) has been used to influence decisions related to both foreign and 
domestic politics in recipient countries. In recent years, donors threatened to cut aid to 
Uganda and Malawi as a reaction to the governments’ homophobic positions; subse-
                                                          
49
  Van der Veen (2011) uses the concept of ‘frames’ to classify ideas about goals and purposes of 
aid. Drawing on legislative debates from 1950–2000, he provides an in-depth analysis of frames 
and their impact on aid programmes in four European countries, namely Belgium, Norway, 
Netherlands and Italy. His findings show how prevailing ideas shape aid policy and practices of 
donor countries, and point to the significance of domestic factors as driving forces behind chang-
ing frames in aid discourses.    
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quently, Malawi repealed its anti-gay law (BBC News 2012), and Uganda put its harsh 
Anti-Homosexuality Bill temporarily on hold (Ndinda 2010). In Rwanda, major devel-
opment partners suspended aid in 2012 following accusations from a UN report that the 
country supported rebels fighting in the Eastern Congo (Rwamucyo 2012). At first 
glance, these examples prompt that by withdrawing aid, the international community 
sanctions human rights violations and external intervention. A second look, however, 
reveals that criteria seem different for different countries, dependent on their strategic 
importance for the donors. Despite evidence of severe human rights abuses and political 
oppression, the Ethiopian government receives around US$ 3 billion of aid every year 
(Stickler & Barr 2011). The generous donations of its major funders, namely the US, the 
EU and the UK can be explained by the fact that they see President Meles Zenawi as a 
stable partner at the Horn of Africa who supports their fight against terrorism (Hagmann 
2012).   
The significance of security interests in the realm of aid has strongly increased with the 
‘war on terror’ proclaimed by the Western world after the September 11 attacks in the 
United States. While security issues have always been part of aid considerations, schol-
ars argue that post 2001 they have taken precedence over poverty or human rights 
concerns (Woods 2005; Aning 2010). As Howell and Lind (2009a: 1279) point out, the 
“securitisation of development policy and practice (…) is manifest in aid rhetoric, poli-
cy discourse, institutional convergence and programming” (see also Howell & Lind 
2009b). Articulating a causal linkage of poverty and terrorism, major donor govern-
ments have reframed the purposes and determinants of aid as an instrument serving 
security interests (Howell & Lind 2009a; Thede 2013).50 The Director General of Au-
sAid, Bruce Davis, expressed the paradigm shift in Australian aid as follows: 
It was not too long ago that aid and development lay firmly on the periphery of serious 
considerations of Australia’s security and strategic interests. Aid was often regarded as a 
somewhat ill-defined process of ‘doing-good’, a process which had little tangible impact 
on the strategic environment faced by Australia and its policy makers. These times are 
now over. (Davis in a speech on 27 October 2005, cited in Howell & Lind 2009a: 1283)  
The new “security-first paradigm” (Aning 2010: 8) has not only brought about intensi-
fied collaboration and institutional tying of development and defence units, but has also 
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  Thede (2013: 795–796) provides an impressive list of major donors who reformulated their mis-
sions and priorities: “In 2002 the Canadian International Development Agency’s mandate was 
revised to include supporting ‘efforts to reduce threats to Canadian security’. In 2003 the Aus-
tralian government cited poverty reduction as secondary to security considerations in its aid 
programme. In 2003 as well Japan modified its ODA charter, adding national security as a pur-
pose of aid and including the prevention of terrorism as one of its principles. In 2004 Denmark 
added the fight against terrorism to the priorities of its aid programme, and has made aid alloca-
tions dependent on recipient country involvement in the ‘war’ on terror. In the USA the 2004 
White Paper by USAID presents aid as an element of security strategies in the global war on ter-
ror. In addition, the EU has included cooperation in counter-terrorism by recipient countries as a 
prerequisite for EU development aid.” 
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affected the direction of funding flows, with ‘fragile states’ becoming prominent recipi-
ents (Howell & Lind 2009a). Various scholars have traced significant changes in aid 
allocations of Western donors, particularly the United States (Aning 2010; Fleck & Kil-
by 2010). Comparing USAID bilateral aid flows in the periods 1998–2001 and 2002–
2005, Moss et al. (2005: 8) found that “Iraq and Afghanistan went from receiving virtu-
ally zero aid before the GWOT [Global War on Terror] to receiving two of the largest 
per capita allocations following 9/11. Jordan, already a major recipient, more than dou-
bled its aid per capita from USAID”. While shifts in allocation patterns may be most 
obvious (and most frequently researched) in the case of the US, they are also found in a 
range of other donor countries (Howell & Lind 2009a). This suggests that the status of a 
country in the ‘war on terror’ has become a decisive variable for Western donors’ assis-
tance decisions (Aning 2010: 8).    
Political influence and security, however, are not the only non-developmental objectives 
of aid. Economic interests are bluntly articulated by some donor governments and re-
flected in their aid agendas. In 2013, The Netherlands adopted a new policy titled ‘What 
the world deserves: A new agenda for aid, trade and investment’ which directly links 
aid and foreign trade (Government of the Netherlands 2013). In its coalition agreement 
of 2009, the liberal-conservative German government emphasised that “development 
policy decisions must take sufficient account of the interests of German economy, par-
ticularly the needs of small and medium-sized companies” (CDU et al. 2009: 64).  
Development cooperation is a conduit for business. Aid projects entail tenders for all 
kinds of goods and services, ranging from vehicles, medical drugs and equipment to 
construction and advisory services in various fields. Until a decade ago, it was common 
practice that such contracts were exclusively awarded to companies or service providers 
from the respective donor country. For recipients, such kind of conditionality not only 
took away any choice, but raised the price of aid products by 15% to 30% and had dis-
torting effects on local markets (Jepma 1991: 15–16; Browne 2006: 29; Petermann 
2013: 105–112). In order to ‘reduce the high transactions costs’ and ‘improve country 
ownership and alignment’, DAC member states committed themselves in the Paris Dec-
laration to ‘make progress’ on untying aid (OECD 2005: 5). Subsequently, the share of 
tied bilateral aid decreased from 54% in 1999–2001 to 24% in 2007 (Clay et al. 2009: 
viii). These data, however, are to be taken with caution. First, since donors voluntarily 
report the tying status of their aid to the OECD system, data are incomplete and incon-
sistent; second, they are skewed since two strongly tied types of aid are not covered, 
namely food aid and technical cooperation. In a country like South Africa which re-
ceives aid mainly in the form of technical assistance, the proportion of tied aid is hardly 
measurable due to a lack of donor information. Qualitative data, however, provide “evi-
dence of de facto tying, with source country consultants or companies brought in to do 
work that could potentially be done domestically” (Ramkolowan & Stern 2011: x, ital-
ics in original; see also Fölscher et al. 2010: 47).  
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The fact that donors continue to use aid to feed their own industries with contracts is 
displayed by plain numbers: In 2012, USAID awarded only 4% of contracts to firms 
outside the United States (Piccio 2013); 18 of the top 20 private consultancy partners 
used from October 2010 to March 2011 were based in the US (Villarino 2011). Num-
bers for DFID are similar: The Guardian revealed that only 9 out of 117 major contracts 
and procurement agreements awarded in 2011/2012 were given to non-UK firms, with 
the large majority going to well established British consultancy companies such as Ad-
am Smith International or the Mott McDonald Group (Provost & Hughes 2012). 
Considering that UK aid is officially untied since 2001, the on-going dominance of do-
mestic firms is somehow striking. The list could be continued with data from various 
other agencies which show that large amounts of aid flow back to the respective donor 
countries’ industries (for AusAid, see Parmanand 2013; for GIZ, see Buss et al. 2012). 
Various interviewees in our study broached the obvious relevance of business interests 
in development cooperation, with one stating that: 
If you’re running a project and you want a project to get an extension, extended financial 
support, you have to ensure that there is provision for positions for foreign experts. Then 
you’re guaranteed of getting a continuation of that support. But I think it’s one way of job 
creation. Nothing else. (Interview 69)  
Apart from the direct gains derived from aid-related export of goods and services, aid 
brings along indirect benefits as it tends to trigger trade between donor and recipient 
countries also outside the field of development cooperation (Johansson & Pettersson 
2005). The return of aid is thus potentially higher than the contract volume for donor 
companies arising out of aid activities. A study which tried to measure both the direct 
and indirect effects of aid on export levels estimates that “aid is associated with an in-
crease in exports of goods amounting to 133% of the aid” (Wagner 2003: 153), with 
exports of services not included.51 Economic gains have always been used for legitimat-
ing development assistance in the domestic political debate of donor countries. When in 
1995, the Republican Party in the United States threatened to cut aid, Andrew Young as 
former US representative to the United Nations argued:    
We get a five to one return on investment in Africa, through our trade, investment, fi-
nance and aid. Don’t you see? We’re not aiding Africa by sending them aid, Africa’s 
aiding us. (Andrew Younge as cited in Bond 2001: 28) 
Despite the significance of aid as foreign policy tool and door-opener for business, it 
would be superficial to lump donors all together and to deny that some give primacy to 
other, less selfish objectives. There are indeed countries which seem more guided by 
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  Wagner (2003: 171) estimates “that 35 cents out of every dollar of aid comes directly back to the 
donor for exports of goods related to the aid-financed project and that another 98 cents finds its 
way back to the donor for exports of goods not directly linked to aid projects. These measure-
ments exclude exports of services, which surely comprise a significant part of donors’ exports to 
recipients.” 
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recipient needs than by political or economic interests, notably some Nordic states 
(Alesina & Dollar 2000). Sweden, for instance, has repeatedly been commended as a 
role model of the donor community with “development at the heart of its foreign policy” 
(OECD 2013a: 16), as an OECD report put it. In 2012, Sweden’s official development 
assistance amounted to almost 1% of its gross national income which exceeds the inter-
national target of 0,7% set by the UN. Allocating the major share of its aid flows to least 
developing countries, mostly in Sub-Sahara Africa, the country adheres to its policy 
which emphasises poverty reduction as the primary goal of Swedish development coop-
eration (OECD 2013a). Yet, although Sweden underlines “solidarity with poor and 
vulnerable people in other countries” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2003: 18) as main 
rationale for support, it does factor in other interests.52 In its 2008 policy for Africa, the 
government outlines a comprehensive approach to development which integrates securi-
ty, aid and trade issues, stating:  
Economic ties in the form of trade and investment benefit African as well as Swedish 
commercial interests, a potential that should be exploited more extensively. The Govern-
ment intends to collaborate with the private sector so as to protect and promote Swedish 
business relations with Africa. Closer political contacts, cooperation in the international 
arena and cultural exchange can be stimulated by and contribute to stronger and deeper 
economic relations. (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2008b: 21) 
Aid must be seen as a policy instrument which serves multiple interests at the same 
time, ranging from global development, poverty reduction and wealth creation to politi-
cal influence, security and trade. While in every donor county, all of these interests to 
some extent play a role in giving aid, governments prioritise them in different orders. 
The ranking of priorities sets the agenda for those who deliver development assistance, 
namely the respective aid bureaucracies and organisations. In order to understand how 
these bodies operate, it is instructive to take a closer look at the organisational structures 
of bi- and multilateral aid providers.  
Organisational Structures of Bi- and Multilateral Aid Providers  
Donor countries have established a range of different set-ups for development coopera-
tion. Bilateral aid organisations vary particularly with regard to their affiliation with 
foreign affairs and their presence ‘in the field’ (OECD 2009a). Considering these fea-
tures, we can broadly differentiate three organisational models. In the first one, 
development cooperation units are directly affiliated with the ministry of foreign affairs 
or even an integral part of it. Denmark, for instance, has fully shifted the responsibility 
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  The Swedish government is also increasingly pushed to consider non-developmental interests by 
domestic players which potentially gain from aid. In 2006, a consortium of Swedish exporters 
(including Volvo, Ericsson and Tetra Pak, amongst others) sent a letter to the minister for trade 
and industry in which they called for a closer involvement of the Swedish private sector in for-
eign aid, arguing that industry’s engagement would create “many qualified job prospects in 
Sweden” (Greenhill 2006: 34). 
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for planning, implementing and monitoring official development assistance to the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. Its representations abroad, namely the Danish embassies and 
missions, manage aid in the respective recipient countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Denmark 2014).  
While similar structures are also found in Norway, Finland and the Netherlands, other 
countries have institutionally separated development cooperation and foreign affairs. 
The United Kingdom, for instance, has established the Department for International 
Development (DFID) as a standalone authority independent from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. Led by a secretary of state who is member of the cabinet, DFID 
has a very strong own standing and “enjoys an unambiguous relationship with other 
ministries, which allows it to influence cross government thinking on development poli-
cy”(OECD 2009a: 16). While DFID offices in recipient countries are often housed in 
British embassies’ venues, they are not subordinate to them. Similarly autonomous are 
the Canadian International Development Agency CIDA and, until 2013, the Australian 
Agency for International Development.53  
Finally, there is a third model of managing aid adopted by a range of donor countries in 
which a superior authority is responsible for policy and decision-making, but a separate 
agency for the delivery of aid.54 In Germany, for instance, the Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) commissions the German development agency 
GIZ to implement aid activities. As a federal enterprise, GIZ has its own offices in re-
cipient countries and operates as the executing arm of the BMZ in the field. Likewise, 
USAID, Sida and JICA function as implementing agencies for the governments of the 
United States, Sweden and Japan, respectively (OECD 2009a: 33).  
In addition to bilateral channels, donors use multilateral organisations and global fund-
ing mechanisms for allocating aid which usually have a three-tier system comprising 
headquarters, regional and country offices. In the period 2001–2011, “multilateral ODA 
has risen from [US$] 27 billion to [US$] 38 billion, accounting for close to one-third of 
gross ODA” (OECD 2012a: 11). For donor governments, multilateral agencies offer 
economies of scale and scope, a global outreach, and the potential to influence the inter-
national agenda in the respective field of specialisation, amongst others (see Martens 
2008). Moreover, intergovernmental bodies are usually regarded as “more objective aid-
givers who tend to allocate aid according to need and the potential effectiveness of aid 
allocations” (Schneider & Tobin 2010: 2) rather than to individual donor priorities. In 
fact, by pooling their funds, governments to some extent lose control over their money 
as “key decisions on what, where and how it is actually delivered are taken at suprana-
tional level” (OECD 2011a: 9). The perceived neutrality of multilateral aid, however, is 
                                                          
53
  On 1 November 2013, AusAid ceased to exist as an independent agency when it was merged into 
the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; at the time of writing, the re-structuring 
process was still on-going (Australian Government 2013).  
54
  The superior authority can either be related to foreign affairs or be an independent development 
cooperation entity.  
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misleading. The fact that governments try to influence aid policies of the multilateral 
agency according to their own priorities is reflected in strategic documents. The US 
administration under President Obama, for instance, emphasised the importance of mul-
tilateral aid in two seminal documents in 2010, namely the Presidential Policy Directive 
on Global Development and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. 
While the former states that the US will “redouble our efforts to support, reform, and 
modernize multilateral development organizations most critical to our interests” (White 
House 2010), the latter outlines how such organisations should be used to foster the US 
agenda:  
Multilateral diplomacy is a specialized skill set that allows us to advance American inter-
ests across a wide range of multilateral organizations. We must expand the ranks of 
diplomats skilled in multilateral diplomacy and improve the links between our multilat-
eral and bilateral diplomacy, especially with respect to our engagement with the United 
Nations. Multilateral diplomats must both maintain relationships with international organ-
izations themselves and mobilize member-states to support our priorities in those 
organizations. (Department of State & USAID 2010: 55)  
The extent to which individual governments are able to foster strategic interests through 
multilateral organisations strongly depends on the allocation of power within the respec-
tive governance institutions. In United Nations agencies, the presence of countries in 
decision-making bodies is usually based on inclusion and rotation mechanisms estab-
lished to ensure that the interests and needs of all member states are equally taken into 
account, irrespective of their political or financial strength.55 The World Bank as a mul-
tilateral financing institution, in contrast, has established a system in which countries’ 
economic performance and financial contribution to the Bank are determinants of deci-
sion-making authority (Stumm 2011).56 The majority of voting power lies in the hands 
of high-income countries, with the five main contributors alone holding 37% of all votes 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2013). The US as the largest 
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  The World Health Organisation, for instance, is governed by the World Health Assembly, the 
Executive Board and the Secretariat (World Health Organization 1946: 4). The Assembly as the 
supreme decision-making body is formed by delegates from all 194 member states. Taking into 
account an equitable geographical distribution, the Assembly elects 34 members entitled to des-
ignate a technically qualified person to serve on the Executive Board over a period of three years 
(World Health Organization 1946). In 2013, the Board was composed of seven delegates from 
the African continent, six from the Americas, three from South-East Asia, eight from Europe, 
five from the Eastern Mediterranean countries, and five from the Western Pacific region (World 
Health Organization 2013).  
56
  This applies to the allocation of the influential Executive Director positions and voting power: 
Five of the 25 Executive Director positions are given to the largest shareholders of the Bank – 
currently France, the United States, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom (International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development et al. 2013). All member states receive votes consist-
ing of basic votes plus additional votes according to their share of the Bank’s capital stock held 
(World Bank 2012c), which leads to appalling power imbalances between developing and devel-
oped countries (Vestergaard 2011). 
4 Actors and Interests in Aid 51 
 
shareholder with over 15% effectively has a veto on fundamental changes in the Bank. 
Consequently, the World Bank’s overall agenda is strongly driven by the strategic inter-
ests of the most powerful Western countries, while member states from the developing 
world have little say.     
To what extent headquarters of bi- and multilateral organisations shape aid on the 
ground strongly depends on the decision-making autonomy of the respective agents in 
the field.57 The degree of authority delegated to staff in country offices varies consider-
ably, both with regard to funding and programmatic issues. While some enjoy full 
financial authority over their country budget, others are not allowed to take any deci-
sions on disbursements (OECD 2009b: 5–6).58 Similar differences exist when it comes 
to decision-making on priorities and modalities of support. DFID’s country offices as 
well as the embassies of Norway and Denmark, for instance, enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy in terms of formulating country strategies, designing programmes and im-
plementing activities. While the superior authority at the central level has the final say 
in approvals, country-based staff has a broad leeway to tailor cooperation to the de-
mands of local counterparts. In Tanzania, the Dutch are well known for their 
responsiveness in this regard, as stated in an assessment of the Netherlands’ pro-
gramme:  
In the health sector, the Tanzanian government appreciated Dutch flexibility to re-direct 
support to fill crucial gaps based on what was needed in Tanzania, rather than what was 
in vogue at home. (OECD 2011d: 20–21) 
The WHO as a multilateral example adopts a similar flexible approach. Although coun-
try strategies based on the global agenda and regional directions provide the broad 
framework for technical support, concrete activities are negotiated at country-level be-
tween WHO staff and the local actors within the ministries and departments.59  
                                                          
57
  Donors differ widely with regard to the allocation of staff between headquarters and ‘the field’ 
(see Table 23: Staffing levels of aid organisationsTable 23 in Annex E). The assumption that a 
higher share of staff in the field goes along with a higher degree of flexibility and responsive-
ness, however, does not hold true. The decisive factor in this regard is the degree of decision-
making authority in the field, as elucidated above.  
58
  According to a study conducted by the OECD in 2009, nine of nineteen DAC donors do not 
allow their field staff to make any financial commitments. In contrast, “DFID field offices can 
commit up to US$ 15 million, and the Netherlands and Norway can delegate full commitment 
authority to the field within budget limits” (OECD 2009b: 5). 
59
  Globally, the WHO is guided by its “Eleventh General Programme of Work 2006–2015” (World 
Health Organization 2006) and the “Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2008–2013” (World Health 
Organization 2008). Further, there are regional policy documents, as for example the “Strategic 
directions for WHO 2010–2015” in the African region (World Health Organization 2010). Yet, 
WHO country strategies emphasise that technical assistance is solely provided upon the request 
of governments and fully guided by their respective priorities (World Health Organization 
2009b; World Health Organization 2009c). 
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Quite contrary to these examples, there are organisations which maintain highly central-
ised structures in terms of decision-making. World Bank headquarters exert significant 
influence on the country assistance strategies which determine the Bank’s scope of sup-
port. Each single project has to be submitted to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors 
for consideration and approval (World Bank 2012b). Among bilateral donors, particu-
larly those using executing agencies have similar centralised set-ups. USAID, for 
instance, is to a large extent driven by directives from Washington where the global 
agenda is set.60 Changes of priorities at the central level immediately affect activities on 
the ground. When the agency released its new Education Strategy ‘Opportunity through 
learning’ in 2011, country offices world-wide had to probe the fit of their on-going ac-
tivities with the new directive. With goal one being “improved reading skills for 100 
million children in primary grades by 2015” (USAID 2011), “every USAID office 
around the globe has to show outcomes in readings” (Interview 42), as an education 
specialist at USAID in Tanzania reported. Consequently, he had to justify programmatic 
elements dealing with math and science which in light of the new strategy were per-
ceived as “out of alignment” (Interview 42) before his superiors in Washington.  
Categorising aid organisations by the extent of their decision-making autonomy at coun-
try-level, we can differentiate two types: The first one with little autonomy functions as 
a service-provider implementing the directives of its superior authority. There is a clear-
cut institutional separation between decision-making and the delivery of aid. The second 
type is more than just an executing arm of the respective headquarters. It is the sub-
agent of the donor country on the ground, responsible not only for implementing activi-
ties, but also authorised to take financial and programmatic decisions. Although the 
superior authority gives overall guidance, representatives in the field have a relatively 
broad room for manoeuvre in prioritising their support.   
Legitimating and Organising Aid: Donor Typology 
Recapitulating the findings above, we can draw the following conclusions: First, bi- and 
multilateral aid is to a varying extent driven by strategic interests of donor governments 
which use different rationales for providing assistance. While some frame aid as an in-
strument to foster their own political and economic interests, others justify it as a 
humanitarian act and a matter of responsibility. Second, the extent to which the donor’s 
domestic agenda determines aid activities on the ground very much depends on the de-
gree of authority delegated to the agents in the field, i.e. staff in country offices or 
embassies.  
Both features, legitimation patterns and organisational structures, determine the extent 
to which aid is tied to a certain donor agenda or adjustable to recipients’ priorities. 
                                                          
60
  As an example, the global strategy “PEPFAR Blueprint: Creating an AIDS-free generation” 
(United States of America, Department of State 2012) released by the US State Department on 
the World AIDS day 2012 became the guiding document for the US AIDS response world-wide 
and heavily influenced second-generation PEPFAR programmes at country-level.  
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Combining the two variables, four different types of donors emerge as displayed in Fig-
ure 3: Type I represents donors which subject aid to strategic self-interests and strongly 
direct the delivery of aid from a central level, making sure it adheres to the headquar-
ters’ agenda. Type II donors set an agenda led by vested interests, but concede a high 
degree of decision-making autonomy to staff in the field which allows for greater re-
sponsiveness to counterpart demands. Type III donors delegate less authority to country 
offices and representations, but are led by the principle to place recipient needs over 
self-interests. Type IV is the antipode to the first one: Guided by the solidarity pattern as 
political rationale for aid, donors of this type refrain from (strongly) tying aid to self-
interests and delegate the responsibility for aid mainly to the field. 
 
Figure 3: Donor typology based on aid rationales and decision-making structures 
Source: Authors’ own illustration based on empirical material. 
For advisory activities, donor types are relevant insofar as they set the conditions under 
which experts operate in the field: The extent to which their support is bound to a cer-
tain agenda or, put differently, can be responsive to recipients’ preferences varies 
depending on the kind of organisation they are affiliated with.  
Organisational Interests of Aid Agencies 
As outlined earlier, donor governments use different conduits for channelling aid, rang-
ing from different types of bilateral agencies to multilateral organisations. While these 
bodies vary in terms of mandates, missions and structures, they share one decisive fea-
ture: Their primary organisational goal is ‘moving money’ (Easterly 2002: 22; Gould 
2005a: 150). This pattern can be explained as follows: The legitimacy of aid organisa-
tions is based on aid delivery. Given the difficulty to assess the quality of delivered aid 
in terms of actual change achieved in recipient countries, performance is measured 
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against quantity, i.e. the volume of money disbursed. Although in recent years more 
emphasis has been put on observable outcomes of support (e.g., more children in 
schools), aid organisations still justify their work with spending figures (Easterly 2002: 
21): The World Bank on its country website for Tanzania mainly displays lending 
commitments and informs that “since 1995 the Bank has provided more than US$ 6 
billion to Tanzania in credits and grants” (World Bank 2013b). In the GIZ 2012 annual 
report, the State Secretary of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development in his function as chairman of the GIZ supervisory board certifies that 
“GIZ made excellent progress by doing business worth over € 2 billion, and gaining an 
even firmer foothold on the international cooperation market for sustainable develop-
ment” (GIZ 2013a: 5). The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presenting its 
performance against the strategic goal of tackling poverty and global inequality, notes 
that in 2012, “development assistance was increased by DKK 234 million and this 
amount will increase by a further DKK 366 million in 2013” (Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs of Denmark 2013: 16).  
The fact that aid providers “redefine inputs to development as outputs” (Easterly 2002: 
21) yields the logic that the more they spend the better. This equally holds true for 
creditor institutions which work towards higher lending volumes, for aid agencies which 
aim at increasing business volumes and for bureaucracies which seek to expand their 
budgets.61, 62 In the case of the latter, the disbursement imperative is exacerbated by the 
risk that “parliaments will react forcefully if approved allocations are not disbursed” 
(Gould & Ojanen 2005: 22), i.e. cut the ministry’s budget.   
The spending pressure pervading aid organisations has significant effects on the ground. 
First, it leads to donor-financed activities which lack any request and need on recipient 
side, being solely organised for the sake of shifting money. A former GIZ programme 
manager told us:  
We had situations where (…) we received the directive to disburse around twelve thou-
sand Euro within the next six weeks. Twelve thousand Euro are a hell of a lot of money to 
spend in a Tanzanian district. So what to do? I conduct a workshop as this is the fastest 
way to ditch money. (Interview 73, translated by authors)63 
                                                          
61
  The conception of the German aid agency GIZ as a company pursuing entrepreneurial goals has 
been underlined by GIZ staff interviewed, with one stating: “We are an enterprise and this has 
been pushed a lot in recent years, with our current chairman of the supervisory board being one 
of the drivers of this development. (…) GIZ is clearly drilled on business, we deliver by order.” 
(Interview 4, translated by authors) 
 The original interview passage in German language: “Wir sind ‘ne Firma und das ist im letzten 
Jahr viel gepusht worden und unser jetziger Aufsichtsratvorsitzender ist einer der Mentoren oder 
Motoren für diese Bewegung. (…) Die GIZ ist ganz klar auf Unternehmen gedrillt, wir arbeiten 
im Auftrag.” (Interview 4) 
62
  For the budget maximizing goals of bureaucracies, see Niskanen (1971, repr. 2007: 36 et seq.).  
63
  The original interview passage in German: „Also wir haben Situationen gehabt, (…) da hieß es, 
ihr müsst jetzt in den nächsten sechs Wochen noch Gelder in Höhe von, ich sag’ jetzt mal, einer 
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Second, donor staff tends to refrain from withholding funds even if interventions fail to 
materialise or irregularities emerge. The organisational target to deliver what has been 
agreed tends to precede concerns about the usage of aid. An interviewee working at GIZ 
commented in this regard:  
There were and there are cases of corruption in Tanzania where one wonders why certain 
donors did not suspend payments and instead just said, ‘we continue to transfer money.’ 
There you think there should be other interests on donor side. (Interview 72, translated by 
authors)64 
The “disbursement anxiety” dominating the donor community is not only related to 
“concerns of institutional survival” (Gould & Ojanen 2005: 22). It also drives donor 
staff at an individual level since professional careers depend on the volume of project or 
programme budgets and the timeliness of delivery (Gould 2005a: 139–140; Mummert 
2013: 59).  
In a nutshell, neither aid organisations nor their functionaries have an incentive to make 
themselves redundant by reducing aid flows and the need for assistance. If they suc-
ceeded in solving the problems of developing countries, their very existence would be at 
stake. The Kenyan economist James Shikwati, an outspoken opponent of foreign aid, 
thus states that “it is not in the interest of the aid industry to promote African home-
grown solutions, because it feeds on the African problem” (Shikwati 2006: 4).  
4.3 The Epistemic Community of Development Experts  
The aid industry provides employment opportunities for a broad range of professionals, 
ranging from bureaucrats to drivers. Its core cadre, however, is formed by experts who 
sell their knowledge and act as brokers in the field of development cooperation.65 Oper-
ating on the ground, they serve as intermediaries between donor and recipient 
governments, bridging the geographical remoteness of the two parties. Experts’ broker-
age facilitates the transfer of monetary and non-monetary resources from one side to the 
other, putting them in a crucial middle position in the aid arena where they constitute a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Größenordnung zwölftausend Euro abfließen lassen. Zwölftausend Euro ist in ‘nem district in 
Tansania wahnsinniges Geld. Also was mach’ ich? Ich mache einen Workshop, das ist das, wo 
ich am schnellsten Geld loswerde.” (Interview 73)  
64
  The original interview passage in German: “Es gibt ja nun mal so Fälle, wo es dann Korrup-
tionsskandale in Tansania gibt oder gab und wo dann auch die Frage war, oder man sich 
wunderte, warum einzelne Geber trotzdem nicht ihre Zahlungen einstellten und einfach sagen: 
Nee, überweisen wir’s aber trotzdem. Und da merkt man einfach, da müssten auch auf Geberse-
ite mal andere Interessen sein.” (Interview 72) 
65
  We draw here on brokerage as a mechanism enabling disconnected groups to politically, eco-
nomically or socially interact via a third party which helps resources (e.g., goods, money, 
information, opportunities) to flow across the gap. For details on the concept, see Stovel and 
Shaw (2012).  
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‘strategic group’ with distinct interests (Bierschenk 1988; Evers 2005). In the triad of 
aid relations, this group in a way takes on the role of the ‘tertius gaudens’ (Simmel 
1950: 154 et seq.) who benefits from the opportunity to make profit and increase its own 
status, to accumulate power and expand its scope of influence. The following chapter 
introduces development experts as a transnational epistemic community, delineates 
characteristics of their shared knowledge stock, and sheds light on their roles, activities 
and impact levels in recipient countries.  
Development Experts: An Epistemic Community with Knowledge as Strategic Resource 
The rise of the ‘knowledge for development paradigm’ brought about the emergence of 
a global network of professionals who have become increasingly powerful: develop-
ment experts in various roles and positions whose dominance is based on their ascribed 
expert knowledge on ‘development’ and all fields perceived as related to it. Haas (1992) 
defines such a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area” an “epistemic community”. Although members may come from 
different disciplines and backgrounds, they share a set of normative and causal beliefs, 
notions of validity and a common policy enterprise, “that is, a set of common practices 
associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed” 
(Haas 1992: 3). Their authority to diffuse their specific truth is based on the superior 
status of their knowledge which is both claimed by themselves and acknowledged by a 
given society and its elite (Haas 1992: 17).  
In the realm of aid, these features apply to the epistemic community of development 
experts. Consisting of professionals from a huge variety of disciplines, its members 
share basic concepts and ideas which construct a reality in which goals and strategies 
increasingly converge (Evers 2005: 11).66 Their power to define ‘development’ and de-
velopment problems, and their legitimacy to provide suitable solutions rests on the 
expert knowledge they claim to possess and the accepted authority of their expertise. As 
will be shown in the following, this knowledge has five distinct characteristics: 1) an 
authority claim borrowed from science, 2) a high degree of self-referentiality, 2) perme-
ation with economic and managerial knowledge, 4) a validity claim of universal 
application, and 5) the potential to transnationally diffuse a distinct set of norms and 
values.  
What Makes an Expert an Expert: Qualification Criteria and Professional Backgrounds  
In order to identify epistemic characteristics of development experts’ knowledge and the 
sources of their expertise, it is a useful starting point to look at formal qualification cri-
                                                          
66
  The Millenium Development Goals proclaimed at the Millenium Summit in the year 2000 and 
agreed by 23 international organisations and 192 countries impressively illustrate the homogeni-
zation tendency in the global development discourse.   
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teria and career backgrounds which may indicate ‘what makes an expert an expert’ in 
the professional realm under study.  
Comparing eligibility criteria for advisory-related positions, the most obvious pattern is 
the requirement for an advanced university degree even at the lowest levels. To enter 
the so-called “Professional and Technical career path” at the World Bank, for instance, 
“advanced academic achievements and/or technical professional credentials such as 
Masters or PhD” (World Bank 2012d) are obligatory. In fact, according to a study 
which interviewed World Bank staff, a PhD is seen as essential for high-level advisory 
positions and promotion within the organisation (Dietrich 2006: 31).  
In our sample, all interviewees working for an international organisation at least had a 
master’s degree, one out of three a PhD. A noticeable aspect related to the experts’ aca-
demic background is where they have received their professional training: Among the 
foreign experts, i.e. experts which are not South African or Tanzanian nationals, 89% 
have acquired their highest level of education either in North America (US or Canada) 
or in Europe, the remaining 11% in both a developing and a developed country. Among 
the South African or Tanzanian nationals working for a donor organisation, two out of 
three have gained a degree in the West, only one out of three received their education 
solely in South Africa or Tanzania. This result supports the observation that the expert 
community in the development arena is dominated by graduates whose expertise is cer-
tified with academic credentials achieved at Anglo-American or European 
universities.67 In the case of the World Bank, many of them pass through the same 
schools, especially those of the US Ivy league and British elite universities such as the 
London School of Economics (Dietrich 2006: 33).68  
The range of subjects studied by staff in international organisations is broad. Classifying 
the subjects indicated by experts of our sample, the majority is related to health scienc-
es, educational sciences and natural/environmental sciences which corresponds with the 
policy fields of the study; the remainder can be categorized into economics and finan-
cial management, international relations/development studies and other social sciences. 
Although the questionnaire only asked for the subject of the highest level of education, 
many respondents specified more than one discipline. In many educational profiles, 
sector-specific studies were combined with additional training in public administration 
or development, for instance “Sustainable Development and Environmental Studies, 
Public Financial Management, International Studies”, “Public Health and International 
Development” or “Environment and Society and MBA”. The variety and the cross-
                                                          
67
  Given that our study focused on traditional donors and did not include agencies from emerging 
donors like Brazil or India, one may criticise that the results presented are geographically biased. 
However, as European, North American and multi-lateral agencies still are the dominant organi-
sations in aid, we argue that our sample which includes experts working for thirteen different 
agencies provides a valid basis for our conclusion. 
68
  In her study on World Bank careers, Dietrich (2006: 33) cites a staff member saying: “A col-
league of mine told me that there are more than 70 different nationalities working for the Bank, 
but they all come from ten different graduate schools.” 
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disciplinary nature of educational backgrounds is a common pattern identified in the aid 
community which has emerged from a shift towards multi-sectorial approaches and 
‘cross-cutting’ issues (e.g., ‘good governance’) requiring “good team players who can 
work across sector boundaries” (World Bank 2005a: 34), as a World Bank report put it.   
In all fields of practice, management and administrative skills have increasingly gained 
importance. Several interviewees on both recipient and donor side noticed a remarkable 
shift in employment practices in the sense that sector specialists in country offices are 
replaced by administrators, accountants and economists. A South African government 
official responsible for international relations delineated this development as follows:   
Now what you then have in the period 1995 to let’s just say 2000 if I had to mark it (…) 
is that foreign governments would place in development cooperation offices experts and 
people who had great interest in the transformation agenda in South Africa. And these 
were experts in their fields. Now what happens after that period is that you find adminis-
trators coming in, who have a very different interest and approach to development issues. 
So that’s I think a very critical issue. (Interview 21)  
The changing composition of advisory cadres is closely related to the changing nature 
of advisory positions and responsibilities. A study on DFID’s use of advisors confirms 
this shift:  
There has been a move towards promoting interdisciplinarity, cross-sector working, and 
therefore multi-sector posts. This trend can be seen in the emergence of ‘results advisers’, 
‘poverty advisers’, MDG advisers etc. (…). As DFID has placed more emphasis on defin-
ing core competencies and on ensuring they align with corporate strategy this has led to a 
stronger emphasis on management skills and experience. (Mendizabal et al. 2012: x) 
Aside from the shift related to educational backgrounds and the respective expertise of 
advisors, a second aspect of qualification is in flux, namely the scope and nature of de-
velopment experts’ work experience. In this regard, the DFID study states that  
whereas a decade ago DFID advisers had substantial professional background and experi-
ence, recruited mid-career and of an older age, advisers are being recruited earlier in their 
careers with less experience, and are unable to offer advice with the same depth.      
(Mendizabal et al. 2012: 11) 
Similarly, a World Bank report finds that in some regions,  
the number of team leaders with less than three years experience in the Bank is relatively 
significant. For example, in the Africa Region the staff profile is becoming less experi-
enced at a time when the operational challenges call for more experience, knowledge of 
what works and how to do it, and capability to help enhance country capacity.         
(World Bank 2005a: 37) 
Many experts enter international organisations relatively soon after finishing their stud-
ies with little work experience in their profession outside the development domain. This 
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tendency is supported by an increasing number of programmes for young professionals 
designed to bridge the timespan between graduation and advisory positions, and provid-
ing a stepping stone for a straight forward career in the aid community.69  
For pushing this career, international experience, preferably in the development world, 
is a crucial asset. Once in the business, advisors accumulate assignments in a remarka-
ble list of developing countries, staying at one place on average for two to four years.70 
The professional profiles indicate a high degree of international mobility, with experts 
shifting from one developing country to the next or commuting between headquarters 
and the ‘field’.71 Interestingly, language skills and cultural knowledge seem to be of 
minor importance for the secondment to a host country. In our sample, 83% of the for-
eign experts did not have basic knowledge of Kiswahili or Africaans, respectively.72 
Both in South Africa and Tanzania, the working language between advisors and their 
counterparts is English, the primary global language used within the expert community.   
The brief glance at professional backgrounds and careers allows a first delineation of 
the epistemic group of development experts: Sharing a common belief in ‘development’ 
and interest in providing knowledge-based concepts for the same, it comprises profes-
sionals from a broad range of disciplines. The formal criteria qualifying members for 
their professional activity is first of all technical knowledge acquired through high-level 
academic training. This specialised knowledge is combined with managerial skills and 
merged with practical experience gained primarily within the professional field of de-
                                                          
69
  Examples are the Junior Professional Officer Programme of the United Nations agencies (UNDP 
2013a), the World Bank’s Young Professional Programme (World Bank 2012f) or the Develop-
ment Cooperation Trainee Programme offered by GIZ (GIZ 2013b). All of these programmes 
require a university degree at master’s level, around two years of practical experience (preferably 
in a developing country), and set the age limit for applicants between 30 and 32 years.  
70
  In our sample, 72% of the foreign experts indicated they would stay in South Africa and Tanza-
nia, respectively, for 2 to 4 years (11% between 5 and 7, 16,6% permanently). Nationals working 
for development organisations, in contrast, show a different pattern in this regard: Many have a 
permanent contract for working in the respective country office. In our sample, six out of seven 
‘national’ experts who gave details about the duration of their stay are deployed on a permanent 
basis (answer “unlimited”). 
71
  The internal regulations with regard to rotation differ. While some organisations do not set strict 
rules, others apply specific rotation principles and limit the duration of stay in overseas offices to 
a certain time span after which staff has to go back to headquarters for a while. The justifications 
for this practice mentioned in interviews are ensuring that experts keep up with headquarters’ 
policies and professional knowledge, and avoid ‘going native’ in the field.  
72
  Among the foreign experts interviewed, only three had attended a language course before com-
ing into the country. In general, preparatory training before going into the field does not seem to 
be standard: Two out of three experts in the sample have not received any technical, cultural or 
language training courses prior to their arrival in the country. The fact that only a small number 
of organisations – in our sample Norway, Sweden, GIZ and USAID – provide preparatory cours-
es is remarkable as one third of the interviewees in the study perceive cultural differences as 
problematic or even extremely problematic. More than half of the sample (54%) assesses differ-
ent styles of communication as a major obstacle for cooperation. 
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velopment cooperation in which international mobility enhances the individual qualifi-
cation.  
Implications for the Nature of Development Knowledge 
Based on these patterns, the knowledge shared by the epistemic community of devel-
opment experts shows five distinct characteristics. First, development experts’ expertise 
derives its credibility from the reference to scientific knowledge and the adoption of 
scientific styles of presentation. Expert knowledge is certified by academic degrees usu-
ally acquired in developed countries of the North. Although aid experts are not part of 
the science community nor do they (regularly) participate in the scientific discourse, the 
authority of their advice is to a significant extent based on the claimed scientific ground-
ing.73 In a way, it is an authority borrowed from the truth claim of science.   
Secondly, the expertise aid experts provide is neither based solely on scientific nor on 
professional knowledge outside the development domain. As outlined above, the work-
ing experience of advisors remains restricted given the direct entry into the aid business. 
The generation of practical knowledge is thus primarily taking place within the realm of 
development cooperation. Consequently, a specific type of ‘development knowledge’ 
emerges which is highly self-referential.74  
Thirdly, while the stock of knowledge comprises a variety of specialist knowledge, it is 
increasingly permeated with economics and managerial thinking. This is displayed by a 
rising demand for specialised economists (such as health or environmental economists) 
and an increasing number of generalists and administrators filling expert positions. The 
changing composition of expertise impacts on advisory processes insofar as it leads to a 
primacy of procedural and finance-related aspects within cooperation (see also chapter 
5.2.2).  
Fourthly, the mobility of experts and the establishment of global knowledge networks 
suggest that the epistemic community regards its specific development knowledge as 
locally unbound and transferable. The practice of adopting and testing ideas and con-
cepts in different countries around the globe implies a validity claim of universal 
application (Evers et al. 2009: 58). 
Such a claim ignores the contextual nature of knowledge, i.e. that knowledge is infused 
with norms and values.75 As Haas (1992: 4) points out, an epistemic community’s ad-
vice “is informed by its own broader worldview”. In the aid context, expert knowledge 
                                                          
73
  This is also displayed by the observation that text (studies, evaluations, reports etc.) produced in 
the context of development cooperation resembles scientific publications in terms of formal 
characteristics such as the style of writing and referencing. 
74
  The self-referential nature of development knowledge is displayed in texts produced in the con-
text of development projects, which primarily refer to publications produced within the aid 
community.  
75
  For the context specificity and constructiveness of knowledge, see Berger and Luckmann (1966); 
Knorr-Cetina (1981); Knorr-Cetina (1984).  
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transmits a distinct perspective on development and democratic governance as con-
structed by the donor community. The potential to transnationally diffuse norms and 
values affiliated with these concepts is the fifth significant characteristic of the 
knowledge prevalent in the epistemic community of development experts. As will be 
shown in the case studies of this book, the specific nature of development knowledge 
has distinct implications for advisory processes and the impact of expertise.  
Representatives, Advisors, and Consultants: Typology of Experts in the Field  
While sharing a transnational epistemic culture and using knowledge as a ‘strategic re-
source’ (Evers et al. 1988; Evers 2005), development experts take on different roles and 
operate at various levels in recipient countries. The positions they hold differ in terms of 
employment conditions, authority and functions, particularly with regard to the linkage 
of administrative, programmatic and advisory responsibilities. Taking these aspects into 
account, one can broadly differentiate three types of experts in the field: representatives, 
advisors and (short-term) consultants.   
With job titles ranging from senior policy advisor, programme director or counsellor to 
first secretary for a specific sector, experts which we categorise as representatives are 
assigned to fulfil a combination of administrative, programmatic and advisory functions, 
and are usually deployed for a period of three to four years. Placed in the country office 
of an organisation or in the embassy of a donor country, they administrate a sector port-
folio or programme, being responsible for both overseeing funding flows and progress. 
Acting as official representatives of their organisation, they also participate in high-level 
meetings in which priorities and the scope of support are negotiated. At the same time, 
they are regularly engaged in policy discussions and closely interact with senior gov-
ernment officials and policymakers. An exemplary job description of UNDP for the 
position of a “Programme Specialist Energy and Climate Change” in Tanzania illus-
trates the broad range of responsibilities, listing thirty-six points of duties which 
comprise “substantive support to national counterparts in policy planning and advoca-
cy”, “participation and leadership in the joint identification of programmatic and policy 
issues to be addressed and formulation of joint programme strategies” and “oversight of 
planning, budgeting, implementing and monitoring of designated UNDP projects, and 
monitoring the use of financial resources in accordance with UNDP rules and regula-
tions” (UNDP 2012).  
Experts in such a multifunctional position are not necessarily sector specialists in the 
sense that they have a training background in the field they are concerned with. For the 
UNDP job above, the educational requirement was master’s degree or higher in the field 
of science, engineering, economics, development or a related field. A DFID education 
advisor in our sample was trained in geographic information science. A CIDA education 
team leader with a background in international affairs and development studies ex-
plained:  
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I’m a generalist, basically, and that’s fairly typical for who CIDA puts in positions like 
mine. (…) Our expertise is more in how to work with governments, and how to work 
with our headquarters, and how to get projects approved, and through the process and so 
on, and then how to manage resources as needed. (Interview 30) 
The tendency to employ generalists instead of specialists is supported by the increasing 
number of hybrid posts covering more than one sector. DFID in Tanzania, for example, 
in 2004 had established an advisory position responsible for education, water and health 
(Mendizabal et al. 2012: 53).76 As will be discussed later (see chapter 5.2.2), the move 
away from sector specialists has significant implications for advisory processes as it 
changes the expertise provided in policy discussions.   
Compared to experts in a representative role, the work of the second type of experts 
which we categorise as advisors is less concerned with representational and administra-
tive tasks and more focused on providing technical expertise. Advisors are usually 
trained as specialists in the area they are involved in and deployed for assisting in a spe-
cific process over a period of on average one to four years. They are often physically 
placed in the government ministry or department in order to closely interact with their 
counterparts who are usually senior government officials in the highest rank of the tech-
nical cadre in the recipient institution. A typical example is the Health Policy, Planning 
and Management Advisor of Danida’s health sector support (2009–2014) who was em-
bedded in the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in Tanzania and supposed to 
closely liaise with the Director of Policy and Planning and the Chief Medical Officer 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark & Government of Tanzania 2009: 67). Simi-
larly, DFID seconded a senior health advisor to the South African Department of Health 
who in the context of a comprehensive programme directly advised the Director-
General on on-going reform processes (DFID South Africa 2013). Advisors thus operate 
within the inner circle of governments. Their deployment is justified with ‘capacity 
gaps’ in recipient authorities which they are expected to fill and at the same time to 
transfer knowledge and skills to their counterparts.77  
The third type of expert is the consultant hired by development organisations and/or 
recipient institutions for the delivery of expertise in the form of specific products such 
as appraisal and feasibility studies, mid-term and final evaluations, expenditure tracking 
surveys, guidelines etc. The time-frame for short-term consultancies is usually far less 
than a year, on average ranging from a few weeks to six months. In many cases consul-
tancies are solely based on the analysis of records and written documents. The 
interaction with ministerial staff is mostly limited to gaining information and access to 
data sources from the local institution. To what extent recipients take up reports and 
                                                          
76
  While the establishment of a hybrid advisor reduced staff costs in the Tanzanian country office, 
it also led to a decreased influence of DFID, particularly in health. An evaluation concluded that 
hybrid advisors are not suited to influence policies in multiple sectors simultaneously, with advi-
sors struggling to provide substantial input at a technical level (Mendizabal et al. 2012).   
77
  The intricacies of this task will be discussed in chapter 5.2. 
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recommendations is out of the consultant’s responsibility and control, as a Finnish spe-
cialist acknowledged:  
Doing consultancy is much like you do short term things and then you write a report and 
even if you manage to communicate very well about it to the people with whom you’ve 
worked, then you don’t know if something is done, if your recommendations are really 
being implemented or what happens after that. (Interview 36) 
In aid receiving countries donor experts of all three types “work in a routinised fashion 
at the centre of policy making” (Harrison 2004: 90). Comparing their potential influ-
ence, the short-term consultant is at the lower end. Several interviewees assessed the 
impact of consultancies as marginal. As a GIZ advisor in South Africa put it:   
Arriving as a short-term consultant, you hand in your analysis, here is the report, these are 
the recommendations. They say ‘Yes, thank you’ – and put it in the shelf. (Interview 4, 
translated by authors)78  
The other two types of experts, in contrast, have a broader scope of impact. Advisors 
seconded to counterpart ministries interact with senior officials on a daily basis, operat-
ing at the highest technical level of government. Representatives may less directly take 
a hand in particular issues, but instead shape the strategic direction of sector discus-
sions. Investigating the impact of external experts in South Africa and Tanzania, it is 
thus crucial to consider their different roles and levels of influence in the realm of poli-
cymaking.  
Advisory Activities of Development Experts 
The omnipresence of development experts in bureaucracies of aid receiving countries 
provokes a simple question: what do these experts actually do, i.e., what kind of support 
do they provide? The common answer given to this question, namely providing tech-
nical assistance or advice, is rather vague. In the donor community, the term is used as a 
placeholder for a variety of advisory activities which address different elements of poli-
cymaking and governance. Table 3 displays a categorisation of advice provided in the 
South African and Tanzanian ministries and departments included in this study:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
78
  The original interview passage in German: “Dann kommt man als Kurzzeitberater hin, gibt ‘ne 
Analyse, hier ist der Report, das sind die Handlungsempfehlungen. Da sagen die: Ja, Dank-
eschön – tun sie in den Schrank.” (Interview 4) 
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Table 3: Advisory activities, types of support and impact levels 
Advisory activity  Type of support  Impact level  
Technical advice  Provision of technical expertise Content of policies 
Provision of international expe-
rience  
Bringing in experience and 
evidence from other countries    
Content of policies  
Process facilitation Facilitating dialogue and sup-
porting the policy process 
Policy processes 
Managerial advice  Introduction and transfer of 
managerial methodologies  
Governance practice 
Organisational development  Assistance in setting up or re-
structuring government bodies 
Governance systems  
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on empirical material.79 
In this categorisation, we define technical advice in a narrow sense as the provision of 
expertise for problems which require specialist knowledge. Experts in our sample, for 
instance, prepared guidelines for the initiation of anti-retroviral treatment on HIV pa-
tients, analysed data for environmental resource assessments or provided input in the 
process of revising policies, in some cases even drafted the final policy document.  
Less directly, experts shape policy content by providing international experience, i.e. 
presenting approaches adopted in other countries for similar problems. A South African 
government official described the advisory service of an expert seconded to his depart-
ment in the following way:  
He [the advisor] will go out and research what is it that we are trying to do and find out 
very good learning experiences from other places (…). So he would be able to say, ‘look, 
I know this what you are trying but in this other places, this is how they approach this is-
sue and it seems as if you have got these options, these are consequences.’ And where he 
could not come up with a clear recommendation, he will phone other people that he was 
working with to search for the solutions that were used in their countries and what were 
some of the problems. (Interview 22)  
Here, the strategic resource experts draw on is less specialised knowledge, but their ac-
cess to a global network in which experiences are stored and shared. This network also 
enables them to source internal and external expertise which governments are struggling 
to obtain. The mobilisation of knowledge is a typical activity classified under the broad-
er rubric of ‘facilitation’ or ‘catalytic work’. While in Tanzania, a large proportion of 
advice is still focused on the provision of technical expertise, many experts in South 
Africa saw themselves as facilitators rather than as knowledge providers. A typical re-
sponse in this regard was given by an advisor placed in the South African Department 
of Health who stated:  
                                                          
79
  Table 3 only includes expert activities related to advice; it does not comprise administrative tasks 
or programmatic responsibilities.  
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A lot of the work that we’re doing is like facilitating groups, getting together, making 
sure due process is adhered to so if you’re going to do a consultation, make sure all the 
right groups are there, it’s that sort of thing. More facilitation and doing catalytic work, 
not so much the technical content of policies because that on the whole is here, that’s not 
where the gap is. (Interview 1)  
In practice, this means that advisors support the policy process by setting up meetings, 
preparing agendas, distributing information, drafting the minutes and monitoring fol-
low-up actions. While this may seem as standard bureaucratic work, it does affect 
policy processes in a significant way. By providing administrative assistance, experts 
impact the pace, procedures and priorities of policy negotiations. As brokers between 
stakeholder groups, they also to some extent influence who is given a voice in the dia-
logue. Finding civil society members or representatives of the private sector in policy 
discussions is often the result of donor persuasion. As a World Bank expert in Tanzania 
put it:  
A significant portion on the Bank’s value added is that you force all these people in a 
room together to talk about things, you know. They would say we’re a convening power. 
(Interview 46)  
This convening power becomes manifest in meetings and events which are not likely to 
take place without external facilitation. A study tour on climate change financed and 
organised by the World Bank in the year 2012 serves as a case in point in this regard. In 
cooperation with DFID and the UNDP, the Bank brought a range of high ranking Tan-
zanian government officials and civil society actors to Namibia for a week of 
workshops and discussions with ‘knowledge providers’ from Mexico, South Africa, 
Zambia and the host country. The aim of this ‘Learning Week’, as the World Bank 
termed it, “was for Tanzanian decision makers and advocates to learn from successful 
approaches to climate change planning in different economic and regional contexts and 
apply these lessons to their own context” (World Bank 2012g). The impact of this sort 
of facilitating work is hard to measure directly. Yet, through organising discourse be-
hind the scenes, experts are able to push certain topics (in the example above climate 
change), to channel who is doing the talk and to accelerate the pace of policymaking 
concerning the respective matter.  
A direct impact of expert engagement which is more easily observable concerns the 
practice of governance: Managerial advice to recipient bureaucracies has fundamentally 
changed their ways of working. Since the rise of new public management, experts have 
introduced “new methodologies of governance based on corporate plans, surveys and 
closer budgeting/monitoring techniques” (Harrison 2004: 90). Asked what kind of ex-
pertise World Bank and UNDP experts provided to his organisation in the context of a 
joint environmental project, a South African official explained:  
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I think they did bring with them a lot of project management skills which was useful, also 
evaluation mechanisms, you know, to evaluate your effectivity on the ground, your pro-
ject effectivity, your cost effectivity, and so on. I think what also came out of this process 
very nicely was it gives you the opportunity to stand back and evaluate objectively what 
you’re doing and why you are doing it, to question on a regular basis that what you do is 
in fact aimed at a proper goal and a proper objective. (Interview 13) 
The adoption of project management tools and evaluation mechanisms has far-reaching 
implications for government ministries and departments. It not only changes the lan-
guage and format of their policies and plans which now commonly entail ‘strategic 
objectives’ and ‘logframe tables’, but also basic principles (‘efficiency and effective-
ness’) and practices of governance.  
The last type of support in this categorisation of advisory activities is organisational 
development. Our study provides various examples in which external experts assisted in 
re-structuring government bodies (e.g., the South African National AIDS Council) or 
establishing new units or offices (e.g., the South African Office of Health Standards 
Compliance), and thus engaged in shaping governance systems of aid receiving coun-
tries.  
Addressing policy content and processes as well as governance practice and systems, 
development experts deal with core issues of democratic governance. As Gould (2005b: 
9) observes, they interact with a “growing assertiveness” in the political arena of recipi-
ent countries. Given their intimate involvement therein, it is somehow striking that 
experts tend to dissociate themselves from the political processes in their host countries 
(Gould & Ojanen 2003: 15).80 Reflecting on their professional role, several experts in 
our sample rejected any political influence.81 Similar to others, a GIZ advisor said:  
Whether I adopt a health financing system based on a social insurance model as we have 
in Germany, or a private one as in the US, or the NHS [National Health Service] in the 
UK, is a political decision. These decisions are made and must then be implemented by 
technical experts. We do not take part in political decision-making, we advise and rec-
ommend, but the decisions have to be taken at a different level. (Interview 4, translated 
by authors)82 
                                                          
80
  Gould and Ojanen (2003: 15) observed the “dissociation from political processes” as a “defining 
characteristic” of the transnational expert elite, with donors “commonly avoid[ing] the appear-
ance of engaging in ‘politics’”.  
81
  Interestingly, when asked for an assessment of their organisation’s impact on policy processes in 
South Africa and Tanzania, almost two out of three donor interviewees (65,4%) in our sample 
ranked their organisation as being “amongst the most influential key players” (7,7% “most influ-
ential key player, “23,1% “middle range impact”, 3,8% “low impact”).  
82
  The original interview passage in German: “Ob ich mich entscheide für ein Krankenfinanzier-
ungssystem nach Sozialversicherungsmodell, wie wir in Deutschland, oder privat für Amerika, 
oder das NHS in UK, das sind politische Entscheidungen. Die werden getroffen und dann 
müssen Techniker das Ganze letztendlich umsetzen, ja. An der politischen Entscheidung beteili-
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Only two senior experts, one of them retired, explicitly acknowledged to have shaped 
political decisions in their host countries to a significant extent. The majority of donor 
representatives interviewed rather downplayed their role in policymaking. Framing ad-
vice as a technocratic exercise, however, not only disguises the impact of external 
experts on policymaking and governance in young democracies. Moreover, it makes it 
impossible to hold them to account for consequences of their advice, despite their con-
siderable discursive power in the political realm. 
4.4 Actors and Interests in Aid: Summary 
The preceding chapters have shown that aid is driven by multiple interests at various 
levels. Development assistance is used as a strategic tool by both donor and recipient 
governments. While the former aim at maintaining geopolitical influence as well as fos-
tering export and trade, the latter seek to increase their budgets and thus their capacity to 
act, but also to strengthen relations with partners on their diplomatic priority list. Hence, 
aid is an instrument of foreign and domestic politics on both sides, albeit used from dif-
ferent angles.  
Looking at the level of organisations, the logic ‘the more aid, the better’ equally applies 
to bureaucracies that receive and to those which deliver it. Underfinanced ministries and 
departments in developing countries are usually keen to access as much additional fund-
ing as possible which often results in struggles between treasuries, line ministries and 
authorities at lower levels competing for donor money. As ‘moving money’ is the pri-
mary goal of aid bureaucracies on donor side, they share their partners’ interest in high 
spending volumes and on-going disbursements. Continued need for external support 
legitimates their existence.  
This also holds true for the individual employees of aid organisations who have tangible 
incentives to ‘keep aid rolling’ since their careers depend on it. Development coopera-
tion has created a profitable market for professionals from various branches who are 
attracted by material and non-material rewards: With salaries matching donor countries’ 
pay scales, aid experts commonly enjoy a relatively high living standard in their host 
countries. Their (ascribed) expert knowledge grants them access to the highest govern-
ment levels. Naturally, individuals work towards keeping that status. New aid projects 
and programmes, however, not only advance the careers of donor staff. They also prom-
ise benefits for officials in recipient institutions who can personally profit from extra 
payments common in donor-funded activities.   
In this summary, we paint a very ‘selfish’ picture of the agents involved in development 
cooperation. It is thus essential to make an important point: We do not deny that there 
                                                                                                                                                                          
gen wir uns direkt nicht, wir beraten und empfehlen, aber entschieden werden muss auf einer an-
deren Ebene.” (Interview 4) 
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are good intentions in aid, i.e. that donor governments provide assistance out of a politi-
cal culture which emphasises solidarity; that recipient institutions secure aid in order to 
fix health systems of improve education; or that experts and government officials coop-
erate in aid projects with the goal of making a change for the people. The purpose of 
this chapter, however, was to shed light on the web of interests playing a role in devel-
opment cooperation. The fact that aid is driven by actors with multiple motives and 
agendas which sometimes correlate, but often collide, provides a complicated setting for 
advisory processes. The intricacies of expert advice resulting from the linkage of aid 
and politics and other structural flaws in the context of aid are brought to the fore in the 
following.
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5 Intricacies of Expert Advice in the Aid Context 
Expert advice provided in the context of aid takes place in a setting characterised by 
colliding interests, political pressures and asymmetric power relations. As will be shown 
in the following, such preconditions are obstructive to advisory processes in several 
regards: First, the linkage of aid and politics makes advice volatile, conditional and sup-
ply-oriented in that it is driven by shifting fads and legitimation pressures (chapter 5.1). 
Second, advisory processes are hampered by structural flaws related to conceptual defi-
ciencies and employment practices on the part of donor organisations which impede 
knowledge transfer and learning (chapter 5.2). Third, advisory relations in the context of 
aid are structured along a knowledge hierarchy that reinforces power imbalances and 
marginalises rather than strengthens local expert communities (chapter 5.3). The various 
constraints which will be outlined in this chapter explain the failure of expert advice as 
a means of development assistance which manifests itself in the persistent dependency 
on external expertise after decades of ‘capacity building’ interventions.      
5.1 The Linkage between Aid and Politics 
Aid provided by states to states is inherently political insofar as it is an outcome of po-
litical negotiation, and carried out in the realm of politics. The current knowledge 
paradigm which legitimates external assistance primarily with capacity needs tends to 
mask the immanent political nature of aid. The prevailing “economic-centric, techno-
cratic approach to development” (Carothers & de Gramont 2013: 3) is preferred by the 
international donor community for good reasons:    
While economics appears as a rational, scientific domain, politics seem to imply inevita-
ble entanglement with the irrational side of human affairs – with ideological fervor, 
nationalistic impulses, and other volatile passions. Economics emphasizes consensual 
ideas, like the universal appeal of prosperity and the tragedy of poverty. In contrast, poli-
tics is all about conflicting visions and objectives. Economics deals in definite goals, with 
easily measurable signs of improvement. Politics is about subjective values, with signs of 
progress hard to agree on, let alone measure. (Carothers & de Gramont 2013: 3–4) 
This chapter aims to highlight the linkage between aid and politics and its implications 
for expert advice provided in the context of development cooperation: It firstly shows 
how advisory processes are affected by shifting fads in terms of aid priorities and modes 
of operation which are driven by global and domestic politics on donor side (5.1.1). It 
then turns attention to the legitimation and accountability pressure in aid which, trans-
lated into extensive reporting practices, substantially impacts on advisory relations and 
bureaucracies in recipient countries (5.1.2). Finally, it elucidates how the linkage be-
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tween aid and politics causes a twofold mismatch of supply and demand for expertise: 
The first pertains to advisory subjects and derives from conflicting agendas on donor 
and recipient side; the second concerns a general discrepancy between advice provided 
and requested which emanates from the fact that it serves donors as a means of influ-
ence and control (5.1.3).  
5.1.1 Shifting Themes and Modes of Operation  
Due to its dependency on politics, the aid community is “very fickle” (Interview 27), as 
a South African civil society leader stated. This equally holds true for priority areas of 
support and favourite modes of operation shifting with global trends and domestic de-
velopments in donor states. A retired government official in Tanzania commented in 
this regard:  
Sometimes priorities change. Sometimes an initiative begins well – and then there are 
things called elections [laughing]. They just happened in France the other day, and you 
have a change of government – this change of government comes with different policies 
saying now we are getting out of environment, now I think we are looking at gender, you 
know. Those kinds of things can actually happen. (Interview 66)  
Fluctuating Trends in Aid Topics and Modalities  
The fluctuation of topics in aid can be traced both across and within sectors. Figure 4 
displays aid flows to selected areas in the period 1990–2012, drawing on aggregate 
ODA data from all donors captured in the OECD/DAC reporting system. Eye-catching 
is the sharp increase of aid to ‘Government & Civil Society’, a cluster summarising as-
sistance for issues like public management, institution-building, and fiscal policy and 
planning. Aid spent on these areas more than doubled from US$ 3 373 million in 1999 
to US$ 7 236 million in 2000 and went up to US$ 21 325 million in 2011 which reflects 
the career of ‘good governance’ as an aid topic over the last decade. In the same period, 
HIV/AIDS began to receive significant attention by the international community. The 
high rise in allocations for health can mainly be ascribed to HIV/AIDS-related funding 
which was pushed through the establishment of the Global Fund and PEPFAR around 
2002/2003. With the advent of governance and HIV as donor priorities, the previously 
strong focus on education diminished. While in the early 1990s, education was among 
the sectors absorbing the bulk of aid resources, it was gradually superseded by other 
topics in the first years of the new millennium. Despite global campaigns such as the 
“Education for All” initiative, spending relatively stagnated: Whereas the total sum of 
ODA from 1990 to 2012 increased by 62%83, the volume of aid to education only raised 
by 14%. Similarly, aid allocated for water supply and sanitation couldn’t keep up with 
growth rates of other sectors which came onto the agenda, as for instance environment 
                                                          
83
  According to OECD data extracted on 16 January 2013 from OECD Stat, total ODA amounted 
to US$ 203 221 million in 1990 and to US$ 328 339 million in 2012. 
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which emerged as an issue in recent years. The volume of aid spent on general envi-
ronmental protection quintupled from 1995 (the first year in which it was captured as a 
separate category in the OECD database) to 2012. Since as a cross-cutting theme, envi-
ronment is also targeted by activities in other sectors (e.g., a forest management pro-
programme in the forestry sector), the total amount of environment-related aid can be 
assumed to be a lot higher than the graph in Figure 4 indicates (OECD 2012b: 57–60).84  
 
Figure 4: Aid to selected sectors 1990–2012 
Source: OECD.Stat (2014a).85 
The composition of aid not only shifted across but also within sectors. In education, the 
once prominent field of vocational education and training faded from the spotlight when 
at the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien 1990 basic education came to 
the fore. Although the concept was originally “associated with the fulfilment of basic 
learning needs related to learning and life skills for every person – child, youth, and 
adult” (Buchert 1995: 19), many donors narrowed their focus on (early) childhood de-
velopment, shifting resources to primary education at the expense of other areas. This 
new emphasis was reaffirmed by the Millennium Development Goals which set univer-
sal primary education by 2015 as a global target. Yet, even before 2015 has come, 
spending figures indicate a sharp downturn in support to basic education particularly in 
low-income countries, with some donors completely pulling out of the area (Global 
Campaign For Education 2013). Instead, ‘old’ priorities come back into the picture, as 
an expert working in the Swedish Embassy in Dar es Salaam observed:  
                                                          
84
  In 2009–2010, the sum of only bilateral aid which scored environmental sustainability as ‘prin-
cipal’ or ‘significant objective’ exceeded US$ 25 billion, “representing a quarter of bilateral 
sector allocable ODA” (OECD 2012b: 57). 
85
  Data were extracted on 16 January 2013 from OECD.Stat for the following codes: Government 
& Civil Society (150), Education (110), Health (120) which was added up with Population Poli-
cies/Programmes and Reproductive Health (including HIV related funding) (130), Water and 
Sanitation (140) and General Environmental Protection (410). For a detailed itemisation of topics 
in the DAC Creditor Reporting System system, see OECD (2012c). 
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We’ve been (…) focusing on basic education for the last [years], but before that during 
the 1990s we were very much into vocational training and before that we were also into 
folk education quite a lot. The Swedish government and Sida Stockholm decided to phase 
out the vocational training – but now we are moving back as many others. (Interview 40)  
In health, the most significant change was caused by the rise of HIV/AIDS as an aid 
priority. The share of HIV-related funding rapidly grew from around 3%–5% of total 
health assistance during the 1990s to 24% in 2010, which constituted the largest portion 
allocated to one specific health area. Moreover, in line with the increasing attention to 
governance in the first decade of the millennium, ‘health systems strengthening’ came 
onto the agenda. While still a minor area, its share sharply rose from only 0,2% in 1990 
to 4,2% in 2010. A topic which lost its previous significance is maternal, new-born and 
child health. Although spending in absolute numbers grew at a stable pace within 1990 
and 2010, its portion of total health-related aid diminished slightly over time. The varia-
tion of spending patterns is illustrated by Figure 5 which covers development assistance 
for health by focus areas from 1990 to 2010 (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
2012b: 70–71):   
 
Figure 5: Spending patterns in health-related aid 1990–2010 
Source: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (2012b: 70–71).86 
                                                          
86
  The table draws on data published by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) in 
its 2012 report on global health financing. Tracking development assistance for health at a global 
level, the IHME extracts data from the OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting System, but additionally 
uses other channels such as audited financial statements and annual reports from public and pri-
vate organisations. Given the divergent approaches used for capturing aid flows, the total 
spending figure for health in Figure 5 slightly deviates from Figure 4 which is based on the 
OECD dataset. Due to donor reporting, a significant proportion of aid to health could not be dis-
aggregated by focus areas and was thus classified as ‘unallocable’. Expenditures which were tied 
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For a certain time span, HIV/AIDS was the most dominant theme of the international 
community; as of 2013, it seems that the peak of its prominence as an aid priority has 
passed. Various interviewees of this study pointed out that donors have now shifted 
their attention to climate change as a new topic of global concern. The following state-
ments were made by an HIV/AIDS activist in South Africa, by the leader of an 
education NGO and by a senior officer at the National Environmental Management 
Council in Tanzania, respectively:  
There’s the fact that other issues have arisen, so you know, they’re putting money into 
climate change rather than into health, and we have to persuade them or try to persuade 
them that HIV is not gone away. (Interview 27)  
The discourse of climate in development, you do it because that’s the new HIV/AIDS, 
that’s the new agenda, you have to check that box. (Interview 70)  
Every donor now is running with climate change. Even now here in Tanzania there are 
other things – we have a lot of problems here. Like the desertification, we have land deg-
radation, we have a lot of erosion, but [those issues] are not receiving attention. You’ve 
got these conventions, we have the CBD, we have the UNFCCC, we have the other one 
on desertification, but when you relatively compare these three sister conventions, it’s 
climate change now on top of the agenda. (Interview 59)  
The observation that climate change is the current ‘order of the day’, as a Tanzanian 
environmental expert put it, is confirmed by spending figures. Since 1998, the 
OECD/DAC tracks aid related to global environmental objectives by using the so-called 
‘Rio markers’ which help to identify assistance for implementing the UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity (UNCBD), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) (OECD 
2012b: 60). Figure 6 which covers activities targeting biodiversity, climate change miti-
gation or desertification as ‘principal objective’ indicates the rapid growth of climate 
change-related aid. Despite a drop following its peak in 2010, spending on climate 
change mitigation is still on the rise, while funding for combatting desertification stag-
nates and aid for biodiversity seems to decline:  
                                                                                                                                                                          
to distinct health targets, but did not fit into one of the six defined focus areas were summarised 
in ‘other’. For details on methodology and data sources, see Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation (2012a), (2012b: 25, 70). 
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Figure 6: Aid targeting global environmental objectives 2002–2012 
Source: OECD.Stat (2014b).87 
Aid changes its composition not only with regard to sectors and priority areas. We also 
find shifting fads in terms of modes of operation where one can witness almost a cycli-
cal movement: While during the first decade of the millennium the use of harmonised 
approaches like sector and general budget support increased, there is now a reverse 
trend back from joint arrangements to individual assistance in the form of projects.88 In 
Tanzania, various donors pull out from budgetary support although it is still the gov-
ernment’s preferred aid modality (Economic and Social Research Foundation 2010: 9–
10). DFID, for instance, in its operational plan for Tanzania 2011–2015 announced to 
reduce general budget support, arguing that according to an evaluation it “was not the 
most effective way to deliver results in the current circumstances” (DFID Tanzania 
2011: 3). At the time of our interviews, Sweden critically discussed whether to continue 
with general budget support; Canada reconsidered its sector budget support for educa-
tion. Germany, once a driving force in the establishment of a sector-wide approach in 
health and one of the largest contributors to the health basket fund, indicated to pull out 
of the basket and to redirect the focus of assistance towards a system-strengthening ap-
proach with emphasis on results-based financing and targeted interventions (GIZ 
Tanzanian German Programme to Support Health 2011: 6).89  
                                                          
87
  Data were extracted from OECD Stat on 21 January 2014 using the Rio markers ‘Biodiversity’, 
‘Desertification’ and ‘Climate Change Mitigation’ and counting only activities scoring one of the 
global environmental objectives as “principal objectives”. Data were available since 2002. As 
the marker ‘Climate Change Adaption’ was only created in 2010, it was not included.  
88
  For details on the emergence of budget support and sector-wide approaches, see Foster (2000) 
and Haan and Everest-Phillips (2010).  
89
  A retired expert who had worked for GIZ for decades annotated the shifts in German assistance 
as follows: “This is what happens in development cooperation, it goes back and forth and back 
again.” (Interview 73, translated by authors) 
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Global and Domestic Politics as Causes of Aid Volatility 
The volatility of aid priorities and modes of operation derives from both global fads and 
domestic political developments in donor countries. International agreements reflect the 
shifting paradigms and principles: While the Paris Declaration (2005) placed ‘owner-
ship’ in the centre of aid relations, fostering harmonised approaches, the use of country 
systems and mutual accountability (OECD 2005), the Busan Partnership Document 
(2011) features a focus on results and “the participation of the private sector in the de-
sign and implementation of development policies and strategies to foster sustainable 
growth and poverty reduction” (OECD 2011b: 10). Although the agreement reiterates 
the principles of Paris, it implies a different message, prioritising issues such as ‘value 
for money’ and ‘aid for trade’. As a Swedish expert in Tanzania put it:   
The message nowadays after Busan – we have forgotten everything about ownership, 
alignment, harmonisation, and what we are talking about in the government is ‘get in the 
private sector and everything will be solved more or less’ and ‘find new modalities.’ Now 
of course [I’m] exaggerating, but it’s going into that direction. (Interview 40)  
The reorientation towards the private sector and trade has been pushed by two parallel 
developments, namely the recession of the global economy in 2008–2009 and a liberal 
conservative shift of politics in aid-giving countries. As a result of the global financial 
crisis, many donor governments were pressurised to tighten their budgets and thus cut 
aid; in 2011, ODA from OECD countries decreased for the first time since 1997 (OECD 
2012b). Selling a reduction of ODA to recipients, however, is easier if framed as a de-
liberate decision derived from the discovery that “with trade and specifically with my 
country, we will solve much more problems now” (Interview 38), as one interviewee 
commented. The argument is indeed brought forward in this tone: In its annual report 
2012, the OECD emphasises the “need to engage the private sector much more”, argu-
ing that “the rewards will be substantial: new markets, new productive partnerships, 
new innovative technologies for developing countries, and more income and jobs” 
(OECD 2012b: 28). DFID even announced that its new focus on the private sector 
would “help private enterprise work its miracles as the engine of development” (DFID 
2011).90 
This legitimation fits well with the market-oriented thinking spreading across Western 
governments where liberal-conservative parties have come to power which justify aid 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 The original interview passage in German: “Das ist so in der Entwicklungshilfe, das geht immer 
rauf und zurück und so weiter.” (Interview 73) 
90
  The sudden turn to the private sector as new addressee and theme of aid programmes has pro-
voked stark criticism even within donor countries. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 
a watchdog institution of UK aid reporting to the British parliament, stated in a recent report that 
“DFID needs to recognise that the private sector is not a developmental panacea”, finding that 
objectives of private sector work are “excessively ambitious and fail to reflect what is possible, 
given the complexity of the challenge” (ICAI 2014: 9/33). 
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with economic interests and revamp development assistance accordingly.91 When in 
Germany in 2009 a member of the liberal party became Minister for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development, he not only drove forth an institutional reform process but also 
the involvement of the private sector through public-private partnerships and business-
oriented alliances (CDU et al. 2009; Riedel 2010; BMZ 2011). The Netherlands fol-
lowed this trend shortly after: In 2010, the newly elected government led by the liberal 
Prime Minister Mark Rutte presented a major overhaul of Dutch development policy, 
shifting away from social to economic sectors, aligning aid with trade and placing 
Dutch self-interests in front (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010, 2011). In 
Sweden, general budget support came under scrutiny when a liberal politician – herself 
originally trained as an auditor – took over the post of the development minister and 
started an intense debate on accountability and control mechanisms, arguing for results-
based approaches (Carlsson 2012).92 
What these examples indicate is that domestic politics have a significant impact on aid-
giving (Lancaster 2007). Changes of political actors within donor governments often 
result in a redirection of priorities and modes of operation. ‘Cash on delivery’ and other 
forms of results-based aid match the prevailing mode of thinking among politicians 
concerned about the traceability of aid. Promising transparency and performance, the 
new modalities are based on a governance logic which is currently en vogue:  
It is basically an iteration of the recent fashion in rich countries to place targets on every-
thing from hospital waiting lists to grades in secondary school. Achieve the target, and 
you get paid a bonus; fail to achieve it, and you don’t. (Glennie 2011)93 
Developed by think tanks and innovation units in aid bureaucracies, the new approaches 
have been embraced by researchers, practitioners and politicians who are optimistic 
about making aid more ‘effective’. This is not surprising given that introducing new 
modalities as soon as (or even before) the current ones show signs of failure is an intrin-
sic reflex of the aid community. Innovations enable donors to promise that in future, aid 
will have more impact than in the past (Lancaster 2007: 51–52).94 For recipient coun-
tries, however, the perpetual cycle of being faced with new ideas and ways of working 
is detrimental. A Tanzanian education specialist engaged in the education sector for 
more than forty years on both government and donor side described her experience as 
follows:  
                                                          
91
  For the prevailing rationales used by governments to legitimate aid, see chapter 4.2.  
92
  Gunilla Carlsson, a member of the liberal conservative Moderate Party, served as Minister for 
International Development Cooperation in Sweden from 2006–2013.  
93
  For details on ‘cash on delivery’ and other forms of results-based financing, see Birdsall et al. 
(2011) and Pearson (2011).  
94
  Delineating upcoming reform initiatives such as results-based management, selectivity, poverty 
reduction strategy papers and sector-wide approaches, Lancaster (2007: 51–52) states that „while 
each of these innovations had both advantages and disadvantages, they did enable officials and 
development advocates to argue that development aid in the future would be significantly more 
effective than it had been in the past and thus helped to refresh support for it”.   
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Sometimes these new internationally processed concepts and styles and approaches have 
a much bigger impact than we think of. Of course for us scholars, it is a way of experi-
menting and innovation. An idea worked in Ethiopia, maybe it will work in Tanzania. So, 
perpetually, these countries are experimental. That sustainability and maintaining the sys-
tem is not really going to happen unless we reach a point of saying ‘enough is enough’. 
We cannot move with what is workable. Let’s not just introduce new ideas, let’s move 
on.             
Because what I’m hearing constantly now that people of my age, a bit older, say ‘But we 
did it in the old days. We had good teachers, children were learning in class, what was 
happening then that’s not happening today?’ It’s the changes, the approaches. So every 
time the government is in a learning curve. Sometimes I pity them, because the changes 
are coming so quickly – before you learn this other one, (…) you are already changing. 
(Interview 31)  
The volatility of aid emanating from its dependency on global and domestic politics has 
adverse effects on government systems and programmes in recipient countries. It im-
pairs understaffed bureaucracies with ever-changing procedures and requirements, and 
makes support unpredictable. Government officials interviewed for this study reported 
various examples of projects and initiatives which had reached deadlock when donor 
interests changed. A retired doctor in Tanzania who had worked for the government in 
the field of public health remembered:  
There was a school health program in the 1980s and the donor decided ‘that’s the end’, 
without consultation, all of a sudden it was stopped (…). Locked the doors, no money, no 
facilities, nothing. Then they come back after some time to continue with that project, 
they continued, finished, off they go. That was a bad one.  (Interview 65)  
Similarly, a senior environment management officer working for the National Environ-
mental Management Council in Tanzania reported:  
We had another project from the Swedish – way back in the 1990s. And I don’t know 
what happened, but they withdrew their support. So everything what we had planned 
within the council also ceased to be implemented. (…) So once [donors] shift their priori-
ties, you have a problem. You find that whatever you planned, you fail to implement. 
(Interview 59) 
In South Africa, a high-ranking official engaged in the education sector reported on a 
donor government which, when joining the war in Iraq, unilaterally cut aid to schooling 
initiatives in Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, two provinces in dire need of educational 
support – “that was a dear lesson for us about commitments” (Interview 21), he com-
mented.   
Currently, governments in developing countries are concerned over the drastic decline 
of international HIV/AIDS funding, primarily caused by cutbacks in PEPFAR and the 
Global Fund (see, for instance, IRIN news 2012, 2013a; Collins 2013; IRIN news 
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2013b).95 Given that many government-run programmes are highly dependent on exter-
nal financing, the reductions put national treatment, care and prevention programmes at 
risk. In South Africa, PEPFAR funding drops particularly threaten NGO-run HIV ser-
vices and specialised clinics which the government struggles to take over (Kahn 
2012).96 Tanzania currently tries to lessen the effects of diminished external support by 
setting up an AIDS Trust Fund (Lamtey 2012), in order “to prepare ourselves to contin-
ue keeping it as a priority regardless of who else keeps it as a priority” (Interview 63), 
as a high-ranking member of TACAIDS put it.  
The Detrimental Effects of Shifting Fads on Advisory Processes  
The “fickleness of aid” (Browne 2006: 7) not only has detrimental effects on budgets 
and programmes, but also on advice which is above all impeded by discontinuity. Sev-
eral interviewees in both South Africa and Tanzania underlined that advisory processes 
require a long-term focus and duration, particularly when they aim at bringing about 
systemic changes and strengthening capacity. Similar to other respondents, a South Af-
rican academic stated:   
I think that it’s about being willing to focus on a few things and do it well over long peri-
ods of time. I think stability and continuity are absolutely key (…) – iterative processes of 
learning, focusing on systems and some stability in the policy thinking and ideas.” (Inter-
view 28)  
Advisory support which met these conditions often had a substantial impact. A South 
African interviewee, for instance, highlighted the contribution of GIZ experts in the 
field of local governance, a permanent focus area of German development assistance 
since 1994:   
These guys had a massive impact in the way in which local government takes place in 
South Africa. Until today, the whole idea of having integrated development plans was 
done with the help of GTZ (…). They were there through thick and thin. Refined the 
thing, made it work, and it’s working until today. (Interview 8)  
Similarly, South African government officials emphasised the value of German assis-
tance in the area of skills development which profited from the long-term relationship of 
key actors involved and the fact that it was continued for over a decade (for details, see 
chapter 6.2.2). One explanation for the relatively stable phase of German development 
                                                          
95
  In November 2011, the Global Fund which accounts for around a quarter of international financ-
ing to fight HIV and AIDS announced to provide no new grants until 2014 due to substantial 
budget reductions in some donor countries (Boseley 2011; Kelland 2011). In 2013, the US ad-
ministration under Obama resolved on a continued drop in PEPFAR funding in its budget for the 
fiscal year 2014 (Aziz 2013).  
96
  In March 2013, around one thousand South Africans protested against US funding cuts which 
had led to the closure of a specialised AIDS clinic in Durban (AIDS Healthcare Foundation 
2013).  
5 Intricacies of Expert Advice in the Aid Context 79 
 
cooperation is that it was headed by the same minister from 1998 to 2009. Eleven years 
of ministerial leadership, however, is rather an exception to the rule given the four- to 
five-year election cycles in many Western countries. Cabinet reshuffles on both donor 
and recipient side often come with far-reaching changes in agreements and relationships 
which directly bear on aid activities in recipient countries.97 Advice is affected by such 
changes with respect to its form and substance: The ways of how advice is delivered 
shift along with preferred modalities of newly constituted donor governments; previous-
ly promoted policy approaches are replaced by new concepts, resulting in a “mad pace 
of new ideas” (Interview 28) recipients are confronted with. The ephemerality of poli-
tics thus collides with the necessity for advisory persistence, which is particularly 
essential in developing countries where governance is usually more fragile than in es-
tablished democracies. 
5.1.2 Legitimation and Accountability Pressures 
Foreign aid is financed by taxpayers’ money. As part of public expenditure, decision 
makers in donor countries thus have to justify aid before citizens, and they need to en-
sure it is responsibly used for the intended purposes. Accountability is required at all 
levels of administration involved in aid, from ministries in donor capitals to implement-
ing units in recipient countries. As will be shown in the following, the legitimation and 
accountability pressure emanating from the public origin of aid money strongly affects 
advisory activities and has profound implications for administrations in developing de-
mocracies.  
Results as Means of Legitimation  
While impact and accountability have always been issues in the public debate around 
aid, they have gained centre stage in the aftermath of the global financial crisis arising 
in 2008. In times of shrinking budgets, expenditures for development assistance need to 
be justified even more than before and be completely traceable – “we need to be careful 
with every nickel” (Interview 30), a Canadian Embassy official remarked. Particularly 
bilateral donor organisations are obliged to explain what they are doing and with which 
results. In the UK, for instance, DFID activities are under close scrutiny; a staff member 
in the Tanzanian country office reported:  
                                                          
97
  A high-ranking government official in South Africa mentioned that from his experience, political 
changes have most significant consequences in the case of the United States: “If a particular par-
ty loses, the whole top management must go. So even the agreements that were signed, some of 
them, people don’t know about them. So it becomes very difficult to pursue those agreements. 
So that is why some of those agreements were very short-term, I mean, if you look at the Bush 
administration – when the political party did not win subsequent elections, it was very difficult.” 
(Interview 22) 
5 Intricacies of Expert Advice in the Aid Context 80 
 
Regularly, we have to give responses to parliamentary questions from MPs, and they 
would relate to programmes of DFID. [For] Tanzania, specifically with regard to educa-
tion, I usually have to give some sort of direct response to MPs from constituencies. 
There’s a parliamentary account committee which has done reports on how DFID spends 
money and their value for money, the effectiveness of the support. And under the current 
government, the liberal democrat conservative coalition which came into power in 2010, 
they established a new agency called ICAI which is an Independent Commission for Aid 
Impact, and they are also now doing country or sector thematic studies. They did one on 
three East African Countries, Tanzania, Rwanda and Ethiopia a year ago, and they also 
came to these conclusions, you know, typically you’re putting too much on budget sup-
port, we need to focus more on results and accountability. (Interview 35)  
ICAI evaluations and DFID management responses are disclosed online; the findings 
are critically discussed by the British parliament and widely reported in the media (see, 
for instance, Express 2013; Chorley 2013; Provost 2013).  
Voices slashing development assistance and questioning if it helps at all have become 
louder not only in the UK. For aid organisations, this has increased the pressure to give 
evidence of their impact. They do so primarily by presenting numbers, as the following 
statements extracted from donor websites exemplary illustrate:  
USAID in Tanzania, HIV/AIDS:  
By March 2013, 90 918 individuals were receiving antiretroviral treatment through 
USAID-supported facilities while 129 206 were benefiting from clinical care and 99 498 
from community care. During the same period, USAID provided support to 181 092 vul-
nerable children, and 1 303 individuals with TB received integrated TB/HIV care and 
treatment. (USAID 2013) 
World Bank in South Africa, Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development 
Project: 
The total number of hectares under formal conservation agreements (…) almost doubled 
from 1,054,033 ha to 1,953,246 ha by 2011, exceeding the target of 1,454,033 hectares. 
(World Bank 2013a) 
Sida in Tanzania, education and learning:  
The Swedish budget support has contributed to sharply increasing public investment in 
education. One concrete result from the support in 2012 is the construction of 130 new 
classrooms for around 4 000 students on the island of Zanzibar. (Sida 2013a) 
The need for producing ‘visible’ results strongly affects the form and substance of assis-
tance: Various interviewees emphasised that donors tend to prefer project interventions 
whose impact is directly measurable, at best in geographical areas easy to reach for del-
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egations.98 Donors refrain from joint support modalities, arguing they are not able to 
trace their individual contribution. In the field of HIV/AIDS, the treatment focus of ex-
ternal support can partially be explained by the fact that it is simple to count patients 
provided with anti-retroviral drugs, but not the number of lives saved through awareness 
campaigns – “from care you get results today, you don’t get results today from preven-
tion” (Interview 62), a Tanzanian interviewee remarked.  
The Accounting Imperative in Aid  
Demonstrating results has become the survival strategy of aid agencies, monitoring and 
evaluation practices – often abbreviated as M&E – their means of legitimation. Perfor-
mance and audit reports serve as proof of accountability, a notion which in the context 
of aid tends to be reduced to its technocratic dimension (Mkandawire 2010: 1156): as 
Rottenburg (2000: 146–148) points out, accountability is translated into auditable ac-
counting. In practice, this means that all kinds of aid activities, irrespective of their form 
and substance, are somehow made measurable, compressed into log-frames displaying 
baseline indicators, inputs, milestones and targets against which they are regularly as-
sessed.  
The current practice of generating factuality in form of quantitative parameters through 
which the impact of aid is traced is problematic in several aspects. First of all, present-
ing the social world as “an assembly of facts which can be counted, aggregated and 
audited uses a rhetoric of de-politicization and absolute objectivity” (Rottenburg 2000: 
148) which disguises the creational element of accounting: Figures used in appraisal 
reports, programme documents and evaluations inevitably are a result of method and 
choice since, put simply, “there are always several means of counting things” (Rotten-
burg 2000: 147). Hence, numbers are always a product of deliberate decisions for 
certain ways of calculation and representation. The HIV/AIDS situation of countries or 
regions, for instance, looks differently if one draws on prevalence rates as a measure for 
the extent of the epidemic or incidence rates which indicate the dynamic of HIV trans-
mission.99 Likewise, assessments on the status of education vary depending on the 
                                                          
98
  A retired Tanzanian government official commented in this regard: „If you leave them [donors] 
on their own, they would always start projects in places close to Dar es Salaam or close to 
Arusha, or where they can be reached quickly, like Mwanza, like Iringa. They won’t go to places 
like Goma, where you can have sometimes no flights the whole week. So when their bosses 
come around, they can’t take them there that easily. So they want to do it around Dar es Salaam, 
so that when their bosses come, they can show the results.” (Interview 64) 
99
  This argument was brought forward by a high-level officer of TACAIDS who strongly argued 
for using incidence as an indicator for the epidemic (Interview 62). Prevalence rates describe the 
percentage of a certain population or group infected at a particular point in time whereas inci-
dence rates display the percentage of newly infected people over a certain time span. High 
prevalence can occur with low incidence and vice versa. While due to data availability, AIDS au-
thorities, international organisations and media mostly use prevalence as an indicator for the 
epidemic, incidence is a better measure for reflecting dynamics in the spread of HIV. For details 
on prevalence and incidence rates, see Mattheyse (2007) and Puren (2011).   
5 Intricacies of Expert Advice in the Aid Context 82 
 
indicators used; the perennial debate around how to measure the quality of education 
hints at the constructed character of figures.100 Nonetheless, they have become the pri-
mary reference for proving impact and legitimating decisions in development 
cooperation. The continuation of general budget support, for instance, depends on the 
recipient government’s progress against criteria outlined in ‘performance assessment 
frameworks’ (PAF) (Driscoll et al. 2005). In Tanzania, the 2013 PAF matrix entailed 38 
outcome indicators covering issues such as standard IV exam pass rates, the number of 
village land forest reserves or the proportion of births at health facilities (Development 
Partners Group Tanzania 2012). Given that despite some positive achievements, targets 
in key areas were not achieved, the Swedish ambassador speaking on behalf of devel-
opment partners announced at the annual review meeting that “the 2014 commitments 
and disbursements from DPs will be affected, as the performance tranches cannot be 
released in full” (Hjelmåker 2013).  
Similar mechanisms have been established at sector level where progress is assessed in 
the course of joint annual reviews. Findings generated through that process strongly 
affect future support – “you cannot go back to Canada, seek more money when form 
four results are getting worse” (Interview 31), an education advisor working for CIDA 
in Tanzania commented. Failures in meeting the agreed targets thus put all players in-
volved under pressure: Government representatives need to explain why they weren’t 
able to bring about the expected changes despite external assistance; donor staff in 
country offices struggles to justify the quest for further support before their headquar-
ters.  
The significance of figures for legitimating aid explains the frictions around defining 
indicators and interpreting results reported by various interviewees in both South Africa 
and Tanzania. In 2013, the performance review in the Tanzanian education sector 
caused a serious dispute between the actors involved. From donor view, the government 
tried to finagle continued financial support by meeting the minimum percentage of out-
comes required with minimum effort whilst neglecting central issues. An education 
specialist at the World Bank in Dar es Salaam vigorously complained about the strategy 
he assumed behind the government’s behaviour:  
The government develops milestones which fit in the routine nature of activities. Then at 
the end of the day it will report: this done, this done, this done (…). When you sum up 
you find they have made 70%. But sometimes you find that those items which they didn’t 
do, they are the most important ones to make the effect, the really intended results in that 
particular milestone or activity. (Interview 45)  
Similarly, a DFID education advisor reported:  
                                                          
100
  For details on the debate around quality indicators in education, see, for instance, Barrett et al. 
(2006) and Alexander (2008).  
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Even jointly agreed indicators [have] come up with some friction, because I think there’s 
quite a complicated matrix that has got all the process-like indicators, just saying that you 
have a process review and the like, whilst increasing the indicators about examining past 
results, the distribution of teachers in the country, are the pupil-to-teacher ratios equiva-
lent to the remoter parts as to the urban parts of the country, and that’s proved difficult to 
get in place. In this year, from the exam results of the last year, end of primary and end of 
secondary, we’ve seen very major drops. But those indicators are things that in theory 
will trigger performance tranche payments to the government. Those aren’t likely to be 
met. (Interview 35)  
The government explained its failure with major constraints in implementation, namely 
“inadequate budget allocations and late receipt of funds; large number of specific ac-
tions, which lead into partial implementation of milestones; agreed milestones are not 
necessarily the same as the Government’s priorities; and, some milestones or specific 
actions are not clearly worded or well understood by all parties” (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2012b: 3). Although some of the crucial targets were not achieved, the gov-
ernment’s final ‘score’ in the 2012 education sector assessment was 62% which 
according to the underlying scale implies a ‘satisfactory performance’ – an assessment 
which sounds very moderate in light of the education crisis exclaimed by civil society 
activists, media and parents who blisteringly criticised the government for the deterio-
rating situation (Nkosi 2012; Twaweza 2013; Tambwe 2013). For donors, however, the 
public articulation of social change is not pivotal in decision-making. Instead, they legit-
imate actions on the grounds of the ‘reality’ as constructed in written documentation on 
the basis of parameters generated through techniques of standardisation and calculation 
(Rottenburg 2009). 
Intricacies of Data Generation in Developing Countries  
Drawing on reports and accounts in countries which struggle to produce the data re-
quired for numerical representations of the social world poses a problem. A high-
ranking government official engaged in the education sector described the situation in 
Tanzania as follows:  
This country is very big. You cannot compare [it] with Germany (…). Infrastructure de-
velopment is not the same. If you have to go from Berlin to Bonn, in a few hours you are 
already there. You can use email, because power, electricity supply is everywhere. People 
have got computers, and I’m told nowadays, normally people don’t even write much. 
They use laptops, desktops and the like, now iPads.  
In our context, that information someone has to scribble and then from the school that re-
port is taken to the district. The district has several schools, they have to be typed, some 
people have to analyse what is contained in the reports and then that report is then taken 
to region, that region is processed and then it’s taken to the centre. It can take more than 
the time allocated in the MoU [Memorandum of Understanding] because the MoU is say-
ing you must be reporting every quarter. In some areas that information reaches the 
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school when the quarter has elapsed (…).  Now because you didn’t get the report timely, 
you are disbursed less. (Interview 60) 
In addition to the difficulty of delivering data on time in a country made up of 169 dis-
tricts which lack a proper road network and basic technological infrastructure, the 
interviewee pointed to another problem related to reporting, namely the general low 
level of training among actors involved in the compilation of educational figures:  
What is basic education in UK, for example? I’m told generally there are very few – un-
less immigrants – who don’t go for secondary education. The majority goes up to college. 
But here, the majority remains at grade seven. This is purely primary. So don’t expect the 
quality of a thing prepared by someone with grade seven can be as good as from a gradu-
ate of university. So we say sometimes, please, you need to understand and bear with us. 
So there’s that departure – expectations vis-à-vis the reality on the ground. We over-
expect. Based on the current reality, you shouldn’t over-expect that much the competence 
and the capacity of those providing those reports (…). The teachers have never been 
taught records management. Why should we blame them? (Interview 60)  
From the view of the government official interviewed, donors blend out the environ-
ment in which recipient governments operate and lose sight of what is happening on the 
ground. Given the focus on written evidence in aid activities, newly acquired chairs in 
classrooms do not ‘count’ without formal documentation – “but a reality is that the 
chairs are there, being used by the kids” (Interview 60). The accounting imperative of 
the aid community encumbers recipients with reporting requirements which – even in a 
country like South Africa which has a comparatively strong administration – over-
stretches their capacities.  
Overstrained Recipient Bureaucracies 
The detrimental impact of aid on recipient institutions has been thematised by various 
scholars who pointed to the weakening of already overstrained bureaucracies through 
project proliferation and donor fragmentation (see, for instance, Morss 1984; Bräutigam 
& Botchwey 1999; Knack 2001; Bräutigam & Knack 2004; Knack & Rahman 2007; 
Moss et al. 2008). While in response to this criticism donors proclaimed the principles 
of ‘harmonisation’ and ‘alignment’ in the Paris Declaration, their rhetorical commit-
ment has little translated into practice (Wood et al. 2011). Instead of coordinating 
procedures and using country systems, agencies continue to impose their own standards 
of managing and monitoring aid. Several interviewees of this study reported on the 
pressure related to meeting donors’ demands. An official in the South African depart-
ment commented in this regard:   
The German government might say I am giving you money to deal with STIs [sexually 
transmitted infections] but I would like you to report on one, two, three, four, five indica-
tors just to tell me, show me what you are doing with my money. And when you look at 
the existing systems, it doesn’t really accommodate what the Germans want. What do we 
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do? We need to go back to our systems and change them to accommodate those or we 
create another system just for them to show our accountability. (Interview 17)  
The complexity of dealing with donor requirements further increases when multiple 
players are involved. Even organisations agreeing on ‘joint’ interventions insist on ad-
herence to their respective rules and procedures. A case in point is the ‘C.A.P.E. 
Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development Project’ carried out 2004–2010 
in the South African Cape Floristic Region.101 While it was praised as the first GEF-
funded project jointly implemented by UNDP and the World Bank, the persons in 
charge of coordinating the cooperation at the South African National Biodiversity Insti-
tute faced serious administrative challenges. A key actor involved told us:  
Interviewee: There are lots and lots of different forms that you have to fill in. You’re do-
ing quarterly reports, we had to do financial reports and financial management reports, 
one for the World Bank, one for the UNDP, and the formats were completely different. 
So it’s things like that which – it was very interesting working with both of them because 
they loved it and it seems to have been one of the very first projects where those agencies 
have worked together on the ground and we can see how valuable it was for them and be-
cause of that we’re happy to have done it. But for us, it caused a huge amount of extra 
work behind the scenes, because even though they promised to align reports and would 
sort of align supervision missions, so they would come at the same time. But out of those 
supervision missions would still come one thing for the UNDP, one thing for the World 
Bank (…).   
Interviewer: And did you find over time that those processes were more closely aligned 
or did they stay kind of divergent? 
Interviewee: No, I don’t think that they became aligned. I think that they got their own 
sort of monsters to feed back on. (Interview 25) 
The compulsion of complying with standards designed to ensure accountability in many 
cases causes severe tensions, delays and deadlocks in cooperation. A high-ranking offi-
cial involved in the initial stages of the primary education sector reform programme in 
Tanzania remembered the tedious negotiations between the government and donors on a 
common reporting format:  
We have the government system of reporting. Donors wanted different systems and it was 
very unfortunate that different donors had different formats. Now which one would you 
take? The one of GIZ, would you take the DFID, would you take that of Sida Sweden? So 
it was very difficult. It took us more than six months to agree on the format. And during 
that discussion  nothing was going on because we haven’t agreed on a format. And some-
one was saying now ‘which kind of format do you people need?’ And eventually they 
employed [name], he was in Rwanda, was just completing his Masters and he joined for a 
year, then he provided a good format over there. They said ‘wow, this is it.’ And we han-
                                                          
101
  Details on the project are outlined in the case study on the South African environment sector (see 
chapter 6.2.6).  
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dled that format for just a year – then they said ‘oh no, the format is very complicated, we 
must go back.’ (Interview 60)  
The struggle described above took place in the early years of the new millennium when 
the first Primary Education Development Plan was prepared. At the time of our inter-
views, more than ten years later, it was still a contentious issue in donor-government 
cooperation. The subject of deficient quality and timeliness of reports has become par-
ticularly sensitive due to the deteriorating situation in the education sector, with donor 
representatives struggling to justify the quest for further support towards their headquar-
ters. The fact that annual reports are not delivered as agreed poses a serious problem for 
field staff. A Tanzanian education specialist working for CIDA expressed her distress as 
follows:   
The reports don’t show results. I mean they are writing the way they write (…). We have 
sat together, we have developed the template. And that template, we are saying ideally 
this is what we should see in your report, (…) this is how it should look like so we see the 
results and blah, blah, blah. But then, there are times when we are questioning – this 
chapter on financing is not actually telling us anything. (Interview 31)  
The original idea behind designing a common reporting format for the education sector 
programme was that it would be used both by the government and donors in order to 
avoid a duplication of bureaucratic efforts. Yet, there are still parallel reporting proce-
dures in place:  
In order to get funding from treasury, they have their own quarterly reports in which case 
the accounting officer in that ministry being the parliament secretary, sits down and says: 
‘this is what was done’ and the accounting officer ‘you gave me this much, this is what 
we did, these are the shortfalls or whatever’, however they are writing it. So quarterly he 
writes that, he gets money, he continues to implement his activities – and we are sitting 
here, waiting for an annual report. (Interview 31)  
The significance of those annual reports as means of legitimation and decision-making 
on donor side leads to the paradoxical situation that experts in the field themselves take 
over drawing up ‘government’ reports:   
We were caught up for some years in actually helping to shape those reports. Why? Be-
cause you sit down, you write your project document, in the end of it you say you are 
going to get this annual report, you are going to get this. Now you also have a duty to ful-
fil this side, you know. So that report has to come through in a way, you are pushing. But 
there are times when you are actually – even though we say, we read and we provide in-
put, it is not quite just an issue of reading and providing input. Sometimes you are 
actually writing the sentences. (Interview 31)             
This behaviour and the various frictions on reporting issues sketched above indicate the 
extent to which the reality of development aid is based on presentational practices of 
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documentation (Rottenburg 2009). The reference frame for actors in the aid arena de-
rives from reports and accounts against which they are assessed.  
The Fabrication of Facts for Legitimating Advice  
The accounting imperative not only puts pressure on recipients to demonstrate ‘devel-
opment’ in form of figures. It also coerces donor experts to substantiate the impact of 
their activities in numbers which is particularly difficult when it comes to advice. First, 
its impact on policy processes and governance is neither quantifiable nor directly trace-
able. Second, it usually doesn’t bring about visible change within the narrow timeframes 
of aid interventions. Experts help themselves by generating ‘far-fetched facts’ (Rotten-
burg 2009) which link advisory support and sector developments in spite of knowing 
that such causalities are fictitious.  
A health specialist illustrated this dilemma using the example of the so-called ‘Multi-
sector HIV and AIDS Prevention Programme’ implemented by GIZ in South Africa on 
behalf of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). A 
substantial element of the programme was the delivery of long-term and short-term ad-
vice which aimed at strengthening national, provincial and local AIDS councils and 
improving their coordination and dialogue. Given that these councils were to a great 
extent dysfunctional at the time the programme was conceptualised, capacity and organ-
isational development were indicated as main components of support by GIZ.102 Such a 
programme proposal, however, is difficult to sell to the ministry in Germany:   
The difficulty with this proposal was that we are convinced that it is necessary to 
strengthen intermediary structures. With three million Euro over three years, it would be 
hubristic to expect making a difference at target group level, so we decided to focus on 
intermediary structures. But then BMZ [the ministry] comes in saying: ‘No, we want to 
see the change at target group level.’ Then you say: Well, it will eventually occur some-
where. ‘No, but we insist on that.’ Basically, the ministry would preferably see us using 
the three million and proving that as a result of our intervention, the HIV testing rate 
among adolescents has increased about 50% in this or that district. This is just not possi-
ble. But they do not want to hear that. (Interview 5)103  
                                                          
102
  This information as well as the following details were obtained from an internal GTZ pro-
gramme document which was given to the authors of the study.  
103
  The original interview passage in German: “Die Schwierigkeit bei diesem speziellem Projektan-
trag war einfach, dass wir der Überzeugung sind, man muss Mittlerstrukturen stärken. Wenn wir 
irgendwie auf einer Ebene arbeiten mit drei Millionen Euro über drei Jahre, was wollen wir da an 
Wirkungen erzielen bei so einer Zielgruppe, das ist ja wahnsinnig, was maßen wir uns eigentlich 
an. Also wollen wir Mittlerstrukturen stärken. Aber dann sagt das BMZ: ‘Nein, wir wollen aber 
sehen, was ist denn die Veränderung auf der Zielgruppenebene.’ Und sagen Sie dem BMZ mal:  
Naja, das wird schon irgendwann, irgendwo passieren. ‘Nein, wir wollen das aber so.’ (…) Im 
Grunde genommen wäre es dem BMZ am liebsten, wir würden irgendwas machen mit drei Mil-
lionen und würden dann nachweisen können: Wegen unserer Intervention ist jetzt die 
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Nonetheless, the proposal in the version on hand did include target indicators such as 
“the knowledge of the population in supported provinces about the prevention of HIV 
transmission has increased to at least 80%”, with ‘baseline’ data ranging from 14% to 
41% in different provinces.104  
The pressure to demonstrate measurable impact at target group level – which in donor 
rhetoric is ultimately the population in recipient countries – was also articulated by in-
terviewees in other sectors. A senior manager working on skills development for GIZ in 
South Africa confirmed being obliged to indicate direct effects in programme concepts, 
preferably in form of quantitative data:  
BMZ doesn’t like qualitative indicators. BMZ prefers concrete indicators and we rack our 
brains how to get them through quantifiable assessment methods. That is a balancing act. 
(Interview 3)105  
In the “Skills Development for Green Jobs” programme the interviewee was concerned 
with, one articulated goal was that “70 per cent of graduates from the various green oc-
cupations requiring initial or continuing vocational education and training should find 
suitable employment in the green economy” (GIZ 2013c). As in the HIV awareness 
example above, it is questionable to what extent the achievements of such targets are 
attributable to one specific donor intervention given the multiplicity of efforts and play-
ers in the field. The fact that aid agencies nonetheless claim credit for positive changes 
exclusively for themselves causes annoyance on recipient side. A retired high-level offi-
cial at TACAIDS remembered an incident when the wife of the then US President 
George Bush came to Tanzania, praising the success of US assistance in tackling HIV:   
Laura Bush came to the country some time and she was speaking in one of the different 
centres and she was saying: ‘Through PEPFAR, so many hundreds of patients were on 
treatment.’ And we were saying: ‘That’s lies, those are lies!’ These were the national fig-
ures and there’s the Global Fund and other people who have actually contributed that. 
That has brought problems. (Interview 65)  
Hypothetic causalities are a prevalent feature of donor legitimation although experts are 
fully aware of their fabricated nature. As a Swedish education specialist in Dar es Sa-
laam stated:   
                                                                                                                                                                          
Testungsrate der Jugendlichen in diesem district um fünfzig Prozent hochgegangen. Da kann ich 
nur sagen, das geht nicht. Ja? Das wollen die aber nicht hören.” (Interview 4) 
104
  The programme document extracted the baseline data form a 2008 survey conducted by the Hu-
man Sciences Research Council on HIV knowledge and prejudices in the South African 
population.  
105
  The original interview passage in German: “Aber da ‘n Indikator zu formulieren, das ist dann so 
qualitativ und das will BMZ nicht, das stimmt. BMZ möchte möglichst konkrete Indikatoren ha-
ben und wir zerbrechen uns unseren Kopf, wie kriegt man die, wenn man das erreichen will, auf 
der Ebene von quantifizierbaren Datenerhebungsmöglichkeiten. Das ist so ein Spagat.” (Inter-
view 3) 
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I don’t really believe that it’s that easy to say that there are either a lot of results or no re-
sults, it’s not causal – we cannot find these relationships between our interventions or our 
support. It’s more complex. (Interview 40) 
In addition to the difficulty of constructing causality, experts face the problem of con-
flicting temporalities of aid interventions and change processes in developing countries. 
The timeframes set by their organisations do not allow to “wait for results” (Inter-
view 53). Several interviewees working for different donors pointed to the impossibility 
to deliver the results expected by their headquarters at the end of a three or four year 
programme. A counsellor in the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, for instance, 
commented:  
For twelve years we have been supporting re-forestation and sustainable forest manage-
ment in Shinyanga area. And it took ten years before we actually had a forest there, 
before we had the success story and we are saying, yes, it is re-forested. The local com-
munities are harvesting, improved livelihoods there. They have funds now to send their 
children to schools, they have milk that they can sell at the market, and all these things. 
So I think that is also a challenge for us working here, that we have to sell these stories. 
You can’t have, you won’t have results in three years or four years. You have to have ten, 
twelve years at least before you can really have results. (Interview 39)  
Particularly advice targeting policy and governance issues doesn’t bring about change – 
howsoever measured – within the short lifespan of donor projects and programmes. 
Nonetheless, donor staff needs to outline targets in spite of knowing they are not 
achievable. A Tanzanian environment specialist working for UNDP in Dar es Salaam 
admitted:    
Sometimes I feel embarrassed when you say ‘I will develop a strategy within two years.’ 
And two years come, you still have stakeholders who are not buying into the strategy you 
are going to develop. It takes a lot of time. (Interview 41)  
The fact that superior authorities on donor side nonetheless insist on the formulation of 
concrete advisory outcomes reflects the accountability pressure which dominates the aid 
community, and which is transmitted from development ministries to their implement-
ing agencies, from headquarters to country offices, and finally from field staff to their 
recipient counterparts. This becomes manifest in the following exemplary experience 
reported by a professor at the University of Dar es Salaam who was decisively involved 
in the Norwegian-Tanzanian cooperation on REDD (Reducing Emissions from Defor-
estation and Degradation). When we visited him for the interview in his office, he had 
just returned from a meeting with his Norwegian partners which had brought about a 
serious discussion:    
The reason why I was at the Norwegian Embassy: I think a minister for foreign affairs 
will be coming down to Tanzania from Norway. Then, of course, the Embassy wants 
some of the activities to be accomplished by the time the minister is here. So that at least 
they can impress upon him or her and say, ‘these are things we have done’. But some of 
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these achievements depend on – they have to go through the government system. And 
each and every government has a bureaucracy, has the procedures to adopt things, to ap-
prove things. So you cannot just say ‘I am the donor, I want xyz to be accomplished 
tomorrow.’ It doesn’t work that way. So you find more of a mismatch on the understand-
ing. And for me who is actually responsible for the REDD initiative in this country, I am 
caught in between because the Embassy wants some things to be concluded at a given 
time frame. But the government has stipulated bureaucratic procedures in approving 
things. And there is no way you can bypass that procedure. (Interview 69)  
External pressure to fast-track aid-related issues and push processes is also experienced 
in South Africa. A government official working for the Department of Environmental 
Affairs commented on the impatience of donors as follows:  
They use the rationale that they’re investing in South Africa and we need to react imme-
diately. And with our processes within the government, we can’t react immediately. So, 
sometimes there is that that pressure, especially with the GEF funded projects. (Inter-
view 15)  
The statement that donor representatives legitimate the claim for prompt government 
response on their concerns by referring to their financial investment adumbrates a pro-
found implication of aid: the emergence of outwards accountability towards donor 
governments which potentially undermines state-citizen accountability in recipient 
countries.  
The Erosion of Internal Accountability as a Result of Aid  
The deteriorating effect of foreign aid on internal accountability in developing democ-
racies has been thematized by several scholars sharing one argument: when 
policymakers are obliged to defend their actions and decisions first and foremost to-
wards external financiers before turning to domestic constituencies, a key democratic 
mechanism, namely the fiscal-social contract based on taxation, is annulled (Bräutigam 
1992, 2000; Therkildsen 2002; Gould 2005a; Glennie 2008; Moss et al. 2008; 
Mkandawire 2010).  As Moss et al. (2008: 269) state:  
If donors are providing the majority of public finance and governments are primarily ac-
countable to those external agencies, then it may simply not be possible to expect a 
credible social contract to develop between the state and its citizens. Using the current 
terminology, aid may undercut the very principles the aid industry intends to pro-
mote: ownership, accountability, and participation. 
The observation that aid erodes public consultation and oversight has been made partic-
ularly in countries which receive large parts of their budget from outside (see, for 
instance, Mwenda 2006 on Uganda). But even in South Africa where aid accounts for 
less than 1% of government resources concerns about the political accountability and 
control of official development assistance are raised. In the National Treasury’s devel-
opment cooperation review 2010, the authors point out:  
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Currently the main central mechanism is the annual report on the RDP [Reconstruction 
and Development Programme] Fund, which only covers RDP fund ODA programmes 
and concerns the management of the fund (deposits, disbursements and balance) but not 
the onward management of resources. There is therefore no mechanism that provides 
Cabinet, parliament and the public with an overview of ODA of all kinds into South Afri-
ca on an annual basis. (Fölscher et al. 2010: 16) 
Comprehensive and disaggregated data on aid flows and their use are not even accessi-
ble to the receiving executive given donors’ restrictive disclosure policies. Government 
officials from both South Africa and Tanzania reported on their struggles to obtain ac-
curate information on donor activities in their respective sectors. Not only are there 
specific expenses such as the amount spent on expert advice which is usually not report-
ed to recipient institutions. Moreover, donors bypass government systems which 
exacerbates the decay of democratic control. In Tanzania, only 28% of external contri-
butions for HIV/AIDS interventions are captured in budget books (TACAIDS 2011: 
2010). PEPFAR funding provided by the US which makes up 72% of the HIV/AIDS aid 
budget is channelled directly to NGOs without going through government structures. A 
financing officer at TACAIDS criticised that this practice divests democratic institutions 
of their oversight function:  
If the money does not pass through the government machinery, it means it is not being re-
flected in the books of parliament and parliament passes the budget though the money is 
outside, and therefore they cannot follow how it was worked on and how it is accounted. 
(Interview 61)  
Given that various donors side-line recipient systems which deprives governments of 
fiduciary control, their commitment on ‘mutual accountability’ emphasised in the Paris 
Declaration appears somehow hypocritical. Various interviewees in our study from both 
government ministries and aid agencies stated that accountability in aid relations is still 
unidirectional and asymmetric: while recipients are constantly pressurised to be ac-
countable to their financiers, namely taxpayers in the donor countries, they have no 
means to hold aid agents liable for their interventions and unintended consequences 
(Rottenburg 2000: 150).   
In sum, the linkage of aid and politics results in the following dilemma:  
As things stand, the more accountable a donor is to its own voters, the more onerous and 
invasive will be its intervention in the receiving economy and the more likely it is to un-
dermine the recipient democratic government’s accountability to its own voters. 
(Mkandawire 2010: 1168) 
Adapting this logic to advice as one distinct form of aid, one could argue that the more 
accountable a donor is to its own voters, the more must advisory activities be directed 
by the agenda and interests of the donor country rather than those of the recipient. That 
this is indeed the case will be shown in the following.   
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5.1.3 Mismatch of Supply and Demand for Expertise 
For more than twenty years, advice in the form of technical assistance has been criti-
cised as “driven by donors rather than provided in response to aid-recipient priorities” 
(Williams et al. 2003: iii) by a plethora of studies (Forss et al. 1988: iii; Jolly 1989: 23; 
Berg 1993: 95; Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway &  Asplan Analyse 1994: 11; 
Williams et al. 2003: iii; Land 2007: x; European Commission 2008: 10; World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group 2008: xvi). Authors consistently find that “this basic and 
pervasive factor – the donor-driven character of so much technical cooperation – is a 
root cause of the ineffectiveness of this form of aid” (Berg 1993: 95). In response to the 
critique, donors acknowledged the importance of ‘local ownership’ and announced to 
allow recipients more participation in the procurement and management of experts. 
Shifting administrative responsibilities, however, doesn’t tackle the actual problem 
which is grounded in the linkage of aid and politics: donors leverage aid to foster issues 
of their own agenda and use advice as a means for influence and control. The political 
interests related to aid explain the frequently diagnosed mismatch of supply and demand 
of technical assistance.  
The fact that donors focus aid on their favourite subjects instead of addressing issues 
prioritised by recipient governments has not only been documented by previous re-
search, but also by this study. Ministry officials from both Tanzania and South Africa 
perceived the donor community as little responsive to their priorities. A member of the 
South African National Treasury summarised his experience as follows:    
Interviewee: Well, if you look at the general development partner relationships, there are 
only a handful of partners who would come in and say: ‘We are prepared to support what 
you would want from us.’  
Interviewer: Who would that be?  
Interviewee: That would be, well, it used to be Sweden. I’m not very attached to the Swe-
dish approach anymore. The Swiss are very much doing the same thing now. The Dutch 
used to do that, they don’t do that anymore, in fact they have got their own attitude about 
it. The Norwegians have a similar kind of approach currently. The Danes had it, but they 
have literally withdrawn. The [European] Commission has very much moved in that di-
rection. The Canadians are very strong in supporting us like that. So primarily, that is the 
core group that will provide support to us in that way.  
The rest of them pretty much come with agendas that are more than you and I could col-
lectively work out. You know, it’s just an incredible amount of agenda (…). So you can 
see that, you know, we sign all of these grand accords in Paris and elsewhere, and every-
body is part of it – and nobody, they just pay lip-service to it. (Interview 38) 
Despite the emphasis on ‘demand-driven’ support in international agreements, donors 
tend to give primacy to their own political agendas in giving aid, irrespective of whether 
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they are in line with the recipients’ priorities or not. As a senior official in the Tanzani-
an health ministry commented: 
Some countries, their people are a little bit more flexible, they can discuss. But some, 
they are too rigid. For me, I see they all have an agenda and sometimes your agenda and 
their agenda just collide by coincidence. (Interview 54) 
The precedence of donor priorities in development cooperation becomes manifest when 
agendas do not collide. In our study, several cases provided evidence for frictions which 
emerged from competing priorities on donor and recipient side. A comparison of these 
incidents revealed three different patterns of incongruence: First, donors intervened in 
the domestic political domain of recipient countries by pushing certain topics which had 
not genuinely been prioritised by the government. ICT for basic education, for instance, 
was driven forth in Tanzania by US assistance; the policy documents developed were 
mainly a product of donor-funded advisors. Second, governments explicitly requested 
external support for a problem identified, but donors refused to assist as the topic was 
not part of their agenda. A typical example is the common disinterest of donors in high-
er education. Both the South African and Tanzanian government struggled to secure 
support for this area. At the time of our interviews, Tanzania’s Higher Education De-
velopment Programme was shelved due to a lack of funding required for 
implementation. Third and most notably, we found cases of colliding priorities which 
caused either open or covert conflicts between donors and recipients. The treatment 
versus prevention controversy in the field of HIV/AIDS which created tensions between 
the US government and various developing countries is a case in point.  
All of the examples mentioned above are discussed in-depth in the case studies of this 
book (see chapter 6.2). What should be illustrated at this point is that political agendas 
play a decisive role in giving aid. This has significant implications for advice in the con-
text of development cooperation: Experts are used to leverage certain subjects on behalf 
of their funding governments which not necessarily match the primary problems articu-
lated by the recipients.  
If advice, however, doesn’t take the concerns of policymakers into account, it fails to 
meet a crucial criterion of quality: As Lentsch and Weingart (2009a: 7–8) point out, 
expert knowledge provided by advisors must not only be technically (or scientifically) 
sound, but also “politically useful and acceptable. In short, it must be epistemically and 
politically robust” (italics in original).106 In the realm of aid, one finds various examples 
of advice which doesn’t meet the second requirement as it is driven by the preferences 
of the supplier (i.e. the funder) rather than responsive to the priorities of the recipients.  
                                                          
106
  At length, Lentsch and Weingart (2009a: 8) define political robustness of expertise as follows: 
“Political robustness of knowledge refers to the acceptability and the feasibility to implement 
recommendations based on it. An advice is robust if it can be politically implemented and meets 
the needs of the policymakers. Political robustness normally implies that the knowledge and the 
preferences of those who can be considered stakeholders are taken into account.” 
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While this mismatch concerns the political layer of advice, vested interests related to aid 
also create a discrepancy between expertise provided and expertise required or request-
ed. Evaluation reports repeatedly criticise insufficient needs analysis as a major reason 
for the failure of technical assistance, with donors paying little attention to organisation-
al capacities on recipient side (Forss et al. 1988: ii; Berg 1993: 94–95; Royal Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs Norway &  Asplan Analyse 1994: 12; DFID 2006: xiii; ECDPM & 
ACE Europe 2006: 53; Land 2007: vi; European Commission 2008: 10). While such 
studies usually suggest a more systematic diagnosis of needs as a solution, we argue that 
improving methodologies will not solve the issue. The core problem consists in the use 
of capacity assessments as a tool for justifying advice which serves donors as a means 
of influence and control.     
In aid receiving countries, capacity gaps in state bureaucracies are predominantly de-
fined by external actors. It is usually donor-funded consultants who compile sector 
analyses which commonly find ‘severe capacity constraints at various levels’. Such as-
sessments, however, are invariably biased: They are financed by donor governments 
who seek to get involved in the policy field under investigation. They are commissioned 
by aid agencies intrinsically interested in providing assistance. And they are written by 
professionals whose primary goal as individual consultants is to satisfy their clients in 
order to get follow up assignments. While we do not insinuate that the authors of such 
studies consciously generate skewed results, we argue that they inevitably adopt the 
perspective of their principals. For the latter, assessment reports fulfil the function of 
justifying the deployment of experts in that they provide ‘evidence’ for the need on re-
cipient side. A lack of ‘capacity’ as stated in such documents thus serves as “a 
generalized (and depoliticized) means of legitimizing external intervention” (Gould & 
Ojanen 2005: 45). 
Given its legitimating implication, ‘capacity’ has become a sensitive notion in the aid 
arena. An expert working for the Canadian Embassy in Tanzania told us:  
It is actually whenever we mention that word ‘capacity’ to the government, it says: ‘Who 
do you think you are?’ And the question is, what do you mean by ‘capacity’? So this is 
also now being taken as a badge, you know, ‘Why are you wishing us that? We are ok.’ 
(Interview 31) 
Several interviewees on donor side expressed the sentiment that the government didn’t 
acknowledge capacity gaps and, as a matter of principle, rejected any advice offered 
despite – in the view of donors – being in need for assistance.  
Interviews with government representatives revealed a different narrative. In their per-
ception, donors come with a “mentality that there’s nothing on the ground” 
(Interview 17), disregarding the local capacity available. Leading officials both in South 
Africa and Tanzania find themselves under constant pressure to repel the glut of advi-
sors donors try to embed into their systems – “there is always the attempt of ‘let me 
bring some people’”, a Tanzanian interviewee commented (Interview 63). As an exam-
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ple, she told us an anecdote about tedious negotiations with the government of Japan 
which had proposed a project with a plethora of advisors attached to it:  
That proposal for support of maternal and child health had everything including people 
working for the mortuary. I think that is abuse! Because the starting point should be what 
are the needs? So we negotiated, we negotiated, we negotiated and negotiated. Finally, af-
ter something like just over a year and a half of negotiations, we ended getting a 
laboratory – which was not the starting point. But it was like extracting a normal tooth – a 
long painful process. So why does one come to negotiate with the assumption that every-
body is asleep and the only people who are awake are coming from Japan? It’s wrong. 
(Interview 63)  
While this particular incident happened in the Tanzanian health sector a while ago, it is 
still a prevailing pattern that donors seek to place advisors into recipient countries’ insti-
tutions, irrespective of articulated capacity needs. A WHO officer in Tanzania frankly 
stated that he sees the majority of external experts in the health ministry as ‘supply-
induced’:  
We [the development partners] ask the ministry: How many can we bring to you? They 
don’t request it from us. They don’t request from us, they don’t request in terms of num-
bers, and in what areas. And sometimes we generate demand for them. (Interview 44)  
The observation that development partners ‘generate demand’ indicates that they pursue 
other interests in providing experts aside from supporting recipients. In some cases, it is 
pretty obvious that donor agents bargain for technical assistance in order to care for the 
careers of their colleagues in the aid market. The following experience which illustrates 
such an attempt of job creation was reported by a leading functionary at TACAIDS:  
There’s one particular donor who – we agreed they will give us a technical assistant for a 
period of one year negotiable and we said one and we agreed one. Six months down the 
line, he dares come to me and say, ‘We have an excellent person, his contract has ended 
at ministry X, I think he could be very useful to help you in one, two, three.’ I said, ‘Well, 
how do you know? You don’t work here. I work here and I’ve not identified that need, 
sorry.’ And it was like he couldn’t believe it, he went on and on for four months. Finally, 
I just decided ‘Look here, if you come here one more time for this, I’m going to the am-
bassador because it’s not right what you’re doing.’ (Interview 63) 
While in this case, the recipient representative refused to accept the unrequested offer 
for expert assistance, decisions become more difficult when advice comes as an explicit 
or implicit condition for funding. Although the donor community officially agreed to 
untie financial from technical support (see United Republic of Tanzania 2006b: 11), it is 
still common that organisations come with a “package [which] includes bringing in 
technical assistance” (Interview 69).  
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Experts placed in ministries and departments grant access to the inner sphere of gov-
ernment and control over resources.107 This explains why donors insist on posting 
advisors to recipient units irrespective of capacity needs. The linkage of advice and 
money has been picked out as a central theme by several interviewees, whereby notably 
donor staff assailed the prevailing practice of deploying experts for organisational self-
interests. A World Bank specialist in Dar es Salaam sharply criticised the aid communi-
ty for this kind of ‘imposed’ assistance:   
Because you are supporting a programme, because you are bringing money, then you 
would like to bring anybody to provide the technical assistance – irrespective of whether 
they need it, whether this guy has actually better capacity and there is no transparency in 
terms of how you get this guy from the mother country, whoever the supporting country 
is. (Interview 47)   
The question whether there is a genuine demand for expertise becomes difficult to an-
swer when money is tied to it, even more so when governments are highly dependent on 
external funding. As an expert working for the Netherland’s Embassy in Dar es Salaam 
said:  
If a [donor]country would really come with a package: ‘We want to invest in the water 
sector over the next five years (…), but we definitely, we insist we want you to get two 
TAs because it’s really needed’ – I think that, if it’s good or bad, Tanzania would not re-
fuse that. (Interview 38) 
The assumption that policymakers in Tanzania are not likely to reject support although 
it entails “prescribed technical assistance” (Interview 47) is proved true by the experi-
ence of interviewees. An example is given by a Tanzanian health expert who 
remembered Danida placing nine advisors in the ministry of health as a condition for 
money and material:  
We asked our bosses, ‘But how do you agree on this?’ They said: ‘No, without them we 
could have not got the EDP [essential drugs programme] drug kits.’ It was a condition 
that if you want EDP drug kits and this programme to run, you have to have these advi-
sors. So you are aware, your people don’t have drugs – please bring them. (Interview 44)  
A government committed to improve the ‘quality of life and social well-being’ of its 
citizens (United Republic of Tanzania 2010) would face a moral dilemma if it waived 
the provision of essential drugs for its population (which it cannot afford to procure by 
itself) on the ground that it doesn’t want to have experts sitting in its ministries. While 
there certainly are exceptions, decision makers in Tanzania tend to accept external ad-
vice for increasing their scope of action rather than decline support due to its 
conditionality.  
                                                          
107
  The merging of advisory, administrative and supervising tasks in technical assistance assign-
ments has significant implications for the relationship between advisors and counterparts which 
will be discussed in chapter 5.2.3. 
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This equally applies to the institutionalised interaction with donor experts in the context 
of joint funding mechanisms such as general budget support, sector budget support or 
baskets. Policy dialogue is an obligatory condition of these modalities which have 
brought about “intense and routine donor involvement” (Harrison 2004: 88) in govern-
ment decision-making.108 In technical working groups, SWAp meetings or annual 
reviews, donor representatives regularly meet with policymakers and senior officials to 
discuss policy issues. From recipient perspective, however, the starting point for this 
kind of interaction is the government’s shortage of financial resources and its interest to 
increase the budget with external funding. Since consulting donors is a procedural con-
ditionality for disbursements, policymakers have little other choice than to accept being 
advised. A director in the Tanzanian education ministry pragmatically stated:   
They’re the funders. They’re the ones who support you, so you have to go into negotia-
tion. (Interview 49) 
In Tanzania, a lot of advice provided either through dialogue structures or technical as-
sistance is pushed through by donors without an explicit request by the government. 
This not only brings about situations where advisors end up placed in offices “with 
nothing to advise” (Interview 44). As will be shown in the case studies (see chapter 6.2), 
it also leads to overt and covert resistance against external interference in the form of 
enforced advice which manifests in frictions between external experts and their coun-
terparts.    
In South Africa, we found a very different picture. Neither is the government compelled 
to constantly interact with donors in dialogue forums nor are departments ‘invaded’ by 
foreign advisors. The government tends to be selective in whose support to accept or 
reject. A director in the National Treasury delineated the country’s strategic approach 
towards expert advice as follows:   
There are some things we choose to bring in and some things we don’t (…). And we say 
that this is the type of expertise we need. So we already start directing it from that point 
of view. And we try to control this process so far that we don’t have experts coming in to 
redirect our policy space. (Interview 23)               
The government’s leeway in selecting assistance is, amongst others, grounded on its 
relative independence from external financing. Donors cannot use money as a lever to 
place experts in authorities against an explicit demand. It is noticeable however, that 
South Africa is an exceptional case in terms of its strong standing against donors. The 
bigger the financial and political power imbalances between donors and recipients, the 
more are the latter struggling to defend themselves against ‘imposed advice’ in the form 
of institutionalised dialogue or technical assistance which doesn’t match their needs.  
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  For agreements which outline the conditions of joint funding mechanisms in Tanzania, see Unit-
ed Republic of Tanzania (2008a), (2008b) or United Republic of Tanzania (2011). 
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5.2 Structural Flaws Pertaining to Expert Employment 
Expert advice in the context of development aid is not only negatively affected by its 
linkage with politics. It is also impeded by several structural flaws related to conceptual 
deficiencies and employment practices on donor side: First, aid agencies lack clear con-
cepts of knowledge transfer and capacity building without which expert advice becomes 
a black box process with respect to its impact (chapter 5.2.1). Second, as a result of 
changing recruitment patterns in aid agencies, experts often lack adequate expertise, 
experience and competencies to provide valuable advice to recipients (chapter 5.2.2). 
Third, current employment practices obstruct the building of trust and interpersonal re-
lationships which constitute crucial preconditions for knowledge sharing and learning 
processes (chapter 5.2.3). These obstacles at the micro-level of advice explain why ex-
ternal experts so often fail to achieve their proclaimed primary objective, namely to 
make themselves obsolete by capacitating counterparts in recipient bureaucracies.   
5.2.1 Vague Concepts of Knowledge Transfer and ‘Capacity Building’ 
‘Capacity building’, ‘capacity development’ or ‘capacity enhancement’ are terms that 
are nowadays found in almost every donor document (Easterly 2002: 53).109 Yet, the aid 
community does not have a commonly shared understanding of what these terms mean. 
Some agencies have not even defined capacity building internally and lack any kind of 
strategic vision of how it is meant to take place. An OECD report compiled in 2009 
found that out of twenty-one DAC members, only ten had “some form of overall capaci-
ty development guidance document – either in final or draft version” 
(OECD/DAC Capacity Development Team 2009: 4). The vagueness of the term also 
becomes evident in the interviews of this study. Talking about capacity building, some 
respondents referred to concrete activities such as professional training courses, while 
others used it as an umbrella term and framed it as an overall goal of donor support, 
stating that “all of it is capacity building in a way” (Interview 1). Considering the am-
biguous meaning and use of the term, it is not surprising that the role of experts in that 
context is similarly vague. Aid agencies lack precise concepts of advice and its trans-
formational impact on recipient side.   
A plethora of studies have identified the absence of knowledge transfer concepts as a 
major shortfall of technical assistance (Forss et al. 1988: ii; Berg 1993: 97; World Bank 
2005a: xiii; DFID 2006: xii; ECDPM & ACE Europe 2006: 63 et seq; Land 2007: vi; 
JICA 2008: 4). In practice, the prevailing assumption among actors involved in advisory 
processes is that the interaction between external experts and their counterparts implies 
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  As Easterly (2002: 53) points out, “capacity building has been a theme of donor recommenda-
tions since forever, although it continues to exert its fascination in the latest reports”. Easterly 
made this comment in 2002, but his statement would still be valid today which is more than ten 
years later.  
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a learning process on the part of the latter. This is reflected by a statement of a Tanzani-
an policymaker who commented:     
Transfer of knowledge is there because you take a report to the donor, they analyse the 
report, and they provide comments. On the basis of those comments you can improve 
your report. And you meet, you discuss, you get challenges through questions, you re-
spond. In a way, there is an implied building of capacity. (Interview 60)  
This implied process of capacity building is somehow expected, but not ex ante articu-
lated.  Terms of reference for advisory positions and consultancies entail detailed lists of 
duties (e.g., participation in policy reviews, development of guidelines, conducting 
analyses etc.), but do not dwell on how knowledge transfer is meant to take place 
through these activities. The absence of a clear operationalization makes external ex-
perts follow a “strategy of hope” (World Bank 2005a: 5) when interacting with their 
counterparts. An expert in the Finnish Embassy in Dar es Salaam admitted: 
Sometimes it’s difficult to know, of course, what is it that you or the other person picks 
up from this collaboration, what are the things? Is it the way of working or is it the way of 
expressing yourself or a way of seeing things? Maybe you understand only later on how it 
happens. (Interview 36) 
The performance of external experts is measured against the input they provided, not 
against their impact on the recipient side.110 Given that knowledge transfer is not “fac-
tored within the agreement” (Interview 47), as a Tanzanian World Bank expert put it, it 
receives less attention by advisors who are under pressure to fulfil the tasks agreed in 
their contract. Delivering products, meeting reporting requirements and carrying out 
projects on time often gains primacy over sharing knowledge with counterparts which 
takes time and requires commitment on both sides. As a result, experts end up as ‘doers’ 
instead of being ‘mentors’, with the risk that “when the advisor leaves, you are back to 
square one because the capacity was not transferred to the team” (Interview 33). 
Cases of ‘gap-filling’ experts in government units who create a “vacuum” (Inter-
view 23) after they leave have been reported many times. Interviewees of this study 
provided several examples from both South Africa and Tanzania where authorities 
faced serious setbacks when technical assistance ended but no local staff had been ca-
pacitated to use a newly established system or to conduct a follow-up analysis without 
                                                          
110
  A study on DFID-funded technical cooperation, for instance, states that “a significant problem in 
the assessment of capacity development impact is that the activities reviewed in general did not 
involve exercises to benchmark capacity and capacity targets were not set. As a result, monitor-
ing of capacity impact was either not built into the project monitoring and evaluation system or 
was not done so using a consistent analytical framework (for instance one that distinguished the 
wider institutional setting, the elements of organisational capacity, or individual staff capacities). 
The absence of such a systematic framework or focus on capacity development limits signifi-
cantly the quality of the information on which judgements about capacity development impact 
can be based” (DFID 2006: xiv et seq.). 
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external support. The absence of knowledge transfer as an explicit element in contracts 
and assessment frameworks for advisors is seen as a fundamental flaw in the design and 
management of technical assistance. The problem that experts thus lack incentives to 
train or mentor their counterparts (instead of taking over their work) is exacerbated by 
the fact that they have an interest in keeping their status: simply put, an advisor or con-
sultant is not necessarily keen on making his or her service obsolete by sharing 
knowledge (for which he or she is hired) with others. As a high-level official in Tanza-
nia commented:  
The thing I have noted with consultants, they don’t want to give you everything. They 
just give you very little because they want them to be unique, to be calling them every 
year. Now if they give you everything, you do it yourself, will they continue to have jobs? 
No. Consultants will always come, do a study, but also create a room for a second follow-
up study. (Interview 60)  
The “competitive and money-based” (Interview 8) nature of the consultancy industry in 
particular creates the perverse incentive to keep knowledge exclusive instead of sharing 
it. That being the case, the assumption that knowledge transfer implicitly takes place 
through the interaction between experts and government officials is, to say the least, 
simplistic. If an expert activity is meant to have any transformational impact in terms of 
capacity building, it would be a necessity to explicitly articulate how this is to be 
brought about and to make it a – if not the – decisive criterion for performance assess-
ment. This is not yet common practice in the aid community, given the absence of clear 
concepts of advice and its linkage to capacity building. Knowledge transfer is thus at 
best a contingent by-product of advisory processes whose quality is dependent on the 
commitment and relationship of the individual actors involved.  
5.2.2 Insufficient Fit of Expertise, Experience and Advisory Competencies 
As outlined in chapter 4.3, the composition of expert cadres is changing. Sector-
specialists are increasingly replaced by ‘hybrid advisors’ and generalists with a back-
ground in economics and administration. Work experience is becoming less important 
as qualification criterion than high-level academic qualification and international mobil-
ity. These shifts in recruitment have significant effects on advisory processes insofar as 
experts often lack adequate expertise, experience and relevant competencies to provide 
valuable advice to their counterparts. The insufficient fit of expert backgrounds and the 
resulting weak quality of advice has repeatedly been criticised in evaluation reports 
(Forss et al. 1988: ii; Jolly 1989; Williams et al. 2003: iii; World Bank 2005a: 37; DFID 
2006: xii; European Commission 2008: 10; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 
2008: xv). In our study, the problem of inadequate expertise has been broached as an 
issue by interviewees on both donor and recipient side, particularly in the fields of 
health and education in Tanzania. Many expressed the sentiment that the dialogue in 
technical working groups has been negatively affected by the changing composition of 
5 Intricacies of Expert Advice in the Aid Context 101 
 
donor representatives. Generalists and administrators have little to contribute when it 
comes to sector-specific problems which require specialist knowledge and a deeper un-
derstanding of the matters at stake. Since their expertise, instead, increasingly lies in 
areas such as project management, auditing and accounting rather than on technical is-
sues, it has become increasingly difficult to “talk the same language” (Interview 44) in 
policy discussions, as an interviewee put it. A Tanzanian health expert with many years 
of experience participating in donor-government dialogue explained the frictions which 
emerge from this mismatch:  
You have Rik in the Netherlands [a foreign advisor with a biomedical background], he 
can understand why you are talking this. But others do not understand because they look 
at the money, not at the product and they do not know the challenges that are in the coun-
try (…). They will stick to these audit reports etc., but they will not see the performance 
on immunisation coverage and cases like that. (Interview 44)  
Similarly, a Tanzanian academic engaged in the education sector told us:  
Many of these development partners, they are not experts in education. But they are sup-
posed to be coordinators or chairs for education and they interact with the Ministry of 
Education. I have been with them, I have been to those meetings. It’s very different from 
a university professor of education talking to the Ministry that ‘this is how things can be 
done, this is how to change the mind set of science students, this is how laboratory work 
can be made interesting.’ It’s very, very different. Those people, the development part-
ners, are interested in their money: ‘Has the next tranche been paid, have you received the 
letter for the next tranche?’ (…) That’s their main interest. (Interview 71)  
The managerial knowledge many aid experts nowadays hold helps to administrate pro-
grammes and to keep track of funding flows. It is, however, not the type of expertise 
suitable to fulfil the main objective of the dialogue, namely to provide ‘sound advice’ 
for tackling sectorial challenges in the respective areas (see, for example, Development 
Partners Group Tanzania 2010a: 1 or Development Partners Group Tanzania 2007: 1).  
In addition to the often inadequate expertise of advisors, interviewees expressed con-
cerns about the tendency of donors to send young experts who might be highly qualified 
with regard to academic credentials but lack experience in dealing with complex policy 
issues. The fact that advisors increasingly become younger is a result of accelerated 
career paths in international organisations which attract graduates with a low starting 
age and fast-track promotion (see chapter 4.3). While advisory assignments in develop-
ing countries push the careers of young professionals, the counterparts on government 
side often perceive their placement as little helpful if not burdensome. A Tanzanian 
health expert stated in this regard:  
You bring a person who has never worked in the government, who has read his or her 
books well and then has got a master just like the other one who needs to be advised. And 
you are now coming to advise, then instead of advising, you ask too many questions. 
How does this work out? (Interview 44) 
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A third aspect related to the aptitude of experts which was picked out as a central theme 
both in South Africa and Tanzania was what interviewees framed as ‘personality’. 
Whether recommendations are perceived as advice, constructive or destructive criticism 
or even interference is deemed heavily dependent on the way they are brought forward; 
several officials reported from tensions which emerged when external experts appeared 
overly assertive and dominant.  
Attitudes and behavioural patterns seem to play a decisive role in advisory situations. 
Various reports confirm the significance of a certain set of competencies (often termed 
‘interpersonal skills’) for the impact of advice, such as listening, communicative sensi-
tivity, an ability to empathise and a commitment to assist rather than to prescribe 
(World Bank 2005a: xiii; DFID 2006: 18).111 In contrast to expertise and experience, 
however, such competencies are systematically neglected in the recruitment and as-
sessment of experts.112 Even though this may result from the fact that it is more difficult 
to capture them as qualification criteria, it is nonetheless a structural shortfall which in 
many cases impairs the quality of advisory relations.  
The importance of adequate expertise, experience and advisory competencies on the 
side of advisors was repeatedly emphasised by interviewees of this study and illustrated 
not only by negative experiences, but also by examples of experts who were perceived 
as having the right ‘fit’ and were thus highly appreciated by recipients. A case in point 
mentioned by different officials was a health specialist working for GTZ (later GIZ) in 
Tanzania. Although at the time of the interviews, he had left the country already a cou-
ple of years ago, his former counterparts still praised his support in the field of health 
and HIV. With a high level of specialist knowledge about public health systems and 
broad experience in other African countries, his advice was deemed highly valuable. 
Officials of the Ministry of Health and TACAIDS described him as an outspoken, but 
respectful person who had shown sensitivity and commitment to engage with his Tan-
zanian colleagues – “he truly believed in partnership as partnership” (Interview 63), a 
high-level decision maker stated.  
Apart from the individual attributes recipients ascribed to this individual, they high-
lighted the strong bonds they had built from a long-term cooperation. Staying in 
Tanzania for eight years, the health expert had an exceptionally long period of assign-
ment in the country. His case points to the fact that building advisory relationships 
requires not only the right mix of expertise, experience and competencies, but also con-
                                                          
111
  A World Bank study suggests ‘listening’, ‘curiosity’, ‘patience’, ‘humility’, ‘flexibility’, ‘empa-
thy’ and ‘building trust’ as core competencies for advisory processes (World Bank 2005a: xiii). 
While we would argue that ‘building trust’ is more a result of behaviour which is also dependent 
on other factors (e.g., time), the remainder are similar to the essential competencies that could be 
identified in this study.  
112
  The World Bank report, for instance, finds that behavioural competencies are “hardly covered” 
in the bank’s Overall Performance Assessment framework used for assessing staff (World Bank 
2005a: 35).  
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ducive employment conditions; the latter, however, are usually missing in the aid con-
text.  
5.2.3 Lack of Trust and Social Ties 
A central theme throughout the interviews of this study was the lack of trust and conti-
nuity in advisory relationships resulting from employment practices on donor side. 
Interpersonal relationships have not yet received much attention in the literature on ex-
pert advice. In evaluation reports, they are, if at all, mentioned as a side note, but not 
further investigated. In organisational theories and management sciences, however, the 
impact of interpersonal relations and trust on knowledge transfer processes within and 
across organisations has become a key object of research (see, for instance, Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal 1998; Zaheer et al. 1998; Hansen 1999; Argote & Ingram 2000; Szulanski 
2000; Levin et al. 2003; Levin & Cross 2004; Inkpen & Tsang 2005; Becerra et al. 
2008; Hajidimitriou et al. 2012; Alexopoulos & Buckley 2013). Although such studies 
draw their findings mostly from the firm as organisational context, their theoretical and 
empirical insights are instructive for analysing conditions at the micro-level of expert 
advice in aid. While organisational determinants vary, the basic constellation at the in-
dividual level is similar: actors encounter each other as potential knowledge sources and 
potential recipients. The crucial question is which factors determine whether their inter-
action results in a learning process. A major finding in this regard is the significance of 
social ties, trust and shared visions as manifestations of social capital (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal 1998).113  
Social ties as a structural feature and interpersonal trust as a relational characteristic 
have proved to be two crucial elements for knowledge transfer which are closely inter-
linked (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998; Hansen 1999; Levin et al. 2003; Inkpen & Tsang 2005; 
Becerra et al. 2008). Several scholars have shown that a close working relationship in 
which actors frequently interact functions as a strong tie that stimulates trust; trust, in 
turn, enhances the potential of knowledge transfer, as actors are not only “more willing 
to give useful knowledge”, but also “to listen to and absorb others’ knowledge” (Levin 
& Cross 2004: 1478). What is important to note is that both elements, social ties and 
interpersonal trust, share two characteristic traits: First, they are actor-bound in the 
                                                          
113
  Social capital as a concept of social science is used in a wide range of theories and filled with 
different meanings. Adler and Kwon (2002) provide an overview of definitions across various 
disciplines. We follow Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) who defined social capital as the “sum of 
the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through and derived from the net-
work of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (243), and differentiated three 
dimensions: a structural dimension which refers to the “overall pattern of connection between ac-
tors” (244); a relational dimension which focuses on the relationship between actors; and a 
cognitive dimension which includes “shared representations, interpretations, and systems of 
meaning” (244). The components of all three dimensions have been shown to significantly affect 
the outcome of knowledge transfer efforts within organisational contexts (Nahapiet 2011). 
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sense that ties or trusting relationships cannot easily be traded or passed from one per-
son to others (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998: 244). Second, they depend on a “history of 
interactions” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998: 244), making time and continuity key deter-
minants for their emergence (Preisendörfer 1995: 267; Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998: 244; 
Adler & Kwon 2002: 22; Inkpen & Tsang 2005: 153).  
Looking at advisory relationships in the context of development aid, we find several 
conditions impeding the development of strong ties and trust between advisors and ad-
vised. A major obstacle in this regard is the high turn-over of staff in donor 
organisations. Experts deployed as advisors spend around two to three years in a coun-
try, consultants often only a couple of months.114 Similar to many other interviewees, a 
retired Tanzanian government member assessed the average stay of external experts as 
too short for building a fruitful advisory relationship:  
I think it needs a much longer period of time of interaction between the local and external 
experts in working together for a common goal (…). When it’s two years and an experts 
comes and goes, you don’t really have much, much impact. (Interview 65) 
The impact of advice is seen as heavily dependent on the relationship between experts 
and their counterparts. The emergence of social ties through regular and continuing in-
teraction between actors, however, is hampered by the “temporariness of interlocutors” 
(Interview 71), as an interviewee put it. Building up relationships and trust that consti-
tute essential preconditions for advice requires a timespan which exceeds the 
employment cycles prevailing in the aid community. As a World Bank expert com-
mented:  
By the time you get even on a personal level to understand the guy, then there’s a new 
advisor coming in. (Interview 47)  
In addition to the problem of discontinuity, the development of trust is obstructed by the 
double role of experts as advisors and administrators. As elucidated earlier (see chapter 
4.3), experts in many cases not only have the function to provide advice to government 
officials, but also to monitor the progress of programmes, the adherence to agreements 
and the proper use of funds. Particularly in the case of technical assistants embedded in 
ministries or departments, the merging of advising and controlling responsibilities caus-
es accountability conflicts and distrust. Several interview statements point to the 
perception that experts placed in recipient authorities primarily serve as donor agents. A 
Tanzanian professor expressed the sentiment he observed among government officials 
in ministries in the following way:  
Why do you want them to be in our offices? They will just be here as spies and looking at 
what we are doing. (Interview 71) 
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  Details on employment conditions are outlined in chapter 4.3.  
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The practice of linking advisory and supervising tasks reduces the trustworthiness of 
advice, as the intentions behind expert engagement get blurred. Recipients who are 
doubtful of the motivation of advice are less likely to be receptive to it. The fact that 
experts are perceived as working in the interest of donors and that they appear to benefit 
from their intermediary position which grants them control over resources and access to 
decision makers complicates the emergence of a trustful relationship.115 Various state-
ments of interviewees point to a mutual distrust on both donor and government side 
about the respective others’ purposes within cooperation.  
The perceived discrepancy of intentions and lack of common goals is also confirmed by 
questionnaire results of this study. Asked about their experience in working with their 
counterparts, many respondents assessed ‘sharing similar interests in reaching targets’ 
and ‘sharing a common vision and similar motivation’ as highly problematic issues 
within cooperation.116 This is particularly noticeable as a shared vision constitutes a 
major cognitive element in relationships which is proved to have a considerable effect 
on the emergence of trust in knowledge transfer processes (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998; Levin 
et al. 2003).  
In sum, developing a trustful relationship in a setting characterised by a discontinuity of 
actors, short time frames and non-transparent interests becomes an inherently difficult 
endeavour. While individual actors may still be able to build such relationships, the pre-
vailing employment conditions of experts are not conducive for a “waxing process” 
(Interview 71) at the interpersonal level, thus hindering knowledge transfer processes in 
the context of aid. 
5.3 Unequal Relationships 
With the rise of the ‘knowledge for development’ paradigm, ‘local knowledge’ and its 
importance for transformational processes have become a central theme in the interna-
tional discourse on development (Warren et al. 1995; Catherine A. Odora Hoppers 
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  Delineating conflicting imperatives of the broker’s role in the political sphere, Stovel and Shaw 
(2012: 151) state that “acting as a middleman between these two spheres frequently engenders 
severe distrust from actors on both sides of the divide”. According to the authors, brokers face a 
constant dual-agency dilemma stemming from the tension between the personal ties essential for 
brokerage processes and the potential individual gains of their role: “Given that a broker – due to 
her greater access to information, control over resources, or structural power – has a clear oppor-
tunity to gain at the expense of either or both of the groups for whom she is brokering, how does 
she maintain the trust necessary to continue brokering between them?” (Stovel & Shaw 2012: 
154). 
116
  The distribution of answers in detail (missings not calculated in the percentage): ‘Sharing similar 
interests in reaching targets’: 10,9% extremely problematic, 36,4% problematic, 40% rather un-
problematic, 12,7% definitely unproblematic. ‘Sharing a common vision and similar motivation’: 
14,5% extremely problematic, 41,8% problematic, 30,9% rather unproblematic, 12,7% definitely 
unproblematic.  
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2002; Santos 2007).117 The debate affected the aid community insofar as it questioned 
the prevailing approach of knowledge transfer and shed light on the ignorance of scien-
tific and non-scientific knowledge produced by developing countries (Torres 2001; 
King 2004). In response to the critique, donor organisations have come up with new 
policies and strategies which emphasise the commitment to recognise, use and thereby 
strengthen recipient countries’ knowledge base. Advice should no longer be a one-way 
street, but become a mutual learning experience; experts should no longer only be sent 
from abroad, but recruited within the ‘partner country’.  
Regulations on expert employment reflect this new approach. The World Bank in its 
guidelines for the selection and employment of consultants, for instance, highlights its 
“interest in encouraging the development and use of national consultants in its develop-
ing member countries” (World Bank 2011a: 2). Similarly, Danida’s guidelines for 
technical assistance instruct to give preference to national experts over external ones:   
The first possibility to consider for any TA needs is whether the required expertise is 
available nationally. If national expertise is available and most suitable for the TA input 
required, it would in most cases be preferable if the partner organisation recruits this ex-
pertise directly, and under national rules. Using national consultants and institutions for 
technical assistance can be considered part of capacity development of the human re-
sources base of a country. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2009: 16, bold in 
original)118 
Although the emphasis on local knowledge has become a key part of the rhetoric of aid 
agencies, development cooperation is still characterised by a predominance of external 
experts and an asymmetric flow of knowledge from the North into the global South. The 
unequal setting in which donors and recipients operate is reinforced through the creation 
of “knowledge hierarchies” (Girvan 2007: 16) which marginalise experts in developing 
countries, and increase the discursive power of the transnational expert community 
working for international organisations. Procurement practices and employment condi-
tions of these organisations consolidate the hierarchical classification of expertise in the 
context of development aid.  
                                                          
117
  The term ‘local knowledge’ needs some clarification as it lacks a common definition. Post-
development/post-modernism scholars often use it interchangeably with ‘traditional’ or ‘indige-
nous’ knowledge developed and used by a society as opposed to scientific knowledge. In the 
context of development cooperation, ‘local knowledge’ usually refers to the knowledge generat-
ed in developing countries in contrast to Western knowledge. In this study, we use the term to 
differentiate knowledge which is locally available in a given society (both scientific and non-
scientific) from knowledge provided by external (foreign) experts.   
118
  After arguing that the use of national experts would strengthen the local knowledge base in the 
recipient country, the text continues: “National consultants are generally better attuned to gov-
ernment officials and departmental cultures, as well as to the private sector in the country – and, 
using national consultants may be a cost-effective solution” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark 2009: 16).  
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5.3.1 The Creation of Knowledge Hierarchies 
The procurement of experts has unexpectedly become a major topic in the interviews 
conducted for this study. It turned out to be a sensitive issue in the cooperation between 
donor organisations and recipient institutions. The frictions that arise in the context of 
procurement point to power struggles underlying the process of assessing expert qualifi-
cation in which donors – despite all claims for ‘local ownership’ – still hold the 
authority to set formal and informal rules. In some cases, the gap between donor poli-
cies and practice is appalling. According to the World Bank policy for the selection of 
consultants, for instance, the responsibility of procurement lies with the borrower 
(World Bank 2011a); a Tanzanian expert working for the World Bank in Dar es Salaam, 
however, told us:   
The participation of the ministry or the government is usually very minimal. I see in some 
areas they do participate in terms of selection, hiring and so on, but it’s just face value. 
(Interview 47)  
The cases in which recipients are potentially involved in procurement are limited. Ex-
perts for representative positions such as sector specialists or first secretaries are 
internally recruited by the employing organisation and, in the case of bilateral agencies, 
often require citizenship in the donor country and respective language skills.119 Conse-
quently, while there may be some exceptions, representative positions are usually filled 
with foreign experts. This may not come as a surprise, but one has to bear in mind that 
experts in representative positions are higher up the hierarchy and – at least in a country 
like Tanzania – are the ones who have the widest scope of influence in the sector they 
are concerned with.  
When it comes to procuring advisors and consultants, the extent to which recipients 
have a say in the process varies from agency to agency. Generally, Nordic countries and 
UN agencies are perceived as less prescriptive than other bi- and multilateral agencies 
such as GIZ or the World Bank which set strict conditions and requirements. Consist-
ently with many other interviewees in recipient institutions, a senior officer working for 
                                                          
119
  Although English is used as a standard official language in the aid community, many of the bi-
lateral organisations require advanced skills of their respective country’s language for leading 
advisory positions. The Swedish development agency SIDA, for instance, states on its website 
that „most positions require good knowledge of Swedish (written and spoken), and also Swedish 
citizenship or a residence permit” (Sida 2013b). In our interviews, this was justified with the 
need to be able to report to and communicate with headquarters in the respective language. Inter-
estingly, online adverts for job vacancies are often distributed only in the official language of the 
donor country and not translated into English or French or the language of the country of as-
signment. At the time of research, SIDA published vacancies on its website only in Swedish. 
Similarly, many job descriptions of GIZ are only published in German (although posted on the 
English website), making it difficult for experts from abroad to identify potential job opportuni-
ties.   
 
5 Intricacies of Expert Advice in the Aid Context 108 
 
the Tanzanian National Environmental Management Council summarised his experi-
ence in the following way:  
Interviewee: In case it is a credit from the World Bank, they have a range of conditionali-
ties that these kinds of projects must be internationally advertised and experts compete.  
Interviewer: And do they, have they got any influence on which experts you choose?  
Interviewee: In most cases, they are the one who have the final say.  
Interviewer: They have the final say? 
Interviewee: Yes, they have the final say. Because you have a number of experts, you 
conduct the evaluation, the evaluation has to be submitted to the World Bank, then they 
are the one who say that ‘okay, this is the kind of expert we would like to work with 
based on the qualifications’ (…). You don’t have the final say as a country or as a project. 
Everything, whatever you raise, must have no objection from the World Bank. In fact, 
there is a little flexibility. Whenever we work with international organisations like the 
UNDP – they don’t attach strict conditions like the other one. Because at least there is the 
flexibility. If we work with the UNDP, they can bring money, then we will do everything 
in terms of advertisement, sourcing the experts and everything. (Interview 59) 
While aid agencies differ in terms of setting procurement regulations and conditions, 
they share the practice of differentiating between “national” and “international” experts. 
National advisory positions are open only for nationals of the respective country and 
candidates are locally recruited. International posts, in contrast, are internationally ad-
vertised. The scope of recruitment, however, is not the only difference. Across all aid 
agencies, international experts tend to have superior positions than national experts. The 
hierarchisation between the two becomes manifest in inequalities with regard to remu-
neration, authority and ascribed credibility of expertise. As will be shown in the 
following, prevailing procurement and employment practices create a market which 
structurally discriminates experts from developing countries. 
Finding an answer to the question how the distinction between national and internation-
al experts emerged and how it is legitimated turned out to be more difficult than 
expected. The categorisation is commonly used in human resources policies and staff 
management documents of donor organisations; it is, however, never thoroughly ex-
plained on which justification it is based and which demarcation criteria are used. Asked 
what decides whether a job is tendered as national or international position, interview-
ees provided two answers. The first referred to the assumed availability of domestic 
expertise: The donor and the recipient would jointly decide if experts are likely to be 
found locally, and if not, they would advertise for an international expert. This approach 
would be in line with the principles set out in policies of recipient countries, e.g., the 
Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania which states that “procurement of TA will use 
national rather than foreign expertise or supplies whenever these are able to meet VFM 
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[value for money] and capacity development requirements” (United Republic of Tanza-
nia 2006b: 11–12).  
The second answer justified the practice with compliance to the rules of the market: 
Advisory jobs or consultancies which exceed a specific financial threshold would re-
quire an international bidding process. In fact, aid agencies within the European Union 
which serve as public sector authorities are obliged to EU directives and thus need to 
tender consultancy contracts amounting to € 200 000 and more in all EU member states 
(GIZ n.d; European Union 2012). Similarly, the World Bank has set monetary thresh-
olds for each borrowing country which determine whether short lists for consultancies 
may be limited to national consultants or must include foreign candidates. In Tanzania, 
this ceiling is set up at US$ 200 000, in South Africa at US$ 500 000 (World Bank 2010 
list). These regulations are justified with the aim to foster competition and ensure the 
best ‘value for money’.  
The differentiation between national and international experts in the context of devel-
opment aid is so common that it is rarely questioned. Yet, it demarcates expertise, 
drawing a line between experts in recipient countries and experts from abroad. A Tan-
zanian government official in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
remembered an occasion at which the differentiation of national and international ex-
perts was challenged:    
Actually at one time, we had a very strong debate at the steering committee meeting. We 
just wanted to hire an international expert and someone from the university actually asked 
the chair, ‘at least make a definition of an international expert. Who would be an interna-
tional expert?’ And the consensus actually came that someone might be a Tanzanian, but 
also have an international qualification. (Interview 55)  
Similarly, a Permanent Secretary in Tanzania argued:  
Our professors learnt in universities from abroad, maybe similar universities. For exam-
ples, at the University of Dar es Salaam, some of my good professors there studied at 
Harvard. Some are better, they got their PhD there. So they have got good expertise and 
they are also used by some international organisations like UNICEF and they present pa-
pers abroad, outside there. So this connotation of international and local is not good. 
(Interview 60)  
Many interviewees expressed the sentiment that the differentiation between national and 
international expertise implicitly downgrades the expertise and experience of experts in 
recipient countries. The perception of a hierarchical classification is indeed formalised 
in prevailing employment conditions. National and international advisory positions dif-
fer greatly with regard to remuneration and assigned authority. It is common practice in 
the donor community to use different payment scales for the two categories: the interna-
tional expert is paid according to the organisation’s headquarters’ salary scale, while 
national experts get a ‘local pay’ (see for example World Bank 2010b; GIZ 2011; Unit-
ed Nations 2013b). Although the latter is normally adjusted to the highest level of 
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payment for similar work in the local market120, the salary of an international expert 
usually exceeds the rate of a national one by far. This applies to both longer-term advi-
sory jobs and short-term consultancies. A Tanzanian professor with international 
reputation sharply criticised the huge inequalities in remuneration he experienced in the 
context of aid projects:  
The international consultant being paid maybe € 1 500 per day, the local consultant, no 
matter how skilled you are, full professor, and you are told your rate is € 300; I think 
that’s even on the high side. But actually at the end of the day, you are the one to do the 
work because those people, those foreign experts, they don’t know the local environment, 
where to source the materials. They end up doing the editing of the document that you 
have done (…). And if you are lucky, you’ll be acknowledged in the final document. If 
you are unlucky, even the name will not appear. (Interview 69) 
The huge discrepancy in remuneration has not only been confirmed by several inter-
viewees of our sample, but has also been documented by studies on the use of advisors 
and consultants in the aid context. A comprehensive report on technical assistance in the 
context of Global Fund grants, for instance, states:  
While precise details are not available, the studies showed clearly that local consultants in 
all the study countries receive far less than their international counterparts: local consult-
ant rates were in the range of [US$] 100–350 per day, whereas international rates ranged 
from [US$] 250–650 per day, with Ethiopia reporting international rates of up to [US$] 
1000 per day. Although there is insufficient evidence with regard to cost effectiveness to 
draw any solid conclusions, it should be noted that in some countries local consultants are 
deemed to provide more effective support, in part because of their ability to understand 
and work within the local context. (Coordinating AIDS Technical Support Group 2009: 
8–9)  
The difficulty to present concrete, comparable data results from the fact that most donor 
organisations do not disclose salary scales or rates for advisors – oftentimes, not even 
recipient institutions are informed how much international advisors get paid. Other or-
ganisations are not able to provide an official payment scale for the simple reason that 
they do not have one. A study on the use of consultants in the United Nations system 
found that UN agencies either used outdated or imprecise remuneration guidelines or 
did not have any internal policies or guidelines at all, resulting in “significant discrepan-
                                                          
120
  The United Nations agencies, for instance, pay locally recruited National Professional Officers 
and General Service staff members according to the principle that “staff should be compensated 
in accordance with the best prevailing conditions of service in the locality; consequently, they 
are paid not on the basis of a single global salary scale, but according to local salary scales estab-
lished on the basis of salary surveys” (International Civil Service Commission 2013: 14). 
Similarly, the GIZ policy for national personnel states that remuneration should be “in line with 
usual market conditions”, specifying that “remuneration is comparable with that provided by pri-
vate sector and international companies and other DC organisations competing with GIZ in the 
country” (GIZ 2011: 2). 
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cies and inconsistencies in remuneration across the system and within each organiza-
tion” (Terzi 2012: 31). On its website, the UN provides indicative rates not for 
consultants, but for professional staff. In 2013, an internationally recruited senior advi-
sor seconded to Dar es Salaam was offered a total annual salary between US$ 142 614–
183 934 (United Nations 2013a).121 A National Officer employed as senior programme 
officer received between US$ 53 988–88 537 (United Nations 2012).122 Although the 
two positions differ in terms of the scope of responsibilities and thus the salary data do 
not allow a direct comparison, the numbers shed light on remuneration levels for na-
tional and international senior positions. 
The unequal and non-transparent pricing of expertise in the context of development co-
operation causes frictions and strained relationships, particularly when experts from 
within the country and from outside are paired and supposed to deliver as a team. A 
high-ranking senior official in Tanzania remembered a programme in which two senior 
professors complained about being paid less than their team leader, a relatively young 
consultant from the UK:  
The professor was saying: ‘We have almost the same job, we know this country, we  
travel a lot, we almost do everything. This fellow is just coordinating our efforts and is 
paid very highly and we are paid lower. We are professors; he is just a PhD holder. I have 
my professorship for the past twenty years; this is just a doctor for seven years back.’ The 
professors were not happy. (Interview 60)  
This case points to the second aspect of hierarchisation which can be traced in employ-
ment conditions, namely the practice of putting international experts into a higher 
position than their national collaborators. Irrespective of academic degrees or work ex-
perience, “the lead will be the external, then the national consultant will do kind of 
support” (Interview 68), as an interviewee put it. Job descriptions advertised by aid 
agencies confirm this pattern. While international experts are delegated leading tasks, 
national ones are employed to assist. To give just one example for what these arrange-
ments look like: A procurement notice published by UNDP announced a tender for one 
international and two national consultancy positions to support the implementation of 
the National Mine Action Programme in Vietnam. The roles and responsibilities were 
assigned in the following way: As the team leader, the international consultant should 
manage the team, design the scope and methodology of the study, and draft and finalise 
the report. The two national consultants, classified as team members, were given the 
tasks to collect and review documents, participate in the design of the study and its im-
plementation, contribute and assist in the production of the required deliverables, and 
translate the reports into Vietnamese, amongst others (UNDP 2013b). While this is just 
                                                          
121
  This is the salary band indicated for internationally recruited professional staff at the senior level, 
i.e. senior experts hired as advisors or programme directors.  
122
  This is the salary band indicated for experts categorised as national staff and employed as senior 
programme or senior administrative officers (total net remuneration: TSh 88 661–145 397 thou-
sand).  
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one random example, it reflects the prevailing division of labour when consultants are 
‘paired’, as it is called in the aid community.  
The superior status of international experts also becomes evident in the fact that the lev-
el of seniority of national staff in country offices is usually lower than that of foreign 
staff. Donors certainly vary in this regard.123 Yet, the discrepancy is a pattern found 
across the aid community and documented by workforce data. In 2011, 49% of DFID’s 
total staff held senior posts as civil servants or advisers, whereas only 18% of the na-
tional staff in overseas offices (so-called “staff appointed in-country”) was employed at 
that top level (National Audit Office 2012: 29 et seq.). A similar picture is found at GIZ: 
National personnel in recipient countries made up nearly 70% of GIZ’s total workforce 
in 2012. While this is indeed a high share of locally recruited staff, only 11% of this 
group were employed as leading or senior professionals (GIZ 2013a: 52 et seq.).124 Aid 
organisations tend to boast about the use of national staff in their ‘partner countries’; 
however, as the data above show, this does not necessarily mean that they put local ex-
perts at equal level with experts sent from abroad.  
According to interviewees, the internal divide of staff is latently noticeable in donor 
organisations. A South African expert who had worked for a foreign embassy in her 
country for over ten years told us that she had constantly been aware of the status differ-
ence between herself and foreign colleagues who were consciously or unconsciously 
suggestive of knowing ‘a little bit better’.125 Such kind of implicit downgrading of local 
expertise was broached as an issue by national experts and government officials in both 
countries of the study, particularly in Tanzania. Several interviewees expressed the sen-
timent that donors consider foreign expertise as more ‘credible’. As a Tanzanian health 
expert with years of experience working for the government reported:  
There could be six months consultancies which you can recruit from domestic market or 
you can recruit from abroad. Now you need to look at where do I get these professionals? 
You might have somebody in the domestic market with experience and he has done simi-
lar work – then we have problem of credibility of the report he will be writing. Because 
the credibility, GIZ or Danida, you are more credible (…). When local, national experts 
are reporting, you get a lot of criticism. We have experience here. We were developing 
the health financing strategy with Professors from the University of Dar es Salam. I tell 
                                                          
123
  Generalising our observations, the discrepancies between international and national staff are 
greater in bilateral agencies and less pronounced in multilateral organisations. In UN agencies, 
for instance, national experts have a solid standing, forming the core technical cadre in country 
offices. In the World Bank country office in Dar es Salaam, key positions for certain sectors such 
as the senior health or education specialist were filled with Tanzanian experts at the time of our 
research. One level up the hierarchy, however, the posts of task team leaders in health and educa-
tion were held by international experts, i.e. foreigners. 
124
  The remaining national personnel was categorised as professionals (29%), junior professionals 
(10%), assistants (20%) and support staff (30%). The shares were calculated with data taken 
from the company’s 2012 annual report (GIZ 2013a: 55). 
125
  This statement was not made in an interview, but during a feedback workshop in the context of 
the study. To preserve the anonymity of the person, no further details are provided.  
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you, that strategy has never ended. In fact, it ended up them saying ‘no, we cannot accept 
this document.’ (Interview 44) 
The term ‘credible’ in this context implies both a high quality of expertise in a technical 
sense and ‘objectivity’ or ‘independence’. The tendency to perceive international exper-
tise as more neutral and local expertise as potentially biased is even reflected in official 
donor documents, in which the “lack of distance to the partner organisation” (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2009: 15) is mentioned as a potential risk of recruiting 
national consultants. Being aware of the subliminal disregard of local expertise on do-
nor side, decision makers in government ministries and departments tend to adopt a very 
pragmatic strategy. A permanent secretary in Tanzania stated in this regard:  
For us, we argue that even the local ones have got expertise (…). But when they [the do-
nors] say ‘if you insist on the local, we don’t provide money’ and you want this thing to 
be done in order for you to make progress, so you agree. (Interview 60)  
The unequal assessment of expertise leads to the paradox situation that experts in recip-
ient countries come “behind the umbrella of the foreign companies” (Interview 59), as 
an interviewee put it. Local experts team up with consultancy firms abroad, creating a 
win-win situation for both: while the former increase their degree of credibility, the lat-
ter can claim to provide experts for the country of assignment which increases their 
chance to win the bidding process. An officer in the Tanzanian National Environmental 
Management Council remembered such a case in the context of the World Bank/GEF 
‘Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project’:   
There was an assignment which was given to a Netherlands company, a consultancy firm. 
But you find most of the activities were being done by the Tanzanians. But the company 
which was engaged came from the Netherlands. They were just coming for about two or 
three weeks and went back, but all the field work, data collection, everything was being 
done by professors from the University of Dar es Salaam. But as professors, they could 
not have that assignment (…). (Interview 59) 
Local experts are not necessarily excluded from an international bidding process. De-
pending on the financing agency’s procurement rules, they are in some cases also 
eligible to apply for international posts.126 The rules of the game in that competition, 
                                                          
126
  Unfortunately, it was difficult to obtain clear answers to the – at first glance – simple question 
whether experts from recipient countries are eligible to apply for internationally tendered adviso-
ry positions in their own countries. We were not able to obtain relevant information from 
documents publicly disclosed by donor organisations. Hence, we tried to clarify this issue by 
contacting some agencies directly by email (emails sent on 05 November 2013). DFID’s press 
office did not reply at all. Two contacts at GIZ could not provide a definite answer, adding that 
this was a ‘complicated question’; one of them explained that he never worked with a national 
holding an international position, but he had heard from colleagues that there are exceptional 
cases. Only an agency commissioned by Danida for administering bilateral positions made a 
clear statement: “All bilateral Danida adviser positions are available to all nationalities, meaning 
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however, put them in a rather inferior position in contrast to applicants from abroad. 
The process of selecting experts in the aid market is guided by standards set by donor 
organisations. Expertise is rated against qualification criteria such as university degrees, 
records of publications and previous assignments, and the quality of technical proposals. 
Applying such kind of assessment factors tends to marginalise experts from developing 
countries as they are not able to keep up with experts from the North, as the NEMC of-
ficer pointed out:  
They [foreign experts] come with big CVs, so it is difficult to compete (…). In fact, in 
most cases – in my opinion – I think you find that whenever they submit their financial or 
technical proposals, probably they are quite good compared to our national experts. And 
you find that in most cases they have a track record. They have done quite similar kind of 
studies in other countries. So when it comes to competition, in most cases you find that 
they just win. (Interview 59)  
This experience of a Tanzanian natural scientist points to a couple of structural obsta-
cles which diminish the competitiveness of local experts, irrespective of their actual 
individual expertise. First of all, given the constraints of science systems in developing 
countries127, the academic records local experts are able to provide are usually less 
comprehensive and, again, less recognised. In this context, two points were raised which 
concern local experts working as scientists and likewise as consultants, namely the 
problems of unequal credit distribution and a hierarchical classification of research out-
put. An internationally well-respected Tanzanian scientist broached both issues, 
reflecting what has been said in other interviews:  
There is this misconception that there is this categorisation of the publications. Something 
published in Africa is ‘grey literature’. Something published in the West, in America, 
that’s top class literature. So even in the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change], in the beginning we were told you have to handle ‘grey literature’ with care be-
cause it doesn’t merit scientific credibility. Those kind of insulting sort of statements – 
and sometimes you get annoyed. 
And further:  
Actually, if you find most of this good piece of work which has been done in Africa, 
much of it has been done by Africans, but they don’t feature them in the documents. 
Mostly, scientists from the West take the credits. (Interview 69) 
The problem of unequal credit distribution was reported for both cases of scientific arti-
cles and consultancy reports. As the majority of publications are financed from outside, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
that also experts in recipient countries are eligible to apply for the advertised positions” (Email 
of Mercuri Urval Denmark, received 05 November 2013).  
127
  For a comprehensive analysis of the state of public science in countries of Southern Africa, see 
Mouton et al. (2008).  
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experts in developing countries frequently experience to ‘disappear’ when it comes to 
authorship, making it difficult for them to document research or consultancy experience. 
The fact that funding usually comes from Europe or North America limits the employ-
ment opportunities of experts from developing countries as there is a clear tendency of 
financiers to select advisors from their own region. A Tanzanian policymaker summa-
rised his experience in the following way:  
EU member states, if they give your government money to recruit foreign consultants, if 
you take one from outside the EU member states, I can tell you even the report may be re-
jected. I don’t know why. May I ask you because you come from the EU member states – 
do you have an implied policy that money from your state should be financing consult-
ants from same countries? (Interview 60)  
The pattern that European or US financiers prefer experts from their own countries or 
region was confirmed by various interviewees of the study and mentioned as a major 
obstacle hindering the development of an African consultancy industry. Although inter-
national organisations increasingly emphasise the importance of South-South exchange 
and make some sporadic attempts to create regional consulting pools128, there is still a 
funding gap and a lack of institutional backing for experts from developing nations 
which in turn makes them less competitive in the international market. They are not 
only disadvantaged as they are less able to provide a comprehensive track record of pre-
vious assignments as advisors in other countries. Due to the lack of experience and 
institutional support, they may also be less conversant with the codes of the consultancy 
industry. As one interviewee put it, “a consultant is not here to create new things, he’s 
here to package them well” (Interview 68). This packaging requires the use of certain 
terminologies, formats and methodologies developed and certified by international or-
ganisations. As Evers and Menkhoff (2002: 21) point out, “choosing the right language 
and the appropriate concepts is an essential prerequisite for success” in the market. To 
demonstrate such consultancy skills in applications and technical proposals is often a 
challenge for experts in developing countries with little experience in the market. The 
competitive edge they could provide as opposed to foreigners, namely profound 
knowledge on their countries with regard to political structures, societal and cultural 
issues, and local language skills, is usually given less weight in the selection process 
than formal qualification criteria and certified technical competencies. Comparing ad-
verts for international advisory positions, it is noticeable that in most cases previous 
experience in the country and/or basic skills of the local language in the country of as-
signment is – if at all – mentioned as an asset, but not as a decisive requirement. 
In sum, experts from developing countries have relatively little chance in the competi-
tion for international advisory positions. With the authoritative power to define 
                                                          
128
  An example is the PEPFAR-funded Grant Management Solutions project which employed con-
sultants from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Carribean to advise governments receiving 
Global Fund grants (Anderson 2008).  
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expertise, donors have created a market which ranks “international (that is, Northern) 
knowledge at the top and so-called local (that is, Southern) knowledge at the bottom” 
(Girvan 2007: 16). Procurement practices and employment conditions in that market 
reinforce the hierarchy between external and local expertise, and thus marginalise expert 
communities in recipient countries instead of strengthening them. The donor community 
thereby preserves the prevailing epistemic hegemony of the North which sets specific 
conditions for knowledge transfer between external and local actors.  
5.3.2 Hierarchical Relations between Advisors and Counterparts 
The hierarchy between international and national knowledge characterises not only the 
expert market but also the relationship between external experts and their local counter-
parts. Commenting on the manifest status difference between these agents, a Tanzanian 
advisor working for a foreign embassy stated:   
Once you are a recipient, the relationship cannot be equal. That cannot be. (Interview 31) 
While donor organisations frame advice as a process of mutual learning, actors involved 
still perceive it as a one-directional transfer of knowledge, with foreigners imparting 
their knowledge to local officials. Many interviewees expressed the sentiment that ex-
ternal experts are generally ascribed superior expertise and competency. Even in cases 
where advisors and counterparts have a similar training background and scope of work 
experience, there is an implicit asymmetry in authority, as a Tanzanian professor point-
ed out:   
We have been to school together, we know each other, we know our capacities. But of 
course, when they’re here, they’re treated as people who can give you instructions. (In-
terview 69)  
From recipient perspective, donors often come with an attitude that local counterparts 
are not capable to perform without their assistance. This becomes evident in reactions 
on policies, plans and programmes which if prepared without external support are 
sharply criticised by the aid community. This leaves senior officials in government min-
istries and departments with the impression that donors generally downgrade local 
capacity in order to legitimise the placement of external experts within their organisa-
tions.  
The fact that foreign experts, coming with expertise and money, often have regular ac-
cess to high-level decision makers exacerbates the status difference perceived by 
government staff. South African and Tanzanian officials interviewed for this study ex-
pressed their frustration about how foreigners work themselves in powerful positions 
and claim to interact only with the leading figures of recipient authorities. A director in 
the South African Department of Health told us:  
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Sometimes they come here – which is a big, big, big problem – they come here and they 
prefer to work with people at the highest, highest level. For example, the head of the de-
partment or the deputy of the head of the department. And then they don’t want to work 
with us. And we are the people that are more skilled and we are the people that have more 
information on this (…). I’m knowledgeable about these policies and frameworks. So 
their preference of wanting to meet with the highest level makes frustration. (Inter-
view 18) 
The perceived superiority of external experts in terms of ascribed expertise and influ-
ence creates a discrepancy between actors who are supposed to work as ‘partners’. This 
discrepancy is exacerbated by the obvious differences in living standards and salary 
which in our questionnaire sample, every second respondent assessed as a problematic 
or extremely problematic issue within cooperation.129, 130 Again, it is difficult to provide 
data on donor and government pay which allow a sound comparison.  
Table 4 provides only exemplary figures to give an impression of the existing salary 
differentials:  
Table 4: Monthly salary bands of advisors, consultants and government staff 
Source: DFID (2007: 224); Crown Management Consultants (2009: 72); AusAid (2012: 14); Best Jobs 
Tanzania Blog (2013); Department of Higher Education and Training (2013b); United Nations (2013b).131 
                                                          
129
  The distribution of answers in detail (missings not calculated in the percentage): 13,2% extreme-
ly problematic; 37,7% problematic; 39,6% rather unproblematic; 9,4% definitely unproblematic.  
130
  The perception that the inequalities in living standards contradict the spirit of partnership was 
also expressed by Tanzanian programme officers in the study of Eriksson Baaz (2005: 94).  
131
  To provide a sound comparison, salary data in this table have been converted into US$ and infla-
tion-adjusted. The original data were: TGS F post in the Tanzanian government (as of 2009): 
TSh 625 550 per month (Crown Management Consultants 2009: 72); TGS H post in the Tanza-
nian government (as of 2009): TSh 1 173 730 per month (Crown Management Consultants 2009: 
Rank Recipient country US$ min. US$ max. 
TZ, PMO-RALG Senior forest officer (government scale TGS F)    -- 727 
TZ, PMO-RALG Principal Economist Policy and Planning Divi-
sion (government scale TGS H)  
-- 1 365 
SA, Dep. of Higher 
Education & Training 
Deputy Director, Academic planning, monitor-
ing and evaluation  
-- 4 867 
DFID Senior advisors (band A2)  7 036 10 145 
DFID National health advisor in Tanzania  2 539 3 754 
United Nations Senior level professionals in Dar es Salaam  11 885 15 328 
United Nations Senior level professionals in Pretoria 11 280 14 549 
AusAid Long-term advisor (discipline group c, job level 
4, e.g., senior advisor on biodiversity) 
13 017 19 525 
AusAid Short-term advisor (discipline group c, job level 
4, e.g., senior advisor on biodiversity)  
708 
(daily rate) 
1 063 
(daily rate) 
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In extreme cases, consultants earn more in one day than what government officials get 
paid in a month.132 Salary differentials of that extent create resentment among govern-
ment staff against experts from outside. Though not an openly addressed issue, the stark 
discrepancy implicitly affects the cooperation, as a Tanzanian World Bank pointed out:  
Here is a foreign and here is a guy, local, and they’re all experts according to their level. 
One, of course, is remunerated by his own government – very high, his living conditions 
and everything. This [other] poor guy is on a very rudimentary salary, a miserable salary, 
and they are supposed to be equal. That would also bring in some kind of tension (…). 
Now they are supposed to work at that level with somebody who definitely is different. I 
mean, they are equal but different. You see what I mean. So, I see some kind of – alt-
hough it’s not straight out or outspoken, but you see that kind of element.             
[The local guy] probably would just continue doing business as usual. Not really then 
having willingness to learn, readiness to learn from this guy – he will know it won’t make 
any difference to me. But who would like to make a difference to the system, you see. So 
that commitment is a problem. So basically you are bringing in advisors to try to 
strengthen a system which is a de-motivated system (…). At the end of the day, you just 
go back home and nothing has changed. That’s my own experience, how I see it. (Inter-
view 47)  
All the different aspects delineated above – knowledge, influence, living standard – de-
marcate a boundary between external and local actors, and rank them in an order in 
which the former is higher than the latter. The extent to which that hierarchy is pro-
nounced certainly varies. In both South Africa and Tanzania, however, policy advice in 
the context of aid takes place in an unequal setting in which “knowledge serves the 
function of justifying hierarchical relations” (Girvan 2007: 6). 
5.4 Intricacies of Expert Advice in the Aid Context: Summary 
Drawing on the findings of the preceding chapters, the intricacies of expert advice in the 
context of aid can be summarised as follows: Policy advice within development cooper-
                                                                                                                                                                          
72); Deputy director DHET (as of 2013): R 495 603 per year (Department of Higher Education 
and Training 2013b); DFID Senior advisor (band A2) (as of 2007): £ 35 900–£ 51 773 per year 
(DFID 2007: 224); DFID National health advisor (as of 2013): TSh 4 071 051–6 018 687 per 
month (Best Jobs Tanzania Blog 2013); United Nations Senior level professionals in Dar es Sa-
laam (as of 2013): US$ 142 614–183 934 per year (United Nations 2013b); United Nations 
Senior level professionals in Pretoria (as of 2013): US$ 135 364–174 584 per year (United Na-
tions 2013b); AusAid Long-term advisor, discipline group c, job level 4 (as of 2012): AU$ 12 
545–18 818 per month (AusAid 2012: 14); AusAid Short-term advisor, discipline group c, job 
level 4 (as of 2012): AU$ 682–1 024 daily remuneration rate (AusAid 2012: 12). 
132
  A study conducted by ActionAid International provided concrete numbers for Cambodia where 
“adviser fees of $17,000 per month are several hundred times higher than the salary of a typical 
government employee, at only $40 per month”(Greenhill 2006: 34). 
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ation takes place in a setting permeated with conflicting interests and power inequalities 
between donor and recipient countries, with the latter being in a weaker position due to 
their dependency on external support. Given the strong linkage of aid and politics, advi-
sory processes are affected by shifting fads in terms of topics and modes of operation, 
legitimation and accountability pressures, and a potential mismatch of donor interests 
and recipient needs. At the micro-level, structural flaws in expert employment and hier-
archical relations create conditions which are obstructive to knowledge transfer between 
advisors and their counterparts. As a result, expert advice largely fails to achieve its 
main objective, namely to increase the capacity of recipients to an extent which would 
make them independent from outside assistance.  
Consequently, governments in developing democracies find themselves caught in a per-
petual cycle of being advised by external experts who circulate in core government 
institutions and are involved in all stages of policymaking. Considering that these ex-
perts share a certain epistemic culture and are primarily accountable to their financiers, 
i.e. the donor community, they bring expertise into government systems which carries 
particular paradigms and interests. Expert advice in the context of aid thus becomes a 
conduit for external influence under the disguise of knowledge transfer. To what extent 
and under which conditions recipients are still able to defend their decision-making au-
tonomy in the political realm will be discussed and analysed in the following chapters.
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6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in 
Young Democracies  
A key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government 
to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals. (Dahl 1971: 1) 
As Dahl (1971) points out, a core idea of democracy is that the rulers in power are re-
sponsive to the state’s citizenry, whereby ‘responsive’ implies that they take the will of 
the governed into account. Thus, a central dimension of quality in democratic govern-
ance is the degree to which decision-making is guided by the needs and demands of the 
voters. Ideally, government policies reflect the majority preference of the people. This 
is, of course, a normative stance. A perfect congruence between what the citizens want 
and what the government does is utopian in any real world democracy where also un-
popular decisions – e.g., an increase in taxation – need to be made. Yet, the legitimacy 
of democratic governments is based on the premise that they consider the demands of 
their constituencies “at least in broad outlines over the long run” (Gilens 2005: 779). 
In aid receiving democracies, the question whose interests are taken up in policy pro-
cesses is often difficult to answer. Given the dependencies pervading aid and the 
omnipresence of donor-funded experts in the power centres of recipient countries, one 
can assume that a plethora of decisions are induced from outside, reflecting the prefer-
ences of donors rather than those of domestic stakeholders. In this chapter, we want to 
explore the extent to which policymaking in South Africa and Tanzania is shaped by 
external experts related to the aid community, using education, health and environment 
as fields of investigation. We selected these areas for three reasons: firstly, they are high 
on the development agendas of both states; secondly, they have been focus areas of for-
eign support; and thirdly, expertise and ‘evidence’ are deemed crucial for legitimating 
policy decisions in the these fields. While it is inevitable for such an analysis to deal 
with the issues at stake in the respective sectors, i.e. to consider the policy content, we 
pay particular attention to the process of policy development, the actors involved there-
in as individuals and members of groups, and the context which provides the ‘setting’ 
for their interaction (Walt & Gilson 1994). Adopting a political economy perspective, 
we closely follow Whitfield (2009b) whose approach starts from a number of assump-
tions, namely that a) structural conditions decisively impact on the outcomes of policy 
negotiation; b) contemporary processes and relations are affected by past experiences 
which requires to take a historical perspective; and c) conflicts of interest between local 
and foreign actors may well be grounded on legitimate political differences (Whitfield 
& Fraser 2009: 37–38). To what extent aid recipients in South Africa and Tanzania have 
been able to defend their views and set their own agenda against outside advice, and 
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what accounts for their strength or weakness to do so, are the guiding questions of the 
six case studies presented in this chapter.   
6.1 Structural Conditions 
Drawing on theoretical considerations (see chapter 1), existing literature, and our empir-
ical findings, we suggest that the extent to which developing democracies are able to 
defend their decision-making autonomy in the political realm primarily depends on 
three structural conditions: their financial strength, their administrative capacity, and the 
local knowledge base they can draw on. In the following, we elucidate the relevance of 
these factors for aid-related advisory processes and look at South Africa’s and Tanza-
nia’s status with regard to corresponding indicators in the fields of health, environment 
and education.  
6.1.1 Financial Strength 
Let me tell the truth: If our relationship is also influenced by donating, do you think you 
have much power if you are a recipient? (Interview 60)  
This statement made by a permanent secretary in Tanzania hints at a pervasive experi-
ence of aid recipients, namely that due to their dependency on donor resources, they are 
invariably the inferior party in negotiations. We assume that the degree of asymmetry in 
donor-recipient relations notably depends on the financial strength of the soliciting 
country. Hence, our first hypothesis is that the higher the financial dependency, the 
weaker is the recipient’s position in defending the local agenda against external pres-
sure.    
Governments in need of donor money are inevitably forced to accept that they have to 
enter some sort of negotiation with potential financiers and may need to compromise on 
the terms and conditions of assistance (Nissanke 2010: 66); as Martens (2008: 289) 
points out, “conditionality is the price the recipient pays in order to get access to trans-
fers in case of nonaligned preferences”. Previous studies indicate that one factor 
determining the bargaining discretion of the beneficiary is the degree of dependency on 
aid as an essential source of finance (Gould 2005a: 143). When aid is constitutive of the 
overall performance of the domestic economy and a government’s capacity to act, recip-
ients are likely to accept external interference in policymaking for the sake of keeping 
their economy and state apparatus running. In extreme cases, the dependency on donor 
funding erodes governments’ agenda-setting function since “priorities turn to whatever 
brings in the most money” (Polidano 2000: 812). 
Scholars have suggested a variety of definitions and variables of aid dependency (see, 
for instance, Lesink & White 1999; Bräutigam 2000; Knack 2001). An indicator com-
monly used at present is the share of aid to the recipient country’s gross national income 
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(GNI) (Glennie & Prizzon 2012). Drawing on statistics extracted from the World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI) database, Figure 7 displays the ratio of official 
development assistance and GNI in Tanzania, South Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa 
from 1993 (the first year in which data for South Africa are available) until 2011. Most 
notably, it shows that the percentage of aid to South Africa’s GNI ranging from the 
lowest value of 0,21% in 1993 to the highest of 0,47% in 2002 remained basically in-
significant. Tanzania, in contrast, has very high ratio levels, both compared to South 
Africa and to Sub-Saharan Africa as a region. Although the proportion of ODA to the 
country’s GNI declined by more than half from 23,07% in 1993 to 10,32% in 2011, it is 
still significant, implying a high impact of aid on the Tanzanian economy.   
 
Figure 7: Aid as share of GNI in South Africa, Tanzania and Sub-Saharan Africa  
Source: World Bank database (World Bank 2014c). 
Relating aid volumes to the gross national income or the gross national product (which 
was previously used as denominator) points to the significance of external finances to 
recipient economies and allows assumptions on the consequential influence of external 
financiers in spending decisions (Bräutigam 1992).133 For our purposes, however, such 
measures have two flaws. First, they describe aid dependency of recipient economies 
rather than governments; and second, they are not useful for a sectorial analysis.134  
                                                          
133
  In an early article on the interdependencies of governance, economy and foreign aid, Bräutigam 
(1992: 11) stated that “when aid transfers reach ten percent or more of total GNP (as they did for 
at least 24 countries in 1989) and exceed total current revenue from other sources, those with the 
loudest single voice on revenue and expenditure issues are international lending agencies”.   
134
  This equally applies for other commonly used indicators such as “Net ODA received per capita” 
or “Net ODA received as % of imports of goods, services and primary income” which cannot be 
disaggregated by different sectors.  
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An indicator which may be disaggregated by sectors is the ratio of aid as a percentage of 
government expenditure. The underlying argument: When donors fund a substantial 
share of sector budgets, they are likely to have a say in defining the priorities for which 
their money is spent. If a line ministry is highly dependent on external financing for 
implementing a national programme, its leaders can hardly reject support even if it 
comes with conditions. These conditions may not even be explicitly written down in 
agreements, but conveyed in policy forums where donor experts and government offi-
cials interact. The latitude of decision makers to take decisions against advice is 
severely restricted when their capacity to deliver basic services depends on donor mon-
ey.         
While the share of external contributions in government expenditures constitutes a suit-
able indicator for (sectorial) aid dependency, it has some crucial constraints pertaining 
the accessibility and accuracy of data. As other scholars have pointed out, figures for 
this measure are scarce and not necessarily consistent, which makes it difficult to carry 
out time-series analysis and cross-country comparison (Knack 2001: 315; Glennie & 
Prizzon 2012: 2). In the WDI database, the indicator “Net ODA received (% of central 
government expense)” lacks information for 15 out of 48 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
including Tanzania; for the remaining ones, data are at best erratic. In addition to the 
limited availability of data on recipient government expenses, donor statistics pose a 
major problem. Aid agencies apply different definitions and standards in reporting 
which are not always clearly spelled out; for instance, many do not disclose which 
amount of a certain programme budget is actually transferred to the recipient or used for 
advisors and administration.135 In many cases, one finds appalling discrepancies be-
tween aid commitments and actual disbursements (Bulíř & Hamann 2008; Celasun & 
Walliser 2008). Moreover, donor figures are often different from those reported by re-
cipient governments (Wood et al. 2011: 13)136, which is exacerbated by huge amounts 
of off-budget funding channelled outside government systems. Hence, information on 
aid flows varies depending on the sources selected.  
In light of such statistical constraints, any numbers related to aid have to be taken with 
caution. The data we present in Table 5 which displays donor funding as share of total 
expenditures in different policy fields thus need to be considered as indicative rather 
than accurate. Extracted from annual reports and expenditure reviews of government 
                                                          
135
  In interviews and during a feedback workshop held in Stellenbosch in 2013 (see chapter 2), gov-
ernment officials from both South Africa and Tanzania utterly complained about donors not 
disclosing disaggregated data on financial disbursements and technical assistance, pointing par-
ticularly to the non-transparent practice of USAID which poses a severe problem for government 
planning and budgeting.  
136
  In a report on the second phase of implementing the Paris Declaration, the authors comment on 
the ‘statistical obstacles’ observed as follows: “It is not clear to what extent these reported prob-
lems result from poor or late reporting (at the international or national levels), to unsynchronised 
cycles and/or to actual discrepancies in commitments and/or disbursements. In any case they 
perpetuate uncertainty and do not encourage trust” (Wood et al. 2011: 13).  
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ministries and departments, they are based on different systems which are not methodo-
logically congruent since the way external funding is accounted in South Africa and 
Tanzania varies. A common feature in financial statements of ministries and depart-
ments, however, is the indication of actual expenditures and the amount of aid thereof. 
Juxtaposing the calculated shares based on these figures may help to receive an impres-
sion of the financial impact of donors in different policy areas: 
Table 5: Aid as share of government expenditures in 2010/2011 (in %) 
 Total Education Health HIV/AIDS Environment 
South Africa 1,0 1,3 0,8 16,4 1,1 
Tanzania 28,2 8,5 38,4 97,5 n/a 
Source: Fölscher et al. (2010: 1); Policy Forum (2010b: 1); Department of Basic Education (2011: 21); 
Department of Health (2011a: 150); Education Sector Development Committee (2011: 115); Department 
of Environmental Affairs (2012a: 71); Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (2012: 14); Republic of 
South Africa (2012: 67); TACAIDS (2012: I).137 
Table 5 provides a snap-shot of the numerical impact of donor contributions on line 
ministries’ and departments’ spending for the fiscal year 2010/2011. A salient contrast 
is the generally low level of external funding amounting to around 1% (except for 
HIV/AIDS) in South Africa, while in Tanzania aid is a substantial part of both total and 
sector expenditures, at the extreme in the field of HIV/AIDS where donor funds made 
up 97,5% . Yet, drawing the conclusion that South Africa can do without aid would be 
too simplistic since plain numbers never paint a whole picture. We therefore contextual-
ise the figures presented above with additional material in order to delineate dimensions 
of aid dependency in the different areas. 
                                                          
137
  The absolute numbers underlying the percentages presented in Table 5 (if not indicated different-
ly, all expenditures are for fiscal year 2010/2011): Department of Basic Education: R 5 587 892 
thousand actual expenditure; thereof R 72 815 thousand aid (Department of Basic Education 
2011: 21). Department of Health: R 21 081 796 thousand actual expenditure; thereof R 163 217 
thousand aid (Department of Health 2011a: 150). South African Global AIDS Response Progress 
Report 2012: R 12 964 273 thousand total spending on HIV and TB; thereof R 2 126 049 thou-
sand aid (fiscal year 2009/2010) (Republic of South Africa 2012: 67). Department of 
Environmental Affairs: R 2 416 076 thousand total expenditure; thereof R 26 053 thousand aid 
(Department of Environmental Affairs 2012a: 71). Policy Forum’s Budget Analysis: TSh 11 609 
557 million overall budget; thereof TSh 3 274 553 million aid (Policy Forum 2010b: 1). Educa-
tion Sector Performance Review: TSh 585 929 million actual expenditures of the Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training; thereof TSh 49 682 million aid (Education Sector Develop-
ment Committee 2011: 115). MoHSW Public Expenditure Review: TSh 924 131 million actual 
expenditures; thereof TSh 354 637 million aid (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2012: 14). 
Public Expenditure Review 2011 for Tanzania Mainland: TSh 442,8 billion total real expendi-
ture; thereof TSh 431,8 billion aid (TACAIDS 2012: I). 
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South Africa’s Financial Strength by Sectors 
A case in point that illustrates the skewing nature of numbers is the impact of donor 
funding in the South African environment sector. At the national level, the Department 
of Environmental Affairs (DEA) is the most important government organisation in 
charge. With 1,1%, aid made up only a small share of DEA’s expenditures in 
2010/2011, implying a very limited role of external funding. The level of donor contri-
bution has not always been that low: In 1999/2000, development assistance amounted to 
20% of the department’s annual budget, and in 2004/2005 it still constituted around 
4,5% (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2006: 72).138 While the sig-
nificance of aid for DEA has considerably declined over the last decade, it remains an 
essential source of income for other public entities and nature conservation agencies 
which are severely underfunded. The South African National Biodiversity Institute 
(SANBI), a national statutory body responsible for monitoring the state of biodiversity 
and providing research and policy advice on biodiversity matters, is heavily dependent 
on external funding in key areas of its mandate (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2012). 
In 2011 and 2012, around half of the resources required for generating science-based 
evidence to inform decision-making related to biodiversity management and climate 
change were obtained from donors. In its strategic plan for 2013–2018, SANBI warns 
that “certain deliverables are at risk if the nature or extent of the external funding 
changes during the five-year planning period” (SANBI 2013: 20). Provincial conserva-
tion authorities such as CapeNature in the Western Cape face similar challenges. In 
recent years, grants from domestic and international donors have amounted to half of 
the organisation’s total budget (Hamman 2009: 1), making the implementation of pro-
grammes and services contingent on external financiers. Given such resource 
constraints of key agents in the field of environment, the sector is to some extent de-
pendent on donor money although it appears marginal from a national perspective.  
In education, aid is an issue of historical importance, but rather negligible in financial 
terms. During the apartheid era, various countries from Europe, the US and states from 
other world regions provided overseas scholarships and extensive funding for educa-
tional initiatives in order to support the oppressed non-white population, bypassing the 
isolated government (King 1999: 257–258).139 When in 1994 the new democratic Gov-
ernment of National Unity came into power, the international community was ready to 
shift its assistance from civil society to the Department of Education and its envisaged 
reform activities. In the early years of the new state, “requests for educational collabora-
tion were arriving virtually on a daily basis from prospective partners as large as the 
Russian Federation and as small as Croatia”(King 1999: 260). While an enormous num-
ber of bi- and multilateral agencies contributed to the subsequent transformation 
                                                          
138
  In 1999/2000, the department was still named “Department of Environmental Affairs and Tour-
ism” (DEAT).  
139
  Details on the historical background of donor support to education in South Africa will be out-
lined in the respective case study (see chapter 6.2.2).   
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 126 
 
process, the financial volume of aid in relation to government spending remained mar-
ginal, making it “almost impossible to identify individual contributions of 
donors”(Ngeleza et al. 2000: 29), as an evaluation of ODA to education from 1994 to 
1999 found.  
This is still the case today. Like in Tanzania, the education sector in South Africa re-
ceives the largest part of the government’s budget. In recent years, its share gradually 
increased from 18,2% in 2010/2011 (R 165,1 billion) to 20,2% in 2013/2014 (R 232,5 
billion). The resources are primarily allocated to the Department of Basic Education and 
the Department of Higher Education and Training responsible at the national level, and 
the nine Provincial Education Departments.140 The figure on aid assistance as a percent-
age of expenditures indicated in Table 5 pertains to the Department of Basic Education 
in fiscal year 2010/11; with 1,3%, the share of foreign funding was miniscule. In subse-
quent years, it remained at a similarly low level, although slightly increasing to 2% in 
2012/13.141 External contribution in expenditures of the newly established Department 
of Higher Education and Training consistently made up less than 1% in its initial years 
of operation.142  
Given such small numbers, it is obvious that the role of foreign money in the South Af-
rican education system is marginal. Yet, various government officials interviewed 
emphasised the value of aid as a means for co-financing pilot projects and ‘niche areas’ 
such as inclusive education for which the regular budget provides only limited re-
sources. In 2010/11, donor funds were used for the development of the Human 
Resources Management Information System in education and for teacher training in 
special schools, amongst others (Department of Basic Education 2011: 128). For such 
initiatives, ODA provides an ‘added-value’ in education. At large, however, the sector 
can be assessed as financially independent from donor assistance.  
In health, we find a similar situation if looking at the sector in general. Although gradu-
ally increasing, external resources for health make up a very small percentage of total 
health expenditure in South Africa, as shown in Table 6:  
 
 
                                                          
140
  In 2009, the former Department of Education was split into two ministries. While the Depart-
ment of Basic Education is now in charge of early childhood development, and primary and 
secondary education, the Department of Higher Education and Training covers tertiary education 
up to doctorate level, adult basic education, and technical and vocational training (skills devel-
opment) which was previously managed by the Department of Labour. Details on educational 
governance structures are provided in the respective case study (see chapter 6.2.2).  
141
  The percentages are calculated from data on aid assistance in actual expenditures as indicated in 
the financial statements of the department’s annual reports Department of Basic Education 
(2011: 144), (2012: 128), (2013: 242).  
142
  This is drawn from financial statements in DHET’s annual reports Department of Higher Educa-
tion and Training (2011: 146), (2012a: 160), (2013a: 209).  
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Table 6: External resources as share of total health expenditure in South Africa 
Year 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
% 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,7 0,8 1,2 1,9 2,2 2,1 
Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database (WHO 2014).143 
Budgetary figures of the Department of Health confirm the financial strength of the 
government. As indicated earlier in Table 5, aid assistance accounted for only 0,8% (of 
the department’s actual expenditures in fiscal year 2010/2011 (Department of Health 
2011a: 150), equivalent to previous years. Such numbers suggest that foreign money is 
insignificant for public health financing. While this holds true in principle, there is one 
important exception: In HIV/AIDS, the focus area of donor engagement, external fund-
ing plays a critical role.  
Although the South African government “is the primary investor in its own national and 
provincial response to the HIV/AIDS and TB epidemic” (Republic of South Africa 
2012: 92), donors substantially contribute to financing interventions. In 2009/2010, ex-
ternal sources amounted to R 2 126 million (equivalent to US$ 265 million), which 
made up 16,4% of all HIV/AIDS and TB spending in South Africa (Republic of South 
Africa 2012: 67). Compared to other African countries where over 80% of HIV pro-
grammes are funded from outside (Venter 2013: 43), this figure may still seem 
moderate. Yet, the significance of assistance has recently become manifest when the 
two largest external financiers, i.e. the United States through PEPFAR and the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), cut their contributions.144 
Since 2004, the PEPFAR programme has channelled nearly US$ 4 billion to South Af-
rica (Kavanagh 2014: i). The bulk of resources were allocated to NGOs offering direct 
services for patients in need of anti-retroviral drugs. Now that the US has ceased fund-
ing in the course of the PEPFAR ‘transition’, many specialised HIV treatment centres 
were forced to close (Katz et al. 2013); the South African government struggles to ab-
sorb patients and staff into an overstretched public health system (Kavanagh 2014).145 
Thus, aid funding has some relevance in South Africa’s HIV/AIDS response, despite its 
limited volume in relation to domestic resources. 
Tanzania’s Financial Strength by Sectors 
Assessing Tanzania’s financial strength in the environment sector is challenging since it 
is handled as a cross-cutting issue for which various ministries share responsibility. In 
                                                          
143
  The figures presented in Table 6 relate to all channels of health spending, i.e. government, the 
private sector and NGOs. Data were extracted on 20.02.2014 (WHO 2014). 
144
  Over the period 2008–2010, R 2 500 million were channelled through the PEPFAR programme 
and R 680 million through the Global Fund, which together amounted to 58.3% of external aid 
for tackling HIV/AIDS (Republic of South Africa 2012: 92/95). 
145
  In 2012, the US announced to gradually reduce PEPFAR funding to South Africa from US$ 484 
million in 2012 to US$ 250 million in 2017 (Kavanagh 2014: 9).  
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 128 
 
contrast to HIV/AIDS (which is also termed cross-cutting), environment is not captured 
in a separate ‘code’ in budget books. Hence, as other authors have pointed out, it is im-
possible to give accurate figures or percentages of government and donor spending in 
this policy area (Luttrell & Pantaleo 2008: 12; Kulindwa et al. 2010: 13).146 In order to 
nonetheless delineate the impact of external funding in environment, it is instructive to 
look at the budgetary situation of major players involved.147 The Division of Environ-
ment in the Vice President’s Office (VPO-DoE) and the Forestry and Beekeeping 
Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) are primarily con-
cerned with the matter. Table 7 displays actual spending of these units as indicated in 
the government’s budget books, i.e. disaggregated into recurrent and development ex-
penditures. While the former cover operational expenses (e.g., for salaries and wages, 
purchases of goods and services), the latter are used for development projects and in-
vestment activities. Two issues are outstanding: first, development expenditures are 
almost entirely financed from foreign sources (except for VOP-DoE in 2009/2010); and 
second, external contributions are notably volatile in terms of their financial volume. 
Table 7: Environment-related expenditures in TSh million 
Vice President’s Office, Division of Environment 
Fiscal 
Year 
Development exp. Recurrent 
exp. 
Total exp. Foreign as % 
of dev. total 
Foreign as % 
of total  
 local foreign dev. total 
2009/10 957 0 957 6 316 7 274 0,0 0,0 
2010/11 0 481 481 3 682 4 163 100,0 11,6 
2011/12 168 3 713 3 881 4 548 8 429 95,7 44,1 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Forestry and Beekeeping Division 
Fiscal 
Year 
Development exp. Recurrent 
exp. 
Total exp. Foreign as % 
of dev. total 
Foreign as % 
of total  
 local foreign dev. total 
2009/10 19 6 740 6 759 13 068 19 828 99,7 34,0 
2010/11 0 3 287 3 287 13 354 16 641 100,0 19,8 
2011/12 0 68 68 14 491 14 559 100,0 0,5 
Source: Tanzania Budget Books (Government of Tanzania 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b). 
Again, it needs to be stressed that the figures do not take into account the large sums of 
foreign funding provided outside the government system. Yet, they reflect the consist-
ently high aid dependency of divisions concerned with environmental issues. The 
                                                          
146
  Trying to compile an overview on the environment budget in Tanzania, Kulindwa et al. (2010: 
28–29) itemised allocations to environment-related programmes carried out by 13 different min-
istries; the contribution of donors to these programmes are unfortunately not traced.  
147
  Details on organisational structures and responsibilities related to environmental governance in 
Tanzania are provided in the respective case study (see chapter 6.2.5).   
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former director of environment in the Vice President’s Office confirmed that during his 
term in office more than 90% of funding for programmes was provided by donors which 
made implementation reliant on continued support. At the time of our interviews, the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism experienced the consequence of this de-
pendency when major donors withdrew aid due to recurrent corruption allegations, 
causing a serious funding crisis.   
Without external resources, not only development programmes grind to a halt. In some 
cases, public entities are under-funded to an extent which imperils its core operations. 
The National Environmental Management Council (NEMC), established as technical 
advisory, coordinating and regulatory agency in charge of environmental protection, 
struggles to meet its recurrent expenditures without donor money. According to a news-
paper article citing the director general, NEMC received only TSh 1 billion out of TSh 7 
billion requested from the government in the fiscal year 2011/2012 (Rugonzibwa 2012). 
An environmental officer working for the council delineated the situation as follows:  
Even if you had the approval maybe that the government is giving one million, at the end 
of the day you are getting 200 000 thousand out of the million. So you find within the fi-
nancial year, you have the promise, you have an approved budget, but the fund is not 
coming. (…) It is unpredictable when you are going to get the funds to implement the ac-
tivities. That’s why there are a lot of problems. (Interview 59) 
The fact that environment comes out at the short end in resource allocation is not sur-
prising in a country with “tremendous needs and huge budget shortfalls” (Interview 46), 
as a World Bank environmentalist put it (see also Mwalyosi & Sosovele 2001: 6). Ex-
ternal funding has become a substantial source of income for government units 
concerned with environmental issues. Hence, the dependency on donor support in the 
field of environment is significant.  
In contrast to environment, education is a priority sector in Tanzania. Like in South Af-
rica, it repeatedly received the largest portion of the government’s budget in recent 
years, with shares fluctuating between 17% and 23% during 2008–2013 (Policy Forum 
& HakiElimu 2011; Ministry of Finance 2012: 9; United Republic of Tanzania 2012b: 
43; PER Macro Group 2013: 18).148 In 2010/11, a sum of TSh 2 045 billions was des-
tined for education of which one third was allocated to the Ministry of Education and 
Vocational Training (MoEVT) and the remainder to the Ministry for Social Develop-
ment, Gender and Children (MSDGC) and the Local Government Authorities (LGAs).  
As in other African countries, aid accounts for only a minor part of education spending 
(Samoff 2009: 11). For the MoEVT, foreign contributions made up 8,5% of total ex-
penditures in 2010/2011 (see Table 5) which implies a rather limited relevance of donor 
funding. What needs to be considered, however, is the leveraging impact of external 
assistance. Education is a sector with high operational costs. Given that the bulk of re-
                                                          
148
  Data on education spending as a share of total government budget provided by different sources 
vary. The discrepancy in figures, however, is marginal, amounting to 1%–2%.  
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sources are depleted by recurrent expenditures such as salaries and allowances, “there is 
little money for teacher education, textbooks, building construction and maintenance, 
even pencils, paper, and chalk” (Samoff 2009: 11). This is where donors come into play. 
While their contribution appears small in relation to the overall education budget, it 
makes up a significant portion of development expenditures. In 2010/11, foreign funds 
accounted for 60% of the education ministry’s development budget, an increase com-
pared to the previous two years where the share has been between 45% and 50% (Policy 
Forum 2010a: 2). Development programmes are thus highly dependent on donor sup-
port and volatile to their priorities: At the time of our interviews, the Primary Education 
Development Programme suffered from decreased funding as a result of diminishing 
donor interest; the Higher Education Development Programme was shelved due to a 
lack of financial assistance. The fact that donors regularly fall short of meeting their 
pledges causes serious setbacks for the implementation of programmes (Policy Forum 
2010a: 2; HakiElimu 2011: 4).149 The significance of external funding in the develop-
ment budget makes donors more relevant than they may seem at first glance. In 
interviews of this study, Tanzanian policymakers concerned with educational issues 
made clear that for them, aid is a central source of revenue besides taxes. Assessing the 
financial impact of donors in the sector, one needs to consider that “a relatively small 
amount of money is a large portion of discretionary resources and purchases a great deal 
of influence” (Samoff 2009: 11).  
Looking at the health sector, the financial dependency is obvious at first glance. Table 8 
displays external resources for health as a percentage of total health expenditure in Tan-
zania, drawing on data provided by the WHO Global Health Expenditures Database.150 
While in the mid-1990s, donor share was still less than 10%, it quadrupled in the new 
millennium.  
Table 8: External resources as share of total health expenditure in Tanzania 
Year 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
% 9 18 19 35 28 18 11 30 31 35 43 40 44 48 40 40 
Source: WHO Global Health Expenditure Database (WHO 2014). 
The share of external resources in the spending of the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare (MoHSW) ranges at around the same level, amounting to 38,5% of total ex-
penditures in 2010/2011 (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2012: 14). As in the 
case of the MoEVT, the situation appears worse if one takes only the development 
budget into account: Donors funded 97,8% thereof, which in practice means that the 
                                                          
149
  According to HakiElimu, a leading civil society organisation focusing on education in Tanzania, 
donors provided only 43% of their commitments in 2008/2009 (TSh 27,6 from 64 billions) and 
48% in 2009/2010 (TSh 30,3 from 63,4 billion) (HakiElimu 2011: 4).  
150
  The figures presented in Table 6 relate to all channels of health spending, i.e. government, the 
private sector and NGOs. Data were extracted on 20.02.2014 (WHO 2014). 
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implementation of development programmes is almost entirely based on aid (Sikika 
2011: 3). The fact that external money is largely earmarked and to a considerable extent 
provided off-budget leaves the ministry with little discretionary power over the use of 
development funding (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2009: 31). Although deci-
sion makers complain about donors tying money to certain areas and topics, they hardly 
reject support – due to the budgetary situation of their ministry, “it is difficult for them 
to say no” (Interview 44), as a Tanzanian WHO officer put it. A retired health expert 
from Germany who had been working with officials in the health ministry for several 
years put it straight:  
They say ‘we have to take every penny we can get.’ Never would someone say ‘well, that 
actually doesn’t fit.’ (Interview 73)151    
The dependency on external resources is particularly extreme in HIV/AIDS governance. 
With a share of over 97% of expenditures, donors almost entirely finance the country’s 
national response. Drawing on data provided in the Public Expenditure Review 2011 of 
the Tanzania Commission for AIDS (TACAIDS) (TACAIDS 2012: 1), Table 9 displays 
the appalling discrepancy between government resources and donor spending on 
HIV/AIDS in the period 2006–2011:   
Table 9: Government and donor expenditures on HIV/AIDS in Tanzania  
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Government expenditures 
in TSh billion 
22,0  23,0  14,0  12,5  11,0 
Donor expenditures           
in TSh billion 
282,0  383,3  566,9  566,3  431,8 
Total expenditures            
in TSh billion 
304,0  406,3  580,9  578,8  442,8 
Government share of total 
expenditures in % 
7,2 5,6 2,4 2,2 2,5 
Donor share of total     
expenditures in % 
92,8  94,3  97,6  97,8  97,5 
Source: TACAIDS Public Expenditure Review 2011 (TACAIDS 2012: 1). 
As the figures compiled in Table 9 indicate, the dominance of external resources has 
slightly increased in recent years from an already high level in 2006/2007.152 Just like in 
                                                          
151
  The original interview passage in German: “Die sagen jeder Pfennig, den wir irgendwoher krieg-
en können, den müssen wir nehmen. Da wird nie jemand sagen, nee, aber das passt nicht rein.” 
(Interview 73). 
152
  Unfortunately, we were unable to find figures for earlier years which would allow a comparison 
of government and donor spending on HIV/AIDS over a broader time span. Data presented in 
the public expenditure review for 2003, the earliest version we have on hand, are based on rough 
estimates and the authors stress that spending figures of both government and donors are incom-
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South Africa, the United States through PEPFAR and the Global Fund are by far the 
largest funders: In 2010/2011, they provided 91% of total aid on HIV/AIDS of which 
the large majority was channelled outside the government system (TACAIDS 2012: 1), 
depriving the government of control and oversight. The absolute dependency on donors 
in tackling the epidemic poses a high risk for the country, making the implementation of 
the government’s national programme, the National Multi-Sectoral Strategic Frame-
work for HIV and AIDS, highly vulnerable to external decisions and developments (see 
case study, chapter 6.2.3).  
Comparative Assessment of Sectorial Financial Strength   
In this chapter, we tried to delineate the financial situation of South Africa and Tanzania 
in the three policy fields under investigation, i.e. health, education and environment. As 
we have seen, drawing conclusions from budgetary figures is an intricate endeavour 
given the lack of reliable and comparable data on government and donor spending at 
sector level. It is important to note that policymakers in aid receiving countries are con-
stantly struggling to keep track of the money poured into and channelled outside their 
systems. Government representatives and officials interviewed in both South Africa and 
Tanzania broached this problem as a huge burden coming with aid.  
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, numbers always imply calculation and choice (Rotten-
burg 2000: 147).153 Therefore, we tried not to rely on aid shares in departmental 
expenditures as an indicator of donor impact in the respective sectors, but complement-
ed the figures with additional quantitative and qualitative material. Aggregating the 
information we obtained for each sector, we assess their financial strength as follows: In 
South Africa, education and health are strongest in terms of finances; donor money only 
plays a minor role in these areas, except from HIV/AIDS where aid is a relevant contri-
bution. Environment is assessed weaker. Although from a national perspective, donor 
funding is marginal, it is a crucial source of income for environmental agents at national 
and provincial level. In Tanzania, education has the strongest position, although external 
money noticeably affects the implementation of national programmes. Health is more 
dependent on aid, with donors providing the bulk of the development budget. The 
weakest fields in our comparison are the cross-cutting issues of HIV/AIDS and envi-
ronment which are almost entirely financed from outside. Table 10 displays our 
assessment, with ‘++’ indicating a high level of domestic resources (implying low fi-
nancial dependency), and ‘--’ a low level of domestic resources (implying high financial 
dependency) at the opposite end of the scale. Admittedly, this illustration is over-
simplified and not devoid of subjective interpretation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
plete and inconsistent (Foster & Mwinyimvua 2003). Making calculations based on these num-
bers seems unrewarding and questionable in terms of reliability.  
153
  The constructed character of figures is discussed in chapter 5.1.2 on legitimation and accounta-
bility pressures in the aid context.  
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Table 10: Sectorial strength in terms of finances 
  South Africa Tanzania 
Environment  - -- 
Health  HIV/AIDS ++ + - -- 
Education   ++ + 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
6.1.2 Administrative Capacity  
The implications of aid dependency for the bargaining power of recipients were raised 
as a prime topic by several interviewees. Yet, various narratives indicated that the fi-
nancial situation is not the only structural condition decisive for the scope of donor 
influence. A retired government member in Tanzania who previously held a high-
ranking position in the Vice President’s Office-Division of Environment, a unit in dire 
need of external funding, summarised his experience as follows:   
The extent to which [advisors] can influence the process depends on the strength the par-
ticular institution has. What carries the day is the arguments put on the table. If the 
technical advisor swallowed the arguments, it will carry the day. So it’s important to have 
a strong national team to be able to see through the presentations of technical advisors, so 
that the nuances or deviations or preconditions can be addressed there, transparently. (In-
terview 66)  
His statement points to the significance of what can be termed ‘absorptive capacity’ as a 
crucial precondition for dealing with expert advice, i.e. the ability of recipients to scru-
tinise expertise for its quality, relevance and implicit interests. Absorptive capacity 
requires the availability of adequate technical knowledge and critical competencies in 
public administration which enable civil servants to utilise instead of being swayed by 
external advice. We assume that the weaker recipient bureaucracies are in terms of their 
internal staff capacity, the higher is the risk that policy processes are influenced from 
outside. One could paraphrase this second hypothesis with the comment of a Tanzanian 
policy-maker in the Prime Minister’s Office referring to decision makers in the senior 
government cadre:  
If they’re competent enough, they can really drive. But if they are not, they’ll be driven. 
(Interview 60)  
Our argument is based on the cognisance that the senior administrative cadre plays a 
substantial part in policy processes. Bureaucrats are not only the decisive agents in op-
erationalising political decisions into strategies, implementing programmes and 
managing public service delivery; as coordinators and informants of their political lead-
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ers, they are also potentially able to exert significant influence on the government agen-
da. In theory,  
a well-institutionalized bureaucracy makes a vital contribution to the quality and coher-
ence of decision-making through policy advice and the structuring of the decision-making 
process, even though the decisions themselves are taken outside the bureaucracy. (Poli-
dano 2000: 810) 
In many developing democracies, however, bureaucracies are hardly capable of ful-
filling this central policy function. While fragile institutions and low skills bases are 
legacies of the colonial rule in Africa, the erosion of the public sector was further exac-
erbated by decades of economic crisis (Bräutigam 1992; Bräutigam & Botchwey 1999; 
Ocheni & Nwankwo 2012); structural adjustment programmes imposed by the interna-
tional financing institutions compelled staff lay-off and retrenchment, leaving 
administration with financial and human resources barely sufficient to run government 
operations (Weissman 1990). Given sharp declines in wage levels and worsening work-
ing conditions, highly skilled and experienced civil servants fled out of the public 
system, poached by the private sector and international organisations which offered sal-
aries vastly exceeding government pay (Olukoshi 1998; Bräutigam & Botchwey 1999: 
14).  
In light of such developments, today’s ‘capacity gaps’ identified in bureaucracies all 
over Africa should not be a surprise to donors whose policies and practices were a con-
tributory cause of the problem. The common response of the international aid 
community has been to supply government organisations with advisors and consultants 
commissioned to assist policymakers and senior officials. As outlined in chapter 4.3, the 
expertise these professionals provide is inevitably infused with a distinct set of norms 
and values shared by the epistemic community of development experts; their advice 
must finally comply with the policy preferences and principles of their respective send-
ing organisation. From the angle of the recipient, it would thus be crucial to scrutinise 
advice offered in order to detect implicit interests and to assess its ‘political robustness’ 
(Lentsch & Weingart 2009a: 8), i.e. to peruse whether it supports the domestic agenda 
and recommendations are politically feasible. If this is not done, governments run the 
risk of adopting external policy ideas and concepts which may collide with the expecta-
tions of their constituencies or are just not implementable in the local context. 
Administrative capacity which results in absorptive capacity on the receiver’s part is 
thus crucial in three respects: First, to prove that external advice takes the local needs 
and interests into account; second, to make the knowledge from outside applicable by 
adjusting it to the local context and conditions; and third for the reason that without ad-
dressees capable to take up and utilise expertise provided, expert assistance may fill 
gaps, but not help to increase the policy capacity of government bodies in the long run. 
Without a critical mass of competent civil servants, advice is reduced to a form of ex-
ternal interference perpetuating the dependency on foreign expertise.  
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This implication, however, is wittingly or unwittingly disregarded by donors who justify 
the deployment of experts exactly with the weakness of recipient bureaucracies. The 
state of public administration in developing countries has entered the limelight since 
parallel to the rise of the ‘new public management’ paradigm in economics ‘good gov-
ernance’ emerged as a core issue on the aid agenda in the 1990s.154 Although the latter 
remained a somewhat fuzzy concept lacking a commonly shared definition, scholars 
constructed a range of indices for measuring the state of ‘governance’ across the world. 
Most of them incorporate the quality of public administration into the assessment, fo-
cusing on issues such as service delivery, management performance, resource 
efficiency, corruption or statistical capacity. Table 11 (see next page) provides a compi-
lation of the most widely known governance indices, displaying indicators related to 
public administration and the latest ratings of South Africa (SA) and Tanzania (TZ). In 
spite of using different methodologies, data sources and concrete variables, indices con-
sistently rank the former higher than the latter. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTI) complements its numeric rating with narrative analyses. In the country report on 
Tanzania, the state of basic administration is delineated as follows:  
The state maintains a basic infrastructure throughout the country. Administrative capacity 
however is weak and ineffective. Staff is poorly trained and often unprepared to carry out 
government goals; what’s more, the administration suffers under political interference, a 
result of more than 50 years of one-party rule (despite, according to the constitution, the 
country’s multiparty democracy established since 1992). As pay is low, administrative 
staff is uncommitted, often not accountable and susceptible to corruption. (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2014c: 8) 
South Africa is rated two points higher achieving a score of 7 for basic administration, 
which according to the BTI codebook indicates that “administrative structures of the 
state provide most basic public services throughout the country, but their operation is to 
some extent deficient” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 17). The country report points to 
the following constraints: 
The quality of administrative bodies varies considerably, with capacity generally declin-
ing from the highest to the lowest levels of government. Major technical and managerial 
skill shortages exist and have an impact on efficiency with which various levels of gov-
ernment execute their mandate. In addition, corruption, nepotism, and maladministration, 
which drain state coffers, are causes for great concern. (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a: 8) 
                                                          
154
  Since academic literature on these two concepts is too broad to be adequately summarised here, 
we point to only a few contributions: A central article laying the foundations for the concept of 
‘New Public Management’ was Hood (1991); Hood and Peters (2004) provide a review on how 
NPM developed as a subject of administrative science and explore its intended and unintended 
effects on public sector reform. ‘Good governance’ as a core element of a new development 
strategy after the decade of structural adjustment was pushed to the fore by World Bank (1989) 
and World Bank (1992). Various scholars have discussed the relevance and implications of 
‘good governance’ in developing countries, as for instance Appiah et al. (2004); Smith (2007); 
Kötschau and Marauhn (2008); Booth and Cammack (2013).  
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Table 11: South Africa and Tanzania as assessed by governance indices 
TZ
3,93 
 
5 
 
42,1 
57,2 
 
2,37 
 
-0,69 
-0,85 
Source: BMZ (2008); AFD et al. (2012); African Development Bank Group (2013); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2013); World Bank (2013c); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014a). 
SA 
 
4,83 
 
7 
 
65,2 
76,9 
 
2,41 
 
0,33 
-0,15 
Scale 
 
1 to 6 (=best)  
 
1 to 10 (=best) 
 
0 to 100 (=best) 
 
 
0 to 4 (=best)  
 
-2,5 to +2,5 (=best) 
 
Methodology 
 
Expert assessment 
 
Expert assessment 
 
Aggregation of various third-
party data based on official 
figures and expert surveys 
 
Perception data gathered  
through expert survey 
 
Aggregation of various third-
party data based on official 
figures and exert surveys 
Description  
African Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA 2012)  
Based on 5 criteria: property rights and rule based governance, quality of budgetary and         
financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilisation, qualify of public administration,  
transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2014)  
Assessment of basic administrative structures as one criteria of ‘stateness’ 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG 2013) 
Based on 7 sub-indicators on accountability, transparency and corruption in the public sector 
Based on 11 sub-indicators: statistical capacity, public administration, inflation, diversification, 
reserves, budget management, ratio of total revenue to total expenditure, fiscal policy, ratio of 
external debt to service to exports, revenue collection, soundness of banks 
Institutional Profiles Database (IPD 2012)  
Based on 14 sub-indicators: reliability of official economic information, transparency of       
economic policy, level of corruption, efficiency of tax administration, transparency in public 
procurement, functioning of the justice system, urban governance, influence of economic     
stakeholders, influence of donors, freedom to establish organisations, autonomy of organisations, 
capacity for state reform, capacity for sectoral reform, tax exemptions 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI 2013) 
Based on more than 40 indicators covering the (perceived) quality of public service and        
bureaucratic capacity in terms of policy implementation and service delivery 
Based on 36 indicators covering the level of corruption, transparency and accountability in the 
public sector 
Indicator 
Governance rating:        
Public sector manage-
ment and institutions 
Basic administration 
Accountability 
Public management 
Functioning of public    
administrations 
Governance effective-
ness 
Control of corruption  
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While the BTI surveys countries in transformation processes from all world regions, the 
Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG) focuses only on African states. What is 
notable is that despite the diagnosed deficiencies in administration, South Africa tops 
the IIAG ranking in the category Public Management with 76,9 points, and achieves the 
fifth rank out of 52 in Accountability. In both categories, the country scores much high-
er than Tanzania which ranges slightly above the average level, but achieves only ranks 
18 and 23, respectively.155 In the African Development Bank’s governance rating, Tan-
zania comes off slightly better in light of a smaller score difference to South Africa 
which is only superseded by Botswana in the country ranking. Referring to the Institu-
tional Profiles Database and the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the discrepancy in 
administrative quality between South Africa and Tanzania appears even less pro-
nounced.  
This divergence of assessments hints at one important point which needs to be consid-
ered in using governance indices: Given that the strength of public institutions is not 
directly observable, all of them draw on proxy indicators which – as the term implies – 
can only indicate administrative capacity rather than de facto ‘measure’ them. The in-
struments through which calculated facts are produced are highly constructed and imply 
certain normative ideas of ‘good governance’ and sound public management. The level 
of accessibility to source data varies; and if one takes a closer look, one finds self-
referential links across indices which to some extent call the validity of results into 
question.156 Aside from such methodological flaws, the indices present our research 
with the problem that they do not allow for a sectoral differentiation. To our knowledge, 
there is currently no measurement of bureaucratic quality disaggregated by sectors. In 
order to delineate the strength of public administration in the different policy fields un-
der investigation, we therefore turn to interview material which we complement with 
ministry workforce data and information extracted from government reports. As we 
already know from the governance indices presented above, South Africa in general is 
stronger than Tanzania with regard to public service performance. In the following, we 
examine whether we find sectoral differences of administrative capacity within the two 
countries, particularly in terms of staffing levels and in-house expertise. Thereby, we 
mainly focus on the relevant line ministries as frame of reference. 
                                                          
155
  The African average score was 53,4 for Public Management and 41,5 for Accountability.  
156
  The extent to which the different governance indices mutually resort to each other’s ratings as 
source data or decision guidance is noticeable. To give just one example: For measuring ‘gov-
ernance effectiveness’, the WGI rating takes scores of the AfDB CPIA into account, namely on 
the quality of public administration, the quality of budgetary and financial management and the 
efficiency of revenue mobilization. The experts doing the assessment for the governance rating 
of the AfDB CPIA, in turn, are advised to draw on ‘key sources of evidence’ amongst which the 
WGI category ‘government effectiveness’ is listed (African Development Bank Group 2009).  
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Sectoral Comparison of Administrative Capacity in South Africa  
For the sectoral comparison of administrative capacity in South Africa, we primarily 
look at the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), the Department of Health 
(DoH), and the two national departments responsible for education, i.e. the Department 
of Basic Education (DBE) and the Department of Higher Education and Training 
(DHET). As part of their annual reports, these ministries disclose data on human re-
sources in their organisations. Table 12 provides a compilation of (filled) post numbers, 
vacancy and turn-over rates in 2011/2012. These figures reflect administrative capacity 
in terms of staffing levels: A high share of unfilled posts implies that the department has 
a rather insufficient number of officials to cope with the workload; a high turn-over rate 
of staff is obstructive insofar as it means a permanent loss of practical knowledge in the 
organisation. Judged on the figures presented below, Environmental Affairs is the 
strongest department in terms of its staffing level, although being affected by a high 
turn-over of personnel. With a vacancy rate of almost 30%, the Department of Health 
seems to be less adequately staffed, followed by Higher Education and Training with 
still over 20% shortage. 
Table 12: Staffing levels of South African line departments in 2011/2012 
 Posts total Posts filled Vacancy rate Turn-over rate 
Environmental Affairs 1 628 1 441 11,5% 10,6% 
Health 1 819 1 293 28,9% 9,7% 
Basic Education  823 628 17,1% 8,7% 
Higher Education and 
Training  
1 077   843 21,7% 7,6% 
Source: Department of Basic Education (2012: 190/192); Department of Environmental Affairs 
(2012a: 142/144); Department of Health (2012: 186/189); Department of Higher Education and Training 
(2012a: 353/358). 
There are various root causes for the problem of vacancies in the different organisations. 
A common challenge for all departments is to fill vacant posts with adequately skilled 
applicants in line with the employment equity regulations. To overcome the racial dis-
crimination and disparities in the labour market created under apartheid, the South 
African government pursues an affirmative action policy formalised in the Employment 
Equity Act which requires employers to ensure the equitable representation of previous-
ly disadvantaged groups in their workforce (Department of Labour 1998). The legacy of 
apartheid and its racially segregated school system, however, still manifests in lower 
educational levels among the black population (van der Berg 2007). Given that highly 
qualified professionals from the designated groups are scarce and attracted by higher 
salaries outside the public system, state organs are struggling to find suitable candidates 
for vacant positions. This is particularly an issue in environment as a knowledge area 
which previously was a “preserve of the whites” (Interview 8), in the words of a South 
African UNDP officer. A director in the provincial conservation authority CapeNature 
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 139 
 
reported from the tedious search for black project managers with an environmental 
background:  
We advertised up to four times to get someone. In the end we didn’t get one and then fell 
back to appointing a white male. (Interview 13)  
As this example indicates, filling vacant posts with adequately trained professionals is 
often a complicated and lengthy process for government departments which are under 
pressure to ‘get equity figures right’ (Interview 13). Aside from this structural problem 
pervading all government bodies, the departments face distinct challenges in sourcing 
and retaining in-house expertise which emanate from political and institutional devel-
opments in the respective policy fields.  
The Department of Health which in 2011/2012 had the highest vacancy rate of the enti-
ties compared is still struggling to recover from the era under President Mbeki and his 
health minister Tshabalala-Msimang who became infamous for the denial of AIDS and 
anti-retroviral treatment. During their leadership, “capacity fled out from the govern-
ment system” (Interview 27), as a civil society representative put it. Many 
knowledgeable and experienced officials left the department due to its controversial 
policies, draining into the private sector or international organisations. A South African 
who resigned from public service during that time to work for a foreign embassy instead 
told us: 
I was a project manager in government working in the AIDS unit. And I must say it was 
very, very nice – very exciting work. But at that stage we had this terrible minister of 
health – Manto Tshabalala-Msimang. (…) And in 2003 I found myself apologising for 
where I worked and when I caught myself I realised I can’t do this anymore. (Interview 5)  
When the new minister Motsoaledi came into office in 2009, he brought about a radical 
policy shift and initiated an organisational reform process reconfiguring administrative 
structures and staffing patterns. Nonetheless, it has remained difficult for the department 
to salvage the lost expertise. According to a HIV civil society activist, “very few people 
go in there other than as consultants” (Interview 27). The insufficient number of compe-
tent permanent staff severely weakens the administrative capacity of the organisation. 
This has been broached as an issue by various South African interviewees with close 
contacts and working relations to the Department of Health, with one saying:  
It’s shocking, because you can count the skilled people inside the government on one 
hand. And the same skilled people are trying to do everything – writing a human resource 
plan, writing AIDS plans, writing national health insurance. And they make a mess all of 
the time, because it’s just too much. (Interview 27) 
At the sub-national level, the situation appears even worse. In 2009, reports on the per-
formance of provincial health departments revealed fundamental shortcomings, 
“ranging from strategic planning and leadership, through to financial management and 
monitoring and evaluation” (Barron et al. 2009: 8). While much has already been tack-
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led by the vigorous new minister, challenges in health administration at both national 
and provincial level still persist.   
Another field in which renewed governance structures are a major cause for current 
capacity constraints is education. The low staffing levels in the basic education depart-
ment and in higher education and training are largely a result of the fact that the two 
entities had been formed out of one ministry: When the national Department of Educa-
tion was split in 2009, financial and human resources needed to be divided and 
apportioned to the two newly structured administrative bodies, leading to budgetary and 
staff constraints on both sides (Department of Basic Education 2011: 19). At the time of 
our research, this organisational transformation process was still going on. Particularly 
the newly established Department of Higher Education and Training was affected by a 
high vacancy rate which posed serious operational problems, as the annual report for 
2011/2012 states:  
The high number of vacancies inevitably had a negative impact on human capacity and 
therefore also on implementation. (…) The University Education Branch has severe ca-
pacity constraints which impact on the delivery of services. The most significant capacity 
problem is at a high level professional end. The post of Deputy Director-General remains 
unfilled. Of the nine director posts, only four are filled. In addition, some sections with 
high workloads have insufficient staff to cope with these. (Department of Higher Educa-
tion and Training 2012a: 143) 
Interviewees from both government and donor side confirmed that there is currently a 
huge vacuum at the higher education department hampering policy development and 
implementation. The situation is thus equal to the one in the field of health: Despite 
highly qualified individuals in office, administrative capacity is constrained due to an 
insufficient manning level.  
The Department of Environmental Affairs, in contrast, has a comparatively low vacancy 
rate and a strong team of competent officials. Various interview partners engaged in the 
environment sector highlighted the high degree of in-house expertise across government 
bodies at the national level, ranging from the line ministry to public entities like SANBI. 
A UNDP programme manager praised his counterpart officials in these institutions as 
follows:    
Extremely well capacitated, you know, there are knowledgeable people writing articles 
and stuff, globally respected. Some of them are part of the negotiating team on biodiversi-
ty perspective. When you run the projects through them, you can see these guys are in full 
control.  You have less stress, they deliver, they know what they want, they know where 
they are going, they are pretty at the play. They are on top of the game. (Interview 8)  
The workforce of DEA and SANBI is largely made up of environmental specialists 
qualified with an academic degree up to the masters’ or PhD level; many are engaged in 
key policy platforms at the global level and strongly networked with the domestic and 
international science community. By way of example, a leading official in the biodiver-
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sity planning unit of the department sketched his professional background and work 
environment as follows:  
Interviewee: I’m a conservation biologist. I’ve got two masters’ degrees, one from the 
UK. Presently, I’m a member of the Society for Conservation Biology. And I think that’s 
my link with the technical academic research (…). I’ve been affiliated with the TWNSO, 
the Third World Network of Scientific Organizations as well. So again, that is keeping 
me up to date in terms of what is currently happening in terms of research. And that actu-
ally informs the way the government addresses issues because the cutting edge research is 
flowing into these processes, whether it’s the minister’s speech or the presentations or 
participation in these various platforms that do exist. My job is predominantly to main-
stream some of those thinking into the national processes.  
Interviewer: ‘Thinking’ meaning scientific evidence?  
Interviewee: Yeah, scientific evidence, scientific concepts we hear on the international 
platforms of engagements because South Africa is very prominent in international circles 
in the sense that we have many multi-national environmental agreements. And our inter-
national work is quite robust because we’re always engaging in the technical working 
groups of the CBD [Convention on Biological Diversity]. I’m a member of the Ad Hoc 
Technical Working Group ‘Biodiversity for Poverty Eradication and Development’. And 
then there are other people as well deployed to various other technical working groups 
like SUBSTTA [Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice] as 
well. (Interview 15)  
While in general South Africa has an outstandingly strong administration in the envi-
ronment sector, interviewees raised some flaws pertaining to the knowledge base in 
government. First and foremost, as mentioned earlier, environmental expertise is largely 
held by a group of people which is not representative of the South African de-
mographics; the expert community in both government and science is still racially 
skewed, and the number of black scientists coming out of university is very limited. 
Moreover, there is a stark discrepancy in capacity between national and sub-national 
levels; as a UNDP officer commented:  
At national level they’ve got tall expertise, you know, PhD people leading policies and 
stuff. (…) But you go to the provinces and then it becomes obvious, never mind the local 
municipalities – to find a person who can be able to tell you how climate change links 
with the development work that they’re doing sometimes can be a challenge. (Inter-
view 8)  
The lack of environmental expertise in provincial and local government is particularly 
profound in distinct knowledge areas where specialists are required. The Environmental 
Sector Skills Plan for South Africa published in 2010 identified a scarcity of soil scien-
tists, taxonomists, ecologists, environmental and resource economists, climate change 
scientists, or biotechnologists, amongst others (Department of Environmental Affairs 
2010a: 19). 
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Despite such constraints related to the dispersion of (specialist) knowledge, however, 
the in-house expertise in government entities dealing with environment is substantial 
which manifests itself in the fact that South Africa leads the way in certain areas such as 
spatial planning and in adopting innovative concepts of biodiversity management. In 
addition, there are well-established structures for policy dialogue and consultation in 
which domestic advisory bodies play a central role. In our sample, environment can thus 
be assessed as the strongest sector with regard to public administration and, hence, ab-
sorptive capacity.   
Sectoral Comparison of Administrative Capacity in Tanzania 
Due to a lack of access to contrastable workforce data, assessing the administrative 
strength of sectors in Tanzania proves to be intricate. The shortfall of qualified staff is 
mentioned in literally all reports on sectorial performance in Tanzania. Most of them, 
however, remain superficial; very few authors support their claim with some sort of 
concrete evidence, which makes it difficult to differentiate the extent of the problem in 
different areas.   
A comprehensive in-depth study on public sector capacity is available only for educa-
tion. The Education Sector Human Resources Situation Analysis published in 2012 
discloses detailed information on staffing levels on the delivery side of the education 
system, i.e. in schools and academic institutions, as well as on the governance side, i.e. 
authorities concerned with education at national, regional and district level. Aside from 
chronic shortages of teachers all across the system, the report reveals massive capacity 
gaps in the respective ministries both in terms of numbers and expertise (Omari & Baser 
2012). A case in point is the Department of Policy and Planning, a key unit within the 
Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT): At the time the study was 
conducted, the planning section entailed only seven officials most of whom lacked 
training or experience in planning; out of the eight persons working in the Education 
Management Information System unit in charge of producing and processing education-
al data for the department, only four had adequate IT qualifications (Omari & Baser 
2012: 172). The lack of professionals with specialised training is also a sign of the gen-
erally low educational level of staff. As Table 13 indicates, less than 50% of the 
workforce holds an academic degree (including bachelors, post-graduate diplomas, mas-
ters or PhDs):  
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Table 13: MoEVT staff by educational level 
Educational level  Number Share of total 
Certificate 142 34,6% 
Ordinary Diploma 42 10,2% 
Advanced Diploma 44 10,7% 
Bachelor 70 17,1% 
Post-graduate Diploma 20 4,9% 
Master 88 21,5% 
PhD 4 1,0% 
Total 410 100,0% 
Source: Education Sector Human Resources Situation Analysis (Omari & Baser 2012: 171). 
At the sub-national level, the situation looks similar if not worse: Regional and district 
offices are affected by high vacancy rates and insufficiently skilled staff. The authors of 
the report made the observation that “many district education officers, even sometimes 
the primary and secondary DEOs [District Education Officers], were not comfortable in 
English” (Omari & Baser 2012: 179).  
In addition to the weak bureaucratic workforce in the national ministry and local gov-
ernment authorities, governance in education has further been exacerbated by the lack 
of overall guidance. For years, a range of decisive leadership positions including the 
Commissioner of Education, the Chief Inspector of Schools as well as various director 
posts were only filled with acting managers which were neither adequately qualified nor 
able to develop a strong steering capacity (Omari & Baser 2012: 174–175) – “there are 
not the right people in the right position” (Interview 45), a Tanzanian expert working 
for the World Bank commented. All in all, the administrative capacity in education can 
be assessed as severely constrained.  
The situation in health doesn’t look much better if looking at the overall sector which is 
facing a serious human resource crisis (School of Public Health and Allied Sciences 
2009). The Health Sector Strategic Plan III 2009–2015 illustrates the dimension of the 
problem with alarming numbers:  
The total of staffing in the health sector stands at 35% of the actual need according to de-
fined staffing norms. The available number of professional health workers in the public 
sector is 35,202 and deficit is 90,722 (…). There is an enormous shortage of human re-
sources for health across all cadres: clinicians, nurses, pharmaceutical technicians, 
laboratory technicians, radiographers, physiotherapists, health officers and health admin-
istration cadres. (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2009: 29) 
The human resource scarcity also affects the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare as 
the main national governance body, translating into insufficient staffing levels particu-
larly in terms of certain specialists. At the time of our research, for instance, the 
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ministry had only three health economists at its disposal who were hardly able to cope 
with the immense workload on their desks. Yet, while the administrative capacity is 
constrained in terms of numbers, the staff in office is said to be skilled and competent – 
an issue which was emphasised by various interviewees from both government and do-
nor side. A Tanzanian WHO officer pointed out:    
It is the numbers and the skills mix in the ministry which need to be made right. But the 
level of qualification is tough, certainly very high. (Interview 44)  
In a similar vein, a German health expert with years of working experience in Tanzania 
commented:  
In the ministry of health as well as in the universities, we do have fairly competent peo-
ple. The issue is, simply put: While in Germany we have six thousand competent people, 
there are six of them in Tanzania. Those who are really capable are thin on the ground. 
(Interview 73)157 
One of the few health economists within the Ministry of Health confirmed this outside 
perception from her perspective as follows:  
We can manage. We’re doing it. We really stretch ourselves, but it’s not as serious as it 
was. (…) A challenge might be the shortage, but not the capacity – few people, many 
tasks, but not the capacity. (Interview 54) 
That the Ministry of Health although being understaffed can resort to a civil servant 
cadre which is comparatively strong in terms of in-house is a crucial asset for health 
governance. There are indeed as well constraints which hamper the overall bureaucratic 
performance: Varying capacities in regional and district authorities which obstruct the 
implementation of policies and health service delivery, a high level of staff circulation 
and brain drain into international organisations and the private sector, and poor recruit-
ment practices leading to intervals in which decisive positions are filled with acting 
officials who lack the confidence and competencies to assume leadership.158 Yet, the 
dimension of such problems appears far smaller than, for instance, in education. 
Rating the administrative capacity in environment is intricate insofar as different public 
entities are concerned with the matter – the Division of Environment in the Vice Presi-
dent’s Office, the Forestry and Beekeeping Division in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, the National Environmental Management Council and the Lo-
                                                          
157
  The original interview passage in German: “Also auch da wieder ja, ist immer nicht so einfach, 
ist immer nicht schwarz weiß. Also wir haben sowohl im Gesundheitsministerium als auch an 
den Universitäten recht kompetente Leute. Nur, ich sag’ das mal so, da wo wir in Deutschland 
sechstausend kompetente Leute haben, haben wir in Tansania sechs. Das heißt also die, die wirk-
lich können, die sind dünn gesät.” (Interview 73) 
158
  At the time of our interviews in 2013, the positions of the Permanent Secretary, the Chief Medi-
cal Officer as well as the Director of Policy and Planning within the Ministry of Health were 
filled with acting officials.   
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cal Government Authorities, to name just the most important ones. A cross-cutting as-
sessment made by internal and external evaluations is that overall, environmental 
governance is severely constrained by a shortage of qualified staff across all bodies, 
particularly at district level (Vice President's Office 2007; Edwards et al. 2012; Nindi 
2012) . Similar conclusions were drawn by government and donor representatives deal-
ing with environment-related issues such as climate change or forestry. A World Bank 
specialist put it straight, saying:  
They just don’t have enough people, they don’t have the skills. (Interview 46)  
This statement hints at one important point made by many interviews, namely that what 
is lacking in national ministries are skills related to leadership, management, strategic 
planning and analysis rather than environmental expertise. A Tanzanian programme 
officer working for the Danish Embassy commented on the capacity of her counterparts 
in government:  
These guys are well trained experts. But in the field of leadership and management, there 
they have a problem. (Interview 33)  
At least for the Division of Environment, the claim that individuals in national bodies 
are well-trained can be confirmed with information on the educational profile of its 
workforce: In 2008 when the Human Resources Training Strategy for DoE was drafted, 
the unit had 54 employees made up of 38 professionals and 16 support staff. Three offi-
cials held a PhD and 29 a masters’ degree, i.e. 60% of all staff were educated to 
masters’ degree level or higher (Draft Human Resource Training Strategy, VPO-DoE, 
April 2008, as cited by Inka Consult 2008: 7). Compared to the education ministry, 
where master and PhD holders together made up only 22,5%, the DoE has a highly 
qualified team in terms of technical knowledge. Nonetheless, there is a fundamental 
flaw in capacity which a counsellor in the Finnish Embassy described as follows:  
Having a kind of strategic view of the things – where do we want to move? What do we 
want to do? How do we make it happen? This kind of strategic thinking I see is very often 
missing. (Interview 36)   
In addition to the deficiencies in terms of this kind of competencies, the division of en-
vironment as well as other public entities are short of specialists in certain knowledge 
areas, as a high-ranking official admitted:  
There’re some emerging issues on climate change, for example, on the capture for green-
house gases. We don’t have experts in Tanzania. Even if we have, there are very few who 
are not ready to be employed for a long time period under contract. (Interview 67)  
Aside from climate change specialists, interviewees pointed to a shortage of profession-
als trained in issues such as resource and risk assessment, geographic information 
systems, or private forestry management. Given the scarcity of specialist knowledge, the 
deficiencies in terms of critical competencies and the enormous lack of adequately 
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trained officials at sub-national level, the administrative capacity in environment is se-
verely limited.  
Comparative Assessment of Administrative Capacity in South Africa and Tanzania 
As stated in the beginning of this sub-chapter, we assume that administrative capacity 
on recipient side is a crucial dimension determining the extent to which external experts 
are able to influence policy processes through advice. We understand administrative 
capacity as the strength of public entities in terms of their in-house expertise and staff-
ing levels. Based on the findings delineated above, we rank the capacity of 
administration in different policy fields as follows: The strongest area in our comparison 
is environment in South Africa, having a capable cadre of civil servants and in-house 
expertise at its disposal. While the qualification levels of officials in health and educa-
tion are similarly high, the two sectors are affected by relatively high vacancy rates in 
line ministries which to some extent limit their bureaucratic performance. In Tanzania, 
public administration generally suffers from insufficient staffing levels and a scarcity of 
specialists. While governance in health and environment is stemmed by a small number 
of highly qualified individuals which ensure a certain level of in-house expertise, the 
education sector lacks a critical mass of competent staff at all levels. Table 14 displays 
our assessment, with ‘++’ indicating a high level of absorptive capacity, and ‘--’ a low 
level of administrative capacity at the opposite end. Again, it is important to note that 
the table serves as means of illustration, not as a quantifiable scale.  
Table 14: Sectorial strength in terms of administrative capacity 
  South Africa Tanzania 
Environment  ++ - 
Health   + - 
Education   + -- 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
6.1.3 Local Knowledge Base 
Equally to the absorption capacity of administrations, the third dimension of recipient 
strength we suggest relies on the general educational level of a given society: we refer 
here to the strength of the local knowledge base in the widest sense, and more specifi-
cally to the size and quality of a country’s science community. We assume that a crucial 
condition for recipients to develop their own agenda without being driven from external 
advice is the availability of domestic sources from which alternative expertise can be 
obtained. The argument put forward reads as follows: The stronger the local knowledge 
base and its voice in the policy discourse, the smaller is the scope of influence for out-
side actors.  
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This hypothesis implies two basic premises of democracy theories and sociology of sci-
ence. The first is that in modern democracies, scientific knowledge serves both a 
problem-solving and legitimating function for political rule: It is required to find solu-
tions for societal challenges and to demonstrate rational decision-making based on 
certified ‘evidence’ (Weingart 2003; Stehr 2010). The second is that scientific 
knowledge despite its universal truth claim is always – though to a varying extent de-
pending on the discipline – contextual and culture-specific, transmitting certain 
constructs, beliefs and values of the epistemic community by which it is generated 
(Knorr-Cetina 1981; Knorr-Cetina 2007). For democratic governments, it is thus essen-
tial to have an endogenous knowledge base to draw on in order to take decisions 
informed by and sensitive to a society’s historical, cultural and political imprint.  
Many developing democracies, however, lack this fundamental requisite and resource of 
governance, given the weak state of their science systems. The persistent import of 
Northern knowledge is problematic insofar as it keeps them in a perpetual status of de-
pendency, and restrains them from developing a genuine policy agenda which rests on 
their own societies’ set of norms and experiences implied in local knowledge. As Gir-
van (2007: 40) points out,  
autonomy – the right to choose one’s path to development and to act in function of that 
choice – cannot be secured without a knowledge base. As long as the South is depend-
ent for its development knowledge on the global centres of power, its own autonomy 
will be compromised. 
This argument does not convey the claim that autonomy emanates from “intellectual 
autarchy” (Girvan 2007: 32) which in a globalised world would neither be viable nor 
helpful. Instead, it makes the point that developing countries require a local knowledge 
base as a counterweight against the dominant body of knowledge provided by the North 
that transmits certain ideologies, shutting off alternative meaning and interpretation. 
Ideally, domestic science communities are able “to filter this [knowledge] through a 
conscious process of selection, evaluation and adaptation to local circumstances” (Gir-
van 2007: 32), and to provide the intellectual ground for problem solutions which take 
the existing social conditions into account. Without endogenous science systems which 
serve as absorptive and knowledge producing entities, recipient governments are likely 
to be driven by external expertise, remaining “consumers (of knowledge) and imple-
menters (of advice)” (Girvan 2007: 22).  
As early as in 1969, the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Tech-
nology to Development of the UN Economic and Social Council stated in its ‘World 
Plan’ “that there is a fundamental necessity to build up indigenous scientific capability 
in the developing countries” (United Nations Economic and Social Council 1971: 102) 
which would enable them to define, analyse and solve nation-specific problems and 
boost economic production. The report expounds the problem of deficient knowledge 
production and points at the hurdles obstructing the development of solid science sys-
tems in developing countries. Today, the situation seems little better if not worse in 
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some respects. Africa’s share in global science as measured in publication output has 
been steadily declining over the past twenty years (Mouton et al. 2008: 199), which re-
flects the widening gap of knowledge inequality between the Northern hemisphere and 
the global South (Weingart 2006: 164).159 Despite some sporadic improvements, science 
in developing countries faces the same problems as identified more than forty years ago: 
a deficient research infrastructure, scarcity of human resources exacerbated by brain 
drain of scientists, poor science governance, and chronic underfunding which results in 
a destructive dependency on foreign financiers, to name just the major hitches (United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 1971; Mouton 2008; Mouton et al. 2008). As-
sessing the state of public science in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) region160, Mouton et al. (2008: 199–200) diagnosed a “de-institutionalisation” 
of science systems of which many operate in a “subsistence mode” struggling to repro-
duce themselves.  
A country which counts as an exception is South Africa. With regard to scientific 
productivity, it is at the forefront of the continent and by far leading in the region (Mou-
ton et al. 2008: 202; African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Development 2010) . 
Table 15 displays publication output and other indicators which are widely used to 
compare the strength of science systems across the globe, using data published by the 
African Innovation Outlook 2010 (African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-
opment 2010). A standard measure in this context is the gross domestic expenditure on 
research and development (GERD) as a percentage of the gross domestic product 
(GDP). While the countries with the highest research and development intensity in the 
world exceed 3% (e.g., Finland, Sweden or Japan) (European Commission 2014), the 
African Union has recommended a 1% GERD/GDP ratio to its member states (Execu-
tive Council of the African Union 2006). Yet, among the countries reviewed by the 
African Innovation Outlook 2010, this target has only been reached by Malawi, Uganda 
and South Africa; the percentages of the remainder ranged between 0,20% and 0,48% 
which was achieved by Tanzania (African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-
opment 2010: xx) . A look at the human resource base in science reveals an even greater 
discrepancy between South Africa and Tanzania. With 825 researchers per million in-
habitants (40 084 as headcount), the density of researchers in South Africa is more than 
ten times higher than in Tanzania with only 67 researchers by million population (2 755 
as headcount). As Weingart (2006: 173) argues, it is questionable whether such a small 
number of scientists can make up a “critical mass to even sustain an internal intellectual 
community, let alone a differentiated one”.  
                                                          
159
  According to Mouton et al. (2008: 199), “Africa has lost 11% of its share in global science since 
its peak in 1987; Sub-Saharan science has lost almost a third (31%)”. 
160
  The Southern African Development Community comprises fifteen member states in Southern 
Africa, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Ma-
lawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe (Southern African Development Community 2012). The bibliometric analyses of 
Mouton et al. (2008) did not include the Seychelles.   
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Given the stark contrast in human resources for science, it is not surprising that there is 
a similar divide in terms of research productivity as measured in publication numbers. 
According to the Scopus database, South Africa produced 86 649 scientific articles dur-
ing 1990–2009, around fifteen times as many as Tanzania for which 5 642 are listed 
(African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Development 2010: 90) . Broken down on 
million inhabitants, the average annual output during 2005–2009 was 135 papers in 
South Africa against 12 papers in Tanzania (African Union–New Partnership for Afri-
ca’s Development 2010: 93) .  
Table 15: Research and development indicators for South Africa and Tanzania 
R&D indicators  South Africa Tanzania 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage 
of GDP (2007) 
1,05 0,48 
Number of researchers (headcount) 40 084  2 755 
Researchers per million inhabitants 815 67 
Scientific output by country in papers listed in the Scopus 
database (1990–2009)  
86 649 5 642 
Average annual papers per million inhabitants (2005–2009)  135 12 
Source: African Innovation Outlook 2010 (African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
2010) . 
Using the standard indicators for measuring research and development, it is evident that 
South Africa in general has a much greater scientific potential and higher level of re-
search productivity than Tanzania whose participation in the global science production 
– equivalent to most other African countries – seems miniscule.161 Yet, one needs to 
consider that the set of indicators presented in the table above is tainted with a funda-
mental bias which discriminates against developing countries in several regards: First, it 
sets a Western concept of science systems and respective features as reference frame for 
the assessment which has fundamental implications (Weingart 2006: 166). For instance, 
the scope of databanks used to measure scientific output is limited to prestigious jour-
nals most of which are published in the North (Gaillard 2010: 109). Given that a large 
part of research findings of developing countries are disseminated in media and journals 
which are not captured by the common indexes, their contribution to the global 
knowledge production is marginalised if solely assessed on the basis of the highly selec-
tive data sources. Hence, various authors point out that the standard indicators most 
probably fail to provide an adequate account of science in the developing world, empha-
sising the need for additional descriptors and narratives (Mouton 2007: 3; Gaillard 
2010).  
                                                          
161
  According to a bibliometric analysis based on the Scopus database and conducted by Arencibia-
Jorge et al. (2012), Tanzania’s share of the world scientific production from 1996 to 2009 was 
0,03% while South Africa accounted for 0,39% in the same period.  
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In the following attempt to briefly sketch out the strength of science in South Africa and 
Tanzania by sectors, we therefore complement bibliometric data with qualitative infor-
mation drawn from different reports and interview statements. Aside from delineating 
the size and quality of the local knowledge base in the respective fields, we also consid-
er the extent to which institutionalised links to the policy sphere are existent. 
The starting point of our analysis is Table 16 which presents publication output by rele-
vant subject areas from 1990 to 2013 on the basis of scientific documents captured by 
the Scopus database:  
Table 16: Scientific output by subject area in South Africa and Tanzania 1990–2013 
Subject Area South Africa Tanzania 
 No of papers % of total output No of papers % of total output 
Health related     
- Medicine 41 644 17,0 4 492 29,0 
- Immunology and 
microbiology 
8 837 3,6 1 816 11,7 
- Health Professions 1 995 0,8 124 0,8 
- Nursing 1 660 0,7 167 1,1 
Environment related      
- Environmental 
science 
13 587 5,6 1 137 7,3 
- Earth and plane-
tary science 
15 021 6,1 549 3,5 
Education  1 552 0,6 81 0,5 
Source: Scopus database.162   
                                                          
162
  For the bibliometric data, the Scopus database was accessed on 11./12.03.2014. We did not limit 
the search to articles, but included all document types (e.g., conference papers or book chapters) 
as they also contribute to scientific output in a wider sense. Since education is not a subject area 
of its own in the Scopus database, we set the search condition that education must either be men-
tioned in the article title or be a keyword; we specified the results further by limiting them to 
those related to the subject areas social science, psychology, arts and humanities, mathematics 
and computer science. The remainder articles clearly dealt with issues related to educational. To 
prove the validity of results, we cross-checked the number and share of articles with those listed 
in Web of Science (WoS) under the category ‘Education Educational Research’. In WoS, the 
timespan of article search was limited from 1995–2013, with 1995 being the first year accessible 
for us. Despite the shorter period, the number and share of documents listed was slightly higher 
for South Africa (1 691 articles; 1,3% of total); for Tanzania, absolute numbers were lower, but 
the share equivalent (38 articles; 0,5% of total). Hence, while the results slightly differ, their 
scale is similar, supporting the argument that education is a rather minor research area in both 
countries.  
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Strength of Tanzanian Science in Health, Environment and Education  
In the Tanzanian science landscape, the leading role of health is reflected by the compo-
sition of the country’s scientific output: In the period 1990–2013, health related areas 
(medicine, immunology and microbiology, health professions, nursing) together ac-
counted for 42,6% of all publications. Environment is also a relatively strong research 
area, making up 10,8% if summing up contributions of environmental science and earth 
and planetary science. Education, in contrast, is almost insignificant in terms of publica-
tion output, with only eighty-one papers over a period of fourteen years which amounts 
to a share of only 0,5%.163  
Health research in Tanzania is conducted by government and private health research 
institutions of which the most productive and prestigious are the Muhimbili University 
of Health and Allied Sciences (MUHAS), the National Institute for Medical Research 
(NIMR) and the Ifakara Health Institute (IHI). While MUHAS is the only public univer-
sity in Tanzania offering degree programmes in health sciences, NIMR serves as a 
parastatal entity under the Ministry of Health mandated to conduct and coordinate med-
ical research; the IHI is an independent non-profit organisation founded by the Swiss 
Tropical Institute which has acquired international renown, particularly for its contribu-
tion to malaria research. According to interviewees, the scientific capacity of these 
bodies varies; Ifakara is said to have the most capable cadre of highly skilled and well-
trained scientists. A cross-cutting constraint, however, is the small human resource base 
of the relevant organisations. Referring to IHI, a Danida health advisor stated:  
I think they’ve got some excellent people, but a few excellent people isn’t enough to do a 
huge amount of work. (Interview 34) 
The small number of researchers is certainly a major cause of the limited capacity of 
health institutions. Yet, another problem obstructing the production of policy-relevant 
science is their huge dependency on foreign financiers. While the Tanzanian govern-
ment contributes some core funding, research activities are almost entirely financed 
from outside: From 2007 to 2010, NIMR did not receive any research budget from gov-
ernment side (Magesa et al. 2011: 10–12); the Ifakara Health Institute states on its 
website that 80% of its annual income comes from competitive grants provided by for-
eign sources (Ifakara Health Institute 2014). Given this situation, focusing on national 
research priorities is more or less impossible, as a senior scientist working at IHI report-
ed:  
So basically, you can set your agenda saying I’ll work in these areas. But working on 
what you really can’t determine, because you are responding to a call for proposals. (In-
terview 68)  
                                                          
163
  The dominance of health and relative strength of environmental science in Tanzania have also 
been pointed out by previous studies using bibliometric data, as for instance African Union–New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (2010: 118)  and Arencibia-Jorge et al. (2012: 156).  
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Given that health research in Tanzania is mainly driven by external funders, it is not 
surprising that the uptake of findings by policymakers is limited. Although IHI is in-
creasingly recognised as a source of expertise by both government and donors, the 
exchange between research bodies and the Ministry of Health is still sporadic. Hence, 
the impact of Tanzania’s scientific community in health is rather small, although there 
are “pockets of long-established research excellence” (Irikefe et al. 2011: 558).  
Similar patterns, but an even more strained situation is found in the area of environment. 
The Sokoine University of Agriculture (SOA) in Morogoro and the University of Dar es 
Salaam with its Institute for Resource Assessment (IRA) are the most productive pro-
ducers of environmental science in Tanzania.164 While individuals working for these 
institutions are highly reputed scientists engaged in international research activities and 
expert forums, they are too few in numbers to build a solid local knowledge base. Aca-
demic staffs lack the time and financial resources for carrying out independent quality 
research at a larger scale. On its website, the Sokoine University of Agriculture indi-
cates that 98% of its research activities are externally funded (Sokoine University of 
Agriculture Directorate of Research & Postgraduate Studies 2014). While we were una-
ble to obtain concrete figures on IRA’s budget and the share of foreign funding, a high-
ranking staff member made the following statement on this:    
The way it is, is that in the absence of donor support from outside, we cease even to be 
called researchers because there isn’t much resources available. (Interview 69)    
Aside from occasionally contracting individuals for consultancies, the government does 
not regularly use the local science community available as a source of environmental 
expertise. There are a few, mostly donor-funded initiatives to establish dialogue be-
tween policymakers and scientists on environmental issues – as, for example, the 
‘Environment for Development’ centre or the ‘Decision makers Forest Academy’ – but 
their scope of impact is limited. All in all, Tanzania’s local knowledge base in environ-
ment is small, and there are no structures in place through which national research 
findings would be disseminated to inform policymaking.  
The weakest area in terms of scientific capacity, however, seems to be education. With 
only 81 articles over a period of fourteen years, the output in this field is marginal. The 
University of Dar es Salaam is the most significant producer, accounting for almost 
50% of all publications; the only other institution which has a double-digit number of 
contributions is the Tumaini University in Iringa. The figures confirm the perception 
articulated by various interviewees that educational research in Tanzania hardly takes 
place. A civil society representative described the state of the local knowledge base in 
education as follows:  
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  The National Environmental Management Council (NEMC), the government’s advisory and 
regulatory agency, is supposed to carry out research by its mandate, but its output is miniscule. 
In the Scopus database, only 9 articles in the period 1990–2013 are listed with institutional affili-
ation to NEMC. 
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I’m going to say something politically incorrect. You are assuming there is a local expert 
community – I don’t think there is one that is worth its salt. There are local experts, indi-
vidual experts, but we don’t have serious think tanks (…). The universities, I can’t point 
you to a single department or programme of work that I can say, this is incredibly solid 
research and analysis and thinking and creative programme development. So what are 
universities, what is the state of our universities? We have expanded them dramatically to 
democratise access; they have become large factories of lecturing. Most professors and 
lecturers are busy doing consulting, and so you quickly do what you have to do at the 
university, often not even do that, you know, they’re often away. If somebody did a care-
ful noting of attendance, you’ll find they are often away even for your basic lectures. And 
then they’re going round doing consulting work, of which each piece may have some util-
ity, but it doesn’t add up to a body of work. So I don’t think there is a local expert 
community in Tanzania (…). There are individual experts, but there is no community, 
there is no coherence. (Interview 70)            
While interviewees from donor side put it less bluntly, they consistently assessed the 
capacity of the science community in education as very low. Notably, the only one ar-
ticulating that the local knowledge base would be sufficiently strong was a director in 
the education ministry who stated:  
Well me, I think we have capacity (…). In the Institute of Education here which is work-
ing with the curriculum development, we have enough and learned sort of personnel. And 
we have people in the universities who have travelled widely. They have been engaged in 
different consultancies here and there, they are knowledgeable (...).  (Interview 49) 
The Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE) the official referred to is a parastatal organi-
sation under the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training in charge of curriculum 
development, teacher training, quality assurance and technical advice; it has a so-called 
‘Research, Publication and Consultancy Section’ which is commissioned to conduct 
evaluations and research on educational matters (Tanzania Institute of Education 2014). 
While TIE is used by the government as a source of in-house expertise, it is not produc-
ing scientific output in a strict sense.  
As both statements quoted above indicate, cooperation with university experts on educa-
tion is limited to ‘consultancies here and there’. From the perspective of various 
interview partners, there is no serious engagement between policymakers and academia, 
and little receptiveness towards research on part of the education ministry. A university 
professor of education commented in this regard:    
You need a minister who shows interest. But we have minister who I don’t think shows 
interest in any research of the academic world. (Interview 71) 
This lack of interest on the part of the political leadership is reflected by the absence of 
a “formalised system” (Interview 45) facilitating exchange between policymakers and 
scientists in education. In light of the interview narratives and the bibliometric figures 
presented in the beginning, it can be said that independent educational research in Tan-
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zania is almost non-existent; the impact of the country’s few academic educationalists is 
narrowed down to consultancy work which does not result in the emergence of an en-
dogenous local knowledge base.  
Strength of South African Science in Health, Environment and Education 
South Africa has a solid science community which in many fields significantly contrib-
utes to the global knowledge production. Comparing productivity in terms of 
publications, health related sciences are at the top of the three areas under review, ac-
counting for 22,1% of the total output from 1990 to 2013 (see Table 16), followed by 
environment related sciences with 11,7% and, at the low end, education with 0,6%.  
In health-related science and particularly in HIV/AIDS research, South Africa has a 
whole range of universities which are internationally renowned for their scientific per-
formance, such as the University of Cape Town, the University of Witwatersrand in 
Johannesburg or the University of Stellenbosch, to mention just the most prolific ones; 
in addition, the country has well-established parastatal bodies such as the South African 
Medical Research Council (MRC) and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) 
which cover a broad spectrum of relevant subject areas. While these institutions deliver 
high-level and sometimes “global ground breaking research” (Interview 27), as a civil 
society activist put it, they are yet faced with structural constraints typical of science 
systems in developing countries, namely a small human resource base and dependency 
on external financing. Expertise is stretched rather thinly, particularly offside the 
HIV/AIDS research field. Reputed scientists are under constant pressure trying to cope 
with teaching obligations, generate third funding streams through conducting studies for 
multiple clients and respond to national priorities while being dependent on foreign fi-
nanciers. In HIV/AIDS and TB research, for instance, more than 70% of the total 
funding comes from outside, less than 30% from local sources (Senkubuge & Mayosi 
2013: 144). Health research in South Africa is thus heavily influenced by the agendas of 
overseas sponsors; a senior scholar at the Institute of Infectious Disease and Molecular 
Medicine of the University of Cape Town stated upfront:      
Of course you’ve got the potential conflict of who sets the agenda, who owns the agenda. 
And in a way I think we need to acknowledge that we’ve become scientific prostitutes in 
the sense that we are giving in to the highest bidder for our services. And it is actually 
much easier in the health field to get your money from abroad.165 
This issue of domestic underfunding was also raised at a National Health Research 
Summit held in 2011 to discuss the state of South Africa’s health research and to make 
it more responsive to national challenges (Mayosi et al. 2011). The event was deemed 
an attempt to strengthen the ties between the health department and the science commu-
nity after the breakup of relations during the Mbeki administration caused by the 
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  This statement was made in the context of an exploratory interview for the research project con-
ducted in 2007.  
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conflict around AIDS and antiretroviral treatment. The new health minister Motsoaledi 
is perceived as hardly trying to establish a closer dialogue with the country’s science 
community; as a professor at the University of Western Cape commented:  
That’s a shift from a kind of vacuum at the centre to the re-emergence of a leadership that 
is willing to engage in a much more explicit way with South African knowledge commu-
nities, there’s no doubt about that. (Interview 28)  
All in all, it can be stated that South Africa’s local knowledge base in health is made up 
by a cadre of researchers which is small, but highly productive and increasingly used by 
policymakers as a source of endogenous expertise.  
The country’s strongest scientific impact, however, is in environment related disci-
plines. According to the Thomson Reuters Global Research Report Africa 2010, South 
African plant and animal sciences had the highest share of world publications (1,55%) 
out of any field in Africa, followed by environment and ecology (1,29%); the report 
further states that “many of South Africa’s most highly-cited papers in this field pertain 
to climate change and its effects on plant propagation” (Adams et al. 2010). Among the 
most prolific producers are some which are also leading in health, such as the Universi-
ty of Cape Town, the University of Witwatersrand, and the University of Pretoria. Aside 
from a range of universities, parastatal bodies such as the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) with its the Natural Resources and the Environment unit as 
well as SANBI are key contributors to environmental research. The science community 
operating within these institutions is regarded as “one of the tops in the world” (Inter-
view 8), as a leading UNDP expert stated. Similarly as in health, however, it is small in 
terms of human resources and still racially skewed, as an environmental specialist ex-
plained:  
There is just a selective few individuals that are champions for the various initiatives. In 
terms of capacity, we don’t have capacity in the sense that – it’s lying only in a group of 
people and that group of people is not representative of the South African demographics. 
So in that respect, the skills development is needed – especially black scientists, it’s very 
limited in the country, because science does not support a fast track transformation agen-
da. (Interview 15) 
In addition to this structural problem, there are some imbalances with regard to the per-
formance in particular subject areas. Animal sciences are traditionally weaker than the 
botanical sciences, and there are some areas such as resource economics and biotech-
nology where expertise is scarce. Nonetheless, the South African science community in 
environment is broad enough to build a solid local knowledge base which substantially 
informs policymaking through its presence in advisory task teams or its contribution to 
the State of the Environment report. In 2012, the Department of Environmental Affairs 
published an ‘Environment Sector Research, Development and Evidence Framework’ 
seeking to further enhance and institutionalise the exchange between researchers and 
policymakers (Department of Environmental Affairs 2012b). In short, environmental 
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science in South Africa is highly recognised in academic and policy circles, both at the 
national and international level.   
Finally, we look at South Africa’s capacity in educational research. As the bibliometric 
figures indicate, its contribution to the overall science output is rather small, at least 
compared to health and environmental sciences. The most prolific producers in this area 
are again the well-known universities, with the University of Cape Town leading the 
way, followed by the universities of Witwatersrand, Pretoria and Kwa-Zulu Natal. 
Moreover, the Education and Skills Development Unit in the Human Sciences Research 
Council is a key body conducting studies on all kind of educational matters related to 
schooling, teaching and learning from primary school to higher education. As an analy-
sis of publications and academic projects indicates, South African educational research 
covers a broad spectrum of topics and disciplinary areas, ranging from educational theo-
ries to studies on classroom practice (Deacon et al. 2009: v). Yet, its methodological 
scope is rather narrow: In the period 1995–2006, “94% of education research has been 
small scale research, usually qualitative, often conceptual and frequently eclectic, (…) 
while hardly any (costly, time-consuming and often quantitative) large scale research 
has taken place, with only 1% of the database falling into this category” (Deacon et al. 
2009: iv). The authors of the analysis attribute the lack of longitudinal large-scale stud-
ies which would provide more systemic findings partly to the prevailing ‘publish or 
perish’ pressure on academics, but also “to the limited availability of research funding, 
the equally limited availability and often poor quality and unreliability of existing data, 
a widespread lack of research capacity and experience, and reduced time available for 
research due to increased teaching and administrative workloads” (Deacon et al. 2009: 
14).  
Despite constraints in terms of funding and human resources, however, educational 
scholars form a solid knowledge base the government regularly draws on. There seems 
to be a frequent exchange between the two educational departments and the academic 
community through conferences and workshops (see, for instance, Department of Basic 
Education 2014c and Department of Basic Education 2014a), and a variety of key re-
ports informing policy decisions are compiled by university experts (see, for instance, 
van der Berg et al. 2011). Hence, although the size and output of educational research in 
South Africa is small compared to other disciplines, it is recognised and used.  
Comparative Assessment of the Local Knowledge Base in South Africa and Tanzania  
On the basis of the bibliometric figures and qualitative information presented above, we 
rank the different fields under review as follows: Environmental sciences in South Afri-
ca provide the strongest local knowledge base which substantially contributes to global 
science and has a strong presence at the national and international level. Although 
health sciences have a higher output in terms of numbers, the local knowledge base in 
this field is assessed weaker since it is highly concentrated on one particular subject, i.e. 
HIV/AIDS, and due to its dependency on external financing subject to the agendas of 
outside players. Educational research doesn’t face this problem to the same extent, but 
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the size and output of the research community is much smaller. We nonetheless rank it 
at the same level as health, since the core of educational scholars provides solid research 
which to a considerable extent informs policymaking. Tanzania’s scientific capacity is 
much lower than that of South Africa which dominates African science in general. Giv-
en the prevailing lack of human and financial resources, science communities in 
Tanzania across all disciplines are struggling to maintain their basic subsistence, let 
alone to produce research under poor working conditions. Yet, “pockets of significant 
science” (Mouton et al. 2008: 200) are found, particularly in the areas of health and en-
vironment where small cadres of highly qualified scholars operate. In education, 
however, such a core of excellence is missing. While individuals in academic institu-
tions do have substantial expertise, a science community in the common sense is non-
existent. Table 17 displays our assessment at a glance, with ‘++’ indicating a very 
strong local knowledge base, and ‘--’ a very weak local knowledge base. Again, we 
want to make the remark that the table is an oversimplification and should be seen only 
as a tool of illustration.   
Table 17: Sectorial strength in terms of the local knowledge base 
  South Africa Tanzania 
Environment  ++ - 
Health   + - 
Education   + -- 
Source: Authors’ own illustration. 
6.2 Sector Studies   
In the preceding chapter, we assessed South Africa’s and Tanzania’s strength regarding 
their financial power, administrative capacity and the local knowledge base, with a fo-
cus on the policy fields under investigation, i.e. environment, education and health. It 
has been shown that there are significant variations not only between the two countries, 
but also across the different sectors. In the following, we aim to investigate whether and 
how these conditions impact on policy processes and external experts’ scope of influ-
ence on them.  
Given that comparative empirical research is inherently confronted with diverse matters 
and material, the case studies presented below unavoidably differ in terms of their com-
plexity and depth. Yet, they share some core themes and a broad texture. To sketch out 
the ‘scene’, we begin each case with shortly delineating sectorial challenges and gov-
ernance structures before roughing out donors and their ‘entry points’ in the respective 
field. We then give a detailed description of policy processes and the players involved, 
with a particular focus on whether, how and in which roles external experts were en-
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gaged. While the narrations are not squeezed into a fixed grid, they are guided by some 
key questions, namely: At which stage and on which grounds (e.g., ‘capacity gaps’) did 
foreign actors enter the policy space? How did actors from government, aid organisa-
tions and academia position themselves and at which levels did they interact? Whose 
expertise and interests were finally taken up and reflected in policy decisions? The case 
studies are concluded with an assessment regarding external experts’ impact on policy-
making and governance in the field under review, taking the structural conditions found 
into account. A synthesis of findings which can be drawn from adopting a comparative 
perspective on the empirical accounts is presented in chapter 6.3. 
6.2.1 Tanzania: Education   
Sectorial Context 
In the light of international goals for education, Tanzania’s performance appears com-
mendable at first glance: Access to primary education is nearly ‘universal’, the 
completion rate stands high at 90%, and gender parity is almost achieved 
(UNESCO Office Dakar and Regional Bureau for Education in Africa et al. 2011: 7). In 
secondary education, the Gross Enrolment Rate has gone up from 20,2% in 2006 (Sum-
ra & Rajani 2006: 2) to 35% in 2012 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2014), while in 
the same period enrolment numbers in higher education quadrupled (see Education Sec-
tor Development Committee 2012: 34).166  
Yet, the rapid expansion in recent years has put substantial stress on the education sys-
tem manifesting in plummeting literacy skills and mass failure in national examinations 
(see, for instance, Twaweza 2013; Uwezo 2013). While children have successfully been 
brought into school, they struggle to learn under worsening conditions in overcrowded 
classrooms without adequate furniture, basic learning material and pedagogical support 
(see Mhonyiwa et al. 2011); as of 2011/2012, the teacher to pupil ratio in primary edu-
cation stood at 1:70 (Education Sector Development Committee 2012: 30). The quality 
crisis in education has become a prime concern among educational stakeholders, spark-
ing off serious dispute between the government and the aid community, as will be 
outlined later.  
Governance Structures 
The two main authorities in charge of formal education from pre-primary to tertiary 
levels in Tanzania are the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) and 
the Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-
RALG). While the former is responsible for policy development, the provision of regu-
lations and guidelines, standard setting, quality assurance and teacher training (Ministry 
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  Total student enrolment in higher education increased from 40 993 in 2005/2006 to 166 484 in 
2011/2012 (see Education Sector Development Committee 2011: 34).  
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of Education and Vocational Training 2014), the latter is mandated to oversee and coor-
dinate the administration of schools which are managed by local government authorities 
(President's Office Public Service Management 2011: 7 et seq.) . Hence, while MoEVT 
is the central body regarding policy issues, PMO-RALG is directly concerned with the 
day-to-day running of the school system. Both ministries collaborate with a range of 
other institutions concerned with educational matters, such as the Tanzania Institute of 
Education (TIE) which develops curricula, teaching and learning materials, the National 
Examinations Council of Tanzania which designs and administrates national examina-
tions and the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children dealing with 
Folk Education.167  
Donor Presence in the Education Sector  
Compared to other policy areas, the number of donors engaged in education appears 
rather limited; as of 2012, the ‘Education Development Partners Group’ (ED-DPG) 
comprised seven active members, namely CIDA, DFID, Sida, UNESCO, UNICEF, 
USAID and the World Bank.168 Depending on the respective focus of these organisa-
tions, representatives participate in one or more of the eight Technical Working Groups 
(e.g., ‘Quality Improvement’, ‘Enrolment expansion’, or ‘Resource Allocation, Cost 
Efficiency and Financing’) to discuss issues coming up in these areas and to share in-
formation about their activities with ministry officials. If required, topics are brought 
forth to a higher level task force and eventually to the Education Sector Development 
Committee chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MoEVT. While all actors are sup-
posed to stick to this structure, both ministry and aid officials conceded that “it isn’t 
really working that way” (Interview 30), and a lot of things are “sort of decided upon 
and shared outside” (Interview 40). Various interviewees reported that the tone of the 
‘dialogue’ has become tense.  
Understanding current aid relationships and the government’s positioning towards the 
donor community requires an awareness of the history of cooperation. As will be shown 
in the following, Tanzania has gone through different phases in this regard.   
The Rise and Fall of Nyerere’s ‘Education for Self-Reliance’ Vision  
When in 1961 the state of Tanganyika became independent, it inherited a society which 
was deeply affected by more than seven decades of imperialist rule. Both the Germans 
and British colonisers had installed a racially segregating formal education system 
whose main objective was to form a submissive yet productive workforce serving the 
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  Detailed information on mandates and functions of these institutions are provided on their web-
sites: www.tie.go.tz/ (last accessed on 18.01.2015), http://www.necta.go.tz/ (last accessed on 
18.01.2015) and http://www.mcdgc.go.tz/ (last accessed on 18.01.2015).  
168
  Moreover, GIZ and the World Food Programme are mentioned in some documents, but their 
engagement seems to be quite focused on cross-cutting issues (e.g., HIV prevention and aware-
ness raising in schools) and specific concerns (e.g., community-led school feeding), respectively.  
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external regime (Mushi 2009: 67).169 Very few Africans attained more than two years of 
formal education (Galabawa 1990: 3). At independence, about 85% of the population 
could not read and write (Nationalist Newspaper, 24 August 1967, as cited in 
Bhalalusesa 2003). Aside from one university college affiliated to the University of 
London (which later became a constituent college of the University of East Africa), 
there were no higher education institutions in the country (Ngirwa et al. 2013: 130).  
Building a literate, conscious and capable citizenry became a central endeavour for 
Tanganyika’s first post-colonial leader, Julius K. Nyerere, who became Prime Minister 
in 1961 and was elected President in 1962. Himself being a teacher prior to his political 
career, Nyerere considered education a fundamental pillar for realising his vision of a 
socialist state based on his philosophy of Ujamaa (the Swahili term of ‘familyhood’) 
which should free the society from the yoke of domination. Right after coming into 
power, Mwalimu as he was popularly called (meaning ‘teacher’ in Swahili) issued an 
Education Act which legally abolished all forms of discrimination in education, nation-
alised primary schools, streamlined school curriculum and examinations, and promoted 
Swahili as the national language (Ministry of Education and Culture 1995: i). This first 
step of change was followed by the release of Nyerere’s impactful ‘Education for Self-
Reliance’ policy of 1967. As a sequel of the Arusha Declaration, the document empha-
sised the essential role of education in ending external dependence and delineated the 
principles of the envisaged socialist education system; amongst others, it stated:  
The education provided must therefore encourage the development in each citizen of 
three things: an enquiring mind; an ability to learn from what others do, and reject or 
adapt it to his own needs; and a basic confidence in his own position as a free and equal 
member of the society, who values others and is valued by them for what he does and not 
for what he obtains (…).  
The education provided by Tanzania for the students of Tanzania must serve the purposes 
of Tanzania. It must encourage the growth of the socialist values we aspire to. It must en-
courage the development of a proud, independent and free citizenry which relies upon 
itself for its own development (…). (Nyerere 1967) 
In Nyerere’s vision, primary education was to become ‘a complete education in itself’, 
preparing students for life in a socialist society; an overhauled curriculum should in-
clude ‘non-academic’ subjects and practical activities such as agriculture and farming. 
Schools were to be integrated into villages and communities; education should be re-
garded a process of lifelong learning rather than a formal system leading to white-collar 
skills (Nyerere 1967).170  
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  For a detailed account of colonial education in Tanzania, see Mushi (2009: 66–89).  
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  The notion of life-long learning is not explicitly discussed in the ‘Education for Self-Reliance’ 
document, but prominently featured in later publications and speeches of Nyerere. In his New 
Year’s Eve Broadcast on 31 December 1969, he particularly emphasised the importance of adult 
education and learning throughout life, stating: “Education is not just something which happens 
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A cornerstone of Nyerere’s philosophy was the idea of compulsory and free primary 
education. Following the abolition of school fees as provided by the Musoma Resolu-
tion of 1974, the intake in primary schools almost doubled; by 1980, the gross 
enrolment rate stood at 98% (Galabawa 2001: 13). Galabawa (2001), a Tanzanian pro-
fessor affiliated with the University of Dar es Salaam expressed the excitement about 
the government’s successful campaign at that time as follows:  
Both internal and external observers witnessed something akin to a miracle as enrolments 
in primary schools across the nation soared and the nation was gravitated in the frenzy to 
implement the call for education for all in a poor country committed to an equitable and 
fair provision of education to all the citizenry. (Galabawa 2001: 17) 
Yet, the ‘miracle’ of having all kids in school entailed some serious drawbacks. Absorb-
ing masses of new students required not only additional facilities and learning materials 
(which were not available), but also teachers. Since expanding teacher training was not 
sufficient to meet the exploding demand, the government introduced “teaching in turns, 
distance training of teachers and using secondary school students to teach in primary 
schools” (Galabawa 1990: 13). Such alternative measures, however, led to a serious 
decline of educational quality as reflected in cognitive capabilities of school leavers. By 
the end of the 1970s, there was a public outcry about the ‘falling standards’ in the edu-
cation system, with parents complaining about a “universalization of illiteracy” (Omari 
et al. 1983: 45).  
The overt discontent about the deteriorating quality in education coincidenced with “a 
period of stress for Tanzania on many fronts” (Samoff 1994: 134) exacerbated by the 
global economic crisis during the mid-1980s. While the government had initially 
stemmed programmes such as the UPE campaign mainly with its own resources, it was 
now forced to turn to foreign donors to maintain the system; as Samoff (2003: 380) il-
lustrates, this shift had significant implications for educational governance:  
As the director of planning in Tanzania explained, planning had in fact become market-
ing. His task was less a process of exploring needs and developing strategies to address 
them than an effort to study the market of prospective funders. He then identified its pri-
orities and value points, using that market knowledge to craft, advertise, and sell projects 
and programs. That strategy was perhaps effective for coping in difficult circumstances. 
Nevertheless, it entrenched the role of the funding agencies in setting national education 
policies and priorities. It also reinforced the status and influence of a particular set of ac-
tors within the country, not those with the clearest or most dynamic education vision or 
those with the most solid national political base but rather those who proved to be most 
effective in securing foreign funding.  
When after a period of resistance (and Nyerere’s replacement by Ali Hassan Mwinyi as 
president) the government gave in and began to adopt structural adjustment policies as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
in the classrooms. It is learning from others, and from our own experience of past successes or 
failures (…). To live is to learn; and to learn is to try to live better” (Nyerere 1973: 138–141).  
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required by the IMF and the World Bank (see Hyden & Karlstrom 1993), it was pressur-
ised to reverse fundamental features of the education system. In 1993, an inter-
ministerial committee was commissioned to develop a new Education and Training Pol-
icy which should serve as a framework for both government action and donor 
support.171 The final document released in 1995 clearly reflected the move from a so-
cialist to a liberal vision of education gearing at a market economy (Buchert 1997: 35). 
Amongst others, the policy confirmed the re-introduction of school fees (promoted as 
‘cost-sharing mechanism’), encouraged private education providers to establish and 
manage learning institutions, and decentralised administration responsibility to the sub-
national level (Ministry of Education and Culture 1995). The imprint of external agen-
cies whose representatives provided comments and participated in discussions was 
manifest not only in the about-turn to privatisation and liberalisation, but also in the 
emphasis on issues such as gender equality and local autonomy which were key areas of 
donor support (Buchert 1997: 50–51). Without any wider public discussion in the media 
or by parliament, the policy was approved by the Cabinet in February 1995. The respec-
tive amendment of the Education Act following in October finally provided the legal 
basis for a re-structured education system which was now broadly conform with the 
ideas and principles prevailing in aid circles at that time.  
Reform Initiatives from 1995 Onwards: Invading Experts and a Plethora of Plans   
The adjustment of Tanzania’s macro and education policies to the international agenda 
paved the way for immense donor engagement in the sector. Adding up the activities 
listed by Buchert (1997: 21–24), at least 86 eduction projects were carried out by differ-
ent agencies during the 1990s, with the information provided not being exhaustive. The 
fact that the various funders including the World Bank, UNICEF, EU, Danida, Norad, 
Sida, GTZ, Irish Aid, France, CIDA, the Netherlands, and the UK, operated largely dis-
connected from each other became a serious concern on both government and donor 
side (Buchert 1999: 226). Proposing a ‘sector-wide approach’ (SWAp) as a new, ‘har-
monised’ mode of assistance, the aid community pushed for the development of a 
comprehensive ‘Education Sector Development Programme’ (ESDP) which should help 
to synchronise interventions and to pool resources for the implementation of the new 
Education and Training Policy. Yet, this was seen as an ambitious undertaking which – 
from the donors’ point of view – was not doable by the ministry on its own. An educa-
tion advisor working for Canada, herself being Tanzanian, expressed the sentiment in 
aid offices at that time as follows:  
                                                          
171
  Buchert (1997: 46–51) provides a detailed account of the different stages of policy formulation 
and actors involved therein, concluding that it remains an open question to what extent “certain 
areas were truly reflecting [government] thinking as compared to being imposed through agency 
pressure” (p. 51). According to her research based on interviews with stakeholders and observ-
ers, the document was perceived as a product of negotiation between technocrats in ministries 
and agency representatives; teachers, parents or students had not been invited to contribute their 
views to the debate.  
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You see, there were new concepts coming around with the development. But then your 
counterparts are not talking that language. The challenge we also had was how much of 
the preparatory work should be done and who should do it? Even doing the needs assess-
ment, doing the initial situation analysis to find out where we start, where we go? We 
ended up bringing a lot of TA [technical assistance] input – a lot. At a moment, that was 
a year we counted, I think almost between twenty-five to thirty different TAs were com-
ing to do different things from different donors (…), and the ministry was like invaded, 
literally. And some donors even felt we should have offices in the ministry to make it feel 
that we are working with the government, for the government. So you go along the corri-
dors of the government ministry, and you are seeing this mzungu and that one and this 
one. (Interview 31)172 
The fact that these ‘mzungus’ came not only with expertise but interests of their organi-
sations was obvious; a Tanzanian consultant who had worked for the World Bank 
commented in this regard:   
It was not an easy one. I saw all of that game coming up, you know, every donor will see 
what they are doing is more important [and] how to push that into the agenda. (Inter-
view 32)   
Many priorities outlined in the final draft published in 2001 obviously match what were 
key issues of donor concern and investment (United Republic of Tanzania 2001: 14). 
The focus on strengthening management capacity and introducing a computerised Edu-
cation and Training Management Information System, for instance, reflect the 
technocratic-managerial approach to education championed by external consultants. 
Some paragraphs virtually read like copied from donor documents; the following ex-
tract, for instance, more or less echoes the World Bank’s human capital view on 
education as reflected in various publications of that time (see, for instance, World Bank 
1988, World Bank 1995 and World Bank 1999a): 
The ultimate goal of any education and training system is to provide relevant and high 
quality education and training services to a broad range of clients in the most equitable, 
effective and efficient ways. This entails building the management capacity at all levels in 
the education sector. (United Republic of Tanzania 2001: 20)173 
The terminology used here indicates a stark conceptual shift: As opposed to the previ-
ous notion of education as a public responsibility with the aim to transmit ‘the 
accumulated wisdom and knowledge of the society’ to the younger generation (Nyerere 
1967: 1), education was now regarded as a ‘service’ provided to ‘clients’ that was to be 
                                                          
172
  Mzungu is a Swahili term which is commonly used in East Africa for talking about or calling 
white people; literally translated it means ‘someone who wanders without purpose/someone con-
stantly on the move’.  
173
  Nyerere, in contrast, had formulated the goal of a nation’s education and training system as fol-
lows: “That purpose is to transmit from one generation to the next the accumulated wisdom and 
knowledge of the society, and to prepare young people for their future membership of the society 
and their active participation in its maintenance or development” (Nyerere 1967: 1).  
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managed ‘in the most equitable, effective and efficient’ manner. It is questionable 
whether this kind of wording was a deliberate choice of ministry officials or – what 
seems more likely – of technical assistants writing the draft.  
The language used in such strategic documents is significant insofar as it structures and 
constrains the policy discourse; it conveys particular conceptions, directions and policy 
preferences (Samoff 1992: 67). In this case, the new emphasis on ‘efficiency’ 
and ‘effectiveness’174 implied to prioritise basic (understood as primary) education on 
the grounds that it had the highest ‘rate of return’ – an argument which had been pushed 
particularly by World Bank economists (see, for instance, Psacharopoulos 1994; World 
Bank 1995: 56) who deemed higher education with its high unit costs “a fiscal night-
mare” (Youssef 2005: 20) in developing countries.175  
Consequently, the first sub-sectorial plan developed as a sequel of the ‘Education Sector 
Development Programme’ addressed primary education. The so-called ‘Primary Educa-
tion Development Plan (PEDP)’ (2002–2006) outlined four major goals, namely 
expanding enrolment, improving the quality of teaching and learning processes, build-
ing capacity and strengthening institutional arrangements for better educational 
planning and service delivery (Basic Education Development Committee 2001). While 
in the foreword, the involvement of “a variety of stakeholder groups” (Basic Education 
Development Committee 2001) in the formulation of the document was emphasised, it 
was regarded as mainly made by donors, first and foremost the World Bank which “al-
legedly [used] its Mozambique strategy as a template” (Holtom 2002: 24). It was also 
the Bank which was the largest external financier of PEDP, providing a grant of US$ 
150 million to be released over a period of three years; other donors (including the 
Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, France, Norway, Ireland and the EU) 
pooled their resources and contributed around the same amount (US$ 154 million) 
through a joint basket fund (World Bank 2005b: 4). Even though the latter was set up to 
support government priorities as outlined in PEDP, conflictual discussions on what the 
money should be spent emerged; a Tanzanian education specialist working for the Ca-
nadians remarked in this regard:  
This issue of prioritisation then came up to be quite an issue. What is it that we want, and 
what is it that the government really wants?  The biggest issue, for example, at that time – 
2000 to 2005/6 – there was this huge enrolment taking place, all over the country (…). So 
the main challenge for the government was having classrooms’ construction. As donors 
                                                          
174
  For an early conceptualisation of ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ in education which was pub-
lished by the World Bank, see Lockheed and Hanushek (1994).  
175
  An important point here is that ‘basic education’ for most donors meant primary (and lower 
secondary) education whereas for the Tanzanian government, the term included pre-primary, 
primary, adult, secondary, and teacher education. This divergence in definition already led to 
tension, as an education advisor working for the Canadian embassy reported: “So there is already 
that conceptual issue: You have to argue between Canada and Tanzania: ‘When we support you, 
this is what we mean’. So the issue becomes then: Who is the interlocutor there? And how do 
you interpret that?” (Interview 31) 
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we stood there and we said ‘We are not supporting construction work. We would like to 
see more inputs, but not buildings. So put your money into capital assets. Put your money 
in buildings, we’ll come in with inputs.’ So that’s a clear case where the government’s 
cry was on more construction (…), where if the government was left on its own – and 
knowing my government counterparts – maybe that is what they would have first done, 
put those structures in place. (Interview 31)  
Given the decisive role of donors in determining the content of PEDP and the tight ear-
marking of resources in the basket, enthusiasm about the programme on the part of 
ministry officials slackened. Observers of the process saw the insufficient internalisa-
tion – or to use the faddish word ‘ownership’ – of the programme by government bodies 
as a predictable consequence of external interference; Holtom (2002: 25) cites an aid 
representative (!) acknowledging:   
PEDP was formulated mainly by donors and according to the donor programme and do-
nors have allocated their resources. So how can the Ministry of Education be involved in 
the process with ‘their’ ownership? Actually they cannot! And of course they cannot deny 
[accepting] aid from donors because, yeah, something is better than nothing. 
Amongst ministry officials the sentiment that the education agenda had been ‘hi-
jacked’176 by the donor community (particularly the World Bank) slowly but surely 
solidified.  
A case in point which fuelled this perception was the abolishment of school fees which 
surprised Tanzanian officials, academics and civil society alike: As indicated earlier, the 
government had re-introduced school fees at the end of the 1980s as a condition of 
structural adjustment loans (Samoff 1994: 151), with the result that enrolment rates 
dropped immediately (Mbilinyi 2003: 4). Against internal critique, this decision was 
confirmed in the Education and Training Policy of 1995, with the education ministry 
allegedly anticipating that donors still advocated for cost-sharing mechanisms (Jerve 
2006: 12). Five years later, however, the World Bank suddenly signalled a reversal of 
its stance: In a late stage of preparing Tanzania’s first poverty reduction strategy, the 
country director “announced to the President directly that the Bank had changed its po-
sition on user fees in primary education and was prepared to finance the shortfall in 
revenue” (Jerve 2006: 14). To the surprise of even high-level officials, the final draft of 
the strategy entailed the proclamation that “in a reversal of past policies, it is intended to 
abolish primary school fees, starting in FY 2001/2002” (United Republic of Tanzania 
2000: 19). That this about-turn had not at all been internally discussed is reflected by the 
fact that after the release of the document the Permanent Secretary of the education min-
istry publicly deemed the passage a mistake (Jerve 2006: 14). While civil society 
organisations welcomed this shift, leading academics who had advised against a blanket 
                                                          
176
  Both ministry officials and observers from NGO and academia are quoted using this notion in 
the context of the ESDP and PEDP processes; see Buchert (1997: 54) or Holtom (2002: 22).  
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removal were shocked (Jerve 2006: 15). Nonetheless, the commitment was confirmed in 
PEDP which followed shortly after (Basic Education Development Committee 2001: 5).   
The external influence on key issues in PEDP is particularly remarkable considering 
that the adoption of a sector-wide approach as introduced by the Education and Training 
Sector Development Programme and the establishment of a basket fund were actually 
meant to strengthen national leadership and foster “a new kind of partnership” (Basic 
Education Development Committee 2001: 21) based on consultation as opposed to con-
ditionality. Therefore, a sophisticated ‘dialogue’ structure was put in place, ranging 
from technical working groups to sub-sectoral development committees to a high-level 
steering committee for education (see United Republic of Tanzania 2001: 70). Donors 
were ‘invited’ to participate at various levels in order to share information and provide 
policy advice. The cooperation should culminate in a joint annual review process of the 
education sector to evaluate the success of specific programmes and plans. The creation 
of these institutions as an attempt to align activities under the guidance of government 
was highly commended by stakeholders and observers; with similar mechanisms in-
stalled in other sectors (e.g., health), Tanzania was deemed a forerunner in realising the 
new ‘partnership’ principles formalised by the 2005 Paris Declaration a few years later.  
Since then, aid experts as members of the dialogue have routinely been involved in the 
development of various policies and programmes brought forth during a decade of re-
form, including two sequels of PEDP, equivalents in other subsectors and a revised 
version of the comprehensive Education Sector Development Programme.177 Yet, there 
are strong indications that this ‘new kind of partnership’ hasn’t grown as planned. 
The Return of the Quality Crisis: Frustration and Frictions  
By 2013, both government and donor officials conceded that while the institutions of 
the dialogue formally continued to exist, they were de facto ‘barely functioning’ (Inter-
view 30). A Tanzanian education specialist working for Canada commented in this 
regard:  
  
                                                          
177
  The list of pivotal programmes developed since 2001 includes (in chronological order of publica-
tion year): Secondary Education Development Plan 2004–2009 (Ministry of Education and 
Culture 2004); Primary Education Development Programme II 2007–2011 (Basic Education De-
velopment Committee 2006); Education Sector Development Programme 2008–17 (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2008a); Higher Education Development Programme 2010–2015 (Ministry 
of Education and Vocational Training 2010a); Secondary Education Development Programme II 
2010–2015 (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2010b); Primary Education Devel-
opment Programme III 2012–2016 (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2012b).   
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The membership or representation in those working groups is very, very erratic, if I may 
use that word. And I think to some extent the government is using it to its advantage. 
When they feel they need something to get that support, they will champion an issue, 
make sure it goes to the right channel, it’s discussed and off it moves. If they are not real-
ly with you, (…) they may just decide no, I’m not attending. I’m delegating my third 
level down to chair the meeting. So there you are just talking. (Interview 31)  
In a similar vein, the education team leader in the Canadian Embassy remarked:  
We find it very frustrating, because we try to follow these structures, but it’s clear the 
government finds it very frustrating also. So it’s not really working. (…) I think from 
their side, they really feel it’s a donor imposed structure. And we feel like this is their 
structure that they created – so it is sort of both sides pointing fingers. (Interview 30)  
Given the high level of frustration on both sides, relationships between the government 
and donors were palpably strained. An issue which exacerbated the frictions and 
sparked off serious dispute was the worsening condition of primary education. While 
the government had been praised for its ‘outstanding achievements’ made through its 
first Primary Education Development Programme for 2002–2006 (see Ministry of Edu-
cation and Vocational Training 2008), the evaluation of the second phase covering the 
years 2007–2011 yielded in rather disappointing ‘results’: Pass rates for the primary 
school leaving examination significantly declined from 70,5% in 2006 to 53,5% by 
2010 which together with a constantly high number of drop-outs levelled down the tran-
sition rate to secondary education from 67,5% in 2006 to 52,5% in 2011 (Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training 2012a: 90–95).178 The poor performance was to a 
large part ascribed to the unconducive learning environment found in many schools 
where teachers and pupils were squeezed in over-crowded classrooms with few desks, 
books and learning materials, housed in buildings which often lacked even basic infra-
structure such as toilets and clean water (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 
2012a: 92). The massive enrolment expansion which had previously been celebrated as 
a success now turned out to negatively affect educational quality as reflected in plum-
meting literacy rates at both primary and secondary levels.179 
The education crisis became a major issue in both the public debate and donor-
government relations. It is interesting to note that while media reports focussed on the 
failure of learning and the resulting implications for the future of Tanzania’s school kids 
(see, for instance, Nkosi 2012; Tambwe 2013; Kaijage 2013; Mgaya 2013), donor–
government discussions rather turned on ‘missed targets’, as the following narrative of 
the DFID advisor reflects:   
                                                          
178
  The failure of learning was further documented by a study carried out by Uwezo, an education 
NGO which found out that many children in their last year of primary school were not able to 
read simple passages in Kiswahili or English or do basic arithmetic (Uwezo 2013). 
179
  According to Wedgwood (2006: 4), observers with a morbid sense of humour allegedly jest that 
the abbreviation of Universal Primary Education ‘UPE’ in Tanzania stands for Ualimu Pasipo 
Elimu in Swahili, meaning ‘teaching without education’.     
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The  evaluation which is commissioned by government overall is quite negative and 
pointed out that a lot of the resources weren’t released by government, some particular 
things like the amount of school grants that were rewarded on a population, or school en-
rolment ratios which weren’t delivered in full – it’s been very large. They have missed 
many of the targets by very large amount, particularly inputs around building buildings, 
deploying teachers, providing books, you know. The government systems to decentraliz-
ing things haven’t worked particularly well. (Interview 35)  
According to the DFID officer, the fact that the government had not nearly ‘delivered’ 
what has been expected created “a sort of difficult dynamic” (Interview 35) with respect 
to future aid. Major donors considered reducing budget and sector support through 
which PEDP II had mainly been financed, arguing that these modalities had failed to 
show results; the education team leader of the Canadian Embassy stated in this regard:  
For the education side, we are looking at options. I don’t know whether we will carry on 
with sector budget support, we might, we might not. This is exactly the discussions we 
are having right now in our team because there’s pros and cons.  I mean we are getting a 
lot of pressure – all donors I think are getting a lot of pressure to demonstrate results.   
(Interview 30)  
Similarly, the first secretary responsible for education in the Swedish Embassy reported:  
At present, we really don’t know when it comes to General Budget Support and so on, I 
think, that is clearly questioned by our Minister for Development Cooperation (…). So 
she has clearly stated we are not going to continue with GBS. This is not the govern-
ment’s official stand at present – they are discussing this. That’s why we had to prolong 
the present strategy. So there’s an on-going discussion. We are trying to find a way within 
– not only focussing on General Budget Support but having a mix of modalities.          
(Interview 40) 
DFID had already decided to significantly reduce its contribution to budget support on 
the grounds that its 2010 country programme evaluation “suggested that GBS was not 
the most effective way to deliver results in the current circumstances” (DFID Tanzania 
2011: 3); in DFID’s view, the ‘unsatisfactory performance’ of PEDP II corroborated 
this claim.   
While certainly donors’ turn-around not only derived from the negative assessment re-
port but from a general trend reversal regarding aid modalities (see chapter 5.1.1), they 
used the education crisis to substantiate the pulling out from joint funding mechanisms. 
This is remarkable insofar as the decline in quality was in a way a predictable implica-
tion of mass enrolment, as a DFID advisor acknowledged:  
You could argue that perhaps it was never feasible to have such a major expansion 
against the MDG goals which are very much focused on gender equity and universal ac-
cess (…). If you tried this in any country in the world, you wouldn’t expect it to have 
anything like the same level of pass rates measured by a standard pass mark because 
you’re putting huge pressure on the system to deliver the schools, the teachers, the learn-
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ing resources needed. But also you’re promoting up into the system children who come 
from very poor, underprivileged, remote, rural backgrounds, children entering primary 
schools who are much more likely to have illiterate parents themselves coming from very 
poor backgrounds. All of the things which are the best predictors of how well children do, 
how educated your parents are, how much opportunity you’ve got from other resources to 
help you learn. So clearly there are many more children who are coming in very disad-
vantaged, so the system is struggling to cope. So given that background, the government 
very reasonably can say, well, what did you expect when you encouraged us to expand 
this way. (Interview 35)  
Hence, although enrolment expansion had significantly been pushed from the aid com-
munity in order to achieve Universal Primary Education by 2015 (the second 
Millennium Development Goal), it was now the government which was deemed respon-
sible for coping with the consequences and regarded as not taking sufficient action to 
improve the situation. Tanzanian policymakers, on the other hand, felt unduly blamed, 
and perceived the announced reduction of budget support as a breach of agreement and 
sign of distrust; from their perspective, donors and their unreliable disbursements were 
at least partly at fault for the failure of reaching certain goals, as a high-level official in 
PMO-RALG remarked:  
Three months you can continue discussing, you know, what and why the government is 
not up to its promises. But in actual fact, it is both. The government depends on collection 
(…). Tax payers, fine, that’s one resource. The donors are another source – borrowing. 
Now, if the donor funds are not forthcoming and it was included in the budget, then that’s 
the reason why we cannot get the amount of money this time. (Interview 60)  
In the course of tedious discussions over indicators, ratings (as essential ‘triggers’ for 
the release of aid money) and the reasons why targets were not met, donor-government 
relationships increasingly soured.180 The friction between the two parties culminated 
when the education ministry in August 2012 distributed its PEDP III draft for comments 
– and received abrasive criticism from the ‘Education Development Partners Group’ 
(ED-DPG) which assessed the document as ‘quite weak’ (Interview 30), recommending  
that significant changes need to be made (…) to ensure that it becomes a credible plan – 
attractive for both internal and external financing and an implementable plan that will de-
liver the human capital needed to put Tanzania on the right track to development (cited in 
Education Development Partners Group in Tanzania 2013: 19).  
Amongst others, donors criticised the – in their view – unconvincing costing scenarios, 
deficient sector analysis and strategic orientation; referring to the latter, the education 
                                                          
180
  Given the numerous meetings dealing with rating frameworks and the like to ‘measure’ progress 
in education, Languille (2013) remarks that the “processes of performance quantification (…) 
contribute to crowd out the policy space of government staff: target setting and endless discus-
sions over numbers are so time-consuming that no time is left to deliberate, in substance, upon 
the quality challenge and the policies to address it.” 
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 170 
 
team leader of the Canadian Embassy who acted as chair of ED-DPG in the interview 
commented:  
It was a grouping of activities without a strategic orientation with a clear flow of: ‘these 
are our objectives, and this is how we are going to do it.’ It was just sort of a piecemeal 
document of well, we do much of these activities and we will do some of this, we do 
some of this. It didn’t really have any coherence to it and it didn’t seem to have any con-
nections between obviously whatever is coming out of – when students leave primary, 
they should be prepared to go to secondary school, and there should be appropriate num-
bers who are passing to fill the places in the secondary and none of that had been 
considered. So there were some weaknesses in that way, and there was no monitoring 
framework at all which we felt was a major gap. (Interview 30)  
When donor representatives put forward their fundamental ‘concerns’ regarding the 
draft to the government, ministry officials made no pretence of their irritation which 
was a rather unusual reaction. Canada’s education team leader attributed the blunt an-
noyance of his counterparts to a lack of receptiveness for critical feedback:  
They were seeking editorial comments, I think. They said ‘Look, this is our plan.’ But 
they were going through the formality of consulting, ‘Let’s consult the donors because we 
have to’, but I’m not sure they were really interested in serious consultations – which is 
why when we came back with major revisions, they were kind of upset. (Interview 30)  
A second version circulated by the MoEVT by mid-October responded to some of the 
issues raised but still didn’t please the aid community. Given the – from their perspec-
tive – need for substantial changes, donors suggested to resort to experts to help rework 
and finalise the document:   
We had said ‘look, we think this isn’t just something for comments, it really needs to be 
worked on a lot more.’ And so we said ‘we are happy to help you with that, we can pro-
vide our experts to do that.’ We can hire experts to do that, but in this case because of 
timing, we just said we all have experts here. And so the government thought that was a 
good idea and they invited a couple of us to provide technical expertise and to sit down in 
a room with their technical experts and they rewrote the document over a few days. They 
went off to another city and they just got it done. (Interview 30)  
To what extent the government in fact deemed the use of external assistance a ‘good 
idea’ remains an open question here; one can find at least indications that there were 
certain issues at stake which led the government to accept the suggestion, such as its 
application to the ‘Global Partnership for Education’ that will be thematised later in this 
chapter.  
Eventually, a small group of ministry officials, civil society representatives and educa-
tional specialists provided by CIDA and UNICEF spent six days in Morogoro, a town 
around 200 km west of Dar es Salaam, in order to rework the PEDP III document. As 
stated in the Minutes of the Education Development Partners Group Meeting of 17th 
October 2012, the draft was “significantly revised” (ED-DPG 2012) in the course of the 
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retreat exercise. Most notably, it now entailed a comprehensive costing and budgeting 
framework as well as a logframe matrix including quantified targets – as for instance, to 
raise the percentage of a cohort completing Standard VII (the last year of primary 
school) from 54,8% in 2012 to 72,8% by 2016 (Ministry of Education and Vocational 
Training 2012b: 48).  
Interestingly, it also contained a passage insinuating that the government had given up 
the insistence on budget support for education; after reference to the Joint Assistance 
Strategy of 2006 which clearly emphasised GBS as preferred aid modality, the text de-
clares:    
The Government has been encouraging Development Partners to channel their develop-
ment assistance through General Budget Support (GBS) rather than basket funds and 
direct project support. However, the Government will continue to be flexible to accom-
modate assistance from Development Partners who have decided not to use the GBS 
funding modality but who are interested to support education interventions. (Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training 2012b) 
It is questionable whether this concession of individual interventions derived from a 
changed government position or – what appears more likely – from donors’ reverse turn 
to projects through which they are more easily able to trace their investments and put 
their flag on results.   
The Conditionality of Consultation and the Centrality of Aid in Policymaking 
The PEDP III process was delineated in such detail since it hints at pervasive patterns 
which in their interplay severely affect educational governance in Tanzania. The first 
pertains to the conditionality of donor consultation and the effects on the nature of inter-
action; the second to the (perceived) dependency on aid money and the resulting 
implications for agenda-setting in education.  
As to the former point, it is instructive to reiterate a statement made by the education 
team leader in the Canadian Embassy. Reporting on the great deal of annoyance caused 
by the donors’ feedback on the PEDP III draft, he assumed that the harsh reaction of 
government officials derived from the fact that they ‘were going through the formality 
of consulting’ without actually seeking advice but with the stance ‘let’s consult donors 
because we have to’ (Interview 30). That this perception is at least partly true is sup-
ported by various narratives of government officials. Asked to assess the usefulness of 
regular meetings with donors, the Primary Education director in the MoEVT responded:  
You know, sometimes it may not be useful – but they’re the funders. They’re the ones 
who support you, so you have to go into negotiation. (Interview 49)  
As a matter of fact, the ‘dialogue’ in the education sector (and similarly in other policy 
fields) has been constructed as a requirement of budget support modalities, i.e. GBS and 
basket funding for education. Clearly, the point of departure for the institutionalised 
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interaction between donors and the government is the financial need of the latter. 
Hence, while the ‘dialogue’ is formally framed as “an open space for discussions, chal-
lenges and agreements on technical and policy issues” (United Republic of Tanzania 
2012b: 1), it is inherently based on a dependency relationship structured by financial 
power. From government perspective, policy discussions are primarily held to comply 
with funding requirements and not because there is a genuine request for being advised. 
In fact, the ‘process conditionality’ (Gould & Ojanen 2005: 25) of donor consultation 
renders actual demand for advice irrelevant. Against this background, it is in a way not 
surprising when ministry officials – as in the case of the  PEDP III draft – react little 
receptive to and displeased about critical feedback.  
On government side, the obligatory nature of interaction with external experts grounded 
in financial needs seems to result in idiosyncrasy against any further interference which 
manifests in a strong rejection of additional technical assistance offered by donors; re-
ferring to her ministry counterparts, a Tanzanian advisor working for Canada reported:      
Consequently they have been refusing, at least in our sector education, when you touch 
issues of – ok, we don’t have money to do X, Y and Z, but what you people need may be 
just somebody to take you through, so that you know how to plan better, how to imple-
ment better. How about us providing that resource, not in money, but we are bringing 
[someone] to sit with you to do X, Y and Z? They are not very willing. (Interview 31)   
Given that deliberation with donors has become an inevitable feature of educational 
governance, the reflexive refusal of technical assistance can be interpreted as an attempt 
to secure a last sphere of autonomy on the part of policymakers whose discretionary 
power is markedly constrained. Ministry officials have become used to bargain convic-
tions against money, as a statement from the director of Primary Education reflects:   
Sometimes you have to lose what your belief is. And the other side also has to lose some 
of the elements, you know. And you come to a place where you win a little bit of it and 
the other side wins a little bit of it as well. (Interview 49)  
The understanding that the feasibility of policies and plans depends on the approval of 
donors is widely internalised among leadership ranks and civil servants in the education 
ministry. Many consider the government’s scope of action as determined by the consen-
sus and agendas of external funders who eventually hold the ‘whip hand’, as a high-
ranking official in PMO-RALG pointed out: 
You cannot implement unless you agree, and you have agreed this dialogue should be 
consultative, respecting one another, you need to listen to a colleague, you see. So there 
are times when these strategies and the policy get stuck to stand still because you have 
not agreed with the experts from the embassies, from the donor cooperation agencies. (In-
terview 60)  
Similarly, a senior official in the higher education department explained:    
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There’s finance from someone who says yes, if you do this, I’m willing to convince 
someone somewhere to release that sum, so that you can do this. But that ‘this’, what is 
it? Is it the real that you want? (…) But what you want to address, you have no funding 
for it. (Interview 48) 
Asked for giving a concrete example, the interviewee pointed to the ministry’s first 
Higher Education Development Programme approved in 2010 and covering the years 
2010–2015. As the outcome of almost a decade of research, consultation and retreats, 
the document presented a detailed list of activities proposed to enhance access and qual-
ity in higher education, focussing on institutional reforms, service delivery and 
sustainability mechanisms (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2010a). De-
spite being commended for its clarity and thorough analysis (see Education 
Development Partners Group in Tanzania 2013: 59 et seq.), HEDP has not yet received 
much attention from the aid community; as the following statement reflects, the lack of 
support for implementing the suggested interventions caused much frustration among 
officials in the higher education department:  
It is just in our shelves now. When it started, there was the idea that someone would fund 
that – none came up to now (…).  But you have spent the department’s budget for almost 
two years or so on that. Nobody came up and said yeah, I’m willing to even pick a por-
tion in that, nobody is there. Of recent, we have been advised to go through it and – I 
don’t know how to put it, but to make different portions, so that you can sell each portion 
separately (…). But even doing that, again we had to dig into the department’s budget to 
prepare that, in hope that someone would come up to support that one. (Interview 48) 
The terms used here are in a way telling: The government had to ‘portion’ its pro-
gramme in order to make it ‘sellable’ to external financiers. The fact that aid providers 
showed little interest to buy in is used as an explanation why HEDP now lied ‘in the 
shelves’. In this case as in many others, officials experienced themselves as being at the 
mercy of the donors.  
The dependency on external funding proved to be the predominant point of reference 
across interviews with education policymakers. The centrality of the theme as the deci-
sive condition structuring relationships and its use as legitimating pattern for 
action/inaction is striking. Although education is de facto less dependent on foreign 
funding than other sectors (see chapter 6.1.1), aid money constitutes the prime concern 
of all actors in the field and the linchpin of debate, as a Tanzanian education specialist 
emphasised:   
So the resource issue becomes the driving – it’s like you talk around the needs, you talk 
around, yes, a little bit on the priorities, but how much on those priorities. (Interview 31) 
The claim that aid money and resource flows have indeed become the prime subjects of 
discourse is supported by various narratives and documents related to the PEDP III pro-
cess which we presented earlier; to iterate just two extracts for illustration:  
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Now if the donor funds are not forthcoming and it was included in the budget, then that’s 
the reason why we cannot get the amount of money this time. (PMO-RALG official, in-
terview 60)  
Significant changes need to be made (…) to ensure that it becomes a credible plan – at-
tractive for both internal and external financing. (DPs cited in Education Development 
Partners Group in Tanzania 2013: 19) 
The fact that ‘development partners’ called for significant changes of the PEDP III draft 
on the grounds that it should be made ‘credible’ and ‘attractive’ for local and foreign 
financiers hints at the central role of aid as a frame of reference in the education sector. 
In this particular case, PEDP III was deemed important not only for donor decisions on 
future budget support for education, but also for prospective funding held out by the 
‘Global Partnership for Education’181, a multi-lateral financing body which signalled to 
allocate about US$ 100 million if Tanzania applied; a successful application, however, 
required the endorsement of educational plans by ‘development partners’. In their view, 
the first PEDP III versions were ‘not good enough’ to be approved, as a representative 
of the Canadian Embassy reported:  
We said: If you submit this, they are not going to accept it. And we were quite confident 
that it wasn’t good enough. (Interview 30)  
Given the ascribed and perceived centrality of external funding for educational govern-
ance, the assessment of policies and programmes against donor standards and agendas 
has become a common pattern. If need be – as obviously in the case of PEDP III – the 
government very pragmatically adjusts strategic documents or reports to make them ‘fit’ 
by including formal elements (e.g., tabular logframes) or the ‘right’ catch-words that 
match the aid community’s current concepts; often, the reframing is not even done by 
ministry officials but by technical assistants familiar with the terminology and formats 
required.182 Gratifying funders in order to ensure that ‘money flows’ seems to have be-
come a priority of policymakers; Canada’s education team leader commented in this 
regard:  
When there’s a cheque on the horizon, again GPE is a good example, it’s 100 million dol-
lars, that caught their attention. (…) And then I do think they sort of figure out, okay 
‘What do we need to do to satisfy the donors so that we can get the money?’ Yeah, I think 
that’s a big part. (Interview 30)  
                                                          
181
  The ‘Global Partnership for Education’ (formerly known as the Education for All Fast Track 
Initiative) is a multilateral financing mechanism providing grants to low-income countries aim-
ing at accelerating the achievement of free, universal primary education. Its budget is made up of 
contributions from European and North American donor countries which are represented on the 
governance boards. The GPE secretariat is based in Washington.  
182
  Referring to the formulation of annual sector reports, an advisor in the Canadian Embassy stated 
in this regard: “Even though we say we read and we provide input, it is not quite just an issue of 
reading and providing input. Sometimes you are actually writing the sentences.” (Interview 31) 
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The ‘Charade’ of Ownership in Educational Policymaking 
The significance of donor agendas as a point of orientation, the focus on compliance 
with aid organisations’ requirements and the intense involvement of external experts in 
formulating decisive documents suggest the inference that educational policymaking in 
Tanzania has been externalised; this claim is supported by the first secretary for educa-
tion in the Swedish Embassy who critically acknowledged:  
We have all these very good policies and programmes and on paper, but it’s not owned. 
It’s very much from the outside. (Interview 40)  
Donors have become involved in policymaking to such an extent that it has become 
difficult to trace where priorities derive from. After decades of interference, they find 
themselves in a situation where they are trying to guess whether there is a genuine gov-
ernment agenda and if so, what it looks like; an advisor working for the Canadian 
Embassy – herself being a Tanzanian – made the following remark in this regard:    
My biggest challenge over the years has always been: What is the government thinking, 
when they sit on the other side and we are on this other side? They know their need; they 
know their priorities as a government. And that’s why even right now, as we are talking, 
they are busy finalising their national budget speech for the year, so they will definitely 
have to go look backwards and forward. So they are planning! They have issued the Five 
Year Plans, now they are talking of a long term plan, those things are on the table (…). 
The question is still, is that what the recipient government would wish to see happen?  
(Interview 31) 
Given the well-entrenched involvement of donors over more than twenty years, it is for 
many hard to imagine how educational governance in Tanzania would look like if the 
government was in a position to decide and operate independently from external inter-
ference. The first secretary of education in the Swedish Embassy commented in this 
respect:    
I’ve stated not many times, but at least ten times in the dialogue from last year: What 
would happen if we suggested that we took time out and just supported the Tanzanian 
government to come up with a curriculum with a starting point from the Tanzanian con-
text on the African continent. How would it look like? Would the subjects be the same? 
Would the content be the same? And I’ve raised this question a couple of times. And then 
they say, the government people say, ‘well, that’s an interesting idea’, but they know that 
the charade must go on. (Interview 40)  
The ‘charade’ going on in the education sector is outlined by a civil society leader who 
similarly to the Swedish official used the notion of an ‘act’ being played, with the main 
protagonists being a “weak, distracted government not clear on what it wants” and do-
nors who “start filling the gaps and trying to make things happen, because of the 
absence of strong clear government leadership” (Interview 70): 
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When that is not there in our government, the donors start stepping in. But we have to all 
pretend that government is in charge, in the ‘driving seat’. So you live this kind of double 
life of officially everything has government stamps and leadership and so on, but in reali-
ty, the people pushing things are the donors. (Interview 70)            
The fact that donors collectively and individually start “creating what they want to see 
in Tanzania” (Interview 40) can be observed in various processes; two examples, name-
ly the push for re-entry of girls in schools and ICT in primary education, are briefly 
sketched in the following.  
“There are Different, Mixed Feelings”: the Issue of Pregnant Girls in Schools 
By 2012, the large number of girls who dropped out of school due to pregnancy had 
come up as a serious matter of concern in Tanzania (IRIN news 2007b). According to 
media reports citing ministry statistics, 5157 girls had been abandoned from primary 
school in 2011 due to pregnancy even though no law explicitly prescribed the expulsion 
of students on that grounds (Assey 2012; Robi 2012). 
Emphasising Tanzania’s international commitments regarding gender equality and the 
right to education for all children, donors strongly pushed the government to include a 
clear policy statement on the re-entry of teenage mothers into a revised Education and 
Training Policy. According to both aid and government officials, the issue became a 
conflictual point of discussion which during the drafting process was repeatedly put ‘in 
and out’. An assistant director in the MoEVT Department of Policy and Planning delin-
eated the sensitivity of the topic as follows:  
The DPs are of the idea that the right should be given. But then, you know, education 
stakeholders are many and they are different from cultural thinking. They think maybe 
from our culture it is not right if you do this. There are religious groups, they have differ-
ent ideas, they say no, once a girl has been pregnant to us, it’s a sin and so and so. There 
are different, mixed feelings. (Interview 50)  
Similarly, the director of Primary Education argued:  
Me, I think that the entry programme is a good programme if you want to have every 
child in school. But the question is on how to implement that. Because education is cul-
tural-based. And we have our culture. Our communities in Mtwara and Lindi have their 
cultures. And so I think we have to merge these two things. We want children to go to 
school but without compromising the culture of the children, the culture of the communi-
ty of that particular, specific community. But also I think we should not do something that 
tomorrow will turn against us – that will speed up the rate of pregnancy, rather than stop-
ping or rather than curbing the problem. And so I think those factors have caused this 
programme to delay. Because you take the idea to the parliament and find a lot of com-
ments come in. (Interview 49)  
In fact, members of parliament seemed to be divided over the issue, with some arguing 
for alternative training of teenage mothers instead of bringing them back to the formal 
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system; a commission formed to examine the matter reported that many teachers op-
posed the idea of allowing re-entry of girls with children (Tanzania Daily News 2012).  
The government found itself caught betwixt and between those positions. Perceiving 
resentment on the part of educational stakeholders, communities and religious leaders, 
the minister clearly signalled donors that Tanzania was ‘not ready for this yet’ (Inter-
view 40). Yet, aid representatives continued to exert pressure, as a high-ranking official 
in PMO-RALG reported:  
They say: ‘You know you are late, you signed the human rights convention, you know, 
the rights of the child, a child must get this [education].’ But you see: Good, we like it. 
But don’t we need preparations for that? But some of these want it immediately. That’s 
where we have a problem. (Interview 60)  
What can be taken from various narratives of educational decision makers is that while 
being aware of international obligations and of the necessity to deal with school drop 
outs, they deemed the implementation of a re-entry policy unfeasible, expecting little 
acceptance on the part of their constituency. According to ministry officials, the on-
going discrepancy about the subject matter led to ‘unsmooth running’ of donor-
government meetings due to ‘some sort of resistance’ among MoEVT representatives. 
During this research, the issue remained unresolved, and the Education and Training 
Policy continued to be revised; commenting on the state of affairs, the PMO-RALG 
leader stated:   
The ministry was forced to change that policy, but it’s still in the draft. At least three 
years have elapsed without that policy being out. (Interview 60)  
Waiting for Computers: USAID’s ‘Tanzania 21st Century Basic Education Programme’ 
Another process which resulted in deadlock was USAID’s ‘Tanzania 21st Century 
Basic Education Programme’, commonly known as ‘TZ 21’. Running from 2011 to 
2015 with an overall budget of US$ 94 million, the project’s stated goal was to integrate 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) into primary education in order to 
enhance children’s learning achievements (Embassy of the United States Dar es Salaam 
2012). Similar to an equivalent project set up in Kenya, schools should be equipped 
with computers, learning and management software, with teachers and administrators 
getting trained in how to use the new technologies.183 Thereby, the project was closely 
aligned to USAID’s new global education strategy which explicitly encouraged the use 
of ICT for achieving the goal of ‘improved reading skills for 100 million children in 
primary grades by 2015’ (USAID 2009: 21).  
                                                          
183
  Initiated in 2009, the “Accelerating 21st Century Education” project in Kenya focussed on 
providing PCs for classrooms, wireless internet connectivity, digital content, and ICT skills train-
ing for teachers (Microsoft News Center 2009; Kenya Ministry of Education 2012).   
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 178 
 
When we met the USAID education team leader in his office on the US Embassy com-
pound in May 2012, he was excited about the recent launch of the initiative on Zanzibar 
and the upcoming inauguration in the Mtwara region, stating that all partners were 
‘jazzed up’ about the ‘fantastic opportunity’ to try out the ‘totally experimental’ ap-
proach: “There’s the feeling ‘let’s do it, let’s get started’!” (Interview 42). 
The partners he referred to comprised a whole range of stakeholders: Creative Associ-
ates International, a US-based development firm which was contracted as implementing 
agent; Microsoft, Cisco and Intel which had been selected as technology supply compa-
nies; regional government authorities; and the national education ministries of Zanzibar 
and Tanzania Mainland. With the latter, he conceded, USAID had ‘a rough time’ during 
the design stage of TZ21 insofar as the MoEVT was ‘not very enthusiastic’ about the 
idea, and objected to the project approach in favour of budget support. Undeterred by 
the reluctance at national level, USAID directly approached local authorities in the areas 
where the project should be carried out184, and encountered ‘very cooperative’ counter-
parts. Eventually, when the opening of the project in Zanzibar went through the news, 
the MoEVT signalled interest to get involved; according to the USAID education team 
leader, the minister was suddenly thrilled by the initiative which he allegedly deemed 
‘incredible’ (Interview 42). 
Speaking to government officials ten months later, we found little of that enthusiasm in 
the ministry. Asked how the project proceeds, the Primary Education director respond-
ed:  
Well, the computers are still in Dar es Salaam. They have not been sent to Mtwara. I saw 
the computers for the first time when the Vice President went to inaugurate. But at the 
moment they are only in two schools – in Kambarage Primary School there in Mtwara, 
and the other one is at Naliendele, another school. There I found about two, three com-
puters or laptops. And the rest of the computers have not been sent to Mtwara.  
Just last week I was talking to one of their representatives here. So I said, do you think 
it’s important for our people here, computer personnel in here, to go and see the specs – 
the computer specifications. Because the project is three years – sooner or later, it’s going 
to come to an end. So what will happen if our people, our own people here, do not know 
the computers – specs of the computer, when they were made, where they were made and 
all these kinds of things? (Interview 49)  
While the director refrained from articulating blunt criticism, his dissatisfaction with the 
course of the cooperation was implied in various narratives. Aside from the annoyance 
about the deadlock in computer installation, a salient point seemed to be the fact that the 
MoEVT was only marginally (if at all) involved by its project ‘partners’, e.g., in identi-
fying or procuring the technical equipment which was meant to be supplied to schools. 
                                                          
184
  According to the USAID education team leader, Mtwara was chosen due to its ‘growing popula-
tion, gas and oil’, and Zanzibar due to the new US focus on investing in ‘islamic communities’ 
as a strategy to prevent terrorism (Interview 42).  
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This was confirmed by a Tanzanian education specialist who had temporarily been con-
tracted as an advisor for TZ21. Herself being highly critical about the way the project 
was carried out, she stated:  
For ownership purposes, you would need also to bring into the process the government, 
the technical people, so that they know when we procure an equipment, let’s say for the 
primary education, it should be of this kind because it cannot be an equipment that can be 
sent to secondary or colleges, you know, because of young children. Let that be docu-
mented and let that be a process that everybody understands. So there are a lot of 
implications of ICT implementation at the school level (…). But when you discuss with 
other people in the project, they don’t see that. (Interview 32)  
An implication which had obviously not been considered and thoroughly discussed with 
national authorities concerned the incorporation of ‘e-content’ into the curriculum. 
While the delivery of education and the management of schools in Tanzania fall under 
the responsibility of local governments, the development of syllabi and learning materi-
als is centrally done by the Tanzania Institute of Education (TIE), a parastatal 
organisation under the MoEVT. Already prior to the release of the government’s ICT 
policy for basic education in 2007, TIE had designed an ICT curriculum (‘Teknolojia ya 
Habari na Mawasiliano’ or TEHAMA in short) to be applied in pre-primary and prima-
ry schools with adequate infrastructure (Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 
2007: 7). Thus USAID’s aim to introduce externally designed ICT modules on TZ21 
project sites seemed highly problematic to the director of Primary Education:  
You cannot have a module which is not compatible to other modules that are applied in 
other regions in Tanzania, or a module that is not compatible with the curriculum that is 
being implemented. Otherwise you have to dismantle everything. And who is ready to do 
that? Nobody is ready for that; we are not ready for that yet. We may wish to review, re-
vise our curriculum, but not because there is this one thing in Mtwara going on. It might 
be very difficult. (Interview 49) 
The potential deviation of curricula was not the only unresolved issue which caused 
irritation among MoEVT officials. Frictions also emerged with regard to suggested 
modifications of the ministry’s Education Management Information System (EMIS). In 
order to strengthen school administration, TZ21 consultants, together with technology 
suppliers, had developed a software for capturing real-time data on the attendance of 
teachers and students; in their view, the information collected through this tool could 
also be constructively used for decision-making and planning if aggregated at the na-
tional level. Unluckily, the programme offered was not compatible with the system 
UNESCO had installed in MoEVT, amongst others since its scope was restricted. Yet, 
USAID and other donors pushed the ministry to adopt their software solution and adjust 
the one currently in use. A senior director in the M&E unit who participated in the ensu-
ing debate reported:  
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We told them: ‘Look, here you have only collected the information for lower primary, 
from standard one to standard four. But here in the ministry we have a system which col-
lects information from pre-primary to higher education institutions (…). Why can’t you 
mainstream it to the ministry data base rather than the ministry mainstreams yours which 
covers only standard one to standard four level?’ So there was some discussion. (Inter-
view 50)  
The tensions arising on issues such as EMIS, ICT modules and procurement show a 
common pattern: The root cause of conflict can be found in a pervasive disregard of 
local institutions. Bypassing national decision-making entities, USAID drove forward a 
project in line with its own agenda but detached from the field it encountered. Against 
this background, one could argue that the difficulties and frictions which emerged in the 
course of the operation were to some extent predictable.  
In a way, TZ21 seems symptomatic for the particularity of ‘ICT in education’ as a poli-
cy subject in the Tanzanian context and its void of local grounding. Actually all round 
table conferences and workshops held in previous years to explore the opportunities of 
ICT in education had been facilitated with donor support (see Nielinger 2006: 273–275; 
Ministry of Education and Vocational Training 2007: 12). A Tanzanian education spe-
cialist tentatively indicated that the ICT policy for basic education had primarily been 
created to please foreign funders, but apart from existing on paper lacked political con-
cern and feasibility; she supported her claim by stating:  
The urgency of preparing that policy, you know, I remember it was not very systematical-
ly done because otherwise – by then I was in the World Bank – I would have heard about 
the process. Usually when it is time to prepare policy, you will know even if you are a 
donor that something is going on. I didn’t hear about that until when something was there 
(…). Since that time up to now, that policy has not been developed for operationalization, 
in terms of operational guidelines at the school level, at the regional level or being budg-
eted for nothing. So as a donor, how will you prepare such a project? I mean the risks 
should have been seen by then. (Interview 32)  
At the time of writing, the project was still on-going; aside from photo galleries with 
children in front of computers and anecdotes of ‘success stories’ on the project website 
(e.g., about communities mounting iron door gates in schools “to ensure the safety of 
the ICT equipment that will be installed” USAID & Creative Associates International 
2014), no information on what TZ21 has actually achieved until now could be obtained. 
(USAID & Creative Associates International 2014).   
Signs of Resistance 
Among policymakers and senior officials in the MoEVT, there seems to be mounting 
resentment about being exposed to aid activities that consume staff time and energy, yet 
constantly result in failure. While Tanzanian government members are usually known 
for outward countenance, their frustration has reached a level where it occasionally 
erupts, as the first secretary of education in the Swedish Embassy reported:  
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In our monitoring and evaluation technical working group last week, there was an out-
burst almost when the government officials said ‘we are so tired of all your projects and 
there’s no sustainability, you, the development partners should really take responsibility’ 
and so on. And then we said, ‘well, ok, we’ve tried to coordinate ourselves, but you could 
also say no, if you don’t want the money. We come with all those proposals, but you 
should make sure that you say no if you don’t want them.’ (Interview 40)  
The claim that government counterparts didn’t make clear statements and didn’t direct 
donors in education was repeatedly brought up by interviewees in country offices and 
embassies. A Tanzanian education specialist who had worked for both the government 
and donors critically stated:  
At the end of the day, it is the government receiving aid that has to be organized, and 
helping to guide anybody coming in. If the government is not going to do that, then you 
have all these scattered things. (Interview 32)  
In the experience of aid officials, most of the issues debated in policy discussions are 
brought up by themselves. Referring to the technical working groups and committee 
meetings which are formally chaired by the government, the Canadian team leader for 
education commented:  
To be honest I find a lot of the meetings are donor-driven. I’m not sure if it’s because we 
are more impatient than they are. I mean, it was often – this was interesting about being 
the chair [of the Development Partners Group], because it meant I would meet with their 
secretariat weekly (…), and we would sit down and say ‘Okay where are things at?’ And 
they’d say ‘well, we’re going to do this.’ They have a work plan, and they’d say ‘we’ll do 
this that, this, that, this, that.’ We’d say ‘okay, what about this, this, this, this?’ – ‘Al-
right’, and they’d start filling in all these other boxes they had apparently not thought 
about or not considered, it just seems like there was too much going on. So, I mean, I 
wonder if we said nothing, what would happen? Would nothing happen? I don’t think so. 
I think they would eventually just pick up the slack and do something. But I think they’ve 
become very accustomed to us sort of setting the agenda, saying ‘well, maybe we should 
do this then, this then and this then’ and they say ‘well, yeah, okay.’ (Interview 30)  
As the narratives above indicate, ministry officials seem to have adopted a conduct of 
compliance towards the aid community. Various circumstances lend themselves as ex-
planations for the steering vacuum. One reason preferably stated by donor 
representatives is the lack of capacity on the part of MoEVT, which – in their view – 
results in an ad-hoc way of working devoid of prioritisation and forward planning.185 In 
this reading, the void of leadership derives from deficient administrative strength.186   
                                                          
185
  The Canadian education team leader, for instance, stated in this regard: “When they focus to do 
something, they can do it. But they can only do one thing at a time. (…) And so, once your issue 
comes up, it’s great because you get immediate action and it’s, you know, pretty, pretty strong 
commitment and I mean there are very dedicated people who work long hours. So it’s not that 
they’re lazy or anything like that, but they do seem to be very sequential.” (Interview 30)  
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The ministry’s indetermination, however, can also be interpreted as a coping strategy in 
a relationship of dependence: Based on accumulated experiences, many high-ranking 
officials and policymakers seem to have internalised the fact that overt objection against 
the aid community leads to nowhere and may eventually result in the withdrawal of 
money. In respect of the precedence of securing funding, concurring with donors opens 
up more room for tactical manoeuvring than taking an unequivocal stand. That this kind 
of strategy might be adopted is implied by a Canadian official who, when asked about 
the government’s receptiveness to donor advice in policy meetings, responded:   
Most of the time they are like ‘yes, good idea, great, we will do something about that, we 
will think about that, we will include that in our next plan’ – most of the time they receive 
it fairly positively. Whether things change, that is another story. (Interview 30)  
As the last part of the quote implies, agreement with donor suggestions is not necessari-
ly followed by action. In fact, various reports from interviewees suggest that the 
ministry deliberately uses inaction and delay as a tool of resistance. The persistent post-
poning of a decision about how to deal with pregnant girls in schools and the resulting 
deadlock of policy revision can be seen as a case in point in this regard.   
While jamming processes certainly helps to thwart plans pushed from outside, it doesn’t 
really bring a local agenda to the fore. Some observers claim that after years of external 
domination there is none left.  
Conclusion 
In a nutshell, the state of education governance in Tanzanian could be sketched as fol-
lows: The need for foreign financing has legitimated an intense involvement of external 
actors in the policy space in which aid money has become the predominant point of ori-
entation. The prevailing sentiment of being at the mercy of donors has paralysed 
leadership and administration which fails to set or refrains from articulating an own 
agenda. The pervasive entrenchment of donor interference in policy issues has blurred 
clarity of what comes from within and what from outside; a civil society leader engaged 
in the education sector commented in this regard:   
                                                                                                                                                                          
 Similarly, a Tanzanian education specialist remarked: “Things are done ad-hoc, you know? Oh, 
the priorities today, oh, the minister wants this, oh this is that, oh… There’s no concentration on 
the priorities that were set.” (Interview 32)  
186
  That donors may exacerbate the ministry’s human resource situation by poaching the most quali-
fied and skilled education specialists was brought up by a Canadian official who commented: “I 
sometimes am a bit concerned; it’s quite difficult to get good experts, I think. We’ve been lucky, 
I’ve been lucky. I have colleagues on different programmes who really struggled to get good ex-
perts. And I also worry, of course, if all the donors are hiring the best experts, who’s actually 
running the system? Because I don’t think - unfortunately, we try not to do this, but I think it’s a 
reality that if you’re really good at something, you’re more likely to go on a job with the Canadi-
ans than with the government.” (Interview 30)  
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It’s almost like you don’t know now, the players, you don’t know what is the truth and 
what is not the truth because we are all doing this act. (Interview 70)  
While the government is formally ascribed the starring role in this ‘act’, the scene is set 
by aid providers whose experts have become the pivotal protagonists of the play. Their 
role in driving forth policy and decision-making processes has become so central that an 
advisor of Tanzanian origin working for Canada critically remarked:    
You ask yourself: When will this end? If we did leave this support, does that mean educa-
tion in Tanzania would collapse? We don’t have an answer, because we have always been 
there. (Interview 31)  
6.2.2 South Africa: Education  
Sectorial Context  
Education is one the most central topics of post-apartheid politics in South Africa. In its 
first White Paper on Education and Training, the new democratic government stated its 
conviction that education is an essential driver of transformation:  
Appropriate education and training can empower people to participate effectively in all 
the processes of democratic society, economic activity, cultural expression, and commu-
nity life, and can help citizens to build a nation free of race, gender and every other form 
of discrimination. (Department of Education 1995)  
The persisting prominence of education on the political agenda after twenty years of the 
transition derives from the massive challenges the country still faces in terms of build-
ing a society in which citizens are provided equal opportunities to attain well-being and 
prosperity. The development of South Africa’s education system and its deficiencies 
cannot be understood without knowing about the role and structures of education in the 
apartheid era. Thus, before delineating current challenges, we dwell on the educational 
politics of the apartheid regime whose devastating effects are felt until today.  
While black South Africans had experienced educational marginalisation already during 
colonial times, the Bantu Education Act passed by the apartheid government in 1953 
cemented the establishment of a segregating and suppressing education system. The 
racial law brought an end to the relative autonomy of mission schools attended by more 
than two-thirds of black South Africans at that time, centralising control over education 
in the Department of Native Affairs which imposed a curriculum designed to ‘prepare’ 
the African population for serving the white minority as labourers and workers (Fiske & 
Ladd 2005: 42). The then Minister of Native Affairs H.F Verwoerd legitimised the act 
before the South African parliament by stating:  
There is no space for him [the “Bantu”] in the European Community above certain forms 
of labour (…). Until now he has been subjected to a school system which drew him away 
from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European 
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society in which he is not allowed to graze. This attitude is not only uneconomic because 
money is spent for an education which has no specific aim but it is also dishonest to con-
tinue it. (Verwoerd cited in Christie & Collins 1984: 173) 
In the course of the apartheid rule, separate schools for each of South Africa’s ‘ethnic 
groups’ were established, creating an educational hierarchy with ‘whites’ at the top, 
followed by ‘Indians’, ‘coloureds’ and ‘blacks’ at the bottom.187 Governed by different 
authorities, the parallel systems immensely differed in terms of syllabi and ideological 
thrust, facilities and funding. By 1960, the per capita expenditure on education for 
whites (R 144,57) was more than ten times higher than for blacks (R 12,46) (Christie & 
Collins 1984: 182). While white students enjoyed conducive learning environments, the 
remaining majority was confronted with overcrowded classrooms, dilapidated school 
buildings, a lack of text books and learning materials, and inadequate instruction. Ac-
cording to figures from 1987, 87% of teachers in black schools were underqualified, i.e. 
had achieved an educational level of less than standard 10 and no certificate. The teach-
er to pupil ratio averaged 1:41, whereas in white schools it was about 1:16 (File et al. 
1989: 96).  
The unequal conditions led to high discrepancies in terms of educational attainment, as 
reflected by data of the 1996 census188: Taking persons aged 20 and older into account, 
two-thirds of the white population had achieved education at the level of Grade 12 
(39,3%) or higher (26,8%). Almost all remaining had at least some secondary educa-
tion; the percentage of people who had no schooling was marginal (1,1%). In contrast, 
among black Africans only one out of six had reached Grade 12 (12%) or higher, with 
the percentage in higher education being minimal (3,6%). Almost one out of four black 
Africans (24%) had received no formal schooling at all (Statistics South Africa 2012: 
34). While coloured people fared only slightly better, Indian/Asian people were marked-
ly better off regarding educational levels. Yet, all of them were structurally 
discriminated in the system imposed by the apartheid regime. The highly unequal edu-
cational opportunities translated into huge discrepancies in labour market status and 
income: As of 1996, only 3% of white people aged 15–65 were unemployed as opposed 
to 23,4% of black Africans (Statistics South Africa 2004: 51). Of those black Africans 
who were part of the formal employment system, one third (33,3%) earned only R 500 
or less per month, whereas only 5% of white employees had such a low salary (Statistics 
South Africa 2004: 73).  
                                                          
187
  The use of race as a form of classification in South Africa is still widespread in both official 
statistics and academic literature. As Spaull (2012: 2) states, “this serves a functional (rather than 
normative) purpose and any other attempt to refer to these population groups would be cumber-
some, impractical or inaccurate”.  
188
  The 1996 census was the first statistical exercise which provided accurate demographic and 
socio-economic data to describe South Africa’s situation after apartheid. The statistical system 
under the apartheid regime was deeply distorted insofar as it was racially fragmented and dis-
jointed (National Statistics System N/A: 1).   
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The statistics above reflect the deep impact of apartheid rule on education in South Af-
rica that over four decades “reinforced the inequalities of a divided society” (Msila 
2007: 147). Twenty years after the end of the ‘rogue regime’, its legacies are not yet 
overcome. Although the Constitution of 1996 made education a basic right for every 
South African (Republic of South Africa 1996, section 29), many still face tremendous 
difficulties in fully utilising this right (Nevondwe & Odeku 2013: 847), and educational 
opportunities continue to be racially skewed (Yamauchi 2005). While significant pro-
gress has been made in terms of providing access – with a Gross Enrolment Rate of 
99% at the primary level –, the quality of education remains at an alarming low level 
(Department of Basic Education 2014b: 7). In comparative international studies on liter-
acy or numeracy (e.g., SACMEQ III or TIMMS 2011), South African pupils lag behind 
those in poorer African countries such as Ghana or Tanzania (Moloi & Chetty 2010; 
Human Sciences Research Council 2011).189 This is even more concerning in light of 
the enormous differentials with respect to learning outcomes between historically 
‘white’ schools (attended by a small minority of students from middle and upper class 
backgrounds) and former ‘black’ schools in township areas (attended by the majority of 
African children).190 The persisting inequality is documented by various assessments; 
the National School Effectiveness Study (2007/08/09), for instance, found that grade 3 
pupils from former white schools scored higher on the same test than grade 5 pupils at 
former black schools, indicating large discrepancies in learning achievements visible 
already by the age of eight (Taylor et al. 2012: 5–6).  
The appalling gap regarding learner performance, resources and teacher qualifications 
points to the “dualistic nature” (Spaull 2012) of South Africa’s school system which 
seems to consist of two parallel subsystems:  
One which is functional, wealthy and able to educate students; with the other being poor, 
dysfunctional, and unable to equip students with the necessary numeracy and literacy 
skills they should be acquiring. (Spaull 2012: 14)  
Given this situation, the lag of black youth in terms of educational attainment is little 
surprising. According to Moloi et al. (2014: 471), “almost 58.5% of whites and around 
51% of Indians enter higher education. The rate for coloureds is 14.3%, while that for 
blacks is even lower at 12%”. Many universities in South Africa are internationally rec-
ognised as “world-class academic institutions, at the cutting edge of research in certain 
spheres” (Moloi et al. 2014: 470). For the majority of learners, however, they are out of 
reach.  
                                                          
189
  For an overview of empirical assessments on the quality of education in South Africa, see Spaull 
(2013). 
190
  As Yamauchi (2011) points out, high-quality schools situated in urban, well-off areas (with dom-
inantly white residents) are neither geographically nor financially accessible for many African 
children. Hence, although racial segregation has been abolished since twenty years, the composi-
tion of students is still skewed along racial lines. While historically ‘white’ and ‘Indian’ schools 
have become more diverse, former ‘black’ schools remain racially homogenous. 
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All in all, it seems that – despite massive resource shifts and several interventions put in 
place by the state – the South African school system in its current form contributes little 
to support the upward mobility of the poor in the labour market (van der Berg 2007: 
849). The economy, in turn, is severely affected by a shortage of skilled workers which 
hampers productivity and “reduces the country’s capacity to develop a knowledge so-
ciety” (Rasool & Botha 2011: 9). Providing equitable chances of education and training 
for all citizens in order to foster individual prosperity and economic growth has been on 
top of the political agenda since South Africa turned into a democracy; yet, it remains 
one of the biggest challenges in the country.                                                                   
Governance Structures 
Since 1994, South Africa’s institutional landscape in the field of education has been in a 
state of flux, with multiple bodies and structures being replaced, revised or recreated in 
the course of governance and policy reforms. As of 2014, the major policymaking bod-
ies at the national level were the Department of Basic Education (DBE) and the 
Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET); both were formed in 2009 when 
the former Department of Education was split into these two separate ministries. The 
DBE deals with primary and secondary education, early childhood development and 
adult literacy programmes; it provides national policy and legislative frameworks to 
give direction to the provinces which have their own education departments responsible 
for financing and managing schools in line with their needs. DHET is in charge of all 
post-school education and training components provided at universities, colleges and 
adult education institutions; it took over the Skills Development Branch from the De-
partment of Labour which shifted the Sector Education and Training Authorities 
(SETAs) concerned with workplace related occupational training to DHET. An im-
portant role-player in this area is the National Skills Authority which liaises with 
SETAs and advises the Minister of Higher Education on skills development matters.  
Donor Presence in the Education Sector  
Similar to other sectors but certainly more markedly, the nature and scope of aid for 
education and training in South Africa has shifted over time. Very roughly, one can dis-
tinguish three different phases: the transitional era up to 1994, the period of system 
building until the early 2000s, and the phase of retreat lasting to the present. During the 
apartheid era, various countries such as Denmark, the United States and Australia sup-
ported non-state actors which strived against the regime by providing education grants 
and overseas scholarships, training programmes and study tours for blacks and anti-
apartheid activists (King 1999: 258). As will be shown below, this informal aid had a 
huge impact insofar as it put key actors of the democratic movements in touch with ed-
ucation and training systems in Europe and elsewhere which greatly impregnated their 
thinking. A witness of that time who participated in the exchange commented in this 
regard:  
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 187 
 
Many people had studied in Britain and in America; they themselves had gone that route 
to study. So they came back believing in those systems because those systems had been 
the ones that had given them the step up. (Interview 20)  
With the turn to democracy, the government and its administration – now staffed with 
many of those who had received support as civil society and union protagonists – be-
came the main recipient of financial and technical assistance. Between 1994–1999, a 
whole range of bi- and multilateral donors addressed the education sector, amongst oth-
ers Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Germany, Belgium, Japan, Canada and the United States (Ngeleza et al. 2000). The ma-
jority of their funding was spent on human resource development (e.g., teacher 
training), followed by school building, the development of new institutions (notably the 
South African Qualifications Authority), maths, science and technology programmes 
and curriculum development (Ngeleza et al. 2000: 16). Hence, aid was used in almost 
all areas in order to build a new education and training system.  
During what we demarcate as the third phase starting in the mid-2000s, both the scope 
of aid and the number of donors significantly diminished. After a decade in which new 
policies, institutions and structures had been put in place, many foreign supporters 
pulled back from the education sector or phased out ODA to South Africa in general. 
While the Department of Higher Education and Training continues cooperation with a 
range of partners, the only donor from which the Department of Basic Education re-
ceived additional funds during the fiscal years 2010–2013 was the European Union 
(Department of Basic Education 2011, 2012, 2013). The government went over to using 
the remaining aid resources for niche areas (e.g., inclusive education) or innovative pilot 
projects which would otherwise be difficult to undertake given the pressure of national 
and provincial education budgets (Fölscher et al. 2010: 59).  
Starting from Scratch: the Creation of a Post-Apartheid Education Vision  
Policy work for a radical overhaul of the South African education system started already 
prior to the official end of apartheid. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, key players of 
the anti-apartheid movement began to liaise with counterparts and like-minded organi-
sations abroad in order to develop visions for education in a new democratic South 
Africa. Funded by an NGO called Australian People for Health, Education and Devel-
opment Abroad (APHEDA) and by the Swedish Sida, the National Union of 
Metalworkers (Numsa) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
carried out research projects which included travels to both developing and industrial-
ised countries; particularly the exchange with colleagues in Australia heavily influenced 
the thinking of South African union leaders (Carton & King 2004: 20–23; 
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Badroodien & McGrath 2005: 8–10).191 A leading protagonist involved summarised the 
phase of policy exploration as follows:   
We had ideas of what we wanted and how we wanted to do it – but we were keen to learn 
other ways, to hear ideas. (Interview 20)  
A unified attempt to conceptualise a future education and training system was undertak-
en in 1993 through the National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) which for the first 
time brought actors from the government in power and its opponents to one table. Faced 
with dysfunctional and racially divided schools, masses of illiterate and insufficiently 
trained people, and a fragmented governance system including 19 disconnected depart-
ments of education, the list of issues to be addressed was virtually endless; questions to 
be dealt with included   
what actual steps to take to work against the fundamental inequalities of the apartheid 
system materially as well as symbolically; what steps to take to deracialise the system; 
how to establish legitimate governance for schools and other educational institutions 
which had a history of contestation of authority; how to reduce spending on the personnel 
budget in education in order to free up money for other changes; what to teach in the new 
system; how best to assess and accredit; how to administer the national system of exami-
nations and their results; how to develop teachers’ capacity and willingness to participate 
in a new system and new curriculum; and so on. (Christie 2006: 376) 
The National Training Board, at that time an advisory body to the ‘Minister of Man-
power’, formed a National Task Team and eight committees including representatives 
from the state, trade unions, employers, providers of education and training, the ANC 
Education Department, and the democratic alliance. Each of the eight working groups 
was commissioned to investigate a certain topic with a view to South Africa’s situation, 
ranging from integrated career paths and certificates to legislation and financing.192 
Task group 7 was charged with compiling an international overview on ‘systems build-
ing’, drawing on experiences from industrialised countries, emerging markets and 
developing states (Heitmann 2010: 107).193 The research of this working group was 
supported by various donors, most notably Germany, which sponsored study tours to 
their own but also to other countries. Members of the task group thus travelled exten-
sively to distil lessons and best practices from successful vocational education and 
training systems around the world; their findings strongly shaped the principles and ide-
as adopted in the Discussion Document on a National Training Strategy Initiative which 
came out of the NTSI process in 1994 (National Training Board 1994). A key person 
                                                          
191
  Details on the Numsa Vocational Training Project and the COSATU Participatory Research 
Project which had a great influence on the thinking of lead unionists are provided by Carton and 
King (2004: 20–23) and Badroodien and McGrath (2005: 8–10).  
192
  For a detailed list of the eight task groups established, see Heitmann (2010: 104–105).  
193
  The countries included in the analysis were Australia, Brazil, Germany, England, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.  
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who was part of the National Task Team described the influence of the international 
comparative work on the preliminary policy document as follows:  
It’s very hard to distinguish between what came from the other countries and what was 
the product of debate here. A lot of people were reflecting on the experience here and 
drawing bits and pieces, like: We like this Scandinavian work on women’s training. So 
we had extensive sections from Scandinavia, where we said, look, we’ve got to train 
women to do traditionally male work and thinks like that. We knew that – but to see it in 
practice was very encouraging, and we thought now we can do this.  
And there were other things from other countries, I mean, we’ve known some stuff from 
some countries in Africa even who had come from a similar context to us. So that amal-
gam pot that had been created was captured into a policy document which included a 
chapter on international experience and was then used as a (…) first training document 
that had been agreed between the old apartheid officials and the new ones coming from 
the trade union movement. (Interview 20)  
The centrepiece of the proposed model was a single National Qualification Framework 
which would fully integrate general education and vocational training in a system of 
life-long learning. Key to the concept was the idea that skills, knowledge and abilities 
would be measured against a general qualification scale which is so to speak ‘blind’ as 
to where those have been acquired – whether in a full-time or part-time school, at the 
workplace, by distance education, at college or university, or a combination of different 
sites. Most notably, it would also take into account learning that took place outside for-
mal institutions and thereby “give value to the kind of learning people have already 
achieved in their lives” (Human Sciences Research Council 1995: 3 as reprinted in 
South African Qualifications Authority 2012). People would receive transferable credits 
for their competencies which would allow them to move across different fields and to 
progress within education, training and career paths. The features of the construct thus 
signalled a transformative endeavour which becomes apparent if one considers the pre-
vailing conditions at the end of the apartheid era: the majority of the population had 
received few years of schooling and lacked formal qualifications which denied them 
access and promotion in the labour market. The new model aimed at redressing the dis-
crimination in education, training and employment opportunities by removing the 
“obsession with institutional learning as the measure of a person’s worth” (Human Sci-
ences Research Council 1995: 12 as reprinted in South African Qualifications Authority 
2012), and instead making learning outcomes the decisive denominator for qualification 
in a system which gives equal value to education and training.  
Adopting the principles of outcomes-based learning, integration and progression, the 
NQF proposal was heavily influenced by education and training systems applied in oth-
er countries. In a couple of Anglo-Saxon states, the concept of National Qualification 
Frameworks had evolved during the late 1980s. South Africa strongly followed the New 
Zealand model in that it envisaged a comprehensive framework for all sectors and a 
unified quality assurance system. While the New Zealand model was favoured by busi-
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ness representatives, union members leaned on Australia’s competency-based education 
approach which allowed for incremental learning (Keevy 2013: 20); the latter was seen 
as a crucial aspect in the South African context, as an official who was member of the 
task team explained:  
Within the trade union movement we had started (…) a policy debate and visited Austral-
ia in 1990 and they were talking policy ideas that I was extensively influenced by. I still 
think they were great, whether they were implementable in the form we thought, that’s 
another story. But those [were] ideas which had to do with a national qualification 
framework and the ideas that workers could come in at a low level and could progress. 
Now the German system is more: you get a good schooling and then you train. In South 
Africa, you have many, many people who have not had a good schooling, so we were 
very keen to look at this progression idea that you might start as a semi-skilled worker 
[and] learn skills incrementally. (Interview 20)194  
Inspired by Australia’s competency-centred approach, unionists advocated an out-
comes-based system which would allow flexible career paths, offer life-long learning 
opportunities and link education and skills ladders. Integrating general education and 
vocational training was deemed crucial to eliminate the hierarchy between the two. 
Sympathising with the German dual system, labour representatives conveyed the view 
that in a new democratic South Africa a vocational training “should stand alongside the 
academic tradition with its head held high” (Interview 20).   
Although the blueprint NQF presented in the Discussion Document thus entailed ele-
ments which had been adopted from outside, it was widely conceived as a product of 
South African origin and debate. In part, this was a result of the National Task Teams’ 
clear positioning with regard to dealing with the findings from the international work. 
The team explicitly deemed the ‘importation’ of external models without adaptation to 
the local context ‘highly undesirable’, emphasising that a future education system must 
“be indigenous to the needs of South Africa to suit our needs, cultures and values” (Na-
tional Training Board 1994: 7 as cited in  Carton & King 2004: 24). Nonetheless, it was 
seen as helpful to take cognisance of others’ experiences. An actor involved commented 
on the extent of external influence as follows:    
We were quite heavily influenced – but we were influenced because it served our pur-
pose, it met a need for us (…). And whilst I don’t see external influence in the sense of 
individuals come into play, I see those ideas straining a little against each other, trying to 
find the best of combination. (Interview 20)  
What is notable is that external policy ideas and concepts were induced by committee 
members connecting with specialists abroad rather than imparted by consultants coming 
from outside. While foreign governments certainly had an interest to offer and promote 
                                                          
194
  Referring to key role players, Carton and King (2004) describe in detail how the strong linkages 
between Australian and South African metal unionists evolved and how this exchange subse-
quently influenced the unions’ positioning in the policy debate.  
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their own educational models to the emerging decision makers of a new South Africa, it 
seems that their role was quite restricted to facilitating the process of policy exploration. 
International study tours and workshops created a space for knowledge sharing and se-
lective borrowing which was not confined to donors’ own territories or expert 
communities but determined by local stakeholders (Carton & King 2004: 20). Hence, 
the policy document which came out of the National Training Strategy Initiative was 
seen as the outcome of a participatory, locally led process, expressing a joint vision of 
post-apartheid education and training (Carton & King 2004: 24).  
Shortly after the first democratic elections in 1994, the newly formed Government of 
National Unity presented its White Paper on ‘Education and Training in a Democratic 
South Africa: First Steps to Develop a New System’ to the public which broadly incor-
porated the principles of the Discussion Document (Department of Education 1995). In 
October 1995, the Parliament passed the South African Qualifications Authority Act 
(No. 58 of 1995) which formally introduced an integrative NQF approach and created 
the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) as a parastatal body responsible for 
developing and implementing the NQF (Republic of South Africa 1995).  
While the Act thus laid the legal foundation for the transformation of the education sys-
tem, institutions and structures such as quality assurance bodies, a new outcomes-based 
curriculum and funding frameworks were still to be designed and set up. Coping with 
the scale of the radical reform would have been difficult enough for any administration, 
even in firmly established democracies. In South Africa, the situation was exacerbated 
by the fact that the authorities faced with this challenge were themselves in a state of 
flux both in terms of structures and personnel. People from the democratic movement 
who entered bureaucratic bodies were highly committed to bring about change, but “did 
not, by definition, bring years of experience to the work of government administration” 
(Bird 2001: 266). Finding themselves in a vibrant, but still fragile working environment, 
they were confronted with a massive task which required both governance and specialist 
knowledge. The decision to approach donors for support was thus not only based on 
financial demand, but also on the need for external expertise, as a high-ranking official 
in the Department of Labour pointed out:  
In order to change the whole system, we had to come up with a new legislation, new sys-
tems, processes, procedures and we wanted to deliver on a mass scale, we wanted to 
come up with a funding framework. And all those things could not have been achieved 
[without external support] because we didn’t have local expertise. (Interview 22)  
Bringing Aid into Line with the Local Agenda: the Case of Higher Education  
The two line departments in charge of education and training, the Department of Educa-
tion and the Department of Labour thus entered negotiations with the aid community 
which seemed eager to provide assistance: In the early years of democracy, “requests 
for educational collaboration were arriving virtually on a daily basis from prospective 
partners as large as the Russian Federation and as small as Croatia” (King 1999: 260–
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261). A high ranking official who then worked for DoE described the dynamism of do-
nor meetings during that time as follows:  
I must say that in the beginning it was like, it was a wonderful terrain to work in. You had 
23, 24 partner countries all in one room and what we would do is, we would give them 
our priorities for the three years – this is what, where do you see yourself fitting in? 
Okay? America said: ‘We want to do curriculum development.’ Japan: ‘Oh no, we will 
give support for schools (…).’ Germany: ‘No, we have got skills, you know, yes, we can 
work with the Department of Labour and give a little support here to science education.’ 
for example. (…) So donor coordination meetings were critical – firstly, to share with 
them our plans, to get buy-in, to say ‘look, this is where we get to go’ or ‘this is where we 
are going to collaborate with another donor.’ (Interview 21)  
Naturally, not all went well in the beginning. In contrast to non-state actors, government 
authorities such as Education and Labour had absolutely no experience in dealing with 
aid; hence, “the complex universe of development cooperation was an unknown quanti-
ty” (King 1999: 261) for them. Aside from the pressure of meeting multiple donor 
requirements and procedures which, as one official stated, were a ‘nightmare’ during the 
first years, it proved difficult to get external assistance under control: The line depart-
ments soon realised that aid providers also used other entry-points to offer their 
services, particularly the provincial governments which were responsible for delivering 
reforms at the classroom level. Given that these implementing authorities didn’t sit 
around the table in national negotiations, aid projects often ran parallel and uncoordi-
nated; in the worst case, high expectations were belied, as an official remarked:  
Then you get a call later [from a provincial official] saying, ‘but you know, Mr So and So 
came to our province, he promised us X, Y, and Z, I’ve never seen him again.’ So we had 
to coordinate this thing much more effectively. And only after years did we manage to get 
the coordination. (Interview 21)  
What also became apparent was the fact that while donors seemed supportive of South 
Africa’s transformative agenda, they had their own interests and priorities. This was 
evident in that they clearly focussed their support on areas which were historically rele-
vant to them; a government official commented in this regard:  
Obviously, the donors also had their own intelligence gathering – they knew exactly 
where and who they want to support, where their missionaries were before, and now they 
were closely related to those geographic areas and therefore they wanted to support them. 
(Interview 21) 
For South African negotiators, it often turned out challenging to shift support to geo-
graphic and subject areas identified as being in particular need of technical assistance or 
funding. A case in point in which a mismatch of priorities became manifest was the 
struggle for aid to the higher education sector. From the government’s point of view, 
higher education was a key issue to be addressed in order to foster national development 
and social change in post-apartheid South Africa. Recognising “the massive influence 
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which higher education exerts on the cultural, social, scientific, technological and pro-
fessional formation of the country’s leadership” (Department of Education 1995), the 
first White Paper on Education and Training emphasised the need to tackle the several 
simultaneous challenges of the system, including fragmented structures, chronic finan-
cial pressure and absorption difficulties. Transforming the higher education landscape 
and advancing access to universities and tertiary learning institutions for students from 
historically disadvantaged communities were thus central concerns of decision makers 
in the then Department of Education, as an interviewee involved pointed out:  
Our view even at that stage when we were still a single department was that the heart of 
the system was higher education, was universities. If you get that wrong, you can’t train – 
you can’t train your intellectuals, you can’t train your teachers, you can’t train anyone. 
(Interview 21)  
Yet, the focus on higher education didn’t really match the international agenda of that 
time. This became manifest in that the government’s request for support targeting the 
higher education reform engendered little response on the part of the aid community. 
Only few development partners, notably Finland and Norway, promptly catered to the 
priorities articulated by the Department of Education by setting up programmes which 
addressed higher education issues.195 The majority of donors preferred to give resources 
for basic learning needs and schooling – hence for matters which were strongly pushed 
by the international community since the Jomtien World Conference (1990) and the 
related Education for All movement during the 1990s (World Conference on Education 
for All 1990). Officials negotiating with donor representatives on behalf of DoE had to 
make strenuous efforts to attract assistance for higher education priorities from their 
international counterparts:   
We kept on having to make overtures and to give more bides for higher education be-
cause they just wouldn’t bid (…). A few scholarships were thrown in. But that wasn’t 
what we wanted. We wanted budgetary support to reconfigure, restructure our higher ed-
ucation system. And I think that’s what we managed to do and we got support. 
(Interview 21)  
The persistence of South African officials in bargaining aid obviously bore fruits. Ac-
cording to an evaluation of development cooperation during 1994–1999, 46% of official 
development assistance to the education sector was channelled to higher education 
(Ngeleza et al. 2000: 15/31); the review team found that overall objectives of ODA 
were well aligned to those of the national and provincial Departments of Education, and 
                                                          
195
  Pertinent programmes set up to target higher education issues were the “South African – Norway 
Tertiary Education Development Project (SANTED)” which focussed on enhancing access for 
and retention of people from previously discriminated groups and capacity building of historical-
ly disadvantaged institutions, and the “South African – Finnish Co-operation Programme in the 
Education Sector” (SCOPE), which, amongst others, helped to transfer teacher education and 
training into higher education.  
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that the distribution of aid “closely mirrored the prioritisation of the South African gov-
ernment” (Ngeleza et al. 2000: 14). The success of department officials in bringing aid 
into line with the South African agenda mainly rested on two structural advantages: 
Despite financial needs, the education sector was not substantially dependent on donor 
money. And: Since plenty of international players competed for being part of South 
Africa’s educational transformation, government negotiators had a strategically advan-
tageous position in which they were able to set the direction and conditions of support, 
as a former DoE official indicated:  
We could be slightly cheeky to a donor to say ‘no, thank you – another partner is going to 
come (…).’ And so we could push the envelope and say: ‘No that’s not what we want. 
We want this instead. We want you to support us in developing X, Y, Z.’ I think in retro-
spect why we could get possibly the highest percentage of support to higher education, to 
universities, was because we could be cheeky. We could tell the donors: Either you sup-
port it or not. But we can assure you that we will do it either way. (Interview 21)  
The relative financial strength and the role as much courted recipient enabled the De-
partment of Education to strategically decide whose and which kind of support to 
accept. In doing so, it adopted a rather wary attitude towards the use of external exper-
tise. Advisors or consultants were only brought in after thorough consideration for 
specific, clearly determined tasks; most notably, department leaders were vigilant about 
keeping foreign actors outside the centre of decision-making. As the following state-
ment reflects, this cautiousness had grown out of both a strong notion of self-reliance 
among the new leadership ranks and their awareness of the risks advice from outside 
entailed:  
So we had that possibility now to shape and to change things, to use our own policymak-
ers and we have had the years of international exposure and experience to develop our 
policies. So never did we have experts or foreign policy people in our policy discussions 
to decide and to determine the route that we are going to take. And it’s not in a kind of ar-
rogant way that we didn’t want that, but we’ve understood also what has been happening 
in other countries. We have had obviously technical advice and expertise coming from all 
over the show [but] we’ve used that expertise to support our policy development agenda. 
(Interview 21)  
One area in which decision makers in charge have extensively drawn on external exper-
tise to realise South African policy visions is the vocational education and training sub-
sector; as will be shown in the following, particularly the close and long-term coopera-
tion with the German GIZ had a profound impact on policies and institutions addressing 
skills development in the new South Africa.  
Expert Involvement in Constructing a New Skills Development Architecture 
When the democratic government came into power in 1994, it inherited an extremely 
poor skills regime which neither met the needs of society nor of economy. With the ma-
jority of the population being insufficiently or inappropriately trained, the country faced 
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a severe skills shortage across all sectors which had a stark negative effect on productiv-
ity and industrial competitiveness; the situation was a result of decades of apartheid rule 
under which institutionalised vocational education and training barely existed and non-
formal skills training hardly provided prospects of qualification and employment (Heit-
mann 2010: 101–102). Enhancing the skills base of workers and unemployed citizens 
by creating a new, demand-driven skills development system was thus a central concern 
of policymakers in the Department of Labour (DoL) bearing the political responsibility 
for occupational training.   
A donor which from the outset lent its support to the envisaged reform was Germany. 
Already before entering an official agreement which defined skills development as one 
of three focus areas of bilateral cooperation, the German government had funded stud-
ies, invested in teacher training and supported the National Training Strategy Initiative 
in exploring vocational education and training systems in other countries. While by the 
mid-1990s almost all aid organisations had turned to basic education, the GTZ as Ger-
many’s implementing agency for development cooperation maintained its focus on 
skills development and offered significant in-house expertise in this field (Carton & 
King 2004: 19).196 When in 1996 the Department of Labour put in place a new Chief 
Directorate charged with developing policy and legal frameworks for a new skills de-
velopment regime, it was agreed that GTZ would provide support to the process through 
a broad-based sector programme which included financial and technical assistance. In 
the course of the so-called “Skills Development Strategy Initiative (SDSI) Support Pro-
gramme” and related projects197, a close relationship between senior officials in the DoL 
and GTZ staff developed. Particularly the then head of the Pretoria country office be-
came highly appreciated by key actors on South African side for his flexibility in 
responding to the department’s needs and his approach of catering advice to the local 
                                                          
196
  As Carton and King (2004: 19) point out, GTZ obviously had a unique selling point at that time 
since the presence of donor staff with expertise on labour skills was significantly diminished by 
the mid to late 1990s: „Sida had only one vocational in-house expert left by the end of the dec-
ade, and DFID had none. Meanwhile the once very large staff of technical educators in the Bank 
had almost disappeared. CIDA too had no in-house professional capacity left. (…) Danida and 
Irish Aid, which were both to play important roles in relation to South Africa, drew more on the 
experience of Danish consulting firms and of FAS International Consulting (the commercial sub-
sidiary of Ireland’s Training and Employment Authority) than on their own staff.”  
197
  The DoL collaborated with GTZ since 1996 through various skills development and labour-
market related projects which in 2007 were merged under the umbrella of the “Employment and 
Skills Development Service (ESDS) Programme”. Running until 2011, the ESDS programme fo-
cussed on the development of skills development systems for the first (formal) and the second 
(informal) labour market and the establishment of a technology transfer network system for 
small and medium-sized enterprises (GTZ 2007: 12–14). South African-German cooperation in 
that field took place also through other organisations such as the Centre for International Migra-
tion and Development (CIM), DED and InWEnt who seconded experts and provided training for 
college teachers and private company managers; moreover, German provincial states (“Bun-
desländer”) such as Bavaria and Lower Saxony established expert exchange with partner 
provinces in South Africa (Department of Labour & GTZ 2008: 7).  
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agenda; a decision-maker in the Department of Labour described the contribution of the 
GTZ director as follows:  
He came to assist – he didn’t come to tell us. And that was the big difference. Because 
once you had a personal debate with him I think he was quick to understand that the 
South African situation is completely different from the German situation. (…) He would 
go out and research what is it that we are trying to do and find out very good learning ex-
periences from other places – he would say ‘look, this is what has happened in Sweden, 
this is what has happened in, for instance, Zimbabwe, this is what is happening (…). I 
know this is what you are trying but in these other places, this is how they approach this 
issue and it seems as if you have got these options, these are consequences.’ And where 
he could not come up with a clear recommendation, he phoned other people that he was 
working with to search for the solutions that were used in their countries and what were 
some of the problems. And he would get that information to us, so that we are able to get 
a balance. (Interview 22)  
Given the internal capacity constraints of the newly established skills unit in the De-
partment of Labour, the assistance of GTZ in exploring how the policy ideas for a new 
skills regime could be translated into action was highly valued. Crucially, the advice 
provided by experts funded or employed by GTZ was perceived as being geared to the 
local agenda rather than driven by external preferences. While certainly the German 
dual system with its combination of theoretical and practical learning served as one ref-
erence point for advisors, experiences and models from elsewhere were equally 
scrutinised with respect to what South Africa could take from them in developing its 
own unique institutions.  
The Green Paper: Skills Development Strategy for Economic and Employment Growth 
in South Africa presented in 1997 sketched out core elements of the envisioned new 
system through which the government hoped to bring about the urgently needed “skills 
revolution” (Department of Labour 1997). First and foremost, it proposed the introduc-
tion of ‘learnerships’: As opposed to the previous apprenticeships which offered only a 
minimal level of theoretical knowledge often unrelated to skills required at the work-
place, learnerships aimed at combining career-related learning in an accredited 
education and training institution with practical on-the-job experience; having succeed-
ed in both areas, learners would obtain a registered occupational qualification signifying 
their work readiness (Department of Labour 1997). A key feature of the approach was 
that contrary to apprenticeships it appealed to a wide range of learners in multiple occu-
pational contexts irrespective of their age and employment status (Kraak 2004: 120–
124).198 As funding mechanism, a compulsory levy-grant scheme on payroll should be 
introduced; of the total revenue collected, 80% were meant to be channelled back to the 
sector via grants to enterprises that train, and 20% to a National Skills Fund to be used 
for strategic priority areas (Kraak 2004: 124–125). The re-allocation of levies was to be 
                                                          
198
  For a detailed itemization of learnership features as opposed to the past apprenticeship system, 
see Kraak (2004: 120–124).  
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managed by Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs)199 which would re-
place the previous Industry Training Boards and function as intermediary institutions 
commissioned to coordinate skills development in their respective sector. A central role 
in the new system was given to the National Skills Authority (NSA) which would sub-
stitute the National Training Board as an advisory body to the government responsible 
for defining skills development policies and priorities in consultation with the Depart-
ment of Labour (Department of Labour 1997). Both SETAs and the NSA should be 
governed by multipartite boards composed of representatives from government, em-
ployers and trade unions (Kraak 2004: 138); the ‘social partnership’ between these 
stakeholders was seen as a crucial principle in the post-apartheid skills regime (Heit-
mann 2010).  
The mechanisms and institutions proposed in the Green Paper of 1997 were formally 
established through a range of laws passed in subsequent years, most notably the Skills 
Development Act of 1998 (Republic of South Africa 1998b) and the Skills Develop-
ment Levies Act of 1999 (Republic of South Africa 1999). While the reform was an 
ambitious endeavour due to the mere number of innovations, the government was under 
immense pressure to set up the new architecture promptly in order to ease the social 
situation and relieve the stressed economy by delivering skilled workers. Given the ur-
gency of the reform, the dimension of the workload and the rather small cadre of 
experienced officials in the Department of Labour, decision makers approached the aid 
community for support, deeming external assistance necessary to get the basic infra-
structure and frameworks in a timely manner (Carton & King 2004: 28). Hence, the 
DoL entered agreements with a number of donors willing to provide financial and tech-
nical assistance, including GTZ, Danida, AusAid, Ireland Aid, USAID, the Netherlands 
Embassy, Korea, and the European Union; the latter accounted for the bulk of support, 
pledging € 46 million over a period of three years (Moodley & Vawda 2000: v).200 Var-
ious stand-alone projects were started, but all of them were aligned to an operational 
strategy of the Department of Labour, the so-called Labour Market Skills Development 
Programme (LMSDP) which served as an umbrella framework for the implementation 
of the skills acts. The Employment and Skills Development Chief Directorate which had 
designed the strategy took on an active leadership role in allocating resources to the 
different programmatic components.  
While foreign funding significantly backed up the financing of the reform, the delivery 
of expertise was even the more substantial element of aid in the context of the LMSDP. 
The EU agreement alone covered more than eleven hundred consultancy months 
(Moodley & Vawda 2000: 37). Experts from both South Africa and from abroad were 
                                                          
199
  This is how the intermediary bodies were eventually termed. In the Green Paper, they were pre-
sented as Sector Education and Training Organisations (SETOs).  
200
  Out of the € 46 million committed by the EU, € 30 million were to be channelled to the DoL as 
work plan funds, almost € 14 million were set aside for consulting companies and the remaining 
kept for contingency. At that time, the EU support was the largest technical assistance pro-
gramme of its kind in the world (Moodley & Vawda 2000: v).  
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used to execute critical tasks for which the DoL lacked own staff. GTZ consultants, for 
instance, were contracted to develop detailed guidelines for learnerships, to assist in 
demarcating SETAs and to train National Standard Body members for their critical role 
in relation to the Qualification Framework; teams composed of specialists from differ-
ent EU countries were commissioned to work on various technical issues, as, for 
example, to sketch technicalities of the envisaged levy grant system (Moodley & Vawda 
2000: 28).201 All personnel brought in from outside had to report to the respective unit 
heads in DoL who issued directives, as a high-ranking official emphasised:   
We told them what exactly we would have to achieve – and they would never do anything 
else. (Interview 22)  
Hence, although a large number of external experts were intensely involved in key is-
sues of the reform, the process was led by the Department of Labour. What is noticeable 
here is that essential decisions were set before consultants were brought in to operation-
alise the nationally negotiated vision of a new skills system. The recourse to donor 
support allowed the government to speed up the implementation of reform by trying out 
and bringing to scale key innovative schemes (e.g., learnerships) within a narrow time 
frame and thus to meet its own deadlines (Carton & King 2004: 27).202 By the turn of 
the millennium, a radically revamped skills development architecture with a range of 
new institutions and governance bodies was set up – from the perspective of key pro-
tagonists, it is unlikely that this would have happened at the same pace without external 
assistance.  
Governance Challenges, Structural Revisions and Changing Relationships   
The integrative education and training system built by the first government of post-
apartheid South Africa was internationally regarded as ambitious and ground-breaking; 
yet, getting this system to run and to deliver turned out challenging. While policies, 
laws and institutions had been put in place in quick succession, transformation on the 
ground couldn’t keep the pace. Difficulties emerged at various levels: Teachers in 
schools were struggling to implement the new outcomes-based curriculum (known as 
“Curriculum 2005” and introduced in 1997), being unfamiliar with its concepts and 
feeling alienated by its terminology (Chisholm 2003: 273, 2005: 196–197). The newly 
                                                          
201
  The EU project drew on consultancy consortia from several countries which were selected 
through a competitive bidding process (Carton & King 2004: 29). The tendering procedure pre-
scribed by the EU, however, was criticised not only for being lengthy and cumbersome, but also 
for disadvantaging companies from outside the EU. A review stated that “the perception in the 
DoL is that the criteria excluded many capable South African organisations from effectively 
competing” (Moodley & Vawda 2000: 34). In fact, almost all contracted companies were Euro-
pean.  
202
  A valuable project which helped to refine a new approach was carried out by Danida in KwaZulu 
Natal where learnerships in the construction and tourism industries were tested; the experiences 
gained in that two-year’s pilot were taken up in the process of adjusting the learnership model 
before taking it to scale (Carton & King 2004: 29).   
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established SETAs faced severe governance problems, including financial mismanage-
ment and fraud (Smith et al. 2005: 558–559; Kraak 2008). Employers only slowly 
began to take up learnerships and showed little commitment to proactively invest in 
training (Moleke 2003); while generally embracing the new approach many companies 
perceived processes as unduly bureaucratic and felt unprepared to offer learnership 
agreements (Mummenthey 2008: ii). Hence, despite ‘pockets of progress’ in terms of 
enhancing the skills base and redressing apartheid’s inequities, education and employ-
ment patterns remained racially skewed (Moleke 2003).203     
A fundamental problem which indirectly contributed to the stagnation was the deep di-
vision ranking between the Department of Education and the Department of Labour 
(Bird & Heitmann 2011: 6). The decisions to keep these two separate ministries – with 
the former being responsible for education and training in public institutions (i.e. 
schools, colleges and universities) and the latter for private providers of learning in the 
labour market – instead of merging them into one as expected in the early 1990s had 
“serious ramifications, most importantly the failure of the new state to discard the polit-
ical fiefdoms and territorial modes of working that characterised the divide between 
‘education’ and ‘training’ in the apartheid state” (Kraak 2008: 12). Both in a way pur-
sued their own incoherent skills development agendas based on divergent philosophies 
parallel, as a former DoL official pointed out:    
The Department of Labour was influenced I think quite a lot by the German thinking 
about skilled training, vocational training in particular. But the colleagues in education 
were moving things by the British. So you had one department influenced by the German-
ic tradition and another department influenced by I think the Anglo-Saxon idea. And that 
led to quite a lot of tension. (Interview 20)  
The discrepancies between the two ministries manifested in a range of laws and strategy 
documents issued from both sides which lacked interrelation and in some cases even 
contradicted each other (Allais 2006: 34–39; Allais 2010: 19–20).204 The tension be-
tween education and labour side actors culminated when the Minister of Education in 
                                                          
203
  Kraak (2008) delineates some successes achieved during the first phase of the National Skills 
Development Strategy; amongst others, more than six million workers out of a total employed 
workforce of 10,8 million people embarked on and finished structured learning programmes over 
a four-year period; moreover, almost 900 000 achieved a National Qualifications Framework 
Level one qualification through adult basic education and training in the workplace. Yet, as 
Kraak himself emphasises, other scholars have raised doubts about the validity of these govern-
ment data.   
204
  Several scholars hint at incoherent or conflicting legislation and structures related to fur-
ther/vocational education and training, and the resulting confusion of role-players in the field. 
Allais (2006: 34–39) provides a detailed account of conflicts over roles and responsibilities par-
ticularly with regard to quality assurance and certification. Bird and Heitmann (2011: 10) note 
that the Further Education and Training Colleges Act No. 16 of 2006 initiated by the Department 
of Education and the Department of Labour’s Skills Development Amendment Act No. 37 of 
2008 that followed shortly after did “not complement one another in any systematic way”.  
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2000 announced a first review of the National Qualifications Framework for which both 
departments shared responsibility. After much contestation whether there should be an 
assessment at such an early stage and what it should look like, an international study 
team comprising South African and foreign experts was commissioned to scrutinise the 
NQF with regard to its implementation (without probing its design) (Allais 2010: 20). 
Finding that “broad malaise of discontent with the NQF and SAQA had taken hold 
among stakeholders” (Department of Education & Department of Labour 2002: 3), the 
authors provided a range of recommendations to overcome obstacles and take the pro-
cess of implementing the NQF forward. Yet, the release of the report in 2002 was 
followed by years of inactivity and silence, although the DoE and DoL had brought 
themselves to publish a joint response in the form of a consultative document (Depart-
ment of Education & Department of Labour 2003). Eventually, it took six years until an 
agreement was reached to make substantial changes through a set of (amendment) bills 
passed in 2008 (Allais 2010: 20).205 The reform provided for the split of the single, inte-
grated NQF into three linked sub-frameworks managed by respective quality assurance 
bodies, namely Umalusi as Quality Council for General and Further Education and 
Training, the Quality Council for Higher Education (QCHE) covering the academic 
sector and the Quality Council for Trades and Occupations (QCTO) in charge of learn-
ing in a workplace context. Hence, while the NQF continued to exist as a ‘meta’-
framework and SAQA remained the national oversight and coordinating body, respon-
sibilities and structures were significantly reconfigured (see Keevy 2013).  
The complex task of establishing this new system was exacerbated by a major reorgani-
sation of line departments which followed shortly after the legislative changes. 
President Zuma who took over power in 2009 decided to divide the Department of Edu-
cation into one for Basic Education and one for Higher Education and Training which 
would carry over skills development (hence also for SETAs and the newly established 
QCTO) from Labour (Khumalo 2009). Shifting the responsibility for all post-school 
education and training was seen as an attempt to overcome the persistent cleavages 
which had blocked progress over the past decade.   
While many stakeholders welcomed this move, it implicated the reallocation of staff 
which inevitably weakened administration in affected government units; particularly the 
Department of Labour which had lost the skills development branch to DHET felt 
drained of experienced bureaucrats. In addition, it became evident how much the DoL 
and related bodies had relied on external expertise provided by long-standing partners. 
According to the head of the Employment and Skills Development Services (ESDS) 
                                                          
205
  These included the National Qualifications Framework Act, No. 67 of 2008, the General and 
Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Amendment Act, No. 50 of 2008, the Skills 
Development Amendment Act, No. 37 of 2008, and the Higher Education and Amendment Act, 
No. 39 of 2008 (Republic of South Africa 2008a; Republic of South Africa 2008b; Republic of 
South Africa 2009b; Republic of South Africa 2009c).  
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Programme of GTZ who took the lead in 2009, the programme had about 120 consul-
tancy contracts running at that time:  
Small ones, big ones, but too many. And I’ve never experienced a project with so many 
contracts. And I was asking my predecessor, why do you have so many consultants em-
ployed? He said ‘it’s because there is no capacity with our partners.’ (…) He had 
contracts with universities, with the research councils, all the experts in South Africa on 
skills development were on our payroll. (Interview 2)  
With the shift of political responsibilities, GTZ like other supporters turned towards 
new counterparts in the field; for DoL, this shift meant a severe loss of administrative 
capacity, as a decision-maker in the employment services branch pointed out:    
Once [the programme] moved, the capacity disappeared and caused challenges (…). And 
that unfortunately is a setback because you can make that assumption if people who start-
ed were still there, but the minute they are gone through this transfer and so on, it’s like 
going four years ahead and then six years back. It becomes a problem because all the sen-
ior people had left here, almost all of the seconded experts that were working here. So it 
becomes very difficult. (Interview 22)  
While since the beginning of South Africa’s education and training transition, technical 
assistants provided by GTZ and other aid agencies had functioned as an ‘extra pair of 
hands’ in various DoL units, their support obviously had not resulted in a strengthened 
administrative capacity of their host organisation. Already by 2000 a team reviewing 
ODA had warned that the use of external specialists who executed key tasks instead of 
mentoring officials would result in ‘minimal skills transfer’ and pose a serious challenge 
for the DoL once projects would end (Moodley & Vawda 2000: viii).206 Almost a dec-
ade later, this scenario occurred, and the Department of Labour struggled to substitute 
the withdrawn specialists.   
Yet, not only government authorities faced difficulties in the course of the restructuring 
process. Donors as well had to adjust their programmes and establish relationships with 
new partners who themselves were trying to find their feet. As of 2011, the previously 
much lauded Employment and Skills Development Services (ESDS) programme of GIZ 
(formerly GTZ) had reached deadlock since GIZ representatives were unable to enter a 
dialogue with DHET decision makers. For the head of the programme in the Pretoria 
country office, this caused mounting pressure as he was unable to demonstrate progress 
and thereby legitimate the on-going operations before headquarters in Germany; in late 
2011, his frustration had reached a point where he felt compelled to call in political au-
thorities in order to enforce communication with DHET decision makers:    
                                                          
206
  The review team stated in this regard: “As the practice of Technical Assistance is new within the 
DoL, officials have minimal capacity to effectively and efficiently utilise and absorb technical 
assistants into project activities and tasks. (…) With the already extensive and intensive work-
load, and inadequate number of staff to execute tasks, skills transfer is an additional challenge” 
(Moodley & Vawda 2000: 15). 
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So now what I try to do is, when you don’t get a response from a counterpart you invite 
for meetings (…), you use diplomatic interventions and this is what I have done. And dip-
lomatic interventions I have to use in case, because it’s a lot of resources. If let’s say 
advisors are not needed, then I have to communicate this. I cannot just assume, ah, we 
have some progress here and there. You can cover up for 6 months maybe. But in this 
case, I really used the escalation ladder from zero to, I don’t know, the highest level. 
There was one letter sent from our ministry in Germany through the Embassy warning ‘if 
you don’t come to a conclusion now, we will wind down the project’, very clearly. Then 
they reacted. (…)  
And tomorrow we have consultations with Higher Education and Training. When I saw 
the people on the list that will come to the meeting, it’s a shame. It’s really a shame. Two 
people from international relations and only one technical person from the National Skills 
Fund; there’s only one person who really knows about the subject. So I don’t understand 
– we requested on the level of DG, please provide the DDGs for the meetings and tech-
nical people. (Interview 2)  
The head of the GIZ programme felt uncertain about whether to interpret the bearing of 
the counterpart as a lack of leadership, sign of disinterest – or simply as the result of the 
persisting capacity constraints in the department which after two years since its formal 
inception was still struggling with adequately staffing the organisation. During 
2011/2012, DHET’s vacancy rate remained high at 21,73%, and many crucial positions 
at the senior level (e.g., directors) had not yet been filled (Department of Higher Educa-
tion and Training 2012a: 353–354; see also chapter 6.1.2).207 In light of the fact that 
officials in place were already over-stretched with day-to-day operations, it is not sur-
prising that donor meetings were not attended or repeatedly postponed which left 
programme leaders somewhat in the dark about their new counterpart’s vision; the GIZ 
director commented in this regard:   
There was almost no donor coordination for the last two years. There was a DG, Mary 
Metcalfe, until September last year, then we have DG Qonde, and each of the DGs just 
had one donor meeting. And on donor side, we have an interest to know the policy of the 
department vis-à-vis cooperation, what are other development partners doing and all this 
kind of exchange. But it was very clear in our case that the Department of Higher Educa-
tion and Training just didn’t request for that. (Interview 2)  
                                                          
207
  According to DHET’s annual report, the slow progress in staff appointment was caused by both 
insufficient funding and the difficulty to find people with adequate expertise and experience: 
“The specialised nature of work in most of the areas of the Department necessitates the use of 
highly skilled people who are at some stages not readily available for permanent appointment 
and have to be appointed on contract for periods as may be required. (…) Some identified critical 
vacancies could not be filled due to limited funding. The prescribed time frame of four months 
for the filling of vacancies in some instances is not met or adhered to due to work pressure 
caused by the staff shortage in the HR section. We have identified a need for staff training and 
development and a request for the creation of additional posts was approved for filling in the 
new financial year” (Department of Higher Education and Training 2012a: 48–49). 
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Discussing the GIZ’s discontent and frustration about DHET’s disregard, a high-ranking 
official who had closely collaborated with the Germans during her previous appoint-
ment in the Department of Labour provided the following explanation for the gridlock 
in cooperation:   
I honestly believe it was a transitional problem that the German government got caught 
up in but which had nothing to do with them. What happened was the new department 
here was set up late 2009, it had to be staffed. There was a change of Director-General in 
the middle of that process, and that’s a very important person in a new department. So 
that was still being sorted out. The new Director General when he took over, he had to get 
his feel more secure around the policy debates and he didn’t want to commit himself to 
projects and things before he had that. So I don’t think it had anything to do with the 
German government or with any of the donors, I think it was a case of the department. 
What it reflects I think is that the South African government wants to lead any discussion 
– so it wants to be sure that it knows what it wants and why you’re having a particular 
conversation. (Interview 20)  
Eventually, the South African-German ESDS programme which had been running from 
1995 ended by 2012. As a consequence of the tedious negotiations with DHET as coun-
terpart during the last phase, GIZ decided to shift its focus to other players in the field 
when setting up a new programme called “Skills Development for Green Jobs (SDfGJ)” 
(GIZ 2012b). While DHET formally remains one the two ‘lead executing agencies’ 
(with the second one being the Department of Science and Technology), the actual co-
operation takes place with other partners, such as the Office of the Premier in the 
Eastern Cape Province and the Manufacturing, Engineering and Related Services SETA 
(merSETA).208 Both organisations are assisted in establishing ‘green skills forums’ in 
order to boost the ‘green economy’, with support including the secondment of advisors, 
study tours and training programmes.  
Although GIZ promotes its new approach as a ‘bottom-up strategy’ with a “much great-
er potential for mainstreaming green skills” (GIZ 2012c), it is obvious that the shift 
towards this level was partly enforced by the fact that GIZ has lost its position in the 
policymaking space. While during the fifteen years of cooperation with the Department 
of Labour, GTZ (as it was then called) had built itself up as an indispensable partner 
providing advice and assistance in the course of the education and training system re-
form, it wasn’t able to transfer this relationship to DHET as the new political authority 
in charge. The reasons therefore are at least twofold: First, the trust which allowed GTZ 
to be engaged in DoL processes rested to a significant extent on the personal bonds be-
tween key actors on both sides which had emerged during more than a decade of 
cooperation. The importance of this aspect was repeatedly addressed by interviewees 
involved, with one official stating:  
                                                          
208
  Moreover, the programme includes support to the Technology Innovation Agency (TIA) focus-
sing on technology transfer which is a continuation of previous cooperation.  
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It was a long-term partnership. If you speak to Werner [the previous GTZ programme di-
rector], I know this is a strong point on his side that many donors work in the short-term, 
they go in, do a project and withdraw, and his feeling was always: No, you got to form 
partnerships at a personal level. And we certainly did form one with Werner. (Inter-
view 20) 
As elucidated in chapter 5.2.3, such social ties are a key element for advisory processes; 
yet, as they depend on “histories of interactions” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998: 244), they 
cannot easily be passed. Hence, it was not easy for the successor of the original GTZ 
director to maintain the importance of the programme when he came into office in 2009, 
and even more difficult when it should be continued with DHET as the new partner.  
Second, it seems as if the nature of support sought by policymakers in charge has 
changed. While they still signal interest in expertise and experiences from other coun-
tries, they seem to refrain from requesting direct advice and assistance in policy 
development. Instead of bringing in consultants from outside to provide ‘hands-on’ 
support to understaffed units, DHET appears to prefer a much looser form of coopera-
tion, keeping external actors out of the decision-making sphere. This is reflected by 
DHET’s first major political undertaking of system reform in post-schooling education 
and training. The Green Paper released for discussion in early 2012 was largely a prod-
uct of internal policy work which was presented to the public – including donors – once 
it was finalised (Department of Higher Education and Training 2012b). An extensive 
process of national discussion about the new post-school vision followed which includ-
ed briefings, workshops and conferences with various stakeholders. While international 
partners were invited to take part in some of these activities, they didn’t play a decisive 
role therein. Moreover, the decision-making autonomy of the South African government 
was clearly evident throughout the process; a GIZ interviewee made the following re-
mark in this regard:    
In April [2012], there was a huge, international conference. We had two speakers here 
from BIBB [the German ‘Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training’] 
which was fine, that was great. But there were also Brazilians, people from Indonesia and 
Australia, six countries were represented, the Swiss as well. That means they [the South 
Africans] precisely pick what fits for them (…). And then it goes on: The South Africans 
have their own experts. Of course, they do not know the countries in great detail. But in-
stead of bringing in consultants from Germany, they would compose a group of people 
travelling to Europe, visiting institutions, interviewing professors and practitioners, de-
velopers and others in ministries and organisations. They have money, they travel.209 
(Interview 3)  
                                                          
209
  The original interview passage in German: ““Wir hatten im April [2012] ‘ne große Konferenz, 
‘ne internationale Konferenz. Da waren zwei Referenten vom BIBB [Bundesinstitut für 
Berufsbildung] da, war gut, war super. Dann hatten wir aber auch Brasilianer hier, dann hatten 
wir Leute aus Indonesien oder Australien hier, also sechs Länder waren vertreten, auch die 
Schweizer. Das heißt, die [die Südafrikaner] suchen sich genau das raus, was hier past (…). Und 
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The process of policy negotiation and refinement was firmly led by key actors within 
DHET (e.g., the Special Advisor to the Minister John Pampallis) which were assisted by 
a drafting team made up of six experts from South African research and advisory insti-
tutions, namely the Centre for Education Policy Development, the Centre for 
Researching Education and Labour of the University of Witwatersrand and Mzabalazo 
Advisory Services (Stuart 2014).210 After almost two years of consultation in which 
nearly two hundred public comments were received, the White Paper for Post-School 
Education and Training was finalised and approved by Cabinet in November 2013 (De-
partment of Higher Education and Training 2013c). One of the main challenges it aims 
to address is providing prospects for young people who have hitherto fallen through the 
cracks, i.e. the 3,4 million aged 15 to 24 currently not in employment, education or 
training (so-called ‘NEETs’). To cater for youth and adults who never attended school 
and therefore were excluded from further studies at colleges or universities, a new insti-
tutional type of ‘community colleges’ is envisaged which are expected “to facilitate a 
cycle of lifelong learning in communities by enabling the development of skills (includ-
ing literacy, numeracy and vocational skills) to enhance personal, social, family and 
employment experiences” (Department of Higher Education and Training 2013c: 22). 
Moreover, the previous further education and training (FET) colleges are to be rebrand-
ed Technical and Vocational Education and Training Colleges on the grounds that this 
name “better reflects their nature and better defines their main role in the diversified 
post-school education and training system”, as DHET argues (Department of Higher 
Education and Training 2013c: 12); turning TVET colleges into “institutions of choice” 
which constitute “the cornerstone of the country’s skills development system” (Depart-
ment of Higher Education and Training 2013c: 12) is a prime endeavour of the 
government which sets itself ambitious targets: By 2013, it wants to have 2,5 million 
students enrolled in TVET colleges (as compared to 500 000 in 2011), one million in 
community colleges (from 265 000 in public adult learning centres in 2011), and about 
1,6 million students in universities (from just over 937 000 in 2011). At the time of 
writing, it is too early to assess the likelihood of success.  
Conclusion 
Assessing the impact of aid on education and training in post-apartheid South Africa, 
one needs to make a differentiated statement: Certainly, financial and technical assis-
                                                                                                                                                                          
das ist dann so: Südafrikaner haben Expertise hier vor Ort. Natürlich kennen die die Länder nicht 
so im Detail. Aber die holen dann nicht die Gutachter von Deutschland hierhin, sondern die stel-
len selber ‘ne Gruppe zusammen und reisen dann nach Europa, gehen dann da in die 
Institutionen und haben die Interviews mit den Profs, mit den Leuten, die das da umsetzen, mit 
den Entwicklern und wem auch immer in den Ministerien, in den Organisationen. Also die haben 
das Geld, die reisen da hin.” (Interview 3)  
210
  Aside from the Special Advisor to the Minister of the Department of Higher Education and 
Training who was appointed team leader, members came from the Centre for Education Policy 
Development, the Centre for Researching Education and Labour of the University of Witwaters-
rand and Mzabalazo Advisory Services (Stuart 2014). 
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tance significantly helped to revamp structures at a pace which would not have been 
possible had the government relied on its own resources. Moreover, study tours spon-
sored and/or facilitated by donors conveyed models and ideas from abroad which 
heavily inspired the thinking of key protagonists involved in shaping a new system for 
the country. Despite extensive foreign support, however, “the overall negotiation for a 
new skills architecture has firmly been in South African hands” (Carton & King 2004: 
31). That policymakers while drawing on external expertise and resources managed to 
retain their decision-making autonomy appears to rest on at least four reasons: First, the 
sector was not financially dependent on donors. This is not to say that additional fund-
ing was not needed; yet, aid didn’t make up the most substantial part of the budget. This 
allowed negotiators to tell international financiers:  
Either you support it but we can assure you that we will do it either way. It’s just going to 
take a slightly longer because we’ll have to wait, but we will do this. (Interview 21)  
Second, education in the broadest sense was a prime topic on the aid agenda; given that 
bi- and multilateral organisations competed to be part of South Africa’s education tran-
sition, government officials could select those which were most responding to local 
needs and priorities. Third, policymaking authorities concerned with education and 
training seem to have adopted a careful approach towards advice and assistance from 
outside which is reflected by the following statement of a DHET (and former DoE) offi-
cial:  
The experts that we had, that we used, were very few. And it was – they were coming in 
towards not the end, but not at the beginning of the process to advise and give support 
and so forth. But they were never sent through to the conceptualization of the direction. 
(Interview 21)  
Finally, what has begun with the National Training Strategy Initiative, it seems as if the 
participation of various stakeholders with strong voices in the South African education 
and training landscape has mitigated the scope of direct influence from outside. While 
the vested and sometimes contradicting interests of education and training providers, 
trade unions, employers may have decelerated the pace or even blocked processes, such 
frictions enforced national negotiation about concepts developed internally or adopted 
from elsewhere; the academic community played a distinct role therein.  
All in all, it can be stated that in the field of education, the South African government 
was able to create its own vision and system although it resorted to aid for both exper-
tise and money. The fact that many institutions and structures were repeatedly revised in 
the course of reform indicates that the system put in place was not ‘perfect’ and entailed 
flaws which became evident in implementation. A DHET official, however, stated: 
We’ve made mistakes; some of them were really unintended consequences of our poli-
cies. But those were our own mistakes. It’s worse what has happened in Tanzania because 
of the Bank’s and other agencies’ interference. (Interview 21) 
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6.2.3 Tanzania: Health  
Sectorial Context 
Regarding the health situation of its society, Tanzania has seen significant improve-
ments in recent years. Life expectancy at birth rose from 51 years in 2002 to 61 years in 
2012 (World Bank 2014a).211 Within the same period, infant and under-five mortality 
substantially declined; according to UN estimates, the rate of children dying between 
birth and five years of age decreased from 114 to 54 per thousand live births (UN Inter-
agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation 2013). The positive trends are largely at-
tributed to a high coverage of immunisation, expanded Vitamin A distribution, and an 
increased use of insecticide treated bed nets to prevent malaria which helped to reduce 
the prevalence among children under five from 18% in 2008 to 9% in 2012 (UNICEF 
Tanzania 2010: 3; TACAIDS et al. 2013).  
Whereas much progress has been achieved in terms of child survival, maternal health 
remains an unresolved challenge. Tanzania’s maternal mortality rate is one of the high-
est in the world; in 2010, an estimated 8 500 women died while being pregnant or 
giving birth (UN Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group 2010).212 While 
most of these deaths are caused by obstetric complications, the poor quality of health 
services and the existence of infectious diseases – most notably malaria and HIV/AIDS 
– indirectly contribute to the persisting high number of cases (Shija et al. 2012: 2).  
As one of the most perilous health problems in Tanzania, malaria continues to be the 
country’s major cause of morbidity and mortality. Although interventions in malaria 
control show signs of success, the tropical disease still leads to about 60 000 deaths per 
year of which 80% are children under five years (Massero 2013). The fight against 
HIV/AIDS seems similarly challenging. Despite huge efforts undertaken since the dis-
ease was declared a ‘national disaster’ in 1999, the HI virus continues to spread in 
Tanzania.213 Even though knowledge about how to prevent transmission is relatively 
common, it is estimated that more than 100 000 Tanzanians are newly infected each 
year (Interview 62, UNICEF Tanzania 2014). The prevalence of HIV among the popu-
lation only marginally dropped in recent years (TACAIDS et al. 2013); as of 2011/2012, 
1,6 million people were living with HIV/AIDS (United Republic of Tanzania 2012a: 2).  
                                                          
211
  According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, the average life expec-
tancy at birth in developing countries of Sub-Sahara Africa was 56,4 in 2012 (World Bank 
2014a).  
212
  In 2010, the maternal mortality rate was estimated to be 460 per hundred thousand live births 
(UN Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group 2010).  
213
  The first three AIDS cases on Tanzania mainland had occurred in 1983. By the end of 1999, it 
was estimated that more than two million people were infected with HIV. At that point in time, 
then President Mkapa called the epidemic “an extraordinary crisis that requires extra-ordinary 
measures to deal with it” (TACAIDS 2014c). 
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An impediment in scaling up interventions to combat the multiple epidemics is the mas-
sive shortage of health professionals in the country. As estimated in the Health Sector 
Strategic Plan (2009–2015), there is a lack of more than 90 000 health workers which 
amounts to a deficit of 65% (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2009: 29). The on-
going human resource crisis is seen as one of the greatest obstacles hampering the im-
plementation of Tanzania’s ambitious health sector reforms (Kwesigabo et al. 2012).  
Governance Structures  
At the national level, the two main authorities dealing with health issues in Tanzania are 
the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) and the Prime Minister’s Office 
Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG). While the former is 
mandated to provide overall policy guidance and quality control, the latter is responsible 
for overseeing the delivery of district health services which form the centrepiece of the 
system and are managed by local government authorities (Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare 2009: 68–69).   
For the fight against HIV/AIDS, the government in 2001 set up the Tanzania Commis-
sion for AIDS (TACAIDS). Established as an independent department under the Prime 
Minister’s Office, TACAIDS has been mandated to provide strategic leadership, formu-
late policy guidelines, advise the government, and coordinate the implementation of the 
national response to the epidemic (TACAIDS 2014a). As the central institution for poli-
cymaking and resource mobilisation in the field of HIV/AIDS, TACAIDS has become 
the focal point for donors engaged in HIV/AIDS related activities.  
Donor Presence in the Health Sector  
Health and HIV/AIDS are policy fields which are both characterised by a high ‘donor 
density’ in Tanzania. As of 2014, the ‘Development Partners Groups’ in the two areas – 
DPG-Health and DPG-AIDS – each comprised more than fifteen members, including 
major bilateral funders such as the United States, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Denmark, as well as multilateral bodies such as the World Bank and UN agencies 
(Development Partners Group Tanzania, 2014a). Experts from these organisations inter-
act with senior government officials through various Technical Working Groups 
(TWGs) which have been established when a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) was in-
troduced (see later in this chapter). TWGs in health focus on issues such as district and 
regional health services, health financing, and public private partnerships; in the field of 
HIV/AIDS, they concentrate on prevention, care and treatment, impact mitigation, and 
evaluation, amongst others (interviews 32, 61, 62). Aid representatives also take part in 
higher level forums concerned with policymaking and resource allocation, e.g., the 
SWAp Technical Committee, the Health Basket Financing Committee or Tanzania’s 
National Coordinating Mechanism for the Global Fund (see Ministry of Health and So-
cial Welfare 2009: 71–73; TACAIDS 2014b). As will be shown in the following, 
donors exert significant influence on decision-making through such structures and be-
yond, both in health and HIV/AIDS.  
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Tanzania’s Health System after Independence 
When Tanzania became independent in 1961, the country’s health system consisted of 
only a few hospitals and private doctors accessible to a small elite living in urban areas; 
the majority of the population relied on traditional healers and missionary centres 
(McIntyre et al. 2008: 872). Providing essential health services for all became a major 
endeavour of the first post-colonial leader, Julius K. Nyerere. Following the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967, the government made public health care free of charge, and invest-
ed in building health facilities in rural areas. Between 1969 and 1978, the number of 
state operated rural health centres more than tripled, and as a result of increased train-
ing, the health workforce grew significantly (Wangwe & Rweyemamu 2001). The 
government financed the system through tax and donor funding; private for-profit prac-
tice was limited and later even prohibited by law on the grounds that health was seen as 
the sole responsibility of the state, assisted by faith-based organisations (McIntyre et al. 
2008: 872).  
When in the course of the economic crisis during the 1980s, Tanzania was forced to 
adopt structural adjustment policies as required by international finance institutions, the 
health sector experienced a sharp decline of government spending, “with real per capita 
expenditure falling by 46% in the decade to 1988/89” (Kumaranayake et al. 2000: 360). 
In order to maintain the system, user fees were re-introduced, and the ban of private 
services was lifted, which “led to a rapid increase in the number of private health pro-
viders, many of them informal and unregistered” (McIntyre et al. 2008: 872). By the 
early 1990s, Tanzania’s health system was fragmented, underfunded and hardly func-
tioning; while the country had a relatively wide network of facilities, these often lacked 
basic equipment, personnel and essential drugs to care for patients (Wangwe & 
Rweyemamu 2001: 11).214  
The Road to Reforms  
Tanzania was not the only African country which experienced a deterioration of health 
services at that time. In its 1993 ‘World Development Report’, the World Bank ex-
plained the poor performance of health systems in developing countries with low cost-
effectiveness, inefficiency and mismanagement, and called on governments and the aid 
community to invest in health sector reforms (World Bank 1993). In the same year, do-
nors held a consultative meeting in Paris where the need for reform in Tanzania was 
discussed; shortly after, a joint workshop with officials from the Ministry of Health was 
organised and, in the following, a working group established (Semali 2003: 71–72). 
With funding from the World Bank and Danida, the group produced the ‘Proposals for 
Health Sector Reform’ (1994)215, the Strategic Health Plan for 1995–1998 and the 
                                                          
214
  As of 1985, an estimated 90% of the Tanzanian population lived within a 10 kilometer distance 
of a health facility which indicates a relatively wide coverage at that time (Hingora: 2).  
215
  The Proposals for Health Sector Reform were approved by the cabinet in March 1996 (Burki 
2001: 13). 
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Health Sector Reform Plan of Action 1996–1999, which sketched out major problems 
and suggested interventions to tackle them. In the process of developing these pivotal 
documents, officials regularly consulted with aid representatives whose support was 
deemed crucial for realising the reforms.  
Aside from being involved in revising and adjusting reform plans, donors in parallel 
began to test the feasibility of new tools and financing mechanisms through aid initia-
tives; the World Bank, for instance, carried out a pilot project introducing a community 
health fund in Igunga District, and the GTZ conducted a study on district planning and 
management in Tanga Region (Semali 2003: 76–78).216 Following a series of ‘joint mis-
sions’, the government and donors eventually agreed on a final ‘Programme of Work’ 
(PoW) for the period 1999–2002 which outlined eight priority areas of reform: the de-
centralisation of authority to the districts which should be given full responsibility for 
the organisation and delivery of health services; the establishment of a referral system 
with back-up secondary and tertiary hospitals to support primary health care; the trans-
formation of the national Ministry of Health into a facilitative policy organisation with a 
normative and standard-setting role; addressing the human resource shortage; ensuring 
central support systems are in place; diversifying health financing through insurance 
systems, cost-sharing mechanisms and user fees; providing for an ‘appropriate’ mix of 
public and private health care services; and ‘restructuring’ the relationship between the 
Ministry of Health and donors (Ministry of Health 1999).  
Regarding the last point, donors and the ministry had finally arrived at the decision to 
move towards a ‘Sector-Wide Approach’ (SWAp) with the aim “to dilute the adminis-
trative and planning burden of multiple systems imposed through the various donor-led 
approaches, and to promote coordinated planning and resource management” (Burki 
2001: 13). The basic idea behind this was that stakeholders in health would collaborate 
to back the implementation of a shared programme under government leadership. After 
tedious negotiations, some of the ‘development partners’ – namely Danida, DFID, 
Swiss Development Cooperation, Ireland Aid, Norway, and the World Bank, later on 
joined by Germany, the Netherlands and Canada217 – also embarked on pooling re-
sources in a basket fund which should be used for agreed priority areas and disbursed 
through the government system (Mapunda 2003).218  
With the introduction of the new modalities, a range of ‘dialogue’ mechanisms were set 
up, including a SWAp Committee which should meet biannually to review the overall 
reform process, a Basket Financing Committee to approve disbursements and review 
                                                          
216
  For a detailed description of the various projects and studies carried out to test different reform 
proposals, see Semali (2003: 76–78).  
217
  The number and composition of basket fund contributors changed over time; as of 2014, these 
comprised Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Switzerland, UNFPA, UNICEF and the World Bank (De-
velopment Partners Group on Health 2014).     
218
  Donors staying outside the basket justified their decision with internal rules and regulations 
which would prevent them from merging funds, whereby the loss of ‘control’ and ‘visibility’ was 
deemed a major barrier (Hobbs 2001).  
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budget execution on a quarterly basis, and various technical working groups to discuss 
specific topics such as hospital reforms, human resources for health, and performance 
monitoring (Burki 2001: 17). As will be delineated in the following, the establishment 
of these multiple forums implied an institutionalisation of external engagement in health 
policymaking which enhanced rather than reduced donor interference.   
The Role of Donors in the Sector-Wide Approach  
Introducing the SWAp and the health basket at around the turn of the millennium, Tan-
zania was seen as a forerunner in experimenting with new, ‘harmonised’ aid modalities 
which were up and coming at that time. In cross-country studies, the arrangements 
adopted in the health sector were deemed ‘most advanced’ and highly commended for 
increasing government ‘ownership’ (Brown 2000: v).219 Protagonists involved in donor-
government interaction also perceived a positive shift in relations; a retired official who 
then served as Chief Medical Officer in the Ministry of Health remembered:  
With the new thinking of the health sector reform, one of the big changes was from think-
ing in terms of ‘a donor and a project’ to ‘donors agreeing and putting the money in one 
budget’ and getting also the government budget together to say ‘ok we have this money, 
what shall we do’? What shall we do? Not what shall I do? Big difference! (Interview 53)  
Similarly, a GTZ representative who at that time strongly championed the new approach 
remarked:   
During the good years of the SWAp, we talked to each other, like ‘what are you doing, 
what are we doing, how do we put that into the overall strategy’ – there was no ‘donor 
agenda’, but a national programme. It was a mutual process, we had a certain model in 
mind, we were kind of a ‘dream team’ which advocated for comprehensive primary 
health care, district health services, so the overall direction was fairly clear. (Interview 73, 
translated by authors)220  
The ‘dream team’ in that context comprised a number of like-minded aid experts and 
key figures in the health ministry who, sharing the same vision and convictions, pushed 
                                                          
219
  This was emphasised by a research report commissioned by the WHO which investigated the 
status of SWAp arrangements in Cambodia, Vietnam, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania in 
early 2000; in the case study on Tanzania, the author noted that “despite high aid dependency, 
government ownership of the programme is growing and national commitment to sector pro-
grammes and public expenditure reform create a positive environment for health SWAp 
expansion” (Brown 2000: v).   
220
  The original interview passage in German: “In den guten Jahren unseres SWAp war das so, dass 
wir uns miteinander unterhalten haben, ‘was macht ihr, was machen wir, wie kriegen wir das in 
die Gesamtstrategie’ – also es gab keine ‘Geberstrategie’, aber es gab eben ein nationales Pro-
gramm. Also das war eine gemeinsame Entwicklung, wir haben ein Modell im Kopf gehabt, das 
ist ja das, was ich gesagt habe, wir waren so ein Dream-Team, wir haben alle in die gleiche Rich-
tung comprehensive primary health care gedacht, Distrikt-Gesundheitswesen, also die Richtung 
war relativ klar.” (Interview 73)  
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forward reforms in the following years. The same group also worked out the subsequent 
Health Sector Strategic Plan 2003–2008 which more or less set out to follow up on the 
PoW priority areas, though with a greater focus on ensuring the delivery of essential 
health packages at district level, sharpening the role of the central ministry, and tackling 
the human resource shortage (Ministry of Health 2003: 2–3); moreover, the fight against 
HIV/AIDS which had become a “serious problem on the country’s economy and devel-
opment” (Ministry of Health 2003: viii) was for the first time taken up as a ‘special’ 
strategy.  
While overall, there seemed little dispute about the ‘rightness’ of reforms within the 
Ministry of Health, it is noticeable that they were considered as being driven forward by 
a rather small cadre of senior officials in the Health Sector Reform Secretariat who 
closely collaborated with donor experts, particularly from those organisations which 
contributed to the health basket (Hobbs 2001: 40; Holtom 2002: 27).221 Through the 
newly established forums, the latter were closely involved in developing policies and 
plans, doing situational analyses and ‘helping’ to think about what should be done; a 
health specialist in the Netherlands Embassy described his and other donor colleagues’ 
contribution as follows:     
I think we had quite intense – that would be too much, but we definitely assisted and fa-
cilitated the whole process around a new policy, a new strategic Health Sector Strategy 
Plan, which – I don’t want to say that those are seen as the most important documents by 
the Tanzanian ministry, but they’re definitely key documents.  
And for example, we, a number of DPs [development partners], helped to analyse (…): 
There are good gains in infant and child mortality, how do we sustain that? We do not see 
these gains yet in maternal health, why is there way too slow progress in that area? Has it 
to do with family planning, new diseases, non-communicable diseases... (…).  
In that case a small group of donors helped to formulate strategic plans, and made sure 
that at all levels monitoring and evaluation became more important, that evidence-
informed decisions became more important. (Interview 38)  
The regular encounter with government officials through the various technical working 
groups and other forums enabled donor experts not only to impact on how issues were 
discussed (e.g., by promoting ‘evidence-based’ decision-making), but also which issues 
were put on the agenda. Particularly the so-called ‘Troika’ of the DPG-Health, a body 
comprising three elected officials from member organisations commissioned to advo-
cate donor positions, had direct access to key figures in the Ministry of Health which 
could be used to turn the spotlight on issues of (donor) concern; the Dutch Embassy 
official reported in this regard:  
                                                          
221
  In contrast to donors, national stakeholders such as research communities, faith-based organisa-
tions, the private sector or civil society were only marginally or not at all involved in the early 
stages of the reform process (Semali 2003: 92).  
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As the Troika, initially, we had a monthly meeting with senior management at the minis-
try, with the PS [Permanent Secretary], the chief medical officer and the directors. And 
they started then a monthly meeting – maybe it was then forced by us that they had that 
meeting – where they started the first half hour with us and then they went on with their 
own meeting. Even at that meeting, you would constantly raise priorities how you per-
ceived them. Are they always taking and act upon that? No. But often, you will find that 
they act. (Interview 38) 
As the statements above indicate, the SWAp dialogue mechanisms provided aid experts 
with the opportunity to become legitimate participants in the policy discourse and shape 
the agenda through formal discussions. At the same time, however, informal negotia-
tions continued, with a lot of “side-meetings” (Interview 61) taking place behind the 
scenes. The entry of global health initiatives with massive financial power eventually 
depleted the potential for concerted action under Tanzanian guidance, particularly but 
not only in the field of HIV/AIDS.  
The Rise of Global HIV Initiatives and their Impact on HIV and Health Governance 
At around the turn of the millennium, HIV/AIDS in Tanzania had become a massive 
“social and economic problem with devastating impact on national development” 
(TACAIDS 2014c). Although the creation of TACAIDS in 2001 helped to shift 
HIV/AIDS onto the political agenda as reflected by a considerable increase in domestic 
and foreign funding (Foster & Mwinyimvua 2003: 4), Tanzania remained far from 
reaching budget levels required to finance the national response outlined by the coun-
try’s first National HIV/AIDS Policy (Prime Minister's Office 2001)  and the related 
National Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework on HIV/AIDS 2003–2007 (NMSF) 
(TACAIDS 2003).222 The first donor to come up with the prospect of additional money 
was the World Bank which offered a loan of US$ 70 million to be used over a period of 
five years (2003–2008) under the umbrella of its Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Programme 
(World Bank 2003). Given the massive financing gap, the government accepted the pro-
ject despite reluctance against yielding to the Bank’s pressure among its own ranks and 
resentment on the part of the remaining donor group which feared to lose influence 
(Holtom 2002: 28–29); the then chairman of TACAIDS remembered the situation he 
found himself as follows:  
                                                          
222
  Reliable and comprehensive information on HIV/AIDS spending before 2004/2005 is hardly 
available; only then, HIV/AIDS was given a separate code in the Tanzanian budget. In their Pub-
lic Expenditure Review: HIV/AIDS Multi-Sectoral Update for 2004, Foster and Mwinyimvua 
(2003: 15) emphasised that both government and donor reports lacked complete and accurate 
figures on HIV-related expenditures. The data they were able to compile indicated an increase of 
TSh 4.75 billion in government spending from 2001/02 to 2002/03, almost entirely accounted for 
by the establishment of TACAIDS. Moreover, the authors estimated that HIV/AIDS-related aid 
channelled through government agencies increased by 107%, and aid directed to NGOs by 
326%. Although the total amount of HIV/AIDS resources which could be traced had almost 
doubled, it was considered “still less than half of the levels that have been estimated to be need-
ed” (Foster & Mwinyimvua 2003: 15).   
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When the World Bank was coming in, they came in with a lot of funds. And so I was hav-
ing a meeting predominantly with the donor group. And they began complaining that 
since the World Bank is stepping in, you are paying attention to the World Bank and for-
getting us and you follow World Bank dictation, etc. So I was quick to point out to them 
that this is a Tanzanian programme and I’m head of this programme and therefore it’s go-
ing to be, you know, home-based. I don’t care where the money comes from, but we are 
going to make sure that it is Tanzanian-led and -oriented. (Interview 64)  
Whether enforced by Tanzanian negotiators or for other reasons, the World Bank indeed 
broadly catered the Tanzania Multi-sectoral AIDS Programme (T-MAP) to the govern-
ment’s priorities, with a focus on prevention and mitigation measures, and institutional 
support for TACAIDS which was charged with coordinating project-funded activities 
and submitting annual work plans and progress reports (World Bank 2003).  
While the Bank undoubtedly made itself the lead agency in the field of HIV/AIDS by 
providing by far the largest share of resources, it did not keep this position very long. 
Shortly after T-MAP started in 2003, a range of global players entered the scene: the 
Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM), the U.S. President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI), all to-
gether large-scale, vertical funding schemes offering enormous amounts of money: The 
Global Fund in its third round awarded Tanzania a total of US$ 87 million for 2004–
2008, PEPFAR held out the prospect of disbursing up to US$ 100 million annually, and 
CHAI promised to raise a sum of US$ 539 million over a period of five years (Barry et 
al. 2003: 14–15). The hitch in these offers, however, was that resources were tightly 
earmarked; large shares – in the case of PEPFAR 55% – were destined to scale-up care 
and treatment, irrespective of the government’s actual prioritisation of prevention and 
AIDS control. The fact that both local and foreign experts deemed the provision of life-
long anti-retroviral drugs neither feasible at that point in time223 nor affordable in the 
long run didn’t allure US representatives from advancing their agenda – a stance which 
outraged the remaining aid community, as a former GTZ representative recalled:  
Interviewee: The Americans had written a programme stating: ‘We have realised that 
HIV/AIDS is a problem in Tanzania. We Americans know how to fight HIV/AIDS, and 
we will fight HIV/AIDS in Tanzania.’ No mention of Tanzanians or other actors. Noth-
ing. It caused a scandal – at that time I was the acting chair of the donor group and there 
was a meeting where all non-US donors left, saying this is unacceptable (…).  
                                                          
223
  A Tanzanian expert who then worked for the US government at the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention commented in this regard: “We were advising: ‘yes, we should start care and 
treatment, but the focus should also be to strengthen the systems, because you cannot throw the 
ARVs [anti-retroviral drugs] in the air and then they go and look for the mouth where to go in-
to.’ That is exactly an example I gave in the same way. But it was a push that we want ART 
[anti-retroviral treatment] (…) and the budget was: more than 50% should go to the drugs. And 
the remaining should go to prevention, the agency costs and whatever. So it remained very lit-
tle…” (Interview 68)      
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 215 
 
Interviewer: How did the Tanzanian side react to that?  
Interviewee: Well, there you encounter the actual problem and the limits of rational ad-
vice: When big money is on the horizon, there is a decision of the president or the 
minister and all the experts – Tanzanians, Europeans, Chinese, WHO, whoever else – 
stand in the corner with no say anymore. (Interview 73, translated by authors)224 
Being confronted with an increasing number of people dying of AIDS, the government 
decided to accept the funding offers and to accommodate the requirements of the re-
spective donators. The Clinton Foundation, for instance, demanded a new National Care 
and Treatment Plan (NCTP), although the Ministry of Health in March 2003 had pro-
duced a Health Sector HIV/AIDS Strategy which entailed a detailed care and treatment 
section. Drafted by experts from the Clinton Foundation together with Tanzanian offi-
cials and approved by the Cabinet in October 2003, the NCTP set highly ambitious 
goals: Whereas the MoH strategy had proposed to put 13 000 patients on treatment until 
the end of 2006, the ‘Clinton’ plan increased this number to 151 000 (United Republic 
of Tanzania 2003; Hutton 2004: 13/16).225 While the authors pointed out that the plan 
neither implied “a radical redirection of policy” nor replaced any “of the careful plan-
ning and wide-ranging action which the United Republic of Tanzania has taken” 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2003: 1–2), it did throw over previous targets and sched-
ules set by the Ministry of Health, and put treatment centre stage in Tanzania’s AIDS 
response.226 
Not only the Clinton Foundation imposed rigid conditions to its funding. PEPFAR in its 
early phase had a strict rule that only ARVs approved by the US Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) could be procured with the programme’s funds, which excluded the 
                                                          
224
  The original interview passage in German: “Interviewee: Und dann haben die Amerikaner 
tatsächlich mit PEPFAR ein Programm geschrieben, da haben sie gesagt: ‘Wir haben erkannt, 
HIV/AIDS ist in Tansania ein Problem. Wir Amerikaner wissen, wie man HIV/AIDS bekämpft 
und wir werden in Tansania HIV/AIDS bekämpfen. Hallo? Tansanier, andere? Nichts. Es gab 
einen Eklat – damals war ich also noch sehr aktiver Vorsitzender dieser Gebergruppe und alle 
nichtamerikanischen Geber sind aus diesem meeting raus und haben gesagt, so nicht (…).      
 Interviewer: Wie hat die tansanische Seite reagiert?  
 Interviewee: Ja, das ist jetzt das eigentliche Problem und da kommen wir auch so an die Grenze 
der, ich sag’ mal, rationalen Beratung: Wenn das große Geld reinkommt, dann gibt’s halt geg-
ebenenfalls einen Entscheid vom Staatspräsidenten oder vom Minister und dann sitzen die 
ganzen Experten – Tansanier, Europäer, Chinesen, WHO und wer es auch immer ist – in der 
Ecke und haben eigentlich nichts mehr zu sagen.” (Interview 73) 
225
  The actual number of patients put on treatment fell far behind this ambitious target; according to 
TACAIDS information, 54 264 were on ART by end of October 2006 (TACAIDS 2014d).  
226
  The participation of the Ministry of Health in drafting the new plan is said to have been limited; 
a study found that “there has been a certain amount of MOH leadership and ownership in this 
process, but this is still far from desirable levels” (Hutton 2004: 13).  
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purchase of most low-cost generic drugs (Dietrich 2007: 285 et seq.).227 Tanzania’s pol-
icy, however, was to give preference to generic alternatives which were ten to forty 
times cheaper than the brand-name drugs provided by the US pharmaceutical industry 
(Venkatesh et al. 2012: 1430). The conflict led to difficult negotiations, as the then 
Chief Medical Officer remembered:   
Interviewee: USAID just said ‘no’ to generics and we said ‘no’ to non-generics because 
this would have been against the drug policy. But at the end we agreed. 
Interviewer: You agreed?  
Interviewee: Yes, we agreed. We had to come to a compromise. (Interview 53)  
In late 2004, Tanzania started a nation-wide care and treatment programme financed 
mainly with money from the new HIV/AIDS initiatives.228 Overshadowing the govern-
ment and the remaining donors all together in terms of funding volumes, PEPFAR and 
the Global Fund in a short space of time became the main sponsors of the overall AIDS 
response: By 2007, both together accounted for almost 80% of total expenditures on 
HIV/AIDS, as the figures of TACAIDS’ 2010 Public Expenditure Review presented in 
Table 18 indicate:  
Table 18: HIV/AIDS expenditures in Tanzania in 2007 
Expenditures on HIV/AIDS in TSh billion as share of total in % 
Domestic expenditures  22,0 5,5 
Foreign aid  380,0 94,5 
thereof United States Government (PEPFAR)  230,3 57,3 
thereof Global Fund  89,9 22,4 
Total expenditures  402,0 100,0 
Source: TACAIDS (2010: viii/22). 
While the entry of new donors meant a stark increase of funding available for 
HIV/AIDS interventions, it didn’t give the government a greater scope of action insofar 
as the money was channelled outside Tanzania’s budgetary system: The bulk of Global 
                                                          
227
  In May 2004, the FDA introduced a tentative approval process for essential generic antiretroviral 
drugs; yet, the number of generics eligible for purchase through PEPFAR only slowly increased. 
For details on PEPFAR’s changing drug policy and regulations, see Venkatesh et al. (2012).  
228
  Despite large volumes of aid channelled through the new global HIV/AIDS initiatives, the pro-
gramme had a slow start (IRIN news 2006). Treatment figures remained well below the 
ambitious targets set by the National Care and Treatment plan; by 2007, 136 700 patients – only 
about half of the number envisaged and 22% of those eligible for ART – received anti-retroviral 
drugs (National AIDS Control Programme 2008: 15).The lack of qualified medical staff, persist-
ing stigma and low voluntary counselling and testing rates were seen as major challenges 
hampering the scale-up of ARV provision.   
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Fund and PEPFAR money was disbursed through NGOs and US agencies, leaving the 
government with little control over resource flows and clarity on what was being done 
in the country (TACAIDS 2010: viii), as the Director of Finance at TACAIDS re-
marked:    
In the first phase when they started in 2004, nobody knew what the US government was 
doing (…). It was like when they come to the meeting, people will ask them and they will 
not be able to explain. (Interview 61)  
For the government, the lack of information on how the money was spent and where it 
went created problems not only with respect to resource allocation and planning, but 
also in terms of accountability. The TACAIDS’ Director of Finance commented in this 
regard:     
When USAID funds Non-Governmental Organizations, that money goes outside the sys-
tem. And the way the government operates, you cannot capture that unless the money is 
passing through the government (…). But we’ve also discussed with US government that 
it’s very important for us to be accountable; and for them as well. Because if the money 
does not pass through the government machinery, it means it is not being reflected in the 
books of parliament and parliament passes the budget though the money is outside, and 
therefore they cannot follow how it was worked on and how it is accounted. (Inter-
view 61) 
Although TACAIDS officials reported that as a result of tedious negotiations, infor-
mation sharing on the part of US representatives has improved over the years, the 
problem of insufficient public oversight over large proportions of HIV/AIDS funding 
has not been solved until today. From fiscal years 2006/07 to 2010/11, the share of off-
budget expenditures (i.e. expenditures which are not captured by the national exchequer 
system) even increased from 78% to over 85% (TACAIDS 2010: viii, 2012: II). The 
fact that the Tanzanian government lacks discretionary authority over the majority of 
resources makes it impossible to use budget allocation as a steering tool (United Repub-
lic of Tanzania 2012a: 40). It also explains the discrepancy between policy statements 
and resource flows: Although prevention was again prioritised by the Second National 
Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework on HIV and AIDS covering the years 2008–2012 
(TACAIDS 2007) and further pushed onto the agenda by the formulation of a National 
HIV Prevention Strategy (Prime Minister's Office 2009) 229, it received less than a quar-
ter of the overall HIV/AIDS funding (23%) in the period 2008–2010 (TACAIDS 2012: 
II); the TACAIDS chairperson made the following comment on this:  
                                                          
229
  For a profound analysis of the formulation process of the HIV Prevention Strategy and related 
interests, see Hunsmann (2013: 146–175).  
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It shouldn’t be like that. The priority is HIV prevention. And HIV prevention should be 
allocated more money than treatment. We know that treatment is prevention, but at the 
end of the day, we’ll continue treating more people if we do not prevent! (Interview 63)230  
That nonetheless 59% of HIV/AIDS funding was spent on treatment, care and support 
can be attributed particularly to the United States’ strong emphasis on this area. The 
government’s recent attempts to obtain a shift in PEPFAR spending patterns had only a 
limited effect; the TACAIDS Director of Finance described the difficulty to prevail 
against the US agenda as follows:  
I know when we were designing PEPFAR 2 which started around 2009/2010, they want-
ed to fund more treatment and we wanted to fund more prevention (…). It was hard – it 
was hard, because for them it’s easy to account for how many test kits and how many 
drugs you have sent to Tanzania, because you can physically count them. But on preven-
tion programmes, actually for any donor it’s hard, because you just educate people and 
you cannot measure it easily, you know. (Interview 61)  
The explanation that the US as well as other donors preferred to support treatment due 
to their internal legitimation pressure was also used by TACAIDS’ Director for Policy 
and Planning who remarked:   
Any external support, they operate result-based. Prevention – whether based on condoms, 
whatever intervention, STIs and alike, these interventions are becoming very unpopular 
because the impact you don’t see now, you will see later. It takes longer to see the results. 
But if you put someone on ART, you monitor for one year, he or she recovers – that is the 
outcome. You can say now they are healthy living, doing her or his duty. So that’s the re-
sult. (Interview 62) 
As a ‘result’ of the massive amounts of aid provided for the scale-up of treatment, the 
number of people receiving antiretroviral drugs increased from 23 951 in 2005 to 
432 293 in 2012 which corresponds to 61% of those eligible for ART (World Health 
Organization et al. 2013: 16; TACAIDS 2014d). While the rapid expansion of ART 
coverage was deemed a notable achievement which saved the lives of many, it implied a 
substantive absorption of financial and human resources in a system which already 
faced a severe shortage of health workers, money and equipment for the supply of basic 
services. The fact that the roll-out of HIV care and treatment negatively affected other 
areas in terms of staff and budget availability was seen as highly problematic by health 
officials; the head of Health Care Financing in the MoHSW remarked in this regard:    
                                                          
230
  The ‘treatment as prevention’ agenda the interviewee refers to was pushed when a clinical study 
funded by the US National Institutes of Health found that treatment of a person living with HIV 
reduced the risk of transmission to partners by 96% (The Lancet 2011). Particularly the United 
States strongly promoted the finding and highlighted the idea of ‘treatment as prevention’ in its 
PEPFAR II Blueprint released in 2012 (United States of America, Department of State 2012).    
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When you focus your money on HIV, you know the impact: attraction of staff from other 
programmes to HIV, because you have money here. But again, the problem cannot be re-
ally solved because HIV patients should go to the labs which are not functioning. So you 
are focusing on an area which also depends on other areas (…). So the challenges are 
there. (Interview 54)  
The statement above hints at one of the most problematic issues related to the entry of 
global health initiatives in Tanzania: They not only shifted the bulk of the HIV budget 
to treatment but also skewed the overall resource allocation in health towards 
HIV/AIDS at the expense of other crucial areas and prevalent diseases (Hutton 2004: 
17–18). Imposing conditions and their own agendas, the new HIV players undermined 
the efforts and main goal of the newly established SWAp mechanism, namely to 
achieve a more harmonised form of health governance under which all stakeholders 
would act in concert. As in other recipient countries, the emergence and dominance of 
these actors in Tanzania profoundly impacted on both policymaking and aid relation-
ships through distorting national priorities and distracting the government from 
assuming leadership (Biesma et al. 2009).  
The Current State of Aid Relations in Health and HIV/AIDS 
While the reforms in the early 2000s were meant to increase national ‘ownership’ and to 
establish a new kind of partnership between the government and donors, the state of 
affairs ten years after seems far from ideal. The sophisticated dialogue structure which 
has repeatedly been refined and revised over the years exists primarily on paper; a 
Danida advisor placed in the MoHSW expressed her frustration about constant delays of 
meetings as follows:  
The actual policy dialogue between the partners and the ministry has been very weak. It’s 
been very poor. I mean the Troika has had to fight to meet with the management to dis-
cuss how things are going. And meetings are barely kept on schedule – meetings that are 
supposed to happen within the SWAp all of which are kind of conditions for the basket 
funding (…). And it’s not very much as an advisor that you can do other than kind of re-
mind people that now there is a commitment to have a meeting, that it’s important. 
(Interview 34)  
The meetings referred to in the statement above include, amongst others, the various 
technical working groups and the Technical Committee of the SWAp (TC-SWAp) 
which was meant to serve as a joint monitoring and advisory body of the health sector 
(Ministry of Health and Social Welfare et al. 2009: 16). Commenting on the functioning 
of these forums, the first secretary for health and HIV/AIDS in the Netherlands Embas-
sy stated:  
Some of them work relatively well – M&E [Monitoring and Evaluation] because we 
have an initiative there, HR [Human Resources] is working relatively well, not so effec-
tive though. There’re other ones who hardly meet (…). Officially we still have four TC-
SWAp meetings a year. Now if you have two, it’s much. (Interview 38)  
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Both interviewees attributed the lack of adherence to meeting schedules first and fore-
most to management challenges in the Ministry of Health, pointing to unfilled positions, 
a high staff turn-over and an ‘ad hoc’ way of working which kept their counterparts 
‘constantly running’. While these problems were explained primarily with unconducive 
organisational structures, poor human resource management and a general lack of ad-
ministrative capacity in the MoHSW, the first secretary in the Netherlands Embassy 
also blamed the aid community for exacerbating the situation:  
It’s also partly caused by the various partners who are coming in and out, etc. Because if 
you now look at the dialogue structure, the idea was that we would not as partners bother 
the government too much beyond those structures. That was the idea. If you had interest 
in HR, then you would be active in the HR group. [But] of course development partners 
still have their own direct lines. And strong governments, they would say more often ‘sor-
ry, but…’ You don’t have to be too Stalinist on that, but it shouldn’t be that you are 
constantly busy. (Interview 38)  
The fact that donors on their part do not comply with the agreed working arrangements 
and principles – such as to limit their interaction with decision makers to the formal 
dialogue in order to reduce ‘transaction’ costs and to increase transparency – was con-
firmed by various officials. Referring to the Finance and Auditing Technical Working 
Committee for HIV/AIDS, the TACAIDS Director of Finance and Administration, for 
instance, reported:  
Apart from that committee, we have side meetings with bilaterals, for example, to discuss 
their funding and some of the issues they want. Because sometimes some of the develop-
ment partners (…), they still want to do some of the things separately. So we 
accommodate them and we have these meetings and agree on various issues. (Inter-
view 61)  
The continuation of bilateral ‘backdoor’ meetings and the persisting donor endeavour to 
push individual interventions not only absorb immense staff time from the Tanzanian 
administration but subvert transparent negotiation and concerted action as envisaged by 
the SWAp code of conduct and the respective terms of references for the DPG sub-
groups Health and AIDS (see Development Partners Group on Health 2006; Govern-
ment of Tanzania & Development Partners 2007; Development Partners Group on 
HIV/AIDS 2013). While ‘development partners’ themselves have set up and signed 
these rules, they seem little committed to adhere to them. Commenting on the deficient 
compliance and the difficulty of ‘speaking with one voice’, the head of the German 
health programme and then chair of DPG Health made the following remark:   
Harmonisation is partly an arduous process since naturally each organisation, each coun-
try is driven by its headquarters, by the capital where political processes take place; and a 
change of minister can have quite an effect. This applies for Germany as well as for other 
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countries – when governments and ministers change, foci and priorities are likely to shift. 
(Interview 37, translated by authors)231 
Given the considerable dependency on aid money, both Tanzania’s health reforms and 
its AIDS response are highly vulnerable to the shifting priorities and preferences of ex-
ternal funders. This has been particularly palpable in recent years when three of the 
largest contributors to the health basket, together accounting for about one third of the 
estimated budget pledged for 2011/2012 (Government of Tanzania &  Health Basket 
Partners 2011)232, almost simultaneously announced to reduce or terminate their sup-
port: The Netherlands decided to cut the number of its recipient countries from 33 to 15 
whereby Tanzania was not on the list and was thus informed that Dutch aid would phase 
out (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011: 15). Norway concluded to withdraw 
from health in order to focus on five other priority areas (Environment, climate and for-
est, Management of natural resources, Fiscal issues and illegal capital flight, Human 
rights and democracy) (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 2014). Ger-
many informed the government that it would scale back the overall financial volume of 
support to the sector and pull out from the health basket (GIZ Tanzanian German Pro-
gramme to Support Health 2011: 6). Approached upon this decision – which seems 
remarkable insofar as Germany had been instrumental in setting up this mechanism –, 
the head of the German health programme responded with noticeable unease:  
Yes, in fact there has been a change of tack which indicates that political decision-making 
processes are not always coherent with technical advisory approaches (…) And quite re-
cently, indeed, Germany in bilateral governmental consultations made clear its position 
that we pull out of basket funding. The partner was sitting on the other side and empha-
sised the importance of this contribution, asking ‘please do not withdraw, it is important 
for the health reform programme which runs until 2015 and we thought Germany would 
stay and provide support.’ But there was a political decision (…) towards which we now 
have to orientate ourselves. (Interview 37, translated by authors)233  
                                                          
231
  The original interview passage in German: “Es ist teilweise ein anstrengender Prozess, die Ab-
stimmung, weil natürlich jede Organisation, jedes Land doch auch immer headquarters, also von 
unseren Hauptstädten her bestimmt ist (...). Und das sind auch teilweise politische Prozesse, wo 
dann schon mal ‘n Ministerwechsel einiges auswirkt. Und das ist für Deutschland so und das ist 
auch für andere Länder so – wenn Regierungen und Minister wechseln, dann wechseln schon 
mal so Foki und Betonungen.” (Interview 37) 
232
  The health basket side agreement for fiscal year 2011/2012 estimated that partners would pledge 
an amount of US$ 11581 million; thereof, the Netherlands was expected to contribute US$ 21,29 
million (€ 15,00 million), Germany US$ 9,93 million (€ 7,00 million) and Norway US$ 5,40 
million (NOK 30,00 million) (Government of Tanzania &  Health Basket Partners 2011: 6).  
233
  The original interview passage in German: “Ja, in der Tat ist da ein Richtungswechsel entstand-
en, wo man sagen kann, politische Entscheidungsprozesse sind nicht immer kohärent mit 
fachlichen Beratungsansätzen (…). Und da war jetzt auch vor kurzem tatsächlich in den Regier-
ungsverhandlungen eine klare Positionierung noch mal, wo Deutschland gesagt hat, wir ziehen 
uns aus der Korbfinanzierung zurück. Der Partner saß auf der anderen Seite und hat gesagt, wir 
möchten bitte noch mal darauf hinweisen, wie wichtig dieser Beitrag ist, zieht euch bitte nicht 
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For policymakers and senior officials in the MoHSW, Germany’s and other donors’ 
decision to terminate support comes more than untimely insofar as it severely threatens 
the implementation of the Health Sector Strategic Plan III (2009–2015) which calculat-
ed on increased rather than reduced contributions from foreign funders, particularly 
through the health basket (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 2009: 7/73). In the 
view of the Chief Medical Officer, the withdrawal of major funders jeopardises the pro-
gress under way:  
In the reduction in childhood deaths, there has been a downward trend very fast. There is 
also a downward trend in maternal deaths, though it is not as fast. But we believe that 
with all these developments, the speed will definitely pick up. And this is where we will 
start now showing the countries, our partners, there is the impact or the outcome of their 
support (…). [If the partners] pull out now, then definitely they will be doing a great dis-
service to all these efforts and the processes and the achievements that are starting now to 
emerge. (Interview 52) 
Not only decision makers in the MoHSW fear to experience a setback through a de-
crease in foreign funding. Officials at TACAIDS face a similarly worrisome situation 
with respect to shifting aid priorities, as the chairperson of the organisation noted:  
The reality is right now, funds are getting less (…). When I joined TACAIDS in January 
2007, there were lots of resources, particularly from the World Bank, very flexible re-
sources so that we could say ‘NGO so and so, you’re just starting and you’re work is on 
orphans, I think this is very good because nobody has gone to that area. Please take this 
money, this is how you report, this is how you will be audited, go ahead.’ Right now you 
cannot do that anymore. So the writing is on the wall that the shape is different, the inter-
est is different and people have other priorities. (Interview 63) 
Since 2011, TACAIDS has been confronted with budget cuts from several key donors: 
The United States and Germany decided to reduce financial aid for HIV/AIDS related 
activities, and Denmark and Canada announced to terminate their support for the AIDS 
response (i.e. the National Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework) by 2015 (GIZ Tanzani-
an German Programme to Support Health 2011: 6; Tanzania Daily News 2013). 
Moreover, the Global Fund cancelled its next round of funding due to insufficient 
pledges of its members, informing recipients that no new grants could be financed until 
2014 (IRIN news 2011b). In response to decreasing aid volumes and the imminent 
phase out of long-standing partners, the chairperson of TACAIDS has repeatedly been 
calling for increased efforts to raise domestic resources, warning that a failure to get 
prompt replacement for the funding would result in a ‘heavy blow’ affecting the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
zurück, das ist wichtig für unser Gesundheitsreformprogramm, bis 2015 geht das noch und wir 
dachten eigentlich, Deutschland bleibt mit drin und unterstützt das. Aber da ist eine politische 
Entscheidung getroffen worden (…) und an der müssen wir uns jetzt orientieren.” (Interview 37)  
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achievements made in the fight against HIV/AIDS within the last twenty years (Tanza-
nia Daily News 2013).234 
Aid Dependency and its Implications  
The centrality of aid for the implementation of health reforms and the national AIDS 
response seems widely internalised among leadership ranks in the responsible organisa-
tions. Given that about 97% of the health ministry’s development budget and the overall 
budget for HIV/AIDS is financed from outside (see chapter 6.1.1), programmes and 
initiatives which do not conform to donors’ expectations are unlikely to be realised. As 
a consequence of this experience, government officials appear to have accepted that 
policymaking and planning is done in close consultation with experts from the respec-
tive funding agencies. This is reflected by statements from the finance directors of 
TACAIDS and the MoHSW, respectively, who commented:  
HIV/AIDS in Tanzania is heavily funded by donors and therefore it’s very important to 
have that relationship (…) – I would say that we have a very, very close relationship in 
everything that we do. (Interview 61)  
The way we have built our dialogue structures – we discuss technically with partners, we 
plan technically together with them, that’s how it has been meant to be; we don’t just go 
up while we have not shared with the working groups. That’s how we work. (Inter-
view 54)  
Aid representatives were outspoken about the fact that despite all rhetoric of ‘partner-
ship’ the whole dialogue is based on the government’s financial needs; a Tanzanian 
World Bank specialist bluntly stated:  
It is inevitable that the government has a dialogue with the donors because there is a gap. 
If there wasn’t a gap, if the government was self-sufficient, then probably it would not 
need any that kind of discussion. (Interview 47)  
The dependency relationship underlying the dialogue latently shapes the outcomes of 
discussions insofar as government officials are forced to reach some sort of agreement 
with donor representatives in order to maintain room for manoeuvre. Faced with ex-
treme resource scarcity decision makers deem rejecting ‘advice’ of ‘development 
partners’ hardly an option if external funding is at stake. That money is openly used as a 
lever to give ‘technical’ arguments more clout was baldly confirmed by a Tanzanian 
health expert working for WHO:  
 
                                                          
234
  As an attempt to mitigate its donor dependency in the field of HIV/AIDS, the government is in 
the process to establish an AIDS Trust Fund through which it hopes to mobilise more local re-
sources (Lamtey 2012; Kassim 2014). At the time of writing, however, the fund was still not 
effective.     
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External experts would normally use the muscle of their financial support – ‘if you don’t 
do this, then I think I would advise my government not to give more money.’ So the na-
tional experts will not win that war although they might have reasons behind it (…). So 
we have seen sometimes the agenda of external experts prevails simply because of the fi-
nancial side on it. (Interview 44)  
The statement above suggests that the mechanisms established in the context of the 
SWAp reform with the aim to strengthen Tanzanian leadership have not been particular-
ly effective. Even in the case of the health basket fund which was set up to increase the 
government’s  steering capacity and control over resources, donors are said to strongly 
determine what the money is used for, depriving the MoHSW of its discretionary au-
thority; the WHO officer, himself a former ministry member, alleged the following 
examples in this regard:  
In terms of diagnostics, what is important in the hospitals [is that] there are x-rays. In its 
policies, the ministry says we want to rehabilitate x-rays – and we [the development part-
ners] say ‘no, that one, we are not buying it.’ (…) And then we go to the health basket 
fund and we say, you forgot to put iodine (…), we will give you money for that. The min-
ister has not even requested that! (Interview 44) 
In both the health sector and the field of HIV/AIDS, the government’s capacity to exer-
cise leadership in terms of defining its own priorities seems strongly limited, with 
donors still earmarking aid for specific purposes even though this contravenes the 
agreed principles of cooperation. Assessing the government’s options in terms of react-
ing against the dominance of external funders, aid officials acknowledged that in the 
current setting it seems to have little choice; the health programme manager of GIZ rhe-
torically asked:   
There is a health system which is utterly underfinanced (…). So don’t you take what 
comes along to at least support some of the most essential pillars? (Interview 37)  
In a similar vein, a Danida consultant placed in the MoHSW remarked: 
It has to be a very confident ministry that will kind of turn down money – even if it’s con-
trary to its own policies. (Interview 34)  
Yet, not all interviewees agreed with the ‘no choice’ narrative. Contrary to the aid offi-
cials quoted above, a Tanzanian health specialist with ten years of work experience in 
the MoHSW argued:  
You can say no! It does not always send the money away. But many people are worried 
that if you say no, then the support will go away. (Interview 68)  
The statement above hints at a problem which further weakens the government’s stance 
towards donors: Senior officials in the administration seem to encounter aid experts 
with some sort of resignation based on the experience or mere assumption that they are 
eventually dependent on the donor community’s consent. This sort of pre-emptive sub-
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missiveness was observed by the former Executive Chairman of TACAIDS who criti-
cised:  
The natives are not sufficiently strong to impress upon the donor organisations that ‘this 
is what we want and this is how we want it’ (…). I notice that some of the people, some 
of the officials who get their assistance, they sort of say ‘well, he has the money, he wants 
to do this and that, well, why don’t we cut a long story short, and let’s agree with him.’ 
That’s where things go wrong. (Interview 64)  
Given the perceived precedence of securing aid, officials in the MoHSW and TACAIDS 
appear to have internalised a conduct of compliance towards the donor community. The 
fact that ‘advice’ from aid experts is seldom contested would also explain why there are 
rather few occurrences of serious dispute in policy discussions, as interviewees from 
both sides noted. While in the official narrative, the lack of conflict is represented as an 
indication for the harmonious relationship of ‘partners’ in health and HIV/AIDS, it can 
also be interpreted as a sign that aid dependency has eroded recipients’ resistance.  
Conclusion 
Analysing AIDS policymaking by investigating the formulation process of the HIV pre-
vention strategy, Hunsmann (2013: 169) came to the conclusion that “international 
donors are not merely ‘influencing’ AIDS policy in Tanzania; they are co-constitutive of 
its very existence”. The observations of this case study not only support the finding that 
there is no sphere of independent, endogenous policymaking in HIV/AIDS, but suggest 
that this also applies to the health sector. A retired official, previously Director of Policy 
and Planning at TACAIDS, generally stated:  
I don’t think we have policies really that are purely national (…) because it’s a process 
and this process always involves the partners. They have a say there, they do have a say. 
(Interview 65)  
With the introduction of the SWAp and related mechanisms, aid experts have become 
legitimate participants in the policy discourse with a strong voice in defining priorities 
and setting the agenda – as opposed to national stakeholders from civil society, the pri-
vate sector or the research community whose role therein seems if at all marginal. While 
the dialogue forums in health and HIV/AIDS were actually established to reduce donor 
influence and induce ‘a more distant form of advice’ (Interview 73)235, it de facto 
brought aid actors closer to decision-making insofar as it entrenched their participation 
in policy development, analysis and evaluation. Given the intense engagement of donors 
in decision-making processes, it is questionable whether the new partnership approach 
increased national leadership in health and HIV/AIDS governance as claimed by its 
proponents, or rather weakened it by institutionalising external interference. 
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  The original term used in German: “Weg der etwas distanteren Beratung” (Interview 73) 
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6.2.4 South Africa: Health  
Sectorial Context 
With an estimate of 5,26 million people living with AIDS (equivalent to 10% of the 
population) as of 2013, South Africa counts the highest number of HIV infections in the 
world (Statistics South Africa 2013: 4). At the same time, the country faces a high inci-
dence rate of tuberculosis (TB) which has more than doubled since 2001 (The Lancet 
South Africa Series Executive Summary Core Group 2009: 5). While the large numbers 
of HIV and TB cases would be enough to put any nation under stress, the existence of 
three other ‘colliding epidemics’ – chronic illness and mental health disorders, injury 
and violence-related deaths, and maternal, neonatal and child mortality – exacerbates 
the situation; the fact that the ‘quadruple burden of disease’ falls on a system which is 
still characterised by inequity and fragmentation makes matters worse (The Lancet 
South Africa Series Executive Summary Core Group 2009). The persisting inequality 
which has its roots in the apartheid era manifests in the huge discrepancy between the 
‘first-class’ health services provided by private suppliers financed through medical 
schemes and out-of-pocket payments, and the dismal conditions in tax-funded public 
facilities which the vast majority of the population relies on; it is also reflected by a 
marked misdistribution of health workforce between the private and the public sector, as 
well as between urban and rural areas (McIntyre et al. 2008: c). In the latter, the chronic 
shortage of qualified staff is particularly severe.236 Overall, the Department of Health 
identified a deficit of about 83 000 health professionals in 2011 (Department of Health 
2011b: 12).237 
Despite the challenge of multiple epidemics, systemic flaws and a severe workforce 
crisis, the government has achieved notable successes since health minister Aaron Mot-
soaledi assumed office in 2009: Life expectancy at birth has increased from 54 years in 
2005 to 60 years in 2011, and the under-5 mortality rate per 1 000 live births has signif-
icantly declined from 56 in 2009 to 42 in 2011; both developments are attributed to the 
extensive roll-out of anti-retroviral treatment and massive efforts in the prevention of 
HIV mother-to-child transmission undertaken by the new administration (Bradshaw et 
al. 2012; Mayosi et al. 2012: 2032). While immense problems remain, the health im-
provements brought about in recent years give rise to positive outlooks; in an article 
                                                          
236
  McIntyre et al. (2008: c) provide numbers which reflect the huge disparity: In the public sector, 
there are 4 200 people per general doctor, 10 800 people per specialist, and 620 people per nurse; 
the private sector, in contrast, counts only 590 people per general doctor, 470 people per special-
ist, and 100 per nurse. Overall, “the majority of health care professionals work in the private 
sector, despite serving the minority of the population” (McIntyre et al. 2008: c).     
237
  The human resources situation in health is exacerbated by the brain drain of health professionals 
to foreign countries, with an estimated attrition rate of about 25% per year (Department of 
Health 2011b: 31). As of 2003, there were more South African medical practitioners working 
abroad (8 921 in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States) than counted 
in the public sector (7 517) (Department of Health 2011b: 22/32).  
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published by the Lancet in late 2012, authors assessing the changing health conditions 
in South Africa came to the conclusion that “for the first time in two decades, this pro-
gress instils a basis for hope” (Mayosi et al. 2012: 2040).  
Governance Structures 
The structures of health governance in South Africa are outlined by the National Health 
Act of 2003 which provides the framework for a uniform system encompassing public 
and private health establishments (Republic of South Africa 2004b). According to the 
act, the overall responsibility for health care in the country lies with the Department of 
Health (DoH) which as the national line ministry provides strategic guidance to the sec-
tor by setting norms and standards, developing policies and plans, and monitoring their 
implementation. The provinces in turn are directly responsible for delivering and over-
seeing most health services from primary care level to specialised hospitals; each 
provincial government has its own health department with considerable autonomy in 
terms of resource allocation and the way how programmes are being implemented 
(Mills et al. 2012: i7).  
The health departments at the national and the provincial levels are supported by health 
councils which are assigned to provide advice on health policy matters; the act further 
established consultative forums comprising representatives of key stakeholders from the 
public and the private sector, civil society, academia and donors (Republic of South 
Africa 2004b).  
The highest advisory and coordinating body on HIV/AIDS is the South African Nation-
al AIDS Council (SANAC) which was formed in 2002 to strengthen the country’s 
multi-sectoral response to the epidemic. After a decade in which SANAC existed by 
name but was more or less dysfunctional, the organisation underwent a major reform 
process initiated in 2012 through which its mandate was expanded and its structures 
were radically revamped. As an independent entity, SANAC brings together ministerial 
leaders, provincial government members and civil society actors from nineteen sectors 
who are represented in the decision-making plenary chaired by the deputy president. A 
small secretariat is supposed to facilitate and coordinate the work of the different 
SANAC institutions such as the Programme Review Committee which monitors im-
plementation, Technical Task Teams which process scientific findings and the Civil 
Society Forum which was established to foster dialogue and information sharing. The 
secretariat is also expected to support Provincial and District AIDS councils and to help 
mobilising domestic and international resources which makes it a focal point for the aid 
community.  
Donor Presence in the Health sector  
As a focus area and ‘cross-cutting issue’ of many aid organisations, HIV/AIDS receives 
by far the largest amount of external resources provided for health in South Africa, “of-
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ten in conjunction with support related to other sexually transmitted infections and tu-
berculosis or primary health care in general” (Fölscher et al. 2010: 59).  
According to a spending assessment covering the years 2007/08–2009/10, aid for 
HIV/AIDS and TB interventions amounted to R 5,57 billion (approximately US$ 693 
million) almost half of which was sourced from the President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programme of the United States (see data cited in Republic of 
South Africa 2012: 92 and SANAC 2013: 3). Hence, considering the scope of financial 
contribution, the US government stood out as the preeminent player in the field, fol-
lowed by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom through DFID and the European Commission; all together, these 
five organisations accounted for 82% of external funding. The list of donors which con-
tributed smaller amounts and technical assistance is extensive, comprising more than 
fourteen bilateral and seven multilateral agencies (see Republic of South Africa 2012: 
93/95).238  
Given the significant number of foreign actors engaged, it is remarkable that only two 
of them, namely DFID and the EU, support the health sector beyond HIV/TB, and that 
aside from informal information-sharing there has been little coordination until recent-
ly.239 In order to improve the harmonisation and alignment of donor activities with the 
national agenda, the DoH in 2011 launched an ‘Aid Effectiveness Framework for 
Health in South Africa’ which provided for the establishment of joint planning and co-
ordination fora (Department of Health 2011e). At the time of our interviews, these 
institutions did not yet fully work as expected; both DoH officials and donor representa-
tives, however, expressed the sentiment that communication already improved, pointing 
to a renewed political leadership and cooperative spirit emerging after an era in which 
donor-government relationships had broken down.    
HIV and Health Governance in Post-Apartheid South Africa    
From today’s viewpoint, the history of health governance in post-apartheid South Africa 
can be told in three chapters structured along the respective response to the country’s 
most perilous disease: the first is about the initial years of democracy in which the rapid 
spread of HIV urged the government to take the issue onto the political agenda; the sec-
ond covers the era of AIDS denialism under the Mbeki administration resulting in a 
deep crisis of government legitimacy and break up of relations with the science and the 
                                                          
238
  These included the governments of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, as well as IOM, UNAIDS, 
UNFPA, UNHRC, UNODC, WHO and the World Bank (Republic of South Africa 2012: 93/95). 
In addition, various international foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
Caritas, Red Cross, Médicins sans Frontières, Open Society Institute and the Ford Foundation 
provided funding and assistance (SANAC 2013: 4).    
239
  The only informal arrangement which existed since around 2009 was the so-called EU Plus 
Working Group in which donors from European member states shared information about their 
activities, but without any government participation (Interview 5).   
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donor community; the third starts with the change of leadership in 2009 which paved 
the way for a radical policy shift initiated by a “passionate” (Interview 11) new health 
minister with a “powerful presence” (Interview 27) in the DoH and beyond.    
Motsoaledi’s coming into office is widely regarded as the crucial turning point for HIV 
and health governance in South Africa. In order to provide the background for conceiv-
ing the paradigm shift he brought about, we briefly sketch out pivotal developments 
prior to his term, before dwelling on recent policy processes and the involvement of aid 
experts therein.  
An Epidemic on the Rise: the Spread of HIV in an Era of Health System Transformation  
When the first democratic government took over power in 1994 a central endeavour was 
to overcome the “racially discriminatory, fragmented, and poorly coordinated” (Benatar 
1997: 1537) health system inherited from the apartheid regime. The ‘White Paper for 
the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa’ released in 1997 envisaged a 
unified national system centred on comprehensive primary health care (PHC) at the dis-
trict level; to redress past inequalities, emphasis “should be placed on reaching the poor, 
the under-served, the aged, women and children, who are amongst the most vulnerable” 
(Department of Health 1997). The realisation of reform, however, was hampered by 
several factors, first and foremost by the vast lack of human resources and managerial 
capacity in the public sector (Coovadia et al. 2009: 374). As in other ministries, the new 
cadre of civil servants in the health department comprised often highly engaged but in-
experienced officials “with little knowledge of large bureaucracies, let alone how to 
achieve innovation through these bureaucracies” (Schneider & Stein 2001: 726). 
Such institutional constraints also impaired the implementation of the first National 
AIDS Plan (NAP) which was developed by the National AIDS Committee of South 
Africa (NACOSA) and adopted by the Department of Health in 1994 (Schneider & 
Stein 2001: 725). With its emphasis on the need for adopting a multi-sectoral response 
and human-rights centred approach, the document was by many deemed an ideal policy, 
combining “the technical with the political” and being “comprehensive, practical and 
carefully costed” (Schneider & Stein 2001: 725). The fact that the fight against AIDS 
was declared a ‘Presidential Lead Project’ signalled high-level commitment to combat 
the epidemic and granted preferential access to resources from the government’s Recon-
struction and Development Programme for related activities (Schneider & Stein 2001: 
725).   
Yet, the plan didn’t materialise as expected; in hindsight, many observers attributed the 
failure to achieve the ambitious aims to the fact that the human resources at the disposal 
of the government in the throes of transition had been highly over-estimated (Schneider 
& Stein 2001: 726; Butler 2005: 593; Wouters et al. 2010: 174). Lacking skilled and 
experienced personnel, the administration struggled to translate the plan into action and 
to effectively use the resources set aside by the government and donors. Of the R 53 
million allocated by the EU for the implementation period 1995–1996 only R 7 million 
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(equivalent to 13%) had been disbursed by May 1997 (Schneider & Gilson 1999: 269; 
Schneider & Stein 2001: 727). 
Given the inability to put intentions into practice and emerging policy contestation 
among AIDS players240, HIV rapidly spread during Mandela’s presidency, with preva-
lence among adults aged 20–64 rising from 1,5% in 1994 to 9,7% by 1999 
(ASSA AIDS Committee 2011).241  
Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang: the Era of AIDS denialism  
When after South Africa’s second general elections in 1999 Thabo Mbeki took over 
power, “the HIV/AIDS epidemic had already taken on horrifying proportions: approxi-
mately 4,2 million South Africans were living with HIV, and an additional 1600 people 
were infected daily” (Wouters et al. 2010: 176). Right after assuming office, Mbeki di-
rected the development of a new five year HIV/AIDS & STD Strategic Plan which was 
finalised in January 2000 (Department of Health 2000). While the pace of its formula-
tion seemed to signal the new leadership’s commitment to tackle the increasing AIDS 
problem, the plan lacked clear activities, timeframes and budgets, and thus remained 
“somewhat generalised in terms of what is to be done and how resources are to be prior-
itised” (Grimwood et al. 2000: 292); most notably, it kept quiet about concrete 
treatment options. A novelty put forward was the establishment of a multi-sectoral 
South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) with the mandate to advise the gov-
ernment on HIV/AIDS and STD policy and to oversee and enforce implementation 
(Wouters et al. 2010: 176). That the institution should be formed by representatives 
from government and civil society was widely commended; yet, when it came to the 
appointment of members, lead activists and renowned academics were excluded 
(Schneider 2002: 149; Fourie & Meyer 2010: 113). 
Mbeki’s relationship with the AIDS and biomedical community had already been 
strained by his key role in the Virodene affair and his publicly articulated claims about 
‘toxic side-effects’ of antiretroviral drugs (Baleta 1999).242 Tensions culminated when 
Mbeki convened a Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel to re-examine causes and solu-
tions to the epidemic, inviting a group of ‘dissidents’ who denied the link between HIV 
                                                          
240
  Serious disputes in the AIDS context emerged about the Sarafina 2 awareness play project 
(1996), the quack remedy Virodene (1997), AIDS notification plans (1997)  and anti-retroviral 
therapy for pregnant women (1998). For details on these controversies, see Schneider (2002). 
241
  Results extracted from the ASSA2008 AIDS and Demographic model of the Actuarial Society of 
South Africa, Summary (Prov) Output as downloaded on 22.07.2014 from 
http://aids.actuarialsociety.org.za/ASSA2008-Model-3480.htm. 
242
  In 1997, researchers from the University of Pretoria presented Virodene as an allegedly ‘break-
through’ treatment to cure AIDS. Mbeki as deputy president was a key actor supporting the 
group despite strong scepticism on the part of the South African biomedical community which 
he accused of retarding access to life saving therapy; due to insufficient evidence and toxic risks 
Virodene was eventually rejected by South Africa’s Medicines Control Council (Schneider 2002: 
147). 
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and AIDS. Mbeki’s championing of the latter evoked massive critique on the part of the 
local and international science community; internal pressure led the president to with-
draw from the debate, but not to reverse his stance (Schneider 2002: 149).243  
In fact, Mbeki’s agenda was pushed forward by his health minister Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang who persistently rejected the roll-out of anti-retroviral treatment, portraying it 
as ‘poison’ and promoting unproven alternative remedies instead (Nattrass 2008: 159). 
Even after being forced by the Constitutional Court to make ARVs nationally available 
to pregnant women as means to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission (PMTCT) 
and being pressurised by the Cabinet to introduce highly active antiretroviral therapy 
(HAART) for AIDS-sick people, Tshabalala-Msimang continued to promote alternative 
remedies and preached the alleged benefits of garlic, olive oil and lemon juice for cur-
ing the disease (see Heywood 2003; Wines 2004; Nattrass 2006a, 2006b, 2008: 159).244 
Comparing the number of persons who received ARVs 2000 and 2005 with an alterna-
tive of what would have been reasonably feasible in the country during that period, a 
study later estimated that more than 330 000 lives were lost due to the government’s 
reluctance to provide anti-retroviral treatment (Chigwedere et al. 2008).  
During the era of Mbeki/Tshabalala-Msimang, the Department of Health’s relationships 
with other actors in the AIDS field completely broke down. The local science communi-
ty and civil society formed alliances internally and internationally to push forward 
PMTCT and ART programmes on the ground, supported by foreign donors who chan-
nelled their aid to NGOs and research projects, bypassing the ministry.245 The cleavage 
between the central leadership and lower levels of the system manifested in that doctors 
backed by medical associations and provincial governments openly defied the national 
policy by supplying ARVs to patients (see media articles Stoppard 2002; IRIN news 
2002).  
In the light of increasing domestic and international pressure following the health minis-
ter’s speech at the Toronto AIDS conference where she reaffirmed her renitent stance, 
the Cabinet eventually transferred the responsibility for AIDS policy to the Deputy 
President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka (Nattrass 2008: 159). This shift of authority and 
                                                          
243
  For a detailed analysis of the public discourse on the matter and its implications for the relation-
ship between politics and science, see Weingart (2002).    
244
  The government was taken to court by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) which launched a 
constitutional challenge when the government restricted the provision of the anti-retroviral drug 
Nevirapine to pregnant women for the purpose of preventing mother to child transmission of 
HIV to a view pilot sites, alleging a violation of the right to health care services as granted by the 
South African Constitution. In 2002, the Court ordered the Minister of Health and the nine 
Health Members of the provincial Executive Committees to extend the availability of Nevirapine 
to state hospitals and clinics and to roll-out a national programme ‘without delay’. A detailed 
summary of the case is provided by Heywood (2003); all official documents related to the litiga-
tion are provided on the website of the International Network for Economic, Social & Cultural 
Rights (http://www.escr-net.org/docs/i/403050, last accessed on 18.01.2015).  
245
  For an analysis of HIV/AIDS-related donor funding to South Africa in the period 2000–2005, 
see Ndlovu (2005).  
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the sick leave of Tshabalala-Msimang in late 2006 opened up a ‘window of opportunity’ 
(Kingdon 1984) to overcome the impasse and change tack. As chairwomen of SANAC 
and the inter-ministerial AIDS committee, Mlambo-Ngcuka drove forward the devel-
opment of a new strategic plan, incorporating AIDS specialists who had previously been 
excluded from the policy terrain (Timberg 2006).246 After extensive consultations with 
health professionals, scientists, activists and officials from various sectors, the 
HIV&AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007–2011 (commonly abbreviat-
ed as NSP standing for National Strategic Plan) was finalised by an expert task team 
and approved by the Cabinet in May 2007 (Venter 2007). In contrast to the preceding 
document, the NSP set clear targets, such as halving the rate of new HIV infections and 
providing treatment, care and support to 80% of all HIV positive people and their fami-
lies by 2011 (SANAC). For its ambitious goals and vigorous commitments which 
signalled a clear policy shift, the plan was praised by health experts, donor representa-
tives and activists alike (IRIN news 2007a; Sapa & AFP 2007). Being more critical 
about the actual soundness of the strategy, a key actor involved in drafting the document 
expressed the importance of the NSP for civil society at that time as follows:  
I don’t think it was a perfect policy paper – people say that, but it wasn’t. The current five 
year plan was something we forced as a way to give us power to shape the policy and im-
plementation agenda. So with that plan at the beginning of 2007, we just threw everything 
into it, because in 2007 Manto Tshabalala-Msimang was still the Minister of Health, 
Thabo Mbeki was still the president – they’ve been forced to back down, but they were 
still there. So we didn’t have strong grounds. So the new strategic plan came along and 
we said, ok, ARVs, male circumcision, prevention of mother-to-child transmission – let’s 
just put everything in, because if it’s in there (…) it would strengthen our hand if we had 
to litigate, if we could go to the courts and say, look, the Cabinet has agreed to this as a 
matter of policy, why is it that they are not prepared to do it when it comes to implemen-
tation? (Interview 27)  
While the NSP thus was a strong symbol of policy change, realising the latter with still 
reluctant protagonists in key positions proved challenging. Implementation was also 
hampered by the fact that expertise had “fled from the system” (Interview 27), as a civil 
society leader put it; under Tshabalala-Msimang, experienced officials had left the 
health department on the grounds that they felt unable to justify the institution’s policy 
against their own conviction. A former official who had worked in the AIDS unit quit 
the public service in 2003 for this reason:   
                                                          
246
  Another key protagonist in that process was the Deputy Health minister Nozizwe Madlala-
Routledge who during Tshabalala-Msimang’s sick leave in late 2006 spoke out against her own 
government, admitting AIDS ‘denial at the very highest level’ (Bevan 2006). Together with the 
deputy president (allegedly an old friend of her) she pushed for policy change, reaching out to 
civil society and scientists her absent superior had refused to consult. In August 2007, Madlala-
Routledge was sacked by President Mbeki on the grounds of an unauthorised trip to the Interna-
tional AIDS Vaccine Initiative Conference in Madrid and “her inability to work as part of the 
‘collective’”(Sosibo 2007).    
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I found myself apologising for where I worked and when I caught myself I realised I 
can’t do this anymore. (Interview 5)  
The era of Tshabalala-Msimang as head of the department eventually ended in Septem-
ber 2008 when Mbeki after losing support of his own party resigned. Interim President 
Kgalema Motlanthe immediately dismissed Tshabalala-Msimang and replaced her with 
Barbara Hogan, one of the few ANC members of parliament who had spoken out open-
ly against the AIDS denialism of the Mbeki government (Gilbert & Cherry 2008).  
Shortly after taking office, the new health minister in a landmark speech before leading 
scientists, clinicians and activists explicitly acknowledged the causal link between HIV 
and AIDS and commended the contribution of science and civil society in the fight 
against the epidemic (Treatment Action Campaign 2008). She also actively approached 
the donor community which over years had been ‘chased away’ by her predecessor, as 
an official in the Swedish Embassy put it, requesting for the renewal of cooperation:  
She asked us to do a lot of things, because she realized that we put ourselves in order and 
we knew what was going on. And one of the things she asked us was to do a mapping to 
see what money was going where, which we did, and she also asked us to assist with 
technical assistance and to assist with money. (Interview 5)  
Hogan’s cooperative stance and commitment to a decisive response to the AIDS epi-
demic evoked much enthusiasm among donors, activists, and health professionals; after 
her first 100 days in office, the head of the Southern African AIDS Clinicians Society 
assessed her as “absolutely superb”, stating that “she hasn’t put a foot wrong” (Kapp 
2009).  
Despite such praise and to the disappointment of many, Hogan’s term as health minister 
ended already after nine months. In the course of a cabinet shuffle in May 2009, the 
newly elected President Zuma moved Hogan to the less influential public enterprises 
portfolio, replacing her with the largely unknown medical doctor and previous provin-
cial education minister Aaron Motsoaledi (Smith 2009; Wouters et al. 2010: 179). 
While his successor had put an end to the era of AIDS denialism, the new health minis-
ter faced the dual challenge of bringing the epidemic under control and turning South 
Africa’s deteriorated health system around.  
Paradigm Shift in HIV and Health Governance  
Given Zuma’s statement about showering after having sex with an HIV-positive wom-
an247 and the fact that he removed the popular ‘hero’ Hogan from the DoH, experts 
raised doubts whether the course prompted by the interim administration would be pur-
                                                          
247
  In 2006, Zuma was on trial for an alleged rape of a HIV-positive woman. In his cross-
examination, he testified that after having ‘consensual sex’ he took a shower thinking this 
“would minimise the risk of contracting the disease” (BBC News 2006). Zuma was eventually 
cleared of the rape charge but rebuked by the judge for ‘totally unacceptable’ behaviour (Peta 
2006).    
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sued under this president (The Lancet 2008). Yet, there were signals that he seriously 
aimed to follow that direction. In a speech at the World AIDS day commemoration on 1 
December 2009, Zuma proclaimed a set of changes and initiatives which signalled a 
radical break with past policies. Aside from pledging increased prevention efforts, he 
announced a massive testing campaign and a drastic expansion of access to treatment. 
With effect from April 2010, all children under one year should get anti-retroviral drugs 
if tested HIV-positive; ARVs should also be made available for pregnant women and 
people with both tuberculosis and HIV having a CD4 count of 350 or less (The Presi-
dency 2009).248  
The new criteria for ART eligibility literally mirrored the revised recommendations on 
treatment, prevention and infant feeding in the context of HIV which the WHO had re-
leased only one month before (World Health Organization 2009a); according to a 
British advisor in the Department of Health, officials had even arranged a conference 
call between the WHO and the Presidency “to make sure every single line was totally in 
line with the international guidance because they were so paranoid of being criticised, 
because they’d gotten it so wrong before” (Interview 1).  
Not only the new ART guidelines, but also other decisions presented by the president 
were informed by analysis and advice from specialised aid agencies: Shortly after taking 
office, the health minister had requested the UN to assist the national department in 
conducting an assessment of the health sector’s HIV/AIDS response and a mid-term 
review of the NSP (see SANAC 2010). Specialists from UNAIDS and WHO partnered 
with senior officials of DoH to undertake these exercises which brought up a range of 
recommendations, such as to integrate HIV and TB services at the primary health care 
level, to shift care and treatment tasks to nurses and auxiliary health workers, or to in-
troduce a fixed-dose combination of ARVs and modify procurement for cutting costs 
(World Health Organisation South Africa 2009, interviews 6, 11). To the surprise of the 
experts involved, the government demonstrated an unexpected high level of receptive-
ness to their advice; a UNAIDS specialist commented in this regard:   
All the recommendations have been addressed to a large extent, so they were very re-
sponsive to everything (…), and it’s been very nice to see that responsiveness, I must say. 
(Interview 6)  
After a decade of confrontation and disconnect from the global health community, the 
South African government seemed anxious to regain legitimacy by aligning national 
policies to international standards and by revitalising cooperation with international 
                                                          
248
  CD4 cells are white blood cells which are essential for the human immune system. If depleted or 
reduced through an HIV infection, the body is highly vulnerable to opportunistic illnesses and 
other infections. The CD4 count of a healthy adult ranges from 500 to 1500 cells per cubic mil-
limetres of blood; a HIV positive person with a CD4 count of less than 200 is diagnosed of 
having progressed to AIDS (NAM aidsmap 2014). Until 2009, access to treatment in South Afri-
ca was limited to those patients who had reached this stage.      
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players. The latter were now deemed key partners for realising the new health vision of 
the ‘10 Point Plan’ which had been released as soon as the new administration was in 
place. The plan outlined the top priorities for the sector; amongst others, it emphasised 
the need for providing strategic leadership, implementing a National Health Insurance, 
improving the quality of health services and accelerating the HIV/AIDS response 
(Health Systems Trust 2010).249 The commitments were later formalised in a ‘Negotiat-
ed Service Delivery Agreement’ which entailed concrete targets to be achieved by 2014 
such as increased life expectancy and reduced maternal and child mortality (Department 
of Health 2010).  
That the new health minister and his Director-General approached the aid community to 
assist in implementing the targeted initiatives was perceived as a paradigm shift in 
country offices and embassies; a South African official who at that time still worked for 
the US government commented on this:  
I remember very well during the old administration, the international donors used to have 
a meeting outside the department where they would discuss strategies on how to assist the 
department and one of the biggest barrier by that time was that they were not really wel-
comed (…). But when the new administration came into place, it came up with ambitious 
plans, we want to put everybody on treatment to get rid of the backlog, we want to im-
prove the sites, we want to come up with new programmes. And the new administration 
was very open because they went outside to all these donors and said: ‘This is the chal-
lenge that we have and this is our plan, where do you fit into this, what can you do?’ 
That’s when all the donors came and said now ‘we can offer this, we can do this, we can 
do that.’ (Interview 17)  
The statement quoted above hints at two notable aspects pertaining to the renewal of 
relations: First, the way the government addressed potential partners signalled that the 
new decision makers were willing to re-assume leadership and fill the steering void by 
which the health department had been deadlocked for a while.250 They ‘opened the 
door’ to the donor community, but at the same time made it clear that the government’s 
agenda would be the reference point for support.  
                                                          
249
  The 10 Point Plan lists the following priorities: Provision of strategic leadership and creation of 
social compact for better health outcomes; the implementation of a National Health Insurance; 
improving the quality of health services; overhauling the health care system and improving man-
agement; improved human resources planning, development and management; the revitalisation 
of physical infrastructure; accelerated implementation of the HIV and AIDS strategic plan and 
the increased focus on TB and other communicable diseases; mass mobilisation for the better 
health for the population; review of drug policy; strengthening research and development (see 
Health Systems Trust 2010) .  
250
  A DFID advisor who entered the health department in 2009 commented in this regard: “When I 
first arrived (…), things were quite messy here, it was very difficult. The previous minister had 
left, there was a big vacuum, the director-general had been moved out, it was almost anarchic. 
There was no sense of who was in control.” (Interview 1)  
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Second, the fact that donors were immediately able to pledge assistance indicates that 
they had not been ‘passive’ while being excluded from the policy terrain and ‘waiting 
out’ Mbeki (Fourie et al. 2010: 13): Instead, they had prepared themselves for leader-
ship change by refocusing portfolios and setting aside resources which they offered as 
soon as new political protagonists entered the scene.251 Technical agencies such as 
WHO and UNAIDS had put in place HIV specialists ready to provide policy advice if 
requested.252  
How external expertise and money was utilised in the course of subsequent reforms is 
illustrated by two exemplary processes outlined in the following, namely the develop-
ment of the National Strategic Plan 2012–2016 and the introduction of the National 
Health Insurance system.  
External Experts’ Involvement in Developing the NSP II  
As indicated above, the coming in of Motsoaledi meant a complete about-turn not only 
of politics but also of donor-government relations in the field of health and HIV; a DoH 
official illustrated this by saying:  
Immediately all the donors came into the department again, you could see the faces of 
people whom you couldn’t see during the old administration. You couldn’t see them. But 
now they are all in the building, they are welcomed and there is continuous working to-
gether and collaboration. (Interview 17)  
Within a short period of time, external experts particularly from UN bodies like WHO, 
UNAIDS or UNICEF established close working relationships with key officials in the 
DoH and SANAC whom they immediately assisted in setting up initiatives such as the 
mass HIV Counselling and Testing (HCT) campaign launched in 2010 (SANAC Secre-
tariat 2010).253  
Given that the term of the NSP 2007–2011 for South Africa’s AIDS response was com-
ing to an end, a pending task on the agenda was the development of a succeeding 
                                                          
251
  DFID and GIZ, for instance, came up with new AIDS and health-related programmes which 
were agreed in 2009/2010, namely the SARRAH programme (“Strengthening South Africa’s 
Revitalised Response to AIDS and Health”) and a Multi-sector HIV and AIDS Prevention Pro-
gramme (MHIVP).  
252
  Both the medical officer for HIV/AIDS in the WHO country office as well as the UNAIDS Sen-
ior Policy & Programme Adviser interviewed for this research started their work in South Africa 
in 2009.   
253
  The government launched the national HIV Counselling and Testing (HCT) campaign in April 
2010 aiming at encouraging citizens to know their HIV status and access counselling and treat-
ment. While the ambitious goal of getting 15 million people tested by June 2010 was not 
reached, the initiative was still praised as the largest scale-up of HCT world-wide, with over 13 
million being tested and 400 000 people initiated in ARVs within one year (Bodibe 2011; Mben-
gashe 2012).  
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document. Preparations for the process of policy formulation began in early 2011, 
though not in a very coordinated way, as a DFID advisor remarked:   
SANAC was approaching people for bits of work and it was very, very messy and not 
sustainable, and no one knew who was doing what. So we agreed to form a group of de-
velopment partners that had funds or resources, and together with SANAC and UNAIDS 
–UNAIDS took on quite a strong role earlier on in helping to coordinate that – we formed 
a group and created a matrix of who would support what. So SANAC said they wanted 
consultants in these provinces and they wanted someone working on the national desk, 
and then we provided expertise as part of that. (Interview 1)  
In the following, SANAC received technical assistance at various levels, with experts 
being deployed and funded by a range of donors including DFID, Sida and specialised 
UN organisations. A senior policy & programme advisor of UNAIDS was commis-
sioned to assist the SANAC CEO in drafting a first road map for the whole NSP process 
which was taken to the Programme Implementation Committee for approval and subse-
quently presented to the plenary to be endorsed. The first key activity organised was a 
two-day think tank meeting in April 2011 where representatives from government de-
partments, civil society and donors met to deliberate “what should be in the NSP, what’s 
the evidence showing us, what’s the guidance, where should we be going” (Inter-
view 6), as the UNAIDS advisor put it. The discussions were informed by findings from 
a range of analyses which had been conducted since 2009, such as the mid-term review 
of the first NSP for 2007–2011, the review of the health sector response, a national 
AIDS spending assessment, and comprehensive technical reports on the status of the 
epidemic, current policies and prevention efforts (see Fraser-Hurt et al. 2011; SANAC 
2011a, 2011b). All of these studies had been realised with external funding and im-
mense technical support, most notably from UNAIDS, WHO and the World Bank 
which had provided experts to coordinate and compile the evidence gathered.  
Amongst others, it brought to light that since the last NSP was developed approximately 
1,5 million people were newly infected with HIV, and despite massive expansion of 
treatment an estimated 2 million had died of AIDS-related causes; as the only way to 
overcome the epidemic it was strongly suggested “to rapidly intensify HIV prevention 
efforts so as to virtually halt all new infections” (SANAC 2011a: 5). The latter recom-
mendation matched well with the new UNAIDS global strategy ‘Getting to Zero’ which 
the UNAIDS country director presented to participants of the think tank meeting; aside 
from setting the target of zero AIDS-related deaths and discrimination by 2015, it advo-
cated for high-quality, cost-effective HIV prevention programmes to get to zero new 
infections (UNAIDS 2010a).  
After two days of consultation, delegates arrived at some basic decisions: The three ‘ze-
ros’ should be adopted as long-term vision of the NSP which for the first time should 
explicitly integrate tuberculosis, given the outstanding high co-infection rate of HIV and 
TB; moreover, prevention should become a prime pillar of the response. In August 
2011, a first draft NSP was disseminated for public comment; in the following months, 
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 238 
 
the editorial team received more than 100 written submissions from a broad range of 
organisations and individuals with diverse interests. Key issues of contestation which 
emerged in the process of consolidation were less addressing priorities, but rather relat-
ed to the nature and scope of the policy document – how broad or specific it should 
become, what kind of concrete targets it should include (and how many), and to what 
extent it should or must be costed (Treatment Action Campaign & Section27 2011: 14). 
Some civil society organisations such as Section27 strongly pushed for costing and 
budgeting the plan to ensure implementation and be able to hold the state accountable in 
terms of resource allocation (Section27 2011); in their view, the new NSP would need 
to serve as “a plan that people actually refer to rather than just (…) a symbol” (Inter-
view 27), as a lead Section27 member put it, arguing:      
A symbol was good for a point. But that’s not what we need now. Now we need a plan 
that will actually guide implementation. (Interview 27)  
Other stakeholders, however, had a different conception of what the document should 
be, envisaging a framework strategy with overall goals and objectives rather than a de-
tailed plan; a senior advisor representing the EU on the SANAC Programme 
Implementation Committee which oversaw the writing process commented in this re-
gard:   
This is something that we found with working through the document time and time again, 
bringing people back again and again that this is not a plan, it’s a strategy! Because peo-
ple want to go further every time. And I think the consultants that we have – they’ve 
chopped down every time and said no, this is not a plan, this is a strategy. The provinces 
and the people who are going to execute this, they will make this a plan. (Interview 5)  
The final version approved by the SANAC Council by mid of November did comprise a 
chapter on costing which estimated financial requirements at R 131 billion (equivalent 
to US$ 16 billion) for the whole period (SANAC 2012: 78); yet, it was explicitly em-
phasised that the amount should be indicative, “with detailed implementation plans 
being developed separately by the sectors and provinces” (SANAC 2012: 76) by March 
2012.  
On the World AIDS Day in December 2012, the ‘National Strategic Plan on HIV, STIs 
and TB 2012–2016’ was officially launched by the president (IRIN news 2011a). The 
four key objectives forming the basis of the response were to address social and struc-
tural barriers to HIV, STI and TB prevention, care and impact, to prevent new HIV, STI 
and TB infections, to sustain health and wellness, and to increase the protection of hu-
man rights and improve access to justice (SANAC 2012). 
Despite some criticism on specific aspects254, the new NSP was widely commended by 
actors from the government, civil society and donors who particularly lauded the pro-
                                                          
254
  The Treatment Action Campaign and Section27, for instance, criticised insufficient attention to 
tuberculosis throughout the document, claiming that “TB has been integrated more deeply into 
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cess through which the policy was produced; a South African HIV specialist in the 
Swedish Embassy commented in this regard:   
All of us pitched in, and we all supported this and we all funded this (…). I think a lot of 
people have worked really hard to get this together in a year’s time. It was a consultative 
effort, which has never really in the past been so much consultative like this time, and I 
think this was under the leadership of the minister and the new DG and other role players 
in the Department. I think it was really, really positive. (Interview 5)  
Even the usually highly critical Treatment Action Campaign (formerly attacked as ‘dis-
grace’ by Tshablala-Msimang) stated that the “NSP 2012–2016 has been developed 
through an unprecedented degree of collaboration between civil society and the De-
partment of Health, under the auspices of SANAC”, and proclaimed that it marked “the 
beginning of a new era in the response to HIV, TB and the social drivers of these epi-
demics” (Treatment Action Campaign & Section27 2011: 1). After a decade in which 
the cooperation between government and other players had completely broken off due 
to the leadership’s counteraction to international consensus on HIV/AIDS, the NSP pro-
cess signalled that South Africa was coming ‘back on track’.  
Creating a South African National Health Insurance System  
A second undertaking which marked Motsoaledi’s first term in office has been the es-
tablishment of a National Health Insurance (NHI) system. As will be shown in the 
following, the process has so far significantly been informed by expert analysis and in-
ternational ‘evidence’.   
The idea of introducing some form of mandatory health insurance had been broached a 
couple of times in South African history even long before its democratic transition; dur-
ing the 1990s, several policy proposals were brought forward, but not further taken up 
(McIntyre 2010: 146).255 At its 2007 policy conference in Polokwane, the ruling African 
National Congress passed a resolution which called for the realisation of a National 
Health Insurance system (African National Congress 2007); yet, only two years later, 
the NHI emerged as an explicit priority on the government’s agenda. In his first budget 
speech as health minister, Motsoaledi justified the envisaged reform as follows:  
The present system of healthcare financing can no longer be allowed to go on, because it 
is simply unsustainable. No way can we perpetuate a system whereby we spend 8.5% of 
the GDP whereas 5% caters for 14% of the population or 7 million people, on the remain-
ing 3.5% caters for a whooping 84% of the population or 41 million people. Nowhere in 
the civilised world can you find that state of affairs; the present model of healthcare fi-
nancing is just outright primitive, and we are going to abandon it. (…)  
                                                                                                                                                                          
each successive draft of the NSP, but often still seems overwhelmed by HIV” (Treatment Action 
Campaign & Section27 2011: 7).  
255
  The different proposals over time are outlined in the Green Paper on the NHI, see Department of 
Health (2011d: 12–14) 
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Hon Chairperson, what is NHI? – it [sic] is a system of universal healthcare coverage 
where every citizen is covered by healthcare insurance, rich or poor, employed or unem-
ployed, young or old, sick or very healthy, black, white, yellow or people of whatever 
[persuasion]. (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2009) 
In late 2009, Motsoaledi established a Ministerial Advisory Committee (MAC) made up 
of twenty-five individuals with a cross-section of skills and expertise, including lead 
South African scientists, health practitioners, government officials, representatives from 
the pharmaceutical and medical scheme industries, and ‘international’ (i.e. foreign) 
health experts. Led by the CEO of the Human Sciences Research Council, the commit-
tee was tasked to provide recommendations regarding the NHI design and relevant 
health system reforms.  
After one and a half years of preparation (and considerable public speculation), the gov-
ernment presented a first Policy Paper on the NHI. Issued in August 2011, it outlined 
the vision of an integrated health care system in which everyone would have access to 
appropriate, efficient and quality health services provided through appropriately accred-
ited and contracted public and private providers; financial risk protection for the whole 
population should be ensured through a mechanism of cross-subsidization, whereby 
funding contributions would be linked to an individual’s ability-to-pay and benefits 
would be in line with an individual’s need (Department of Health 2011d). Given the 
need for a ‘complete transformation of healthcare service provision and delivery’ and a 
‘radical change of administration and management’, it was proposed to phase in the 
NHI over a period of fourteen years, whereby the first five years would be used to es-
tablish core institutions and to introduce core features on selected pilot sites 
(Department of Health 2011d: 5).  
The launch of the Green Paper on the NHI was followed by immediate action; aside 
from entering stakeholder discussions, the DoH set about key interventions scheduled 
for the first phase of implementation. Thereby, it received substantial assistance deliv-
ered through the DFID-funded ‘SARRAH’ (Strengthening South Africa’s Response to 
HIV And Health) programme. Negotiated in 2009, SARRAH was set up as a pro-
gramme channelling technical and financial support for strategic initiatives related to 
South Africa’s health sector reforms. The budget of £ 25 million was placed at the dis-
posal of the national health department for selected priorities agreed with DFID. A 
central role in this flexible arrangement was given to a senior advisor from the UK who 
was seconded to the DoH with the dual mandate of advising high-ranking decision 
makers and overseeing SARRAH-funded activities; HLSP, a UK-based, internationally 
operating firm specialised on consultancy, project management and policy advice in the 
health sector, was contracted to supply expertise and administrative support as requested 
by DoH leaders.  
The NHI became a key area for which these services were used. The range of tasks car-
ried out by contracted specialists in the course of conceptualisation and implementation 
is comprehensive; provides a compilation of technical support and consultancies specif-
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ically addressing NHI matters and provided in the first four years of the SARRAH pro-
gramme (2010–2013). The information was drawn from project briefs available on the 
programme’s website as of 01. August 2014; given that not all activities might have 
been documented in this form, the list should be understood as indicative rather than 
fully comprehensive:  
Table 19: Expert support to the NHI process through SARRAH 2010–2013 
Description / Purpose Timeframe Provider 
Logistical support for the Ministerial Advisory 
Committee on NHI 
01/2010–12/2012 HLSP, N. James 
Consultancy for the provision of support services for 
the NHI Communications strategy 
03/2010–05/2012 Meropa Communications 
Technical support for the purchasing sub‐committee 
of the NHI Ministerial Advisory Committee 
09/2010–11/2010 Team of consultants led 
by L. Gilson & K. Grant 
Consultancy services for the purchasing sub-
committee of the Ministerial Advisory Committee 
09/2010–08/2011 J. Miot 
Project planning and management support to the DoH 
Project Team 
12/2010–12/2011 J. Katzke  
Technical assistance to District Specialist task team 04/2011–10/2011 K. Jacobs 
Consultancy on development of packages of services 
to be provided on NHI pilot sites  
03/2011–12/2011 L. Ngubane, K. Grant, D. 
Whittaker, J. Katzke 
Project manager to coordinate work related to District 
Clinical Specialist Teams 
08/2011–01/2012 N. Bandezi 
Expert advice to the Office of the DG in developing 
NHI health purchasing implementation steps 
09/2012–09/2013 S. O’Dougherty 
Project manager to the office of the Director General 
of Health in coordinating the national community 
outreach programme 
10/2012–03/2012  E. Paulus, B. Sash 
Technical support for General Practitioners initiative 2012–2014 (sic)  SARRAH Team  
Logistical and administrative support for General 
Practitioners Contracting initiative 
n/a n/a 
Technical and logistical support to NHI road shows 
in 11 NHI pilot districts 
2012–2013 (sic)  SARRAH Team 
Provide revised national costing of NHI pilots 01/2013–03/2013 PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Consultancy to DoH on strengthening management 
arrangements of central hospitals 
02/2013–04/2013 S. Hayes 
Rapid assessment of the status of the 11 NHI pilot 
districts 
02/2013–05/2013 SARRAH technical leads 
and consultants 
Technical support for establishing prototype PHC 
facilities  
08/2013–11/2013 S. Asmal 
Source: Project briefs available on the SARRAH website accessed 01.08.2014.256 
                                                          
256
  http://www.sarrahsouthafrica.org/ABOUTSARRAH/SARRAHprojectbriefs.aspx (last accessed 
on 18.01.2015). 
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Categorising the assignments listed above, one can broadly differentiate between facili-
tating and analytical work which was assigned to experts outside the DoH who either 
provided administrative support or technical input. The former mainly helped to drive 
forward the NHI process insofar as consultants were commissioned to organise meet-
ings and events, to ensure that timetables are adhered to, or that written documentation 
is distributed to all stakeholders. Such tasks were the main components of the logistical 
support for the Ministerial Advisory Committee, technical assistance to the District 
Specialist task team or the project management support to the DoH project team. In the 
latter case, for instance, the consultant was expected to “develop and maintain a plan-
ning process and secure timely contributions and revisions from team members and 
stakeholders; monitor and report on project implementation plans with timelines, critical 
path and risk management; facilitate all Project Workgroup forums and record delibera-
tions and findings for the Project Leader” (SARRAH 2011a).  
While these kinds of assignments required strong administrative/managerial skills, the 
second type presupposed specialist knowledge of highly technical nature and analytical 
abilities. Experts were commissioned to generate ‘evidence’ in the form of reports, 
analyses and assessments to be used for refining NHI components. The range of docu-
ments produced includes six technical papers on resource allocations and purchasing 
strategies distributed to the Ministerial Advisory Committee; a report for the Director-
General on the proposed packages of services to be available under the NHI with details 
on how these services could be delivered through a purchaser/provider split; a study to 
determine frameworks and modalities for contracting private sector General Practition-
ers in public clinics; a revised national costing of the NHI; an assessment of ‘ideal’ 
Primary Health Care Facilities; a rapid appraisal of the 11 NHI pilot districts after 
twelve months, covering their status in terms of quality, hospital reforms, primary 
health care (PHC) re-engineering, infrastructure, human resources, management per-
formance, referral systems, and cooperation with private doctors. The list could be 
further continued. Notably, most of the analyses supplied through the SARRAH pro-
gramme were done by renowned health experts from South African academic 
institutions such as the University of Witwatersrand or the University of Cape Town. 
Hence, while the expertise was mobilised by external agencies (i.e. DFID/HLSP), it was 
largely provided from ‘locals’ with national and international research experience con-
tracted to serve as consultants to the DoH.  
Having said that, external health system ideas did play a significant role as points of 
reference in the development of the NHI. Many of the commissioned studies delineated 
‘lessons learned’ outside South Africa, pointing out how models worked or did not 
work in other countries. The Green Paper on the NHI explicitly refers to international 
evidence and experience, as the following extracts illustrate:   
A review of the international evidence on high-level strategies to promote health and 
health equity found that comprehensive benefit packages should be determined first by 
considering which interventions are important in improving access, offering financial pro-
tection to less advantaged groups and enhancing redistribution of healthcare services. (…)  
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In preparation for contracting with private providers, mechanisms for achieving cost-
efficiency will be investigated including international benchmarking from countries of 
similar economic development that have successfully implemented such processes. (De-
partment of Health 2011d: 27/32)  
Following the release of the Green Paper, DFID organised three study tours to the UK 
where high-level decision makers such as the minister and DoH’s Director-General met 
with their counterparts and visited health institutions to gain an understanding of the 
British system (SARRAH 2011b, 2012a, 2012b). Together with the EU, DFID also co-
sponsored and facilitated an international conference held in Johannesburg where ex-
perts from aid organisations, foreign universities and health ministries presented 
experiences from a range of developing and developed countries, including South Ko-
rea, Thailand, Turkey, Ghana, Germany, Australia, France and the United States; the 
event was attended by high-level decision makers including the minister and the Direc-
tor General, senior government officials, experts from academic institutions and private 
sector representatives (see Department of Health 2011c). In her concluding speech, DG 
Matsoso highlighted that the “lessons shared were eye-opening” (Department of Health 
2011c: 43), and that insights gained would be considered in the process of refining the 
South African NHI system.   
The conference which took place in early December 2011 was a key event in the phase 
of public consultation on the Green Paper which formally ended on 30th December 
2011. By then, the DoH had received over a hundred submissions from various stake-
holders; main points of criticism were a lack of public deliberation in the initial stage of 
policy development, and the vagueness with respect to crucial aspects of the reform, 
such as cost implications and the future role of private schemes (see, for instance, Helen 
Suzman Foundation 2011; South African Private Practitioner Forum 2011; van den 
Heever 2011). In early 2014, the minister announced that the release of a NHI White 
Paper which should shed light on such details was ‘imminent’ (Kahn 2014a); at the time 
of writing, the much anticipated document was not yet disclosed, but was said to be ‘in 
the final stages’ (Jadoo 2014; Kahn 2014b).  
Patterns of Current Health Governance  
The processes of NSP and NHI development were delineated in such detail to illustrate 
the paradigm shift within the DoH which manifests in a radically changed stance to-
wards the use of scientific knowledge and expert advice. In contrast to the preceding 
administration, the new leadership extensively draws on local and external expertise, 
adopting a governance approach which is marked by a number of patterns:  
First of all, it strongly features scientific knowledge as the point of departure for policy 
development. Documents such as the National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS and the 
Green Paper on the NHI entail numerous references to studies and analyses whose find-
ings are used to justify decisions; the following extracts are exemplary for the prevailing 
pattern of argumentation:    
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The NSP’s goals and strategic objectives are guided by evidence from various reports, in-
cluding the Know Your Epidemic (KYE) report, a situation analysis of TB in the country 
and other epidemiological studies. These studies identified key populations that are most 
likely to be exposed to or to transmit HIV and/or TB (…). Within each strategic objec-
tive, these key populations will be targeted with different, but specific interventions, to 
achieve maximum impact. (SANAC: 13) 
Evidence has demonstrated that those who are not adequately covered by any form of 
health insurance are among others women; children; the elderly; low income groups etc. 
It is for this reason that coverage should be extended to all these populations. (Depart-
ment of Health 2011d: 12) 
Whereas the previous government had openly questioned the robustness of evidence put 
forward by the mainstream science community, it is now used as the main means of 
legitimation for policy decisions. The importance of underpinning decisions with con-
sensual scientific knowledge was also emphasised by the Chief Director of the 
HIV/AIDS unit in the DoH who stated:   
We pursue evidence – evidence that’s relevant, that’s closer to the issues. We understand 
evidence is not sufficient; it has to deal with values and other issues. So we’re not ideo-
logical about what we’re trying to do. Our starting point because of the burden of disease 
that we need to fix [is that] there are some things that we know that work and we want 
people to help us to do that. (Interview 19)  
Although the DoH director seemed wary of conveying the impression that the govern-
ment blindly followed evidence without scrutinising it for its relevance and embedding 
it into the social context, his statement affirms the significance of scientific knowledge 
as reference point in policymaking.  
A second feature which manifested in both the NSP and NHI processes is the strong 
orientation at international guidance; the uptake of WHO’s ART guidelines and of uni-
versal coverage as an overall objective of the health system (promoted by the WHO 
since 2005) illustrates efforts to realign policies with the international agenda. After an 
era in which the government deliberately ignored recommendations from global health 
players, decision makers in the DoH seemed eager to demonstrate that this has changed 
with the new leadership, as a DFID advisor pointed out:    
They went out of their way to make sure absolutely everything that they did was totally in 
line with international policy (…). HIV/AIDS is the most obvious one but in other areas 
as well. And they are at pains to point out that they stick to international guidance. So 
when WHO suggests changing the CD4 count, the level at which you start treatment, 
South Africa takes it on immediately and they’ve been very proactive in keeping up with 
international best practice because they have this terrible history together. So they’ve 
gone to the other extreme now, they can’t now do enough in line with international guid-
ance. (Interview 1)  
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The fact that alignment with international guidance has become an imperative in the 
health department is reflected by the statement of a director who emphasised:  
Whatever we are doing has got to be internationally accepted (…); we need to make sure 
that we meet the international standards. (Interview 18)  
The new orientation at scientific knowledge and international guidance has come along 
with a wide openness for external assistance and receptiveness to advice which can be 
seen as the third characteristic of the current governance approach. In both the NSP and 
the NHI processes, the DoH extensively drew on advisors and consultants to realise the 
envisaged reforms. In seeking facilitative and analytical support, however, decision 
makers seem selective in terms of whom to approach for what kind of tasks and to 
which terms257; commenting on the consultants coming into the DoH, a senior official 
emphasised:  
Whatever work they are doing, it’s work that is a directive of the Director-General or the 
minister. So they don’t come here and want to do their own things. (Interview 18)  
The statement points at what can be seen as the fourth outstanding feature of current 
health governance, namely the strong guidance executed by DoH leadership ranks both 
in terms of setting the agenda and directing experts in supporting the department’s poli-
cy work. Various advisors engaging with the DoH reported on the firm stance of their 
South African counterparts; a UNAIDS specialist commented in this regard:  
They do close the doors if they don’t think you’re useful.  And they don’t miss their 
words, they say it clearly – they fire the consultant on the night. (Interview 6)  
Given that the DoH has been severely weakened in its capacity through the brain drain 
of specialists, it now does depend on the support of outside experts to manage the mas-
sive reforms envisaged. Yet, it seems as if decision makers use external assistance in a 
deliberate way, namely as a means to get things done quickly and to figure out how to 
achieve objectives rather than which objectives to achieve; this is reflected by a state-
ment of the health department’s Chief Director for HIV/AIDS who explained:   
You find that when the problem is quite substantial, you tend to spend your time on the 
things that need to be fixed today. So, what do experts and technical advisors do? My 
sense is that what they do is really look in the manner how we’re doing things and say: 
‘Look, there is one aspect, if you would do this, this will release many of those things that 
you need to do.’ So, it’s like finding the disconnect between the things that we really 
want to do, the capacity that we have and the thing that’s holding us back not do it (…). 
                                                          
257
  A review of the SARRAH programme, for instance, reports that in many cases the DoH took 
over responsibility for the appointment of consultants, “and instructed DFID and HLSP accord-
ingly” (Wright 2012: 13). 
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They can do the analysis of the composition of my finance, they can tell, look, you know, 
if you’re saying this where you want to go, in the manner how your budget is right now, it 
is unlikely you get there (…). When we hit bottlenecks on quality – when we’re not 
achieving our coverage, when we’re not being able to actually attract the right people and 
reach the right people, then there is some analysis that needs to be done (…) – that’s the 
role that they can actually play. (Interview 19)  
What becomes clear in this narrative is that external experts are ascribed a facilitative 
function rather than a determining role in policy development and implementation. The 
Chief Director for HIV/AIDS used the following metaphor for explicating this approach 
in a nutshell:  
These people for me, when they come in, they are co-pilots; they’re not driving the plane. 
(Interview 19)  
Re-building Relationships: Government Interaction with the Local Science Community  
A notable point mentioned earlier on is that in seeking assistance, decision makers in 
the DoH increasingly resort to members of the South African science community, which 
indicates that after almost a decade of schism between government and academia rela-
tionships are slowly building up. Yet, the lack of ‘histories of trust’ and of 
institutionalised dialogue still hamper the full utilisation of local knowledge resources. 
Various interviewees broached the issue that policymakers tended to request support 
from donor organisations although expertise was locally available. A WHO representa-
tive in the Pretoria country office reported on her experience as follows:    
South Africa is asking us for expertise when we use their South Africans to send else-
where. So it’s like the proverbial biblical saying ‘the prophet is not known in his own 
home’ acts here. (Interview 12)  
Aside from the still existing disconnects between the political system and academia, 
another problem lies in the fact that the South African knowledge community in health 
is strong with respect to scientific performance but small in terms of numbers (see chap-
ter 6.1.3). Given multiple obligations, the capacity of scientists to serve as advisors in 
policy processes is severely limited; a professor at the University of Western Cape stat-
ed in this regard:  
South African knowledge communities have an absolute place – there’s just not always 
enough of it and enough time. You know, I mean in a place like this, a) it’s quite difficult 
to travel to Pretoria for a meeting, b) we’re training people and the universities have loads 
of other things to do, so the ability to provide the very kind of flexible, immediate exper-
tise when it’s needed in very short time frames – the donors do that and mobilise it from 
international consulting communities.  
The fact that the local knowledge base doesn’t match the burden of disease in South 
Africa thus creates a void of expertise that is filled by aid organisations which source 
specialists from their country offices and global expert networks.  
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Conclusion 
As shown by using the examples of the AIDS plan and the National Health Insurance 
reforms, external experts do have a presence in the current era of South African health 
governance. Providing advice, analysis and administrative support, they impact on poli-
cy development and implementation in various regards. Yet, they do so on the request 
of leaders who demonstrate a high level of steering capacity both in terms of setting the 
agenda and dealing with donors. Not being dependent on aid money, decision makers 
are able to determine the conditions of support and to be selective with regard to whom 
to approach for assistance. At the same time, a strong local science community and vo-
cal civil society limit the risk of external interference.   
The fact that South Africa’s HIV and health policies have been radically revised and 
adjusted to international standards is less the result of outside pressure than of the gov-
ernment’s attempt to regain credibility in the global health arena and to redress the 
failures of past policies. In the reform of the health system, UN bodies such as WHO 
and UNAIDS have gained considerable influence, “not so much because they’ve come 
in and sought to be influential, but because what they have produced has been picked up 
internally and used to develop policy” (Interview 27), as a civil society leader put it. In a 
similar vein, a professor at the University of Western Cape remarked:  
I would say (…) it’s not a kind of very overt and forceful colonisation of ideas; it’s a pro-
cess of harmonization and emulation. (Interview 28)  
The policy shifts of recent years can thus be interpreted as a process of deliberate 
alignment pursued by a health administration which is characterised by a high degree of 
receptiveness to expert advice and science.  
6.2.5 Tanzania: Environment 
Sectorial Context 
Given natural ecosystems of forests, grasslands, savannah, wetlands, rivers, lakes and 
the Ocean, Tanzania is by comparison a rich country in terms of environmental wealth 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2012c: xi). The Serengeti National Park, well-known 
throughout the world, is only one of several biodiversity hotspot areas.258 Tanzania’s 
territory is home to numerous endemic animal and plant species (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2009: 6):  By 2003, 10 008 plant species, 316 mammals, 229 breeding birds, 
335 reptiles, 116 amphibians and 331 fish species were counted in the country (UNEP - 
                                                          
258
  Other areas that are known as biodiversity hotspots are the Eastern Arc old Block-Mountain 
Forests (Usambara, Nguru, Uluguru, Ukaguru and Udzungwa Mountains); the Coastal forests 
(e.g., Pugu, Rondo); the Great Lakes for Cichlid fishes (lakes Victoria, Tanganyika and Nyasa); 
the marine coral reef ecosystems; and the ecosystems of the alkaline Rift-Valley Lakes (e.g., Na-
tron and Eyasi) (United Republic of Tanzania 2009: 6). 
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Convention on Biological Diversity 2014). Although almost 30% of the terrestrial area 
and around 10% of territorial waters are protected (IUCN & UNEP-WCMC 2011), 
large parts of the natural habitat are at risk: Many biosphere reserves such as the Mount 
Kilimanjaro are severely affected by land degradation (Temba 2012). Coastal and ma-
rine areas are suffering from pollution and erosion that decline living resources (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2009: 8). Moreover, a rapid deforestation is taking place which is 
exacerbated by over-harvesting, illegal logging, bush fires, and detrimental cultivation 
practices (United Republic of Tanzania 2009: 22–25). According to the FAO Global 
Forest Resources Assessment 2010, Tanzania is among the top ten countries  that had 
the largest annual net loss of forest area world-wide between 2000 and 2010. (FAO 
2010b: 21).259 Poverty is seen as the main cause driving the persistent exploitation. The 
former director of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division sketched the linkage between 
poverty and deforestation as follows:  
People are heavily depending on [forests] for their livelihood. They don’t have another 
support. They don’t have another alternative, they need to survive. Sometimes climate 
change is causing havoc here. Crops don’t produce when they are about to produce. 
Drought at flowering stage or at the fruiting stage, maize and everything collapses, what 
do you do? And you need to see your children surviving. So the alternative is to harvest a 
tree (…).  
In Dar es Salaam and other cities, 90% of the household energy is charcoal. You can’t use 
electricity, it is very expensive. You can’t use gas, it is very expensive. And sometimes 
availability of gas is a problem, acquisition of the gadgets, they are very expensive. So for 
a normal person, middle income and others – they use charcoal. Then those guys in the 
rural areas, they know there’s a big demand for charcoal. Some business people are going 
in the rural areas looking for charcoal. So if you cut more trees for charcoal making, you 
earn something. (Interview 58)  
Forest and nature degradation is a huge problem in Tanzania, threatening not only more 
than 700 plant and animal species, but also the livelihoods of large parts of the human 
population.260    
Governance Structures 
The structures of environmental governance in Tanzania are laid down by the Environ-
mental Management Act (EMA) of 2004 which frames environment as a horizontal 
policy issue cutting across various sectors. While line ministries such as the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Tourism which is also responsible for forests are required to 
manage environmental matters in their respective areas, the act established the Director 
                                                          
259
  From 2005–2010, Tanzania lost 403,000 hectares per year, equivalent to 1,16% of the total forest 
area (FAO 2010a).  
260
  According to the IUCN Red Lists 2012, 302 plant species and 408 animal species are currently 
threatened, include species classified as critically endangered, endangered and vulnerable (IUCN 
2012a; IUCN 2012b).   
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 249 
 
of Environment and his unit – the Division of Environment in the Vice President’s Of-
fice (VPO-DoE) – as the focal body in charge of policymaking, coordination and 
oversight under the overall leadership of the Minister of Environment. EMA also speci-
fied the mandate of the National Environment Management Council (NEMC) which 
serves as the leading technical advisory and regulatory agency; aside from conducting 
and coordinating research, its main functions are to enforce compliance with environ-
mental quality standards by reviewing and monitoring environmental impact 
assessments. As in other policy areas, the actual implementation of policies and legisla-
tion falls under the responsibility of Local Government Authorities (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2004).  
Donor Presence in Environment   
Since 2004, donors supporting and carrying out environmental activities in Tanzania are 
joined in the so-called “Development Partners Group on Environment”, or DPG-E in 
short. As of 2014, it comprised ten bilateral funders, namely Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, DFID (UK), the European Union, Finland, France, Germany (and GIZ), Norway 
and USAIDS as well as five multilaterals, namely UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, the World 
Bank and the African Development Bank. Depending on their focus, these aid providers 
are related to sub-groups on climate change, natural resource management or environ-
ment in general. Actually, the members of these groups are supposed to interact with 
their main counterparts in government, i.e. the Vice President’s Office – Division of 
Environment and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, through the estab-
lished dialogue structure including meetings on thematic areas, cluster working groups, 
and discussions related to general budget support  (Development Partners Group Tanza-
nia 2014b). Yet, at the time of research, participants admitted that these forums didn’t 
work as they should; while government officials complained about being unduly occu-
pied with aid meetings, donor representatives were upset about the absence of 
policymakers in the same and the consequent slow pace of decision-making. Overall, 
relationships seemed tense, with both sides accusing the other for not adhering to the 
agreed conditions of dialogue and cooperation.   
The Making of Environmental Policies in Tanzania 
Environment conservation has always been a playground of external actors in Tanzania. 
During the colonial rule, the British imposed preservation policies which restricted hu-
man activities in designated game parks and nature reserves; after independence, a 
range of external organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Ger-
man GTZ took over and divided up the funding and management of national parks, 
while Tanzania’s first President Nyerere supported the expansion of protected areas 
primarily in order to boost the country’s tourist industry (Levine 2002).  
With the Brundlandt Report “Our Common Future” published 1987 by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, the notion of ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ ascended the international agenda, and environment gained centre stage as an 
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 250 
 
issue of global concern (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). 
For Tanzania, this translated into generous funding offers arising in the run-up of the 
1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, as the former Director of Environment remem-
bered:  
When at that time, in 1991 January, these negotiations for the Earth Summit were going 
on, it gave rise to several meetings at the global level, at the regional level within Africa, 
at the sub-regional level, and at national level (…). And in order to be able to understand 
the process and to contribute meaningfully, you simply had to get time to participate, to 
travel – and that’s expensive. So in Tanzania, I put up together a team of – at that time, I 
think it was twelve technical people from various ministries, and also representations 
from NGOs. And you couldn’t have the government to support these travels because per 
diems and flight tickets are expensive. I was simply fortunate that there was such a cli-
mate of giving from the donors – it was basically the donors who were just covering 
everything. They simply wanted me to produce the list of people that were going. So I 
wrote a letter, ‘this is what I want.’ They were just happy to support. (Interview 66)  
Amongst the major aid providers sponsoring the participation were UNDP, the Nether-
lands, and Nordic countries such as Sweden. According to the former Director of 
Environment, their support enabled his delegation to take part in the summit’s prepara-
tion as well as in negotiations on the three Rio Conventions on biodiversity, climate 
change and desertification; from his perception, Tanzania was thereby given a voice in 
the global discourse.  
The increased donor interest in environment not only yielded new programmes and 
funding mechanisms (e.g., the Global Environment Facility), but also brought forth new 
conditions. The World Bank, for instance, made environmental impact assessments of 
varying depth obligatory for the approval of projects, and required IDA borrowers to 
formulate ‘National Environmental Action Plans’ which Tanzania endorsed in 1994. As 
in many other recipient countries, this donor-initiated document led the foundation for 
the subsequent National Environmental Policy. Aside from identifying six urgent prob-
lems – land degradation, lack of accessible, good quality water, environmental 
pollution, a loss of wildlife habitats and biodiversity, deterioration of aquatic systems 
and deforestation – it framed environment as a cross-sectoral issue and set overall poli-
cy objectives (United Republic of Tanzania 1997). The role of the lead organisation in 
the process of policy development was given to the Division of Environment in the Vice 
President’s Office, which received substantial assistance from the Danish govern-
ment.261 Although according to the former Director of Environment, the Danes didn’t 
set any conditions related to the policy content, it is remarkable that their financial sup-
port justified the presence of Danida representatives in policy discussions, as the 
following statement reflects:  
                                                          
261
  While the Division of Environment had been established in 1991 under the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, it was transferred to the Vice President’s Office in 1995 to give it more 
political clout (Death 2012: 9). 
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They supported the process. And I don’t remember any incident where we had any pre-
conditions given by the Danish on what we should say in our policy. There was nothing 
like that. Of course, because they provided funding, they would be interested in the pro-
cess to ensure that the money they are giving is being put to good use. And so we would 
bring them on board in terms of the meetings we’d hold for our discussions and they 
would be giving their views. (Interview 66)  
The policy’s was primarily shaped by national consultations and a range of workshops 
attended mainly by government officials, donor spokespersons and a few NGO activists. 
Despite “a clear bias toward an elite understanding of the problems of the environment 
and their solutions, (…) there was little public or private controversy over the guidelines 
and plans of the National Environmental Policy when it was finally adopted by the Cab-
inet in 1997” (Elliott-Teague 2011: 849). 
In the subsequent years, environment as a policy issue came to the fore on Tanzania’s 
agenda; the increasing importance can partly be attributed to the active lobbying of in-
tellectuals with influence in political circles (Assey et al. 2007: 7), but also to an 
enhanced engagement of international organisations which supported environmental 
champions “to express their views” (Interview 66) and financed government activities. 
According to the then Director of Environment, donors accounted for over 90% of the 
funding for environmental programmes and projects undertaken by his unit.  
The Division of Environment also received external assistance in the course of two pol-
icy processes which took place in parallel in the early years of the new millennium, 
namely the development of the Environmental Management Act (EMA) and the poverty 
reduction strategy known as MKUKUTA. Donors backed up these processes through 
two major initiatives: the ‘Institutional and Legal Framework for Environmental Man-
agement Project (ILFEMP)’ designed to prepare environmental legislation, and the 
‘Integrating Environment Programme’ which aimed at ‘mainstreaming’ environmental 
issues into MKUKUTA. While the former was primarily sponsored by the World Bank, 
USAID, Sida, and the WWF, the latter was supported by UNDP, UNEP, Danida, DFID, 
and the Norwegian government (Assey et al. 2007: 17; Elliott-Teague 2011: 850). Both 
initiatives were officially housed in the Vice President’s Office, and included the use of 
national and foreign experts for various tasks. 
The ILFEMP project started in 1998 with a team comprising an American technical 
advisor and three Tanzanian specialists from different research institutes commissioned 
to review the institutional framework of environmental management, and, in the second 
phase, to draft a respective bill (Elliott-Teague 2007: 104).262 The process involved con-
                                                          
262
  According to Elliott-Teague (2011: 852), the Tanzanian experts consisted of Dr. P.J. Kabudi, a 
member of the Faculty of Law at the University of Dar es Salaam as well as the chair of the 
Board of Directors of a non-governmental organization called the Lawyers’ Environmental Ac-
tion Team (LEAT) who was brought in as the legal expert and project coordinator; Dr. Suma 
Kaare who at that time was affiliated with the Economic and Social Research Foundation served 
as the institutions specialist, and Mr. Deo-Gratias Gamassa, an ecologist at the College of Wild-
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sultative meetings with representatives from government ministries, non-government 
organisations and donors; supporting studies and background papers were produced by 
individually hired scholars (Elliott-Teague 2011: 851). After two years of analysis and 
discussion, the team published a report outlining viable options for institutional ar-
rangements; interestingly, they rejected initial donor concerns over institutional 
structures as unjustified (Elliott-Teague 2011: 850). Taking up the report’s recommen-
dations on future legislation, an expert group paid by the World Bank and made up of 
two members of the University of Dar es Salaam, the Executive Director of the Tanza-
nian law organisation LEAT (Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team) and the chief 
Parliamentary Draftsman in the Attorney General’s Office developed a bill which went 
for Cabinet approval; after a brief public hearing, the Environmental Management Act 
was finally passed by Parliament in 2004 (Elliott-Teague 2007: 106–110).  
The use of local expertise, the wide range of stakeholder workshops held and the fact 
that the final drafting team consisted of solely Tanzanian actors suggest that the act in-
deed reflects a national perspective on how environmental management should be 
organised.263 There is no evidence that international assistance for the preparation and 
formulation of the law presupposed any concrete policy demands (Elliott-Teague 2011: 
854–855). Yet, donors were highly engaged in the process, strongly pushing for the de-
velopment of environmental legislation; it is questionable whether without their 
sponsoring of the review and drafting process, EMA would have been developed in this 
form and pace.  
A similar ‘pushing effect’ of external assistance was attained through the ‘Integrating 
Environment Programme’ related to the process of developing Tanzania’s National 
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty which is popularly known as MKUKU-
TA. Initiated in 2003, the aim of the programme was to make sure that the policy 
considers environment as a key component in poverty reduction efforts.  
The idea of ‘mainstreaming environment’ has internationally come up at around the turn 
of the millennium when a number of influential World Bank publications such as the 
Environment Strategy “Making Sustainable Commitments” (World Bank 2001) estab-
lished linkages between environment, poverty and growth, and made the claim that 
these needed to be better addressed in developing countries policies (see also World 
Bank 1996; Bojö & Reddy 2002; Dale 2005).264 The aid community broadly adopted 
                                                                                                                                                                          
life Management, was hired as natural resources expert. The foreign member of the ILFEMP 
team changed. Finally, the position was filled by an international consultant from Great Britain. 
263
  The final team preparing the EMA draft consisted of two members of the Faculty of Law at the 
University of Dar es Salaam, the acting Executive Director of the Lawyers’ Environmental Ac-
tion Team LEAT and the chief Parliamentary Draftsman in the Attorney General’s Office 
(Elliott-Teague 2007: 106). 
264
  The World Bank’s publication list on the environment-poverty nexus has become too vast to be 
reflected here. Amongst others, the Bank has issued a range of “Environment Strategy Notes” as 
well as an “Environment Matters” series with annual reviews all of which are accessible on its 
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this agenda, and UNDP together with UNEP launched a global ‘Poverty-Environment 
Initiative’ through which governments in developing countries should be assisted to 
include environmental objectives into national plans and budgets (Bass & Renard 2009). 
Tanzania was one of the pilot countries receiving financial and technical assistance for 
this purpose. The Vice President’s Office which was assigned to coordinate the main-
streaming efforts got a full-time advisor from the UK who played a central role by 
disseminating environmental information and analyses, keeping the process on track 
and assisting the MKUKUTA drafting team (Assey et al. 2007: 18).265 Donors’ tech-
nical leads provided input through their participation in the Environment Working 
Group which was established “to improve consensus amongst environmental stakehold-
ers” (Assey et al. 2007: 18), bringing together representatives from government, the 
private sector, civil society and aid organisations. Moreover, the programme funded a 
range of analyses which substantially informed the MKUKUTA document, such as a 
review of expenditures on environment (Vice President's Office 2004)  and the devel-
opment of indicators of poverty-environment linkages (Vice President's Office 2005) 
.
266
 Ultimately, the MKUKUTA entailed at least 15 environment-related targets (Rutasi-
tara et al. 2010: 12), ranging from ‘reduced land degradation and loss of biodiversity’ to 
‘improved access to clean and safe water’ and ‘reduction in harmful industrial and agri-
cultural effluents’ (United Republic of Tanzania 2005) . Progress in achieving these 
targets was to be measured against mostly quantitative indicators as specified in the 
MKUKUTA log-frame and monitoring master plan (United Republic of Tanzania 2005; 
Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment 2006) .  
UNDP/UNEP assistance continued during the implementation of MKUKUTA with a 
focus on reporting and generating statistics on environmental conditions (UNDP & 
 UNEP 2014). Through the Development Partners Group on Environment, experts from 
various agencies and embassies substantially contributed to developing the subsequent 
strategy MKUKUTA II for the period 2011–2015, as a UNDP environmental specialist 
in the Dar es Salaam office sketched out:      
At the point where you are doing sector reviews, partners are invited to provide their in-
put. At the point where they are harmonizing and they finalizing the final document, 
donors are also invited – the entire plan is presented to stakeholders and you input in it. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
website. In 2012, the Bank launched its new environment strategy for the next decade (2012–
2022) (World Bank 2012e).    
265
  The post of the „Poverty-Environment adviser” was filled by David Howlett, a DFID specialist 
on food and climate change policies who during 2002–2005 had been seconded to UNDP (Assey 
et al. 2007: v).  
266
  The report on the poverty-environment indicators was contracted to two UK-based and one Tan-
zanian institution, namely the Environmental Resources Management (ERM) London, the 
Institute of Resource Assessment (IRA) Dar es Salaam and Oxford Policy Management Limited 
(OPML) Oxford (Vice President's Office 2005: v) . The public expenditure review was contract-
ed to NORPLAN Tanzania Branch, a consulting company linked to the Norwegian firm 
Multiconsult (Vice President's Office 2004: ix) .  
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So we are mainly involved and we provide the input. And sometimes they may ask for 
even writing, so you provide that writing. (Interview 41)  
Concrete ‘input’ was provided, for example, in the form of comments on priority results 
areas which strongly proposed including climate change and sustainability aspects into 
operational targets (DPG 2010). In the final document, various references are found to 
these matters. One strategy to reduce income poverty (goal 2), for instance, foresees 
“integrating, harmonizing and coordinating environmentally sustainable policies and 
strategies for growth in key growth sectors, including climate change adaptation and 
mitigation” (United Republic of Tanzania 2010: 42).  
Tanzania’s ‘environmental mainstreaming’ work has been widely praised as a success 
and has been promoted as a ‘best practice’ case in various reports (see, for instance, 
Assey et al. 2007 and Dalal-Clayton et al. 2009). All in all, Tanzania’s environmental 
policies, legislation and programmes are regarded as “very advanced” (Interview 36) by 
the international community. 
A Look Beyond Intentions and Official Narratives  
Looking at government action related to environmental management as opposed to in-
tentions, however, reveals a picture which starkly contradicts the success story told 
about Tanzania in aid publications. A review assessing the progress made during 
MKUKUTA I found persistent problems “relating mainly to knowledge gaps and 
change in mind-set on the importance of environment. Lack of accurate data, capacity 
limitations in terms of requisite professional skills to suit the different sector situations 
as well as financial resources still remain major setbacks” (Rutasitara et al. 2010: v). 
Several interviewees from donor organisations pointed to an appalling discrepancy policy 
statements and (perceived) government action; some bluntly conceded that this diver-
gence may partly derive from their organisations’ interference in environmental 
governance. A natural resources specialist in the Finnish Embassy was outspoken about 
the obviously divergent agendas of local and external players:   
Many of the policies and legislations that exist have been pushed by development part-
ners. And the government has put a minimum of interest on that because they have 
another kind of agenda and another kind of economy where they work. (Interview 36) 
For officials concerned with environmental issues in ministries and parastatal bodies, 
the lack of interest and support on part of the government manifests in deficient re-
sources allocated for environmental interventions. A senior officer working at the 
National Environment Management Council stated:  
The integration of environment in most of the development plans is there. But in the 
budgetary process, that’s not happening. It is just in the documents, but we don’t see real-
ly the commitment. (…) So that’s the problem. It is acknowledged that environment is 
very important for the poverty reduction efforts, but whenever it comes to the resource al-
location, it is not one of the priority sectors. (Interview 59)  
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A retired director who had led the Forestry and Beekeeping Division in the Ministry of 
Natural Resources summarised his experience as follows:   
The government has so many other priorities. Environment, forestry is not among the pri-
orities. The priority here it is agriculture, it is energy, it is education and water, 
infrastructure. So those are the sectors heavily covered by the government, but forestry is 
not among them. So, you see, you get more money from donors, from workshops, consul-
tancies. You analyse the situation through the consultant, you get the reports – but you 
can’t put those reports into action, simply you don’t have that ability. So that is the differ-
ence. (Interview 58)  
Given financial constraints and insufficient staffing levels in public entities, environ-
mental policies and legislation are hardly put into practice. A case in point in this regard 
is the Environmental Management Act.  
The Environmental Management Act: “Great”, But “Ineffective” 
The Environmental Management Act – according to a World Bank employee a “great 
act” which “is fantastic” – has become operational in 2005. Yet, the progress in imple-
menting institutional reforms prescribed by the act is slow. By 2007, only few ministries 
had established environmental sections as required, and none had prepared environmen-
tal action plans (Government of Tanzania & Danida 2007: 58). Compliance with the 
environmental impact assessment system, a central component of the act, remains poor, 
which partly derives from a low awareness of regulatory requirements among local gov-
ernment bodies and the fact that violations are rarely penalised (Sosovele 2011).267 
Public authorities seem unable to fulfil the functions assigned to them by the environ-
mental law, given the lack of a “clear and proper mandate to institutions and personnel 
with autonomous positions” (Pallangyo 2011: 517) as well as insufficient human and 
financial resources. A NEMC officer told us:  
Our institution, it has the mandate to oversee that the act is being enforced (…). But if we 
don’t have the funds to actually implement it on the ground, then really you find that we 
have a problem. Because I think there was the expectation that the government would 
                                                          
267
  According to EMA, public and private investors are obliged to commission an analysis of poten-
tial environmental effects in the process of planning development projects. Only registered 
experts are authorised to conduct such environmental impact assessments (EIAs), and the Na-
tional Environment Management Council is mandated to review and oversee compliance with 
the EIA requirements. While the legislation for this system is in place, it is not yet working in 
practice. A recent study found that “even the central government was implementing construction 
projects that fell under mandatory EIA list, without subjecting them to the EIA process” (So-
sovele 2011: 129). Amongst these projects were the headquarters of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism, the headquarters of the President’s Office – Public Service Manage-
ment, as well as the headquarters of the Prison Departments. The author of the study found a low 
degree of awareness of the EIA requirements among decision makers in Dar es Salaam munici-
palities, stating that “up to 40% of those interviewed admitted to have no basic knowledge of the 
act and EIA regulations” (Sosovele 2011: 129).    
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provide support in terms of implementation of the act, but that is not the case. (Inter-
view 59)  
In order to boost the execution of the new legislation, the Vice President’s Office in 
2006 proposed an ‘Environmental Management Act Implementation Support Pro-
gramme’, in short EMA-ISP. The idea of the programme was to establish a basket fund 
which would increase financial resources. The anticipated ‘medium-term outcome’ of 
the programme was to create an “enabling framework for EMA implementation – i.e. 
through policy harmonisation, planning, environmental assessments, enforcement, re-
porting, and awareness creation – (…) that significantly improves environmental 
management in Tanzania” (Government of Tanzania & Danida 2007: 54). In light of the 
broad assistance received from technical and financing agencies for the development of 
EMA, decision makers in the Vice President’s Office anticipated various ‘partners’ to 
sponsor the programme.  
The interest on donor side, however, was unexpectedly low. It was only Denmark who 
joined in 2007, pledging assistance in the amount of 35 million Danish kroner (around 
US$ 6 million at that time) over a period of five years and thereby covering 15% of the 
estimated programme costs; in 2011, Canada came on board, with a contribution of US$ 
2,75 million approved until 2013. A retired high-ranking official who had initiated the 
programme in the Vice President’s Office surmised shifting agendas of donor govern-
ments as major reason for the meagre support:  
In the development of the programme, we had all the donors together and the Canadians 
were looking at it. The Embassy here was for it, they had to convince their bosses in the 
centre in Canada; and that depends on the politics in the centre, and depends on which 
priorities they have. Sometimes priorities change, sometimes an initiative begins well – 
and then there are things called elections (…). You have a change of government and this 
change of government comes with different policies saying now we are getting out of en-
vironment, now I think we are looking at gender, you know. Those kinds of things can 
actually happen. (Interview 66)  
At the time of our interviews, frustration was high on all sides – while government offi-
cials were disappointed about the lack of funding, donor staff at Danida despaired about 
poor progress. A mid-term review conducted in 2010 recommended to ‘refocus’ Danish 
support in order to achieve visible results until the end of the programme:  
Given the lack of success in establishing a functioning basket fund for support to EMA-
ISP, the slow pace of implementation of on-going activities, the rapid development in 
some sectors (i.e.: the increased focus on agricultural productivity) and possible new 
needs in these sectors as a result, the ASR [Annual Sector Review] team strongly recom-
mends a “refocusing” exercise. The ASR finds is [sic] urgent to look for the most 
appropriate modality to ensure that there will be documented results/ outcomes in the last 
three years of Danida’s support to EMA implementation. (Danida et al. 2010: 9) 
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Notably, government and donor actors concerned with EMA-ISP stated different root 
causes of the strained situation. While an official at NEMC underlined the lack of finan-
cial resources as the major obstacle in implementing the act and the programme, the 
Danida officer in charge pointed out the lack of capacity in the Tanzanian counterpart 
institutions. Her narrative on the problem is cited at length, since it entails a number of 
implications which are discussed below the quotation:  
Interviewee: Things have not been smoothly, because the capacity is very weak there. We 
did a capacity assessment for the Vice President’s Office and NEMC. The report just said 
their staff is overstretched, they need a support, technical support. And still they couldn’t 
accept that.   
Interviewer: In which field of knowledge do they have the greatest needs where you 
would say that should be something that has to come from outside?   
Interviewee: We are not there to monitor day-to-day activities because that would be mi-
cro managing from the mission point of view. We are assessing the type of reports we 
receive, the quarterly reports, the annual reports, the work plans and budgets that we get. 
If you submit to us your annual work plan and we review it three or four times – what 
would your judgement be? There is a problem here. Because here is an individual coordi-
nating for ten ministries to prepare everything – and you get various different reports with 
a different format, though they have a standard format.  
Then you look at the type of activities people are planning to implement – at times they 
are out of scope. Then you look at the person that is coordinating the programme, you 
look at his work, at his knowledge, and the skills and the capacity, is he a team leader? A 
real team leader, because a team leader has to be flexible and tolerant. How is he coordi-
nating the crew? How are the people that he is coordinating responding to the issues that 
he is raising? Those are the things that we look at in general. And we find that maybe 
they need someone else to assist. And then, as the time goes, he’s trying to pull back and 
assist them to have that ownership. So you feel also the ownership is not there, you just 
get the ownership when they want the disbursement of funds.   
And now at the coming in of Canadian CIDA, the review team felt that no, the pro-
gramme is suffering. There is very slow implementation; we get very low quality reports. 
And so we feel there is need for someone to come in and assist you in various areas. Es-
pecially they didn’t have a standard monitoring and evaluation system. If someone could 
come in and help them with that, maybe things would move. (Interview 33)   
In her statement, the Danida programme officer indicates some important aspects per-
taining the understanding of ‘capacity’ and the nature of bureaucracy on donor side. The 
fact that the capacity of government bodies is assessed on the basis of reporting, plan-
ning and management performance implies a strong technical perspective on public 
administration. The problematic framing of incongruent reporting formats and the miss-
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ing monitoring and evaluation system confirms this notion.268 Adopting such a technical 
view, it logically follows that if someone helped to settle administrative deficiencies, 
‘things would move’. Consequently, the mid-term review urged the Danish Embassy to 
draw on the expertise of an international technical assistant, suggesting to contract a 
“process consultant, expert in results-based programming (…) with immediate effect” 
(Danida et al. 2010: 7, italics in original).  
This kind of argumentation implies that the main reason for the poor implementation of 
the programme is insufficient administrative capacity. What it seems to ignore, howev-
er, is the political nature of the issues at stake. Given that environmental management is 
handled as a cross-cutting issue involving various ministries which often pursue con-
flicting objectives (e.g., an increase in agricultural production or industrial investment 
vs. environment conservation), it is obvious that institutional reforms entail difficult 
negotiation processes. The constant delays in planning and approval procedures and the 
absence of key actors in decision-making meetings support can be seen as an indication 
for a low priority of the EMA implementation on the Tanzanian agenda, or simply as a 
sign for the complexity of cross-sectoral governance.  
Through the technical lens of aid providers, however, such political intricacies seem to 
be blanked out. Danida’s and CIDA’s joint response to the lack of progress was to 
strongly push for an advisor to be embedded in the Vice President’s Office who should 
drive forth the process and ‘assist them to have that ownership’. The negotiations about 
technical assistance turned out tediously, given that VPO officers in charge didn’t see a 
need for external support. Danida’s programme manager described the situation as fol-
lows:  
The Vice President’s Office – in principle, they don’t want advisors. They feel that they 
have the capacity to implement activities on their own. And later on, they said ‘No, we 
don’t want an international advisor, we want a local advisor. But still, if you want to bring 
in an advisor, the funds to support the advisor’s role should not come from the pro-
gramme. You should outsource somewhere, but not use the same funds (…).’  
And so they have accepted now to have an advisor, but not long term, they want a short 
term advisor. We have just received the draft terms of reference. We are now in the pro-
cess of reviewing and seeing how we can bring in an advisor, because we would like the 
advisor to start in July. (Interview 33)  
Donors seemed not very happy with this arrangement, which might also be resulting 
from the experience that the ‘contextual analysis’ delivered by a short-term advisor in 
the inception phase of the programme passed unheeded:  
                                                          
268
  It is somehow noticeable that the interviewee mentioned the incongruence of formats as a prob-
lematic issue, but didn’t refer to the content of the reports submitted, i.e. what they tell or should 
tell the readers. 
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After the advisor left, the report was kept on the shelf, it was never revised. And so you 
find now, the start of the programme had a lot of challenges. From the beginning, they did 
not want to have a technical advisor. So for that case, the programme has also been af-
fected by not having a technical advisor to assist them, also how the report should look 
like. (Interview 33)   
In 2014, Danida and CIDA funding for EMA-ISP was about to be phased out. At the 
time of writing, there was no final report publicly accessible which assessed the impact 
of technical assistance and the progress of the programme until external support ended. 
In light of the extensive donor engagement in the development of the Environmental 
Management Act and its international promotion when it was adopted, it is remarkable 
that the aid community’s interest in the actual implementation of the act seems to have 
faded away. In line with the changing global agenda, the focus of donors in Dar es Sa-
laam appears to have shifted towards a new prime topic on the rise, namely climate 
change mitigation and the related REDD+ process. Once again, Tanzania is among the 
pilot countries in which the feasibility of a new international approach is tested.     
The Emergence of REDD+ and the Spread of Related Aid Programmes in Tanzania    
REDD+ is the commonly used term for an envisaged global mechanism channelling 
payments to developing countries which effectively contribute to climate change mitiga-
tion: While REDD stands for ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation’, the plus indicates that aside from a reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sions, conservation, the sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks are considered as rewarding mitigation efforts.   
REDD+ has evolved in the course of various high-level meetings related to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the role of for-
ests as greenhouse gas reservoirs has for long been recognised, halting and reversing 
forest loss as an approach of the global climate change regime was formalised in the 
Bali Road Map agreed by the thirteenth Conference of the Parties in 2007 (UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties 2008).269 Although details of REDD+ continue to be negotiat-
ed and a financing mechanism is not yet in place, the concept has been taken up by the 
aid community which promptly designed a range of programmes in order to ‘prepare’ 
the potential beneficiaries.   
Norway was at the forefront of donor countries incorporating REDD in its development 
work through the ‘International Climate and Forest Initiative’ which the government 
established in 2008. According to the environment counsellor in the Norwegian Embas-
sy in Dar es Salaam, Norway had a great interest in getting Tanzania to participate:  
                                                          
269
  Already the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 referred to the “promotion of sustainable forest management 
practices, afforestation and reforestation” (United Nations (1997), Article 2) as a measure to 
achieve quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments.  
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Tanzania was already chosen as one of the countries that we wanted to try this out. And 
why Tanzania was chosen was because we wanted to have African countries and also 
wanted to have countries with dry forests. So Congo Basin is part of this initiative, but al-
so then Tanzania and Zambia. It was in the beginning three countries on each continent. 
So very early the Embassy here, the ambassador started dialogue with the government in 
this country to see if there was an interest. And it was. (Interview 39)  
In April 2008, the governments of Norway and Tanzania signed a letter of intent on 
climate change collaboration for which Norway pledged 500 million Norwegian Kroner 
(equivalent to US$ 83 million at that time) over a period of five years, with the money 
being destined for policy development, pilot projects, and research related to REDD+. 
Shortly after, Tanzania was also selected to join the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Part-
nership Facility through which financial and technical assistance is channelled to 
countries preparing for REDD+. In 2009, the United Nations came in with the UN-
REDD programme, a collaborative partnership of FAO, UNDP and UNEP launched 
with the objective “to assist developing countries to build capacity to reduce emissions 
and to participate in a future REDD+ mechanism” (UN-REDD Programme 2011: 1). 
Other REDD+ related aid projects which started at around the same time included Fin-
land’s support to the first comprehensive forest inventory in Tanzania, the so-called 
National Forest Monitoring and Assessment, and the Clinton Foundation’s Clinton Cli-
mate Initiative with a focus on the development of social and environmental standards 
for the implementation of REDD+ activities. In sum, donor commitments for REDD+ 
efforts in the period 2009–2012 amounted to US$ 93,5 million (Kaijage & Kuhanwa 
2013: 8).  
The generous supply of assistance fostering REDD+ processes in Tanzania can be ex-
plained by the fact that the country serves as an ideal field of experimentation for this 
new approach: With 35,3 million hectares, the country is endowed with vast forest re-
sources which cover almost 40% of the mainland area (United Republic of Tanzania 
2012d: 5). Given an annual deforestation rate of 1,16%, forests are at a high risk (FAO 
2010a). Aside from the ‘appropriate’ natural conditions which make Tanzania predes-
tined for the new international approach, the preceding involvement of various donors 
in the country’s forestry sector might have been a factor boosting the prominence of 
Tanzania as a forerunner of the REDD+ regime.  
External Influences on Forest Governance in Tanzania  
The history of foreign engagement in Tanzania’s forestry sector dates back to the early 
1970s. Given that forestry and related industries played an important role for their own 
economies at that time, Scandinavian countries which favoured Nyerere’s socialist vi-
sion of ujamaa were among the first to provide assistance by first sending experts and 
later on channelling money to Tanzania’s forestry administration, research and training 
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institutes.270 Until the 1990s, their support focused on the expansion of village forestry 
and the commercialisation of forest plantation and logging activities, emphasising the 
potential of forestry for economic development. With the rise of ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ on the international agenda, donors such as Sweden and Finland reframed their 
aid towards environmental aspects of forestry. At the programmatic level, this meant 
that support to state-led forest industries was gradually phased out, being replaced by 
initiatives promoting community-based approaches and privatisation, and their incorpo-
ration into policies and law. In the course of this paradigm shift, ‘Participatory Forest 
Management’ evolved as the favourite theme of forestry-related aid in Tanzania.  
The notion Participatory Forest Management or PFM in short subsumes a range of dif-
ferent concepts and arrangements varying from country to country.271 The basic idea of 
the approach is that local communities should be involved in the management and utili-
sation of natural forests and woodland, which in Tanzania, as in many other states, has 
historically been an exclusive governance domain of the central government. During the 
1990s, various donors including Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, UNDP 
and the World Bank started to pilot participatory management through a range of pro-
jects in different districts, while at the same time advocating and providing support for a 
comprehensive reform of policies and legislation.272 In 1998, the old forest policy which 
had been carried over from colonial rule was revised and a new version approved (Unit-
ed Republic of Tanzania 1998); this was followed by a new Forest Act passed by 
Parliament in 2002 (United Republic of Tanzania 2002). Together, the new policy and 
legal framework meant a substantial change in forest governance in that it decentralised 
authority and formally allowed communities to own and (co-) manage forests under a 
set of arrangements; the act notably encourages private sector involvement, and em-
braces the principle of subsidiarity, stating that the responsibility of forest management 
should be delegated to the lowest possible level. The reforms were widely praised by 
the donor community which lauded Tanzania for having “one of the most advanced 
community forestry jurisdictions in Africa as reflected in policy, law and practice” 
(Blomley & Ramadhani 2006: 94).  
In the years following the policy change, Participatory Forest Management spread from 
a couple of pilot sites to being implemented in various districts across Tanzania. By 
                                                          
270
  By 1972, ten Swedish forestry experts to Tanzania worked for the government’s Forest Division 
and the Tanzania Wood Industries Corporation (TWICO) paid by Sida; in the mid-1970s, Swe-
den accounted for almost 90% of the Forestry and Beekeeping Division’s and TWICO’s 
combined budget (Katila et al. 2003: 1/15).  
271
  In the understanding of the FAO, “participatory forestry refers to processes and mechanisms 
which enable people with a direct stake in forest resources to be part of decision-making in all 
aspects of forest management, including policy formulation processes” (FAO 2012).  
272
  In 2006, the Forestry and Beekeeping Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tour-
ism counted twenty-two initiatives which supported the roll-out of PFM on Tanzania mainland, 
of which fifteen were carried out by bi- and multilateral agencies, five by international NGOs 
and two by national conservation groups (Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 2006). 
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2008, around 2,300 villages engaged in PFM under joint or community-based forest 
management arrangements covering almost 4 million hectares equivalent to 11% of the 
total forest land) (Blomley & Iddi 2009: 16).273 Research conducted in recent years 
found slight signs of improved forest conditions in PFM sites as reflected by increased 
basal areas and declined forest disturbance by human activities, and pointed to a few 
examples where villages began to see economic potential from forest management 
(Blomley & Ramadhani 2006; Blomley et al. 2008; Ngaga et al. 2014; Treue et al. 
2014). Yet, the same studies also document a wide range of constraints and problems 
which seem to overshadow the improvements gained, ranging from persisting exploita-
tion, illegal logging and elite capturing of benefits to massive governance shortfalls and 
pervasive corruption at all levels.  
Explanations for the widespread infraction of law which prohibits uncontrolled forest 
activities vary: Officials commenting on this issue referred to the lack of financial and 
human resources for controlling what’s happening on the ground. Donor staff, in con-
trast, expressed that the government has little incentives to enforce compliance with its 
own legislation, given the vested interests of individuals and collusive networks in for-
est activities. A counsellor in the Finnish Embassy commented in this regard:  
There are politicians who interfere in the affairs of the ministry all the time. And the only 
person that could make any changes is the Minister for Natural Resources, not the others 
because they are more or less administrating, they are technicians. And as much as they 
want to change the things – even the director of FBD [Forestry and Beekeeping Division] 
when he was there or the CEO of TFS [Tanzania Forest Services Agency] – as much as 
they want to change things, there are limits to that. Because you always have somebody, a 
politician coming there and asking for favours and make sure that this functions like this, 
and this, and this. (…) There are lots of people who are looking for their own good. So 
the policy, the legislation and programmes are very good in Tanzania, very advanced. But 
they cannot function properly because of political interference – they cannot, absolutely. 
(Interview 36)  
A donor-financed report authorised by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism 
in fact found evidence of “self-dealing, nepotism and cronyism involving timber trade” 
(Milledge et al. 2007: 11) permeating all government levels, as well as “high levels of 
collusion, organisation and protection between different government institutions and the 
private sector” (Milledge et al. 2007: 12); the authors of the study concluded that “cur-
rent policy, as set out in the formal laws and regulations governing the management of 
these resources, was systematically being manipulated by domestic and foreign private 
                                                          
273
  Under Joint Forest Management agreements, ownership remains with the government while 
communities co-manage a designated forest area and in turn get shared benefits and user rights.  
Under Community-Based Forest Management arrangements, “villagers take full ownership and 
management responsibility for an area of forest within their jurisdiction and declared by village 
and district government as a Village Forest Reserve” (Blomley & Ramadhani 2006: 94).  
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 263 
 
sector interests in concert with senior Tanzanian and foreign government officials” 
(Milledge et al. 2007: 2).  
The Outcomes of Aid to the Forestry Sector: Discontent and Frictions 
Having spent around US$ 30 million on rolling out PFM in Tanzania (Treue et al. 2014: 
25), donors were rather dissatisfied with the state of forest governance at the time of our 
research, and perceived the government as insufficiently committed to put any effort in 
changing the situation. A counsellor at the Finnish Embassy expressed the common 
discontent on donor side as follows:   
All the funding for the community based forest management has been coming from the 
development partners. The government has not funded it as such at all. So I mean it’s 
very clear that they have the policy and the legislation on this. But it’s a clear sign if there 
is no funding from the government for this type of activity – they don’t see it as a priority. 
(Interview 36)  
Budgetary figures do not confirm the claim that the government did not fund Participa-
tory Forest Management at all, but they do show a significant imbalance between local 
and external resources: During 2005–2008, the government allocated around US$ 16,8 
million for development programmes of the forestry sector, while donors provided more 
than twice as much, namely US$ 35,6 million which accounted for 68% of the total 
budget (Akida et al. 2012: 24).274  
Aside from the small financial contribution on government side, the slow progress in 
implementing activities seriously disgruntled staff in country offices and embassies un-
der pressure to deliver results and disburse appropriated funds. As indicated by the 
following statements, their explanations for the various deadlocks ranged from capacity 
constraints to disinterest and deliberate jamming on the part of their Tanzanian counter-
parts. With regard to the first of these obstacles, a Danida officer commented:  
At the PMO-RALG, it’s one officer responsible with forest activities. And it is not only 
one donor who is supporting participatory forest management. For instance, you have 
Finland, you have Denmark, you have the World Bank. It’s over 60 districts in the coun-
try implementing Participatory Forest Management. But in the sector coordination, you 
have one component leader. Can this one person manage three different donors with three 
different headquarter demands? Those are the challenges that you see in terms of capaci-
ty. (Interview 33)  
                                                          
274
  In the Tanzanian Five-Year Development Plan 2011–2016, the discrepancy between projected 
local and external resources is even wider, with the government being expected to provide US$ 1 
million (TSh 1 548 million) against US$ 8 million (TSh 13 131 million) from development part-
ners. According to the plan, the forestry sector would require an amount of TSh 71 563 million 
for the fiscal years 2011/12–2015/16; the open balance is to be covered by other sources such as 
the private sector whose contribution is not reflected in the figures (President's Office 2012: 81) . 
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Whilst acknowledging the additional burden donors put on already overstrained gov-
ernment units, the interviewee yet still complained about the lack of engagement as 
reflected by the absence of leading officials in environment working group meetings:  
You expect the people who should come to these technical meetings are directors, but 
they send in junior officers who are not decision makers or policymakers. Then you have 
the steering committees, where you expect the permanent secretaries will be there for you 
to discuss the policy implementation. Then they bring in junior officers, not directors. But 
this is the meeting where decisions have to be made. So there is also that weakness in not 
understanding the significance of the programme in that particular organisation. That is 
what you also see. (Interview 33)  
From donor experience, the only way to get their counterparts in government engaged is 
to provide tangible incentives in the form of individual payments to those attending the 
meetings and events. This practice, however, seems to have got out of control, resulting 
in a situation where the pace of programmes has become solely dependent on the extra 
amounts paid. Yet, it proves difficult for donors to abolish the incentive system they 
have created, as the Danida officer spelled out:  
We have reached a point where developing partners say ‘no, we will not give you top up 
allowances, we’re not giving you seating allowances, we’re not giving you honorarium. 
Now, here’s a project that does not support that.’ But this is an officer who is not only re-
sponsible for this project; he also has to look at this project. Now this project pays more. 
Do you expect him to assist you in this? He is paid less. But there is a five days meeting 
where he will be paid 400 thousand in the end of the week. Where will he go? (Inter-
view 33)  
The sentiment that the ‘per diem’ culture seriously affected programmes in the forestry 
sector in a detrimental way was not only expressed by the Danida officer. Her colleague 
in the Finnish Embassy also raised the issue reporting about the support for Tanzania’s 
National Forest Programme which had been developed with Finnish assistance a decade 
ago. In order to boost its implementation, Finland set up a project which was supposed 
to run from 2009 to 2011 and included a grant of € 6 million to be channelled through 
the MNRT. By 2012, however, only € 3 million were used, with the result that the pro-
ject was extended until 2014. Commenting on the disbursement difficulties and the poor 
financial management on the part of her counterparts, the counsellor in the Finnish Em-
bassy stated:  
With the Ministry of Natural Resources, it’s not very easy to have a good relationship be-
cause things are not moving. (…) And there are reasons for that. And I can only guess 
because I am not in the ministry. But for me, it’s very much a deliberate thing. I mean 
people – it’s not rocket science. They could make those systems work. They know how to 
work them. But there is a lot of mismanagement of funds. Funds are directed to different 
directions where they shouldn’t go. And then I also think it’s deliberate that they were on-
ly able to use half of the money that we were giving them for two years – they used it in 
three and a half years. And you know, somehow in my mind the idea is that if it lasts for 
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six, seven years, it’s easier to get more daily allowances, all these per diems, discussion 
workshops organized and so on. So it kind of dilutes the whole thing. (Interview 36)  
The in-transparent use of funds in the context of the National Forest Programme had 
been attested by a review conducted in 2010 which found that documentations for train-
ing sessions, workshops and meetings were missing, funds had not been audited and 
procurement procedures had not been followed (Karani 2010: 14–15). Given the on-
going problems with regard to the financial management of MNRT and PMO-RALG, 
the Finnish Embassy finally decided to re-allocate the remaining project resources to-
wards service providers and private sector companies in the forestry sector, arguing 
that:  
This is the only way to support something that works instead of continuing this very con-
frontational relationship with them [the ministries]. (…) It doesn’t take us anywhere if we 
just continue doing audits. I mean, it’s difficult to give them money and see all the time 
that the audit reports are bad and their financial management is not in place and so on. So 
we try to find those alternatives where can we work. (Interview 36)  
Finland was not the only donor which withdrew funding from the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Tourism due to concerns of financial accountability and deficient pro-
gress. The World Bank made a similar experience with its Forest Conservation and 
Management Project starting in 2002 with the objectives to scale up participatory forest 
management, to get an endowment fund in place and to improve service delivery by 
establishing the Tanzanian Forest Services Agency, amongst others. With the MNRT as 
‘implementing agency’ on government side, the World Bank disbursed almost US$ 35 
million until the project ended in 2009. The ‘Implementation Completion and Results 
Report’ rated outcomes as ‘moderately unsatisfactory’, indicating significant shortcom-
ings in the operation’s achievement of objectives (World Bank 2010c). Asked for the 
Bank’s reaction to the negative assessment, the senior environmental specialist in the 
Dar es Salaam country office commented:    
Well, I can tell you with regards to that, we stopped financing MNRT. I mean right now 
there are no programmes or whatsoever with MNRT through the World Bank. So I think 
for a variety of reasons, because they weren’t able to deliver, because there were all kinds 
of corruption problems, I mean there was serious mismanagement of funds and – walk 
down the street and you’ll hear the same answer. (Interview 46)  
Given that most aid agencies and embassies suspended funding or terminated coopera-
tion with MNRT in the aftermath of corruption cases and allegations, the ministry faced 
a serious crisis at the time of research. The withdrawal of external assistance substan-
tially weakened the MNRT not only in financial terms, but also with regard to its 
political influence in the evolving REDD+ regime.  
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The Changing Nature of Aid to the Forestry Sector Under the REDD+ Regime 
The aid community’s turning away from ministries towards other players in the forestry 
sector, notably NGOs, the private industry and academia, had significant implications 
on both the direction of resource flows and the power relations in the context of the 
REDD+. Norway as the most instrumental donor driving forth the process determined 
not to channel any funds of its REDD portfolio through the government, justifying the 
decision with the at that time still open case on the misuse of aid money in its previous 
natural resources support programme.275 Instead, the available resources were trans-
ferred directly to NGOs implementing pilot projects, universities carrying out research 
and the secretariat of the National REDD+ Task Force. That the latter was established at 
the Institute of Resource Assessment of the University of Dar es Salaam and not in one 
of the key ministries assigned with the political authority to deal with climate change 
and forestry, i.e. the VPO-DoE and the MNRT, was to a significant extent the result of 
Norway’s objection against placing this central institution in one of the government 
bodies. Commenting on this arrangement, the counsellor in the Norwegian Embassy 
stated:  
Interviewee: This current process, of course, is part of government responsibility. But in-
stead of having the secretariat within any of the ministries, it’s at the university. So that is 
also kind of giving the authorities support without channelling funds directly to the minis-
try.  
Interviewer: Is this a unique case due to this corruption case?         
Interviewee: Yes, as far as I know from the Norwegian side, it is, this kind of set up. Be-
cause usually they work much closer with the relevant sector ministry.             
Interviewer: And does that harm your processes?  
Interviewee: Of course some will think that we have a closer cooperation when the mon-
ey is following the dialogue, so it might be. I mean, we know that the Ministry of Natural 
Resources very much would like also to have funds, of course. I also know that in some 
meetings, the ministry has not met. I should not say that they are boycotting, but al-
most…that’s suspicion. That might be because of this arrangement, but also I think it’s 
mainly because it’s an on-going competition between the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and VPO about who should be in charge. It’s forestry and climate change. Forestry, it’s 
                                                          
275
  From 1994–2006, Norway financed the so-called ‘Management of Natural Resources Pro-
gramme’ in Tanzania, spending around US$ 60 million, about US$ 5 million per year. After 
twelve years of support, a final evaluation raised doubts about the use of funds; subsequent audit 
reports of a Danish consultancy firm found evidence for massive mismanagement and corrupt 
practices, such as (double) payments of per diems and allowances for workshops which didn’t 
take place as indicated, the coverage of undocumented travel expenses, and the purchase of over-
priced or non-existent goods and services, amongst others (Jansen 2009: 14). As a consequence, 
Norway stopped funding to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism which was responsi-
ble for the programme.  
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within MNRT, climate change in VPO. So they are competing all the time. And for that 
reason, actually it is nice to have a body outside both of them. I think several times that it 
is not so bad, it’s a solution. Actually it might be very good. And also, now having this 
direct support to NGOs has secured the kind of bottom up process for the development of 
the REDD strategy. We feel that now the NGOs also have strong voice into the process. 
(Interview 39)  
In fact, NGOs such as the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group were strongly bolstered 
up by the piloting role given to them by the aid community; through implementing pro-
jects on the ground, they have gained sufficient strategic power to substantially 
influence REDD+ processes at both the local and national levels (Manyika et al. 2013: 
76). Already in the early phases of REDD+, it has become evident that their policy pref-
erences are not necessarily congruent with those of the government-focused task 
force.276 Given the vested interests of local actors seeking to profit from future forest 
carbon trading and the external influence of foreign financers, one can assume that 
“both strategic behaviour and power struggles may lead to political legitimacy concerns 
and subsequently affect the effectiveness of the chosen governance structures” 
(Manyika et al. 2013: 77). The fact that despite a long, consultative process, Tanzania’s 
REDD+ strategy approved in 2013 did not clarify “many unresolved and thorny issues 
such as legal gaps, tree/carbon tenure, benefit sharing and financial mechanisms” (Nor-
deco & Arcacia 2013: v) can be seen as another indication for struggles behind the 
stage.   
All in all, it seems that the REDD+ process in Tanzania is heavily driven and orches-
trated by the aid community which during 2009–2012 accounted for 95% of the funding 
for related activities (Kaijage & Kuhanwa 2013: 14). Donor-financed expert engage-
ment ranged from delivering studies and providing administrative support to preparing 
strategies and commenting on drafts. Given the extensive involvement of external actors 
in both financial and technical terms and the small contribution from government side, it 
appears as if preparing Tanzania for the REDD+ regime was primarily a concern of the 
developed countries – the potential buyers of carbon credits – rather than a national re-
quest. Commenting on this argument, a counsellor in the Norwegian Embassy 
responded:  
Both yes and no. Because of course, for the case Tanzania, they really have realised that 
they need to protect forests. And also, Norway has supported through this old, corrupted 
programme – protecting forest as a catchment area and so on has been a major part of it. 
So it is not just that we’re coming down with an issue that they were not interested, that 
was not part of the priority of the country. (Interview 39)  
                                                          
276
  This is drawn from Manyika et al. (2013: 76) who found that governance structures proposed by 
NGOs “contradict what has been proposed at national led REDD+ governance process”. Accord-
ing to the authors, the case studies analysed reflect that “pilot projects envisage selling Carbon 
credits directly to the international markets, and thus propose establishment of their own lo-
cal/project level Carbon credit marketing strategy, which does not necessarily link with the 
NRTF [National REDD+ Trust Fund] proposed at national level”.   
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Considering that Tanzania would potentially benefit from a future carbon trading mar-
ket under the REDD+ regime, it is certainly true that the government was interested in 
getting engaged with donors on that matter. A retired official from the Forestry and 
Beekeeping Division delineated decision makers’ stance as follows:  
Donors are part and parcel of the REDD development process, globally and nationally. 
(…) REDD is not a one-sided business. We are talking of selling carbon and where are 
the markets for carbon? They are not in Tanzania; if they were in Tanzania, they would 
be very limited. So much of it will be a global market and at a particular point in time, 
we’ll need to negotiate with those. (Interview 58)  
Whether aside from the prospect of additional financing, the Tanzanian government 
sees the overall objective of REDD+, i.e. mitigating climate change by reducing emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation, as a national priority, is another 
question; a high-ranking director in the VPO-DoE gave a very clear answer in this re-
gard:  
For us, for the government, our priority is on poverty reduction. But donors maybe want 
to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions by implementing some projects here. They will 
say, ‘why don’t you say climate change?’ But they’re not giving us a room to say what 
the priority issue is. Although they may say: ‘You guys, you don’t see people are affected 
by draught and you are facing a lot of floods in some parts, why don’t you consider cli-
mate change as a priority issue.’ That’s an imposed priority issue! It’s not an intrinsic 
priority issue. A genuine priority issue in our country, a genuine one is the one which is 
thought to come from the government. And that’s why I was saying: For the government, 
poverty reduction is a priority issue and the means to reduce poverty or to ensure food se-
curity and nutrition. If it involves climate change, fine, then let’s address climate change. 
(Interview 67)  
“Tell Me What You Have Money For, and I’ll Tell You What My Priorities Are”  
As the narrative quoted above indicates, the evolvement of REDD+ put Tanzania under 
significant pressure to adjust its policies to the new paradigm, i.e. to reframe forest 
management as a matter of climate change mitigation. That aid is used by the interna-
tional community to leverage such policy shifts is evident in respective changes of the 
funding portfolio. A Tanzanian environmental specialist at NEMC reported on the cur-
rent situation:  
Every donor now is running with climate change. Even now here in Tanzania there are 
other things, we have a lot of problems here – like the desertification, we have land deg-
radation, we have a lot of erosion, but that ones are not receiving attention. (…) It’s 
climate change now on top of the agenda, even if you go to the UN organizations, what is 
being supported is climate change now. It’s the order of the day. (Interview 59)  
In response to the ever-shifting aid agenda, Tanzanian decision makers concerned with 
environment and natural resources appear to have adopted what could be called a ‘cha-
meleon’ strategy, strategically framing their priorities according to the respective donor 
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preferences in order to access money. A director in the VPO-DoE commented on this as 
follows:  
You see, donors have their own political propagandas. If you can come up with a strong 
statement that climate change is a priority issue – for them, it is an advantage that now 
they can give you a lot of money. Maybe you can use that to address poverty – where in 
principle they won’t be happy, if you direct the big share to address poverty issues, be-
cause if you talk of poverty issues, it has its own parameters which may not tally with the 
climate change parameters. 
While at the surface, it may seem as if the government does not set clear priorities, vari-
ous narratives of government officials indicate that out of strategic reasons those are not 
openly communicated towards the aid community. The tactical manoeuvring of decision 
makers seems to have evolved from their experience that national requests are neglected 
by donors pursuing their own agenda, as a previous director of the Forestry and Bee-
keeping Division pointed out:  
They come with already predetermined activities to be done – we can support this, we can 
support this, regardless of its impact on whatever you want to achieve on the ground. (…) 
On the issue of climate change, we said like in Dar es Salam here, it is the question of ac-
cess to affordable energy. They made a study here in Dar es Salam to be able to network 
the use of natural gas which we already have here. Five years ago, they would have need-
ed US$ 35 million to be able to do that. And if they had connected maybe 70% of the 
households here in Dar es Salam, our demand for charcoal would have gone significantly 
down. But who is giving that money? You go to the government which says oh, we don’t 
have that, sorry, our budget, we have so many issues to respond to. You go to the donors 
who say: ‘Ah no, this is not my priority or I don’t have that money.’ (…) They may have 
the money but if that money does not fit into their programme of work which has been al-
ready agreed through the parliament and the other decision-making machinery – to 
change it, it’s not so easy. (Interview 58)  
Learning from the recurrent neglect of their actual demands, decision makers in Tanza-
nia’s environmental authorities seem to have adopted a stance of ‘take what you can 
get’ which is clearly recognised by staff in country offices and embassies; an interview-
ee in the Norwegian Embassy resignedly stated:  
I think here you can ask them for anything. Are you interested in? And they will say yes. 
(Interview 39)  
The environmental specialist in the World Bank’s Dar es Salaam office even put this 
notion more bluntly:  
If you ask here, give me what your priorities are, they say ‘well, you tell me what you 
have money for and I’ll tell you what my priorities are.’ (Interview 46)  
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Conclusion 
As the detailed description of previous and current policy processes has shown, aid has 
been an essential driver of environmental policymaking in Tanzania: The majority of 
environmental policies and laws have been stipulated and financed by the donor com-
munity whose experts were substantially involved in the development of the same. 
While the immense external engagement helped to shift the issue on the country’s polit-
ical agenda, it seems to have narrowed down decision makers’ autonomy in the policy 
space, with aid providers using their relevance as financiers to push priorities in line 
with their own portfolios; a professor at the University of Dar es Salaam commented in 
this regard:   
On the forest management part, you see in some areas the forests are being well managed, 
so I wouldn’t totally say that the support that is given from the foreign countries is use-
less. But I think the only thing is that we would wish to see that, okay, you give 
resources, but you allow for the locals or rather the nation to set priorities – what they 
think is a priority; even within the forest sector, how one would like to be supported, for 
example. There should be a leeway for the respective nations to dictate on what needs to 
be done. (Interview 69)  
Experiencing that their agenda-setting authority is constrained by the dominance of for-
eign funders, Tanzanian decision makers seem to have adopted a strategic stance 
towards dealing with donors; the alignment of priorities to the prevailing aid agenda 
enables them to secure resources which are direly needed in the underfunded sector. 
What then happens on the ground is another story. The appalling gap between policies 
and implementation may thus be seen not only as a result of deficient capacity and 
budget constraints (as it is usually explained and certainly true to some extent) but also 
one of tactical manoeuvring on the part of recipients who thereby aim to preserve dis-
cretionary while being dependent on aid. 
6.2.6 South Africa: Environment 
Sectorial Context 
While occupying only 2% of the earth’s land surface, South Africa is one of the world’s 
richest countries in terms of natural habitat, being home to 10% of the planet’s plant 
species and 7% of all reptile, bird and mammal species (Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism 2009a: ii). Exceptional high levels of biodiversity can be found in 
three hotspots: the Succulent Karoo, the Maputaland-Pondoland-Albany hotspot, and 
the Cape Floristic Region. The latter is unique insofar as it is the only floral kingdom 
world-wide that falls entirely within the borders of a single country (Conservation Inter-
national 2013).  
Yet, Red List assessments indicate alarming figures: Around 20% of freshwater fish and 
mammals and 15% of birds face a high risk becoming extinct in the near future. 2 500 
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(12% of all) domestic plant species are already threatened (Driver et al. 2012: 127). 
Nearly half of the country’s wetland ecosystem types which are vital for ensuring water 
quality and regulating water supplies are critically endangered (Driver et al. 2012: 7). 
While nature degradation, invasive alien species, pollution and waste, over-exploitation 
of resources and climate change are seen as the main drivers of habitat loss, the tension 
between conservation measures and conflicting interests evolving from an emerging 
economy is a core problem in the country (Driver et al. 2012: 129). A director in the 
Department of Environmental Affairs described the major challenges with regard to 
preserving biodiversity as follows:    
I think the biggest one is probably covered under the broad term sustainable development 
where the biggest threat is the economy – the question how do we protect and enhance 
and reap a benefit from sustained ecosystems (…). We’re grappling with rhinos, with 
species management, and that is the one thing that is keeping us all running a lot in the 
biodiversity space. We are grappling with issues of land use and land use change and 
what that then means; with issues of mining and protected areas, and how to make a case 
for conservation versus the extractive use. (Interview 14)  
Reconciling environmental protection with economic growth is a challenge many 
emerging countries are confronted with. Yet, it is a particularly sensitive issue in South 
Africa, given its long, but problematic history of conservation. Under colonial and 
apartheid rule, racial policies led to the forcible removal of thousands of South Africans 
from their ancestral land. Black communities were ‘re-settled’ to make way for game 
parks open exclusively to whites, while the majority of the population was deprived of 
access to desperately needed natural resources (Crane et al. 2009: 144–145). The fact 
that “billions of rands were spent on preserving wildlife and protecting wild flowers 
while people in ‘townships’ and ‘homelands’ lived without adequate food, shelter, and 
clean water” (McDonald 2002: 1) reflects the perverse politics of that time. As a result, 
“the environment was seen to be a white, suburban issue of little relevance to the anti-
apartheid struggle. At worst, environmental policy was seen as an explicit tool of racial-
ly based oppression” (McDonald 2002: 1; emphasis in original). 
When the new democratic government came into power in 1994, it made huge efforts to 
replace the destructive approach of the apartheid regime with a re-framed notion of en-
vironment as a human rights and development issue. This is reflected by the South 
African Constitution of 1996 which in section 24 grants all South Africans the right:  
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and  
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that  
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;  
(ii) promote conservation; and  
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(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development (Republic of South Africa 
1996). 
This paradigm shift went along with the development of a whole set of environmental 
policies and laws. Through an extensive process which comprised widespread national 
consultation, the ‘White Paper on Conservation and the Sustainable Use of South Afri-
ca’s Biological Diversity’ (1997) and the ‘National Environmental Management Act 
(1998) were formulated, which outlined the principles of environmental governance in 
the new democratic South Africa.  
Governance Structures 
The National Environmental Management Act of 1998 (or NEMA in short) is interna-
tionally regarded as one of the most progressive legal frameworks for environmental 
management; it articulates the idea of environmental justice and emphasises the princi-
ple of public participation in section 2 (4) where it states:  
Environmental justice must be pursued so that adverse environmental impacts shall not be 
distributed in such a manner as to unfairly discriminate against any person, particularly 
vulnerable and disadvantaged persons; (…)  
The participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental governance must 
be promoted, and all people must have the opportunity to develop the understanding, 
skills and capacity necessary for achieving equitable and effective participation, and par-
ticipation by vulnerable and disadvantaged persons must be ensured. (Republic of South 
Africa 1998a) 
 
The act defines environment as an area of cooperative governance which means that 
legislative and executive powers are allocated to various line functionaries at the nation-
al level (e.g., the Department of Environmental Affairs, the Department of Water 
Affairs, the Department of Mineral Resources or the Department of Energy) as well as 
to provincial and local authorities. In order to ensure alignment of governance efforts, 
NEMA stipulates that all spheres of government and state organs concerned with envi-
ronmental issues “must co-operate with, consult and support one another” (Republic of 
South Africa 1998a).277  
The lead authority mandated to formulate, coordinate and monitor the implementation 
of national environmental policies, programmes and legislation is the Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA) which since 2009 operates under the newly established 
Ministry of Water and Environmental Affairs. The work of the department is supported 
                                                          
277
  While the principles of cooperative environmental governance are widely endorsed, various 
scholars have shown that the current environmental governance and policy regime in practice is 
highly fragmented which hampers effective service delivery (see, for instance, Kotze 2006; Du 
Plessis 2008).  
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by statutory bodies such as the South African National Parks (SANParks) which is 
charged with overseeing and managing conservation in South Africa’s national parks, 
and by the South African National Biodiversity Institute (SANBI) which plays a crucial 
role as a consultative body: Established through the National Environmental Manage-
ment: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004, SANBI has been given a broad mandate which aside 
from maintaining botanical gardens includes carrying out and coordinating research, 
reporting on the status of biodiversity and providing science-based policy advice to en-
vironmental stakeholders at all tiers of government (see Republic of South Africa 
2004a, section 11). Hence, SANBI also closely works with environmental departments 
and conservation authorities in the provinces (e.g., CapeNature in the Western Cape), 
particularly in the context of bioregional plans and programmes, which will be illustrat-
ed in the following on the case of CAPE.  
Donor Presence in Environment   
The circle of donors providing aid for environment in South Africa has – compared to 
other sectors – always been rather small. The limited extent of external support in the 
first years of democracy was not necessarily caused by a lack of donor interest but by 
the fact that the lead agency on government side, the Department of Environmental Af-
fairs and Tourism (now Department of Environmental Affairs), was in a state of 
institutional flux and officials were “initially cautious and reluctant to engage” (Alber-
tyn & Fakir 2000: 45). An evaluation of ODA conducted in 2000 found ten donor 
agencies which by then had invested in environmental projects, namely DFID, Finida, 
Norad, USAID, GTZ, the Netherlands, and the Danish Cooperation for Environment 
and Development (DANCED), the most active bilateral aid provider; multilateral play-
ers engaged were the European Union, UNDP and the Global Environment Facility 
which has been the largest source of international funding for environmental activities 
over the past two decades (Albertyn & Fakir 2000: 27). From 1994 to 2012, South Afri-
ca received GEF grants amounting to US$ 108,1 million for national projects, plus US$ 
2,7 million for smaller programmes executed by civil society and community-based 
organisations; US$ 288,7 million were spent on regional and global projects in which 
South Africa participated (Global Environment Facility 2012: 1).278 
By 2012, the group of donors active in environment was significantly reduced. Most of 
them had phased out their conventional ODA to environment in South Africa, having 
shifted the focus on other topics and new forms of partnerships. The major players re-
maining are the World Bank and UNDP as implementing agencies for GEF-financed 
                                                          
278
  The Global Environment Facility has been set up as an independent financing mechanism 
providing grants and concessional funding to cover incremental costs of measures targeting 
global environmental benefits in the areas of biodiversity, climate change, international waters, 
land degradation, ozone layer depletion, and persistent organic pollutants. As of 2014, the organ-
isation comprised 183 member states. South Africa joined the GEF when it became a democracy 
in 1994.  
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programmes.279 The nature of cooperation and the contribution of experts in this setting 
will be elucidated in the following, using the example of what is seen as South Africa’s 
most influential undertaking in the field of environment, the CAPE programme.  
The Making and Implementation of the CAPE Programme 
Following the policy change in the early years of the democratic transition, South Africa 
was being granted US$ 12,3 million by the Global Environment Facility in support of 
the ‘Cape Peninsula Biodiversity Conservation Project’. Running from 1998 to 2005, 
the project was mainly carried out by SANParks and WWF-South Africa who were as-
sisted and supervised by the World Bank. While the bulk of the funding was directed at 
the creation of the Table Mountain National Park and the expansion of the Table Moun-
tain Fund, US$ 1 million was assigned for preparing a long-term strategy and action 
plan to protect the biodiversity in the Cape Floristic Region (CFR). The process began 
with a phase of stock-tacking and analysis: During the initial phase, scientists from the 
University of Cape Town were commissioned to assess the current state of biodiversity 
in the terrestrial, marine and freshwater ecosystems of the CFR; experts of the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research reviewed the legal, policy, institutional, financial, 
social and economic aspects affecting conservation in this area (Younge & Fowkes 
2003: 20–21).280 The recommendations coming out of these studies were taken up by a 
team comprising consultants and technical staff of executing agencies such as the West-
ern Cape Nature Conservation Board (today known as CapeNature), DEAT and 
SANParks who formulated a first draft strategy. Their preliminary version was scruti-
nised and refined by representatives from government, the private sector, civil society 
and the local science community during a three-day workshop held in early 2000 
(Lochner et al. 2003: 33–34). The revised draft then was circulated to around 1 500 in-
dividuals before its final release as the ‘Cape Action Plan for the Environment’ (CAPE) 
which comprised the following main objectives:   
To establish an effective reserve network, enhance off-reserve conservation and support 
bio-regional planning; 
To develop methods to ensure sustainable yields, promote compliance with laws, inte-
grate biodiversity concerns into catchment management and promote sustainable nature-
based tourism;  
To strengthen institutions, policies and laws, enhance co-operative governance and com-
munity participation, and support continued research (CAPE Project Team 2000: 3) 
                                                          
279
  The GEF term ‘implementing agencies’ is to some extent misleading insofar as the role of the 
IAs (as for instance the World Bank, UNDP or UNEP) is focused on assisting and overseeing the 
actual implementers which are usually government bodies or NGOs. In GEF terminology, the 
latter are called ‘executing agencies’.  
280
  For a detailed list of the reports and their respective recommendations, see Younge and Fowkes 
(2003).  
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Nationally and internationally, the CAPE strategy was seen as the outcome of a success-
ful regional planning exercise. Part of the success was ascribed to the extensive public 
consultation with a large number of disparate stakeholders whose commitment was 
deemed crucial to ensure that the strategy would be financed and internalised in the long 
term. In order to achieve the necessary ‘ownership’ of local actors, it was tried to keep 
external players at the side-lines of the process; according to members of the organising 
team, outcomes “were consequently only translated into a log frame format and present-
ed to international role-players once local buy-in was secured” (Lochner et al. 2003: 
31).     
Hence, although the development of the CAPE strategy was substantially funded from 
outside, the involvement of donor experts – e.g., the World Bank task team leader or 
consultants funded through GEF resources – was limited to administrative backing and 
supervision. A CapeNature official described their part as follows:  
They did bring in some expertise but it was more expertise in terms of funding, project 
management and that kind of thing, and they did make use of local expertise or local sci-
entists in terms of developing the original strategy. And so we went through a whole 
process within which we agreed on what we want to do with this funding. So it wasn’t 
forced on us, it was part of a broadly negotiated process. There were lots of arguments at 
that stage between the scientists locally, you know, the one group saying no we must go 
in this direction, the other one saying we must go in that direction. And so the GEF ex-
perts played a facilitating role in trying to find a common ground. (Interview 13)  
Although the outcomes were broadly accepted and the parties involved pledged to rea-
lign existing resources around agreed priorities, it was clear that turning the strategy into 
action would require external funding, at least in the first phase of implementation. The 
action plan designed for the initial five years called for an investment of R 812 million 
(equivalent to around US$ 107 million at that time), of which R 487 million (equivalent 
to around US$ 64 million) needed to be sourced from outside (Cape Action Plan for the 
Environment 2000: 57).281 In order to attract financiers, an international conference was 
held in September 2000 where core projects related to priority areas outlined in the 
strategy were presented; all proposals had been developed by or in close collaboration 
with the respective South African institutions that would execute them (Cape Action 
Plan for the Environment 2000; Younge & Fowkes 2003: 26).  
Amongst the largest aid providers responding to this request was the GEF which in sub-
sequent years approved a range of supporting activities, such as the Agulhas 
Biodiversity Initiative, the CAPE Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Develop-
ment Project as well as investment through the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund 
(CEPF).282 The World Bank and UNDP were commissioned to oversee the interventions 
                                                          
281
  Rand was converted into US$ using the exchange rate on 31.12.2000 (7 595:1).  
282
  The Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund was launched in 2000 as a partnership between the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), the World Bank, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation, and the government of Japan with the aim to provide grants to NGOs and the private 
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and ensure compliance with GEF requirements. According to the programme developer 
of the CAPE Coordination Unit, experts of both organisations particularly assisted in 
hooking up proposals with the international agenda to make projects ‘sellable’ to the 
GEF:  
Chris […] from the World Bank and Nik […] from UNDP were very involved in putting 
together the application to the GEF, so they helped us frame it and package it, you know, 
‘the GEF’s not interested in that but they might be interested in that’, ‘frame it like a pro-
grammatic approach’, ‘build on another phase here’ – that sort of thing. Having said that, 
it did come on the back of this twenty-year strategy that we had already. So it wasn’t like 
they were coming in fresh with their own new ideas. (Interview 25)  
One of the biggest policy changes leveraged through donor-funded CAPE initiatives 
was the introduction of ‘biodiversity stewardship’ as a new tool of managing South Af-
rica’s protected areas network. Evolving on a few pilot sites in the Western Cape 
Province, the concept was rapidly taken up into national policies and legislation, as will 
be elucidated in the following.  
The Evolvement of ‘Biodiversity Stewardship’  
Analyses conducted in the context of CAPE found that while 80% of priority conserva-
tion areas in the Western Cape region were in private and communal hands, few 
mechanisms were in place to secure the conservation of threatened species and ecosys-
tems outside the formal reserves managed by the state. Given the fragmentation of 
landscapes, it was recognised that government authorities would not be able to link the 
sites flagged as critically endangered and build conservation corridors without bringing 
private and communal landowners on board (Ashwell et al. 2006: 124). In 2002, the 
Botanical Society in collaboration with CapeNature initiated a small pilot project in 
order to develop and refine workable stewardship arrangements with farmers owning 
land of high biodiversity importance. The stewardship concept rests on the idea that 
instead of buying up land to protect threatened habitat, conservation authorities offer a 
range of co-operation agreements to land owners who are willing to conserve biodiver-
sity through sustainable land use for which they are rewarded with tangible benefits.283 
Central to the concept is that land owners do not cede any ownership rights, but remain 
the custodians and key users of their properties. They voluntarily decide whether to en-
ter an agreement and which of the available options to take, with categories ranging 
from informal, flexible agreements to legally binding, long-term contracts which de-
                                                                                                                                                                          
sector for undertaking conservation activities in biodiversity hotspots. As of today, it is also sup-
ported by Conservation International, L’Agence Française de Développement and the European 
Union.  
283
  CapeNature has defined stewardship as follows: “Stewardship refers to the wise use, manage-
ment and protection of that which has been entrusted to you or is rightfully yours. Within the 
context of conservation, stewardship means protecting important ecosystems, effectively manag-
ing invasive alien species and fires, and grazing or harvesting without damaging the veld” (Cape 
Nature Conservation 2003). This definition has been widely adopted throughout the country.  
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mand a higher degree of commitment but qualify for more substantial incentives such as 
tax deductions and advanced management assistance (Cadman et al. 2010: 72–83).284  
While landowner engagement initiatives existed before – with little success due to cum-
bersome procedures and a lack of legal security – the Conservation Stewardship Pilot 
Project helped to simplify and sharpen the stewardship concept by exploring feasible 
models on three pilot sites in the Cape Floristic Region (Ashwell et al. 2006: 127–
128).285 Although the project closed in 2004 without having contracts signed, it had a 
substantial effect insofar as it informed subsequent bioregional programmes concerned 
with the creation of conservation corridors by involving the private sector and commu-
nities (e.g., the Agulhas Biodiversity Initiative or the Succulent Karoo Ecosystem 
Programme).286 Several of these activities were greatly driven forward by external fund-
ing, in particular from GEF and CEPF. For international investors, South Africa’s 
stewardship approach fitted neatly with the globally emerging paradigm of ‘main-
streaming’ biodiversity into production sectors and development planning (see, for 
instance, Petersen & Huntley 2005; Global Environment Facility 2010a; Huntley & 
Redford 2014). Hence, the concept was promoted by the aid community as an efficient 
tool to ‘establish the foundations of the biodiversity economy’ (World Bank 2011b).287   
In fact, the stewardship programmes carried out in the context of CAPE have leveraged 
significant changes in land-use planning and helped to expand protected areas. Through 
contracts with private landowners and communities, the area of (critically) endangered 
ecosystems under conservation in the Cape Floristic Region increased from 16 115 hec-
tares in 2004 to 61 603 hectares in 2011 (World Bank 2011b: 31). The models and 
guidelines developed in the Western Cape were adopted by other provinces such as the 
Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and Gauteng, and taken up by the Department of Envi-
ronmental Affairs which set up a ‘Biodiversity Stewardship South Africa’ programme 
to establish and strengthen provincial stewardship initiatives (Department of Environ-
mental Affairs and Tourism 2009b: 79). Alongside of being tested and proved on the 
ground, the concept was gradually incorporated into South Africa’s environmental poli-
                                                          
284
  Aside from the landowner’s willingness to put effort into conservation and accept land use limi-
tations, the biodiversity value of the land is a determining factor for which types of arrangement 
are being offered by authorities. The highest stewardship category under which land is declared 
as nature reserve requires that the site contains ecosystems, habitats and species which are criti-
cally important and endangered.  
285
  The pilot sites of the Conservation Stewardship Pilot Project were the Agtergroenberg near Wel-
lington, the Bot River Valley near Grabouw and the Lower Breede River area near Swellendam 
(Ashwell et al. 2006: 124). 
286
  According to the Project Completion Report compiled by the Botanical Society, no actual 
agreements had been signed at project completion, but several were pending for final legal pro-
cessing (Botha 2004: 2).  
287
  This term was used in the World Bank’s final report on the GEF-funded ‘Biodiversity Conserva-
tion and Sustainable Development Project’ which targeted the expansion of stewardship 
arrangements and the development of financial incentives for environmental services, amongst 
others (World Bank 2011b).     
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cy and legal frameworks. While the Protected Areas Act of 2003 and the Biodiversity 
Act of 2004 laid out enabling provisions for piloting the approach, biodiversity steward-
ship was featured as a key conservation mechanism in strategic documents such as the 
National Biodiversity Framework (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
2009b) and the National Protected Area Expansion Strategy (Department of Environ-
mental Affairs 2010b).288 Moreover, the government developed a national Biodiversity 
Stewardship Policy and Guideline Document as well as a framework for fiscal incen-
tives encouraging conservation through the custodianship of land (Republic of South 
Africa 2009a). By 2014, biodiversity stewardship has taken hold as a strategy to secure 
South Africa’s threatened ecosystems. The experiences and results achieved so far have 
received much attention by the international community which promotes the Western 
Cape as a pioneer of innovative conservation approaches (Cadman et al. 2010; Müller & 
Fourie 2011).  
The Role of Donors in the CAPE Process  
Biodiversity stewardship is just one example for a concept which in the course of CAPE 
implementation triggered a step-by-step change of the country’s conservation regime. In 
both government and donor publications, CAPE is praised for its achievements with 
regard to policy reform. A UNDP expert engaged in the process from the beginning 
explained its effect as follows:  
What happened with the CAPE programme is that it tested things, it was an early starter, 
which then progressively got injected into the national policy process. Prior to the CAPE 
programme starting, all there was in terms of policy for biodiversity was a white paper. 
We then subsequently had two acts, the Biodiversity Act and the Protected Area Bill and 
then we have the National Biodiversity Framework. All of this was sort of infused into 
that. (Interview 7)  
International bodies attribute part of CAPE’s success to the ‘catalytic support’ they pro-
vided to the process. In its Country Portfolio Evaluation for South Africa, the GEF 
emphasises that “key policy, strategy, and legislation changes such as SANBI’s expand-
ed mandate, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP), the National 
Environmental Management Biodiversity Act, and the National Environmental Man-
agement: Protected Areas Act have been funded directly or catalyzed or informed by 
GEF investment and projects” (Global Environment Facility Evaluation Office 2008: 
                                                          
288
  The National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 2003 creates a legal framework 
for the management of South Africa’s protected areas network and outlines a range of conserva-
tion categories and related governance options. The crucial provision it entails with regard to the 
stewardship concept is that it allows private and communal land to be declared as protected area, 
given the consent of the owner (Republic of South Africa 2003). The National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act 2004 provides an array of planning tools for assessing the state of 
biodiversity such as the National Biodiversity Framework; the categorisation of threatened eco-
systems on the basis of the helps to focus interventions on priority areas to be conserved and to 
identify sites for biodiversity stewardship (Republic of South Africa 2004a).  
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62). Promoting its contribution through the ‘Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable 
Development Project’, the World Bank on its website reports that aside from channel-
ling grants it supplied “the expertise and technical knowledge of several experts” 
(World Bank 2013a). While such statements remain at a very general level, a closer 
look reveals that the role of donors in implementing the CAPE strategy has in fact been 
very specific and limited both with respect to financial and advisory support.    
In terms of funding, it is noticeable that the initiatives carried out in the context of 
CAPE were mainly stemmed by local sources. As displayed in Table 20, the share of 
foreign contributions in major projects didn’t exceed 40%, while the remaining budget 
was provided by government authorities, the private sector, South African NGOs and 
academic bodies.  
Table 20: Local and foreign resources in GEF-supported CAPE projects 
Project Period Local sources Foreign sources 
  in US$ mio. as % of total in US$ mio. as % of total 
Cape Peninsula Biodiversity 
Conservation Project  
1998–2005 92,02 87,1 13,65 12,9 
Agulhas Biodiversity Initia-
tive 
2003–2010 7,22 61,2 4,57 38,8 
Biodiversity Conservation 
and Sustainable Develop-
ment Project  
2004–2010 51,40 82,4 11,00 17,6 
Source: World Bank (2006: 22); Child (2010: 41); World Bank (2011b: 27). 
Despite external funding appearing relatively modest, it had a significant effect from the 
perspective of the actors involved, insofar as it enabled them to experiment with ideas – 
e.g., the stewardship concept – for which they didn’t have allocations from the state 
(Cadman et al. 2010: 84). The establishment of a shared, publicly accessible database 
(the so-called Biodiversity Geographical Information System) and a facility disseminat-
ing biodiversity information to underpin land-use planning, for instance, was primarily 
made possible through foreign money and support, as a leading official at SANBI 
acknowledged:  
We would not have been able to win the case with our government in terms of our funds 
to say actually the way forward is to have an information facility that can be accessible to 
researchers, to the public, to the citizens, unleashing this information and bringing it in 
the public eye. We wouldn’t have been able to make the case to our government at the 
time – and they [the donors] were able to pioneer that kind of idea. (Interview 24)  
While international funding coming in through CAPE helped both national and provin-
cial authorities to pilot initiatives, it also entailed bureaucratic burdens. Referring 
particularly to the World Bank, interviewees from DEA, SANBI and CapeNature criti-
cised the cumbersome requirements related to financial management and procurement 
which partly blocked implementation and made processes overly complex. Yet, given 
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that their institutions are generally underfunded, officials nonetheless weighed the value 
of accessing additional financing higher than the administrative challenges related to it, 
as the statement of a SANBI director reflects:    
We have learnt how to overcome those, so I would play those down rather than play those 
up. We’re wiser now, we won’t go into another GEF grant without setting up a coordina-
tion unit that’s big enough to really do it – whereas the other way around we did that, and 
our team ended up being stretched beyond, so were all of our other partners. So, you 
know, now there are great benefits to show, and as time passes the bitterness of being so 
under the hammer all the time by the donors sort of evaporates a bit and you can see the 
positive impact. (Interview 25)  
Similarly, a leading official at CapeNature commented:  
We did benefit a lot from being part of international funding and we feel we’re now get-
ting to the stage where we know how to play the game, so to speak. You’ve got to 
understand how it works, you have to be able to know how to play the game to get the 
benefits and I think that applies both sides, for the funder but also for the recipient. And 
we’re definitely more mature now in terms of how to deal with these kinds of things than 
we were ten years ago, without any doubt. (Interview 13) 
According to interviewees, South African authorities went through a ‘steep learning 
curve’ in terms of handling the different requirements associated with grants channelled 
through the World Bank and UNDP. While the main role of the latter was to function as 
a conduit for GEF money, they also served as a source of expertise, particularly with 
regard to innovative approaches tested and adopted in other countries. One example 
mentioned by officials was the provision of best practice cases and international experi-
ences around ‘payments for environmental services’ (PES) schemes which compensate 
land users for maintaining and enhancing the flow of ecosystem services.289 Since 
SANBI and CapeNature considered including such a scheme in a future financial incen-
tive system targeting sustainable land management, there was an interest in how PES 
mechanisms were set up elsewhere.290 Given their links to PES programmes carried out 
                                                          
289
  ‘Payment for Environmental Services’ (also known as ‘Payment for Ecosystem Services’) is an 
umbrella term covering a broad array of arrangements; the shared underlying principle is that 
those who provide environmental services (e.g., farmers who clear their land from invasive al-
iens or forest owners who replant trees) get paid for doing so by those who benefit from them 
(e.g., water users and government authorities who pay on behalf of their citizens). Pilot projects 
carried out in Costa Rica and other Latin American countries have received significant attention 
by aid practitioners and scholars. For details on PES definitions and features, see, for instance, 
Wunder (2005); TEEB (2011: 181–198); Tacconi (2012).  
290
  South Africa’s ‘Working for Water programme already introduced a PES-like approach in 1995 
by paying people for clearing landscapes from invasive alien plants which threaten the ecological 
functioning of natural systems and pose a direct risk for water security. The programme is how-
ever specific insofar as “the service providers are previously unemployed individuals that tender 
for contracts to restore public or private lands, rather than the landowners themselves” (Turpie et 
al. 2008: 788).  
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in Costa Rica and other Latin America countries, the World Bank and UNDP were able 
to present examples and facilitate exchange with experts and practitioners from abroad 
who shared their lessons learned. Such kind of input was perceived as very useful on the 
South African side, with officials appreciating the “global perspective” (Interview 24) 
their international partners brought in.  
While in the course of CAPE and related initiatives a range of workshops and study 
tours on specific topics took place, technical assistance was used to a rather limited ex-
tent, and if so in many cases provided by South African experts affiliated with public 
and private research institutes. To give just one example, when SANBI required a con-
sultant to develop a feasible PES model, the six months assignment was given to an 
internationally renowned resource economist from the University of Pretoria.291 Experts 
from abroad were mainly used for progress reviews and evaluations on the grounds that 
these “require an outsider’s perspective” (Interview 7), as a UNDP representative ar-
gued; in the case of the ‘Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development Pro-
Project’, for instance, final reports were compiled by an expert from New Zealand and a 
British consultant (see Tortell 2010; World Bank 2011b). 
The most regular collaboration throughout the lifespan of CAPE initiatives took place 
between members of the CAPE Coordination Unit housed at SANBI and permanent 
staff in the UNDP country office, with the latter acting as interlocutors for both manage-
rial and technical issues related to GEF-funded programmes. Despite challenges in 
terms of ensuring compliance with reporting and management requirements which put 
all actors under pressure, interviewees from both sides spoke in high terms of the quali-
ty of cooperation and the relationship that has evolved. A SANBI official summarised 
her experience as follows:   
I think it’s a very complementary relationship. I think they bring us insight into what the 
international agenda is, and they bring us some clues as to what’s happening in other 
places of the world. They’re able to help us frame funding applications – for example, 
there’s a big project on the Agulhas Plain that has received climate change adaptation 
funding. And if it were not for Nik and his colleagues at UNDP, we wouldn’t have even 
figured out that we could frame our work in that way. At the same time, what we give the 
UNDP and the World Bank is practice of this international agenda wish list. So they came 
up with a concept of mainstreaming – and a couple of years ago, I presented on main-
streaming at a GEF meeting and we were the only project at that stage that was putting 
these policies into practice. (…) So we bring them that nice hook into a developing para-
digm but with all the capacity and all the experience and all the skills of the teams of 
people that work on these projects. (Interview 25)  
The high capacity of government officials particularly within SANBI was in fact high-
lighted by UNDP representatives in the Pretoria country office. A programme officer 
                                                          
291
  This example was reported by a SANBI programme officer referring to the National Grasslands 
Biodiversity Programme which is closely intertwined with CAPE projects insofar as it drives 
forward biodiversity mainstreaming into production sectors at a national scale.  
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concerned with UNDP’s environment and energy portfolio in South Africa commented 
in this regard:  
When you run the projects through them, you can see these guys are in full control. You 
have less stress, they deliver, they know what they want, they know where they are going, 
they are pretty at the play, you know. They are on top of the game. (Interview 8)  
As the statements above indicate, both government and donor representatives perceived 
the cooperation as taking place at eye level, with South Africans taking the lead. Sum-
marising the role of international players in CAPE, it can be stated that aside from 
providing and channelling funds their main contribution was to mobilise expertise and 
to facilitate knowledge exchange by using the global networks of their organisations. 
While external actors did give technical input in designing and implementing initiatives, 
they didn’t play a decisive part in decision-making and policy processes; the priorities 
of CAPE and the policy changes it brought about were largely an outcome of local ne-
gotiation informed by national science and practice. This is not to say that findings and 
experiences from outside were disregarded; in fact, South African actors expressed that 
they appreciated advice provided by foreign specialists and scholars. Having said that, it 
appears that external expertise was only taken up at a stage when the broad agenda was 
already agreed which ensured that despite the use of foreign aid CAPE remained a lo-
cally driven process. The fact that CAPE partnerships and initiatives persist while major 
donor projects have ended can be seen as an indication supporting this claim.    
Entering the Second Phase of CAPE  
It should not be withheld that the gradual phasing out of international financiers did 
entail problems for authorities which struggled to find alternative sources of funding 
and to retain staff recruited in the course of CAPE projects. A leading official of Cape-
Nature described his organisation’s situation during this phase of transition as follows:  
We could take up, I would say, about 50% of the people that were part of the CAPE pro-
ject in terms of project managers and so on but we couldn’t take all of them and absorb 
them as part of the process. I think SANParks were even worse off, you know, they took 
a very small percentage on. So I think the goal there was to create this kind of workforce 
of expertise and make it part of the organisational structures, but it didn’t in all cases 
work out like that. (Interview 13) 
Such challenges, however, didn’t bring an end to the partnerships established in the 
course of CAPE. At the end of the first ten year phase, most participants signalled a 
willingness to continue the cooperation, as a member of the coordination unit at SANBI 
reported:  
  
6 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young Democracies 283 
 
Early this year [2011], we asked everybody, do you want CAPE to carry on or should we 
just close it because the project is done now, and all of the partners said they wanted it to 
carry on. They’re all engaged, they still come to the meetings, it’s no longer about im-
plementing a project, it’s about all of the other things that we need to do to get alignment 
around conservation and development in the Cape Floristic Region. (Interview 25)  
At the beginning of the second phase of implementation, 23 government entities and 
NGOs were signatories to the CAPE Memorandum of Understanding (Cape Action for 
People and the Environment 2011). Although this doesn’t give evidence of proceedings 
on the ground, it indicates at least formal commitment and can be seen as a sign that the 
strategy has gained a high degree of legitimacy across environmental stakeholders.  
“We Welcome New Ideas, But Against Our Agenda” 
While CAPE originally emerged as a regional programme, national authorities such as 
the Department of Environmental Affairs and SANBI played a crucial part in the pro-
cess. Both authorities are known for taking a strong stance in dealing with donors which 
a UNDP programme officer exemplified as follows:  
We recently had a project for which the EU was proposing to give between US$ 500 000 
and US$ 700 000, and US$ 30 000 for the preparation of a small concept about the pro-
ject. It was on climate change mitigation. The government said, ‘no, we don’t want it.’ 
We wrote so many letters and they said no (…). We’ve got a couple of ideas which we 
pushed, which we thought they were good and innovative – the government just said 
‘we’re not interested,’ (…) they say ‘you can go back with your money,’ and that’s it. So 
it’s an interesting dynamic. (Interview 8)  
The fact that aid offers are rejected by government officials is noticeable insofar as en-
vironmental authorities do face financial constraints, with many relying on external 
resources to fulfil their mandate (see chapter 6.1). CapeNature, for instance, needs to 
source 40% of its budget externally. Yet, in the course of CAPE decision makers have 
come to the point that donor support comes at a high cost to their organisation if not 
aligned to its core business. A high-ranking director stated in this regard:   
In the early stages of CAPE, (…) some of the projects were not entirely what we needed, 
they were a bit off the mark. But through the process we learnt, and nowadays, for exam-
ple, we wouldn’t take on international funding projects unless it speaks directly to our 
research needs or our capacity building needs or protected area expansion objectives, 
whatever the funders aim at, so we’ve become much more choosy in terms of what we 
accept as a funding. (Interview 13)  
The policy not to engage with foreign funders unless their support fits South African 
priorities is also promoted at the national level. A leading official at SANBI strongly 
emphasised the importance of setting and defending the local agenda against donors 
irrespective of financial imbalances:  
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If you understand what your agenda is, what you want to achieve and you say this is your 
agenda then you can engage with donors on a more equal footing. But if you don’t have 
that understanding and you haven’t got the confidence to put it on the table, then of 
course people who are cleverer than you can come and tell you what to do and your solu-
tions. It’s a two-way thing, it’s not – you’re not a victim here, you know, victim, victim, 
victim... And somebody comes along and we just take the money. So it’s a two-way 
street. We have to have more confidence in what we see are our solutions. We must have 
the confidence to also absorb other best practices in the world but not take it holus-bolus. 
We must have the confidence and ability to say to donors, ‘there you are, let’s work to-
gether.’ (Interview 24)  
That environmental agents in South Africa do in fact adopt such a firm attitude towards 
donors and advance their own proposals for cooperation rather than accept external sug-
gestions was repeatedly confirmed by staff in country offices and embassies. An 
environmental specialist who previously worked as a first secretary for the Norwegian 
Embassy in Pretoria reported about her former South African counterparts:  
They know what they want, and then they know also which country they want to use for 
support. At least it’s the picture of what I experienced. For instance, they approached the 
Norwegian Embassy to have some support for pollution control in Durban where they 
have refineries and so on. And Norway was not so much into pollution control. So we 
said, ‘oh, Denmark is doing this, so why do you come to Norway’? And they said ‘No. 
First, Denmark is coming in with too many experts. We don’t want these to overtake our 
ministry. And we have been on the internet, talking with a Norwegian institution that has 
this kind of instrument that we want to use. That’s why we are coming to you.’ So, I have 
many stories like that. They are doing their homework to see where to find the best tech-
nical advice or solutions or at least what they think has to be done, then they start a 
dialogue. (Interview 39)  
The narrative above hints at a salient feature of environmental agents’ dealing with aid: 
They define not only the need and area of support, but also whom to approach, what to 
request and which conditions to set. The ability to show this kind of leadership seems to 
rest to a large extent on the highly capacitated cadre of experts in environmental au-
thorities.  
Negotiating Expertise: the Absorptive Capacity of Experts in Environmental Authorities    
Assessing the capacity of environmental entities such as DEA and SANBI, a UNDP 
expert pointed out:  
Some of these guys who are managing various sectors of government are now well capac-
itated. It’s been 15 years now and we’re starting to see an emergence of young, assertive 
people, who when you come and say we are gonna do a workshop or do this, they say, no, 
that’s not capacity building. We only like your idea (…). So in that context I think they 
are forcing organisations like ours to become innovative and to come up with good ap-
proaches. We can’t just sell anything anymore. You can’t just say something and 
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everybody says it’s good, it’s good. No. Now there are people who can say, no, this is not 
good. (Interview 8)  
From donor perspective, the strength of environmental authorities in terms of in-house 
expertise and capacity is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it simplifies the coop-
eration if aid projects are administrated by capable counterparts in recipient institutions. 
On the other hand, the pace of interventions is often slowed down due to lengthy nego-
tiation processes which a director in the biodiversity unit of DEA explained as follows:  
It’s because we are adding some value to the process. We just don’t accept it, we question 
it, we will say ‘what are the implications for this’ and ‘it’s a duplication’, this and that. 
And so that’s why we take long and it’s often perceived as if we are delaying processes or 
not being proactive enough to harness opportunity. But I think it’s about questioning why 
this is done. (Interview 15)  
The frictions emerging in the joint preparation of projects are not necessarily caused by 
contradicting objectives, but sparked off by the divergent use of concepts and terminol-
ogies, with government and donor experts trying to frame interventions in line with their 
own agendas and paradigms. Conflicts of this sort have recently emerged in the context 
of designing applications for the fifth GEF replenishment. For the period 2010–2014, 
South Africa was offered an indicative resource envelope of US$ 52,65 million accessi-
ble for interventions in the fields of biodiversity, climate change and land degradation 
(Global Environment Facility 2010b: 13). Preparing project proposals, experts from 
DEA and international partners had different conceptions about both approaches and 
issues to be prioritised, as the following narrative reflects:  
Interviewee: There was a lot of pressure for us to make decisions about how we want 
these projects to run as a programme approach or as an individual project approach. And 
the country’s position is that we need to use these GEF resources to empower smaller or-
ganisations so that they can build capacity. And then UNDP came with their approach to 
say ‘no, we want to be the big player in this whole process, we want to take on a pro-
grammatic approach rather than a project, or a smaller project approach.’ So there was 
much conflict in that respect because we didn’t see the merit in actually taking on a pro-
grammatic approach as opposed to a project approach. But eventually, I don’t know 
whether we saw the light, but we gave in in the sense that we took the programme ap-
proach because some of the implementing agencies in the country supported it. (…)  
Interviewer: But there wasn’t a struggle about the content or the priorities?  
Interviewee: There was a conflict of interest in terms of the content as well. Certain 
things were duplication and belonged to other branches within the country or within the 
department, so then we had to start channelling, choking and changing things. For exam-
ple, green economy: Green economy is a concept and a project that is driven by a 
different branch and not the biodiversity branch. So we had to change things to make 
them aligned with our priorities. Say, we need to remove green economy from the con-
cept and maybe include it under some other way, like valuation of biodiversity for 
example – which is one and the same thing, but again, it’s aligning with the national pri-
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orities. And also terminology, you know, to include the priority areas – for example GMO 
[Genetically Modified Organisms] that is one of our priorities. From the outside perspec-
tive that wasn’t a priority, so we had to fight for the space for GMOs in the project.  
Protected areas and stewardship as well: Those are two concepts that are very often inter-
changeable. But stewardship means something different in South Africa. It’s about 
voluntary participation of land owners and it’s outside the protected areas, and protected 
areas is a formal designation of protected areas. So those content issues did emerge. (In-
terview 15)  
Frictions around divergent terminologies for ‘one and the same thing’ might seem trivial 
at first glance. Yet, since wording conveys meaning, it has significant implications for 
the nature and legitimacy of activities, particularly in the realm of environmental gov-
ernance.292 Recognising the nuances of technical language and paradigmatic 
underpinnings is thus crucial in the context of setting up policy-related government pro-
grammes, even more so if they are prepared with the assistance of aid experts who bring 
in their own organisations’ interests. 
How easily initiatives can be infused with external concepts becomes evident in the case 
of the Grasslands Programme. South Africa’s grasslands biome has been identified as 
one of the spatial priorities for conservation action that is particularly threatened by 
productive activities such as agriculture, coal mining and forestry (Department of Envi-
ronmental Affairs and Tourism 2005). In response to this finding, SANBI requested 
GEF-funding for the design and implementation phase of a programme targeting the 
integration of biodiversity objectives into the major production sectors operating on 
South Africa’s grasslands biome. A South African official involved in the process re-
membered how the notion of ‘mainstreaming’ was kind of pushed into the proposal: 
So we developed the concept and then the UNDP came in and said ‘no, we need to make 
this concept more sexy’, that were the words that they used. So they added some termi-
nology of ‘mainstreaming in production sectors’ and all sorts of things. And it didn’t go 
down well in the initial stages. (Interview 15)  
While the programme was launched in 2008 to run until 2013, the ‘mainstreaming’ no-
tion only slowly gained acceptance in both environmental policy circles and production 
sectors. A mid-term review conducted in 2011 remarked that benefits were achieved on 
a very limited scale and criticised that some targets were so unrealistic that it was rec-
ommended to drop them altogether (Tortell 2011). Still, the experiences gained from the 
Grasslands Programme were presented at several international conferences and work-
                                                          
292
  To give just one example from South Africa, the CAPE process revealed that the term ‘reserve’ 
entails negative connotations for many people, reminding them of ‘re-settlement’ processes un-
der the apartheid regime and raising fears of land confiscation; this is why environmental 
authorities established the term ‘corridors’ rather than using the internationally more common 
notion of ‘mega-reserves’ in the context of large-scale landscape conservation (Ashwell et al. 
2006).   
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shops, amongst others at a side-event of COP 11 in Hyderabad293 where – according to a 
participating DEA official – the initial insubstantiality of the concept was acknowl-
edged:    
The UNDP people (…) admitted that when they did take the concept note of the Grass-
lands Programme, they actually didn’t know what they were doing and it was a major risk 
to actually take this approach. So if the government knew that it was something that was 
uncharted territory, they wouldn’t have bought into it at all, because it’s a major risk: 
How do you ensure that such a programme is actually going to provide tangible benefits 
for our grassland conservation? And so it was just a concept, a pie in the sky that they ac-
tually sold to us. And again, it comes back to officials like myself trying to make sense of 
some of those abstract concepts. And we make sense of it with the knowledge that we 
know – and sometimes we’re not convinced, but then we try to pull it together. (Inter-
view 15)294    
That such kinds of experiments do not result in major failures can to a significant extent 
be ascribed to SANBI’s and DEA’s institutional strength. The presence of civil servants 
possessing a high level of technical knowledge together with a sound understanding of 
national and international agendas seems to make environmental authorities in South 
Africa less prone to being “swayed off the path” (Interview 25) while being advised and 
assisted from outside. Having learned from experience, government officials indicated a 
high awareness for the need to scrutinise and adjust external models and approaches; a 
DEA director commented in this regard:  
UNDP comes in with this concept – but it needs to be shaped and aligned with the nation-
al processes. (…) And sometimes those concepts are too bizarre to actually be adopted by 
the South African people. So if it can’t be adopted, it’s not going to be a success. (Inter-
view 15)  
                                                          
293
  The eleventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 11) to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity was held in Hyderabad, India, from 8 to 19 October 2012. 
294
  The claim that the ‘mainstreaming biodiversity into production sectors’ as proposed by the 
Grasslands Programme was in fact ‘unchartered territory’ is supported by technical reviews con-
ducted in the run-up to GEF approval; the reviewer of the Scientific and Technical Advisory 
Panel made the following remarks in this regard: “Much has been written about the need to in-
volve a broad spectrum of stakeholders just as a lot is written about the importance of the use of 
economic instruments and other incentive measures to enhance conservation. However there are 
few actual cases on the ground to demonstrate that these “new” approaches work. This project 
would therefore be breaking new ground in the country and indeed the continent in getting the 
private sector, driven by a profit motive, to recognize that conserving the natural resource base, 
particularly biodiversity, has long-term benefits for the sector and the rest of society” (STAP 
Technical Review of Project Proposal, as disclosed in Global Environment Facility (2007: 35)). 
In various comments, however, concerns about the feasibility of the programme were raised; the 
GEF council, for instance, criticised: “The project goal (i.e., biodiversity and associated ecosys-
tem services of grassland biome sustained and secured) cannot be achieved within the five-year 
project timeline. Neither will it be feasible to wisely spent the requested [US$] 8 million plus 
[US$] 45 million counterpart funds within the proposed time period” (Global Environment Facil-
ity 2007: 23).  
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The Targeted Use of External Expertise and the Impact of Local Consultation 
Given that national authorities can revert to a cadre of highly skilled specialists, one can 
hardly find technical assistants embedded within the organisations; asked whether there 
are any advisors deployed to DEA, an official responded:   
In the ministry itself, there is very limited of those (…). And I think we don’t have a per-
manent person that would be sitting here. Actually I think once the concept paper and 
everything is developed, then they move away from the project and the rest is us that im-
plement it (…). So we don’t have them constantly influencing what is happening. 
(Interview 16)  
If external experts are requested, they are contracted for a rather short time period and a 
specific task outlined by the recipient authority which according to a UNDP officer are 
adamant that they are the ones setting the conditions for support:   
In some instances you find that we do the contracting for them. But they will formulate 
everything you need like what they want this person to do and then they will also be re-
sponsible for monitoring the performance of this particular person. Immediately once you 
say you are going to supervise this person, and you put the money, they say ‘oh, even if 
the money is yours, no, we have control of the person.’ (Interview 8)  
Foreign specialists brought in for consultancies are in most cases paired with local ex-
perts from government or research institutes. The policy drafts or studies produced 
usually pass through an internal discussion and public consultation process before being 
taken up to the political decision-making level for approval.   
Given that the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) explicitly provides 
for the public participation in policy development, various structures have been set up to 
integrate stakeholders from the national and provincial governments, communities, the 
private sector and science.295 Platforms which enable the articulation of interests and 
views on environmental issues include the national Wildlife Forum which brings to-
gether the government and the wildlife industry, the Peoples and Parks conferences 
which deal with community concerns, or the ‘Rhino Dialogues’ which were initiated 
2012 in response to the deteriorating rhino poaching crisis. Although the scope of influ-
ence stakeholders are able to exert through such structures varies, it is clear “that public 
participation has become a basic feature of environmental decision-making” (University 
of Cape Town 2007: 78). A director at DEA commented on the required consultation 
processes as follows:   
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  Amongst others, NEMA outlines the principle that “decisions must take into account the inter-
ests, needs and values of all interested and affected parties, and this includes recognising all 
forms of knowledge, including traditional and ordinary knowledge” ((Republic of South Africa 
1998a), section 2 (4) g). 
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In the case of biodiversity, to a large extent your stakeholders are polarized, so you actu-
ally never get them all on the same page and agreeing. But we do have an extensive 
process prescribed within the Act of what constitutes public consultation and that would 
need to be taken into account. So our stakeholders are the public, the users, fellow gov-
ernment departments where we need mandate’s clarity sometimes, industry if there are 
impacts of an industry, communities. So we try to ensure that we’ve got really as many 
voices as possible. (…) So, when we present the report to our minister to take a decision, 
she can safely say that we have really consulted and have on record the views of all these 
constituencies. (Interview 14)  
An example that shows how public involvement in a way counter-balances the impact 
of external expertise is South Africa’s green economy modelling report. Following a 
first national summit on the issue held in 2010, DEA requested a scoping study which 
would outline potential opportunities and options for a transition to green economy in 
South Africa. On behalf of DEA, UNEP commissioned two policy analysts from the 
US-based Millennium Institute and two researchers affiliated with the South African 
Sustainability Institute and the Centre for Renewable and Sustainable Energy Studies of 
Stellenbosch University for technical assistance. While this team finally conducted the 
modelling exercise and prepared the report, the priority sectors, targets and scenarios to 
be included in the analysis were defined in the course of a workshop attended by South 
African policymakers, economists and researchers; moreover, various government de-
partments contributed to data collection (UNEP 2013: 11–13). Hence, although the 
assessment process was co-financed and supported by UNEP, UNDP and the European 
Commission, the “South African Green Economy Modelling Report” launched in 2013 
was substantially shaped and informed by local actors. 
Conclusion 
All in all, the picture which emerges with regard to environmental policy-processes in 
South Africa is that although being financially supported through aid, they are firmly 
led and driven by local actors. This is noticeable insofar as environmental authorities to 
some extent do rely on external financiers, at least in emerging areas which are not (yet) 
established enough to receive budgetary allocations. The strength of recipients in de-
fending their agenda-setting and decision-making autonomy despite this dependency 
seems to derive from different sources: First, from the high level of in-house expertise 
within government bodies which are staffed with a cadre of civil servants able to scruti-
nise and adjust policy concepts suggested from outside, and, if necessary, to defend 
decisions against external pressure; and second, from established internal advisory and 
public consultation mechanisms which mitigate external influence insofar as they ensure 
national deliberation. Given the strong voice and interaction of local stakeholders from 
government branches, the private sector, civil society and not least the science commu-
nity, the impact of donors in environmental policymaking is fairly limited.   
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6.3 The Impact of Expert Advice on Policymaking in Young 
Democracies: Synthesis of Findings 
In the preceding six case studies, we aimed to explore the impact of aid-related expert 
advice on policymaking in South Africa and Tanzania, whereby ‘impact’ is used here in 
its qualitative meaning. Instead of ‘measuring’ influence or providing some sort of 
quantitative scale, we tried to reveal the effects of external engagement on the agenda-
setting and steering capability of recipient bureaucracies. The key question which we 
wanted to approach by delineating policy processes in the fields of education, health and 
environment was: What enables governments to retain their agenda-setting autonomy, 
i.e. to define and defend own priorities, while relying on aid and expert advice? Taking 
previous findings and theoretical considerations into account, we assumed that three 
structural conditions are decisive in this regard, namely the recipient’s financial status, 
its administrative capacity and the local knowledge base (i.e. science community). 
Hence, we assessed South Africa’s and Tanzania’s strength with respect to these indica-
tors, finding variance not only between the two countries but also across sectors (see 
chapter 6.1).  
The case studies showed that recipients deal with donors very differently. This is not 
surprising given that each area of governance has its own history of aid relationships 
and experiences which impact on the way recipients position themselves towards the aid 
community. Although the case studies are thus in a way distinct, their comparison al-
lows for the identification of patterns which indicate that certain structural conditions 
indeed strengthen or weaken governments’ ability to remain sovereign in the realm of 
policymaking while dealing with donors. In the following, we highlight the effects of 
these conditions with empirical findings before we conclude with glancing at the role of 
recipient agency in a given context.296  
Financial Strength  
Financial strength or, the opposite, financial dependency is certainly the dimension 
which is most often used for explaining donor-recipient relationships, whereby it is ar-
gued that governments which rely heavily on foreign funding have little power to defy 
policy pressures exerted by the aid community (see, for instance, Bräutigam 2000: 1; 
Gould 2005a: 143–144; Mkandawire 2010). Our case studies provide indications that 
this thesis partly applies, but also suggest that finances are neither the only nor neces-
sarily the decisive condition for recipients’ bargaining position.  
In Tanzania, empirical evidence which supports the dependency narrative is found 
across all sectors. The fact that aid accounts for the bulk of ministerial development 
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  All information on finances, staffing levels and science capacity used in the following is docu-
mented with source material in chapter 6.1. The empirical examples we draw on are taken from 
the respective case studies where policy processes are delineated in detail (see chapters 6.2.1–-
6.2.6).  
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budgets and for more than 97% of HIV/AIDS expenditures inevitably coerces authori-
ties to reach consensus with funders if they want to maintain some scope of action; 
policies and programmes which are not ‘endorsed’ by donors in a way become irrele-
vant if they cannot be implemented due to lack of money. The stark dependence on aid 
lends itself as explanation why decision makers feel forced to consult with aid experts 
and usually follow their ‘advice’ – which tends to be an implicit requirement for cash 
disbursement – even if this means to adjust priorities and plans according to external 
funders’ preferences. The uptake of climate change as a priority issue, the formulation 
of a new HIV/AIDS Care and Treatment Plan, or the repeated revision of the Primary 
Education Development Programme III are just three examples for this kind of align-
ment which appears to be driven by the necessity to secure foreign funding rather than 
by actual conviction on government side.  
In South Africa, one finds a very different setting. This is not too surprising given that 
aid as a share of budgets is much lower, currently around 1% of national departments’ 
expenditures. Decision makers particularly in education and health showed themselves 
quite aware of the fact that their scope of action is not determined by donor money, alt-
hough it is valued as an additional source of finance. The relative independence from 
aid enables them to take a strong stance towards potential funders when it comes to de-
fining priorities and setting the conditions of cooperation. If donors do not agree and 
withhold support, it may affect the pace of policy implementation but not compromise 
implementation as such.  
While this applies to the health and education sector (or at least to major reforms carried 
out in these fields) the situation is different in environment where national bodies and 
provincial authorities do face financial constraints and often rely on external funding to 
realise important programmes. Interestingly, however, this does not seem to affect the 
sovereignty of environmental actors: Despite requiring resources from outside, they take 
a firm stand towards international players. Although environmental entities have re-
ceived substantial grants particularly from the GEF and have closely collaborated with 
experts from the World Bank and UNDP, they have been able to retain control over the 
agenda and keep external actors out of decision-making spheres; the CAPE process de-
lineated in this study can be seen as a case in point in this regard. 
The examples of the South African environment sector and to some extent also of 
HIV/AIDS, an area where financial and technical assistance continues to play a role, 
challenge the thesis that the recourse to aid inevitably results in a loss of policy autono-
my. They also refute what seems like an irrevocable fact in Tanzania, namely that 
recipients need to accept external involvement in the policy space in return for money. 
Various statements of government officials indicate that this corollary is taken as given 
and is internalised across leadership ranks in Tanzanian authorities; to repeat just a few:  
They’re the funders. They’re the ones who support you, so you have to go into negotia-
tion. (Interview 49, see chapter 6.2.1) 
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We discuss technically with partners, we plan technically together with them, that’s how 
it has been meant to be. (Interview 54, see chapter 6.2.3) 
HIV/AIDS in Tanzania is heavily funded by donors and therefore it’s very important to 
have that relationship (…). (Interview 61, see chapter 6.2.3)  
Because they provided funding, they would be interested in the process (…), so we would 
bring them on board in terms of the meetings we’d hold for our discussions and they 
would be giving their views. (Interview 66, see chapter 6.2.5).  
Given the sectorial variance regarding the level of dependence, the similarity of state-
ments from ministerial representatives is notable; one could have expected that leaders 
in education where aid makes up ‘only’ 8,5% of total and 60% of development expendi-
tures (considering MoEVT figures in 2010/11) might have a different position than 
decision makers in HIV/AIDS whose programmes are almost entirely financed by the 
aid community. This, however, doesn’t seem to be the case. Quite contrary to the as-
sumption that due to their relatively high domestic budget educational actors would take 
the strongest stance towards donors in the Tanzanian comparison, they most markedly 
showed signs of resignation in terms of defending a local agenda. Whereas officials in 
HIV/AIDS at least tried to convince donors to support national policy priorities (as ex-
emplified by the treatment/prevention struggle), officials in education seem to have lost 
the confidence of raising objections due to the perception of being at the mercy of ex-
ternal funders.   
The observations that a) South African environmental actors successfully retain their 
policy autonomy despite relying on aid and b) the Tanzanian education sector seems 
particularly weak in agenda-setting although being ‘better off’ than others in terms of 
finances suggest that financial strength is not necessarily the (only) determining factor 
of recipients’ ability to maintain the lead in policymaking while being advised from 
outside. 
Administrative Capacity  
Looking at the South African environment sector, a feature which obviously plays a 
crucial role in policy processes is the outstanding administrative strength of authorities 
dealing with donors. Whether it is the national Department of Environmental Affairs, 
the South African National Biodiversity Institute as an advisory body or the provincial 
agency CapeNature, all of them are known for being staffed with highly knowledgeable 
and skilled officials who encounter experts from the aid community at eye-level in 
terms of environmental expertise. Given that these actors possess both specialist 
knowledge and a sound understanding of national and international agendas, they are 
able to scrutinise and challenge policy ideas put forward to their organisations by inter-
national funders – as a UNDP officer remarked, “there are people who can say ‘no, this 
is not good’” (Interview 8). Such kind of absorptive capacity grounded on internal ex-
pertise has been a major factor why the policy changes leveraged through CAPE were 
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an outcome of exploration and negotiation by local stakeholders although the pro-
gramme was heavily co-financed from outside. The ability of environmental authorities 
to guide such processes and to keep control over the engagement of external actors 
therein – which also includes rejecting proposals which don’t support the South African 
agenda – rests to a significant extent on the capacity of their own expert cadres.  
A notable point here is that administrative strength doesn’t necessarily mean to have in-
house expertise for all spheres of responsibility on hand; particularly in emerging 
knowledge areas, entities like DEA or SANBI also face ‘capacity gaps’ which require 
assistance from outside. What can be observed, however, is that these organisations 
themselves determine the tasks assigned to consultants (e.g., the compilation and inter-
pretation of data or the development of planning tools required), and clearly delimit the 
scope of assistance. While external experts are commissioned to carry out analytical 
work or prepare recommendations, they do not get engaged in decision-making process-
es. Instead, their deliverables are validated by officials who deduce policy implications 
and put them forward for discussion. Such kind of absorption capacity seems to be a 
major factor why environmental agents in South Africa remain firmly in control of their 
agenda despite resorting to financial and technical support; the risk of being swayed by 
foreign actors is mitigated by a strong administration in the environmental sector.  
In other fields of governance, the scope of influence for external experts tends to be 
greater. Due to their limited in-house capacity, line departments in health and education 
rely much more on sourcing policy advice (as opposed to mere technical assistance) 
from outside. Advisors and consultants supplied by aid organisations have played a sig-
nificant role in past and recent reform processes in these sectors; in the course of 
establishing a new skills development system or preparing the National Health Insur-
ance, for instance, they were not only used to elaborate technicalities of implementation, 
but also to provide expertise and advice in early stages of policy exploration. The ideas 
and concepts conveyed through experts from outside markedly shaped the policies and 
schemes adopted by the South African administration. 
Yet, it needs to be emphasised that despite using advice at various stages, authorities in 
health and education have held the upper hand in making policy choices. While strategic 
decisions taken in the course of reforms were certainly informed by external expertise, 
they remained nonetheless locally ‘driven’ for at least two reasons: First, decision mak-
ers were not burdened with substantial financial needs and could thus pick or reject 
recommendations without being concerned about funders’ reaction. Second, despite 
limited in-house capacity, recipient authorities were strong enough to determine general 
policy objectives and direct advisors accordingly.  
This kind of steering capability on the part of the administration often seems missing in 
Tanzania. Given the immense shortfalls of qualified staff in national ministries (with 
deficits being even worse at lower levels), the latter are struggling to carry out intellec-
tual work without financial and technical assistance. This doesn’t mean that policy and 
planning units are void of skilled officials; one can certainly find highly knowledgeable 
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individuals with an impressive training background and years of experience who would 
be able to undertake the analytical exercises and studies required. Yet, the number of 
such specialists is just insufficient; the fact that at the time of research the Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare had only three health economists at its disposal (with one of 
them being the Permanent Secretary) indicates the dimension of the problem. The scar-
city of specialists has two implications for recipient organisations: Not only is their 
ability to develop an endogenous policy vision which would be essential to direct the 
aid community and its experts severely constrained; they are also hardly capable of 
thoroughly canvassing the advice put forward by external actors and counter arguments 
with own analyses.  
The lack of steering and absorption capacity opens up wide space for external experts to 
impinge on sectorial agendas and decision-making, as reflected by the examples deline-
ated in the case studies: Particularly health sector strategic plans and educational 
programmes have been strongly shaped by advisors and consultants who provided ‘evi-
dence’ in the form of situational assessments, statistics, expenditure reviews or 
evaluations. In many cases, policy recommendations were taken up almost unfiltered in 
the sense that they were included one-to-one into policies and strategic frameworks. 
One explanation why decisive documents (e.g., the Education Sector Development Pro-
gramme) frequently mirror external concepts and priorities is that the contribution of 
ministry staff in the course of their preparation is often more nominal than substantial, 
and that internal processes of critical validation are non-existent.297  
As the comparison of cases in South Africa and Tanzania shows, it is not the use of aid 
funded experts per se which allows external influence but the absence of absorptive and 
steering capacity in recipient authorities. The latter seems even more problematic if sec-
tors lack vocal stakeholders outside the administration who are able to challenge 
external policy proposals.  
Local Knowledge Base  
The availability of a local science community which is able to play a critical part in pol-
icy discourses and to serve as a source of alternative expertise was suggested as a third 
factor determining recipients’ strength to set their own agendas. Sector studies from 
both countries confirm the relevance of this dimension through both positive and nega-
tive examples. Again, the CAPE process which has brought about significant policy 
changes in South Africa lends itself as case in point: Aside from participating in public 
consultation, scientists from local academic institutions were involved therein by carry-
ing out research required to understand the state of biodiversity and socio-political 
conditions affecting conservation; their results were crucial for developing policies and 
approaches fitting the particular context in which they were meant to be applied. A no-
                                                          
297
  The second explanation which seems to apply in the case of environment is that the alignment to 
aid agendas is a deliberate choice of recipients as part of their tactical manoeuvring in dealing 
with aid; this point is raised below when the role of recipient agency is discussed.  
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ticeable point here is that many of the analyses conducted in the course of CAPE were 
financed with grant money from the GEF or other external financiers; yet, they were 
contracted out to South African researchers holding knowledge of both environmental 
issues and country-specific peculiarities. The utilisation of local scientists as producers 
of policy-relevant expertise can be seen as one factor which limited the ‘import’ of ex-
ternal views into the process.  
The example of CAPE suggests a more general conclusion: The availability of local 
expert communities potentially helps recipient authorities to keep foreign actors out of 
decision-making spheres and thus to preserve their agenda-setting authority even if they 
rely on donor funding. While the environmental sector in South Africa serves best to 
illustrate this finding, it is also supported by other cases: The fact that the South African 
health administration invited the HIV community to participate in developing the sec-
ond National Strategic Plan for AIDS, and used academics from within the country to 
provide advice and consultancies in the process of preparing a National Health Insur-
ance system seems to have strengthened its ability to re-assume leadership in the policy 
space; while various donors supported these processes with financial and technical as-
sistance, their impact on decision-making remained limited.  
The Tanzanian environment sector serves as a third example: Given that the National 
Environmental Policy and the Environmental Management Act – despite being funded 
from outside – were drafted by local experts from government and academia, these doc-
uments clearly reflected a national perspective on how environment in Tanzania should 
be conserved and managed. While there are a number of reasons for the failure of im-
plementation, including conflicting interests in the political realm, deficient budgets and 
staff constraints, it is not a matter of ‘imposed’ priorities which hinders execution. On 
the contrary, environmental authorities, most notably the Division of Environment in 
the Vice President’s Office, have repeatedly been trying to get support for implementing 
its policy and legal frameworks; unluckily, the aid community has shifted its attention to 
new issues.    
The significance of local expert communities manifests itself not only in the case stud-
ies where the latter have contributed to policy processes, but also in those where they 
are either non-existent or simply not utilised. While the former seems to apply to the 
Tanzanian education sector, the latter seems true for health. In both areas, foreign ex-
perts commissioned by aid agencies have taken over the function of feeding decision-
making bodies with ‘facts’ which suggest certain policy choices – e.g., to introduce 
‘treatment as prevention’ or to focus educational investment on the primary level due to 
its high ‘rate of return’. Given the current imperative of ‘evidence-based’ policymaking, 
recipients have little to argue against such recommendations if they cannot present 
‘counter-expertise’ to support a dissenting stance. The lack of local explanations for 
social problems such as the current quality crisis in education or missing sexual behav-
iour change despite widespread HIV awareness opens up room for donors to give 
reasons and provide solutions which fit the paradigms prevailing in headquarters. If 
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their reasoning is not scrutinised by actors within or outside the administration, recipi-
ents risk becoming fields of experimentation for the aid community’s newest ideas and 
approaches – USAID’s ICT project in primary education is a case in point in this regard.  
Overall, the investigation of educational and health policymaking in Tanzania indicates 
that the absence or non-involvement of local science communities tends to weaken poli-
cymakers’ ability to counter advice put forward by the aid community. Given that they 
are able to play a crucial role as knowledge producers and critical examiners of outside 
expertise – as other case studies have shown –, it is even more questionable why expert 
cadres available (e.g., in the field of health) are not better used.  
The Effects of Structural Conditions and Recipient Agency  
Taking a comparative view on the six case studies from South Africa and Tanzania, a 
very general conclusion which can be drawn is that all of the conditions we focussed on 
– financial strength, administrative capacity and the local knowledge base – do in fact 
appear to have a determining impact on recipients’ control over sectorial agendas. What 
needs to be emphasised here is that it is not one of these conditions but – as Whitfield 
and Fraser (2010: 365) have concluded from similar research (see chapter 1) – their ‘in-
tersection’ which seems to be decisive: A higher degree of financial dependency does 
not necessarily result in a loss of control but can to a certain degree be compensated by 
a strong administration which uses the local science community to define and defend its 
policy choices against outside advice. Equally, being better off in terms of finances does 
not prevent external influence if authorities are unable to scrutinise donor recommenda-
tions for their responsiveness to the local agenda, and/or continue to rely on foreign 
advisors and consultants who generate evidence for policy decisions.  
One implication which follows from these observations is that it is insufficient to ex-
plain external influence on policymaking with a single factor since there is no one-
dimensional causality. Using only aid dependency as a justification for weak recipient 
leadership would thus mean to disregard other conditions from which governments 
could potentially gain strength to keep control over the policy space. That nonetheless, 
some senior officials in Tanzania tend to do so, hints at an important aspect pertaining 
to the effect of structural conditions, namely the significance of subjective interpretation 
and consequent agency on recipient side. As Whitfield and Fraser (2009: 39) have 
pointed out, “conditions do not determine the outcome of any negotiation in a mechanis-
tic sense”. While they do provide resources or constraints which delimit the bargaining 
power of decision makers, it also matters how the latter react to them.  
The case studies from Tanzania have shown that recipients confronted with largely 
similar conditions choose different strategies of dealing with donors: In education, offi-
cials seem to have adopted a stance of submissiveness towards aid experts whereby 
resistance is expressed through deliberate postponing of decision-making; in health, 
leaders rhetorically keep promoting national priorities while at the same time accom-
modating funders’ demands; in environment, decision makers embark on tactical 
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manoeuvring, framing priorities to the aid agenda while following their own route in 
implementation. All these strategies primarily aim at maximising aid which in the light 
of the existing budget deficits is a justifiable objective. The downside of executing such 
strategies is that to a greater or lesser extent policy autonomy gets lost. 
The question is whether this is an inevitable consequence of receiving aid – our cases 
from South Africa indicate that it is not. As delineated in the sector studies, all three 
fields at times faced unfavourable conditions; particularly during the early years of tran-
sition, authorities were short of money and experienced officials, and thus relied on 
funding and expertise from outside. Nonetheless, decision makers took a strong, asser-
tive stance towards donors, making clear who will lead and set the overall direction. 
While other factors (e.g., diplomatic interests) certainly came into play, it was also the 
aplomb demonstrated by South African leaders that made external actors to accept and 
support national policy visions. This observation supports Whitfield’s finding that while 
structural conditions largely explain variation in recipients’ ability to retain control over 
the agenda, “a significant degree of variation is due to the confidence of recipient gov-
ernments to turn their conditions into negotiating capital” (Whitfield & Fraser 2009: 
364).  
Individual decision makers in Tanzania certainly possess this kind of confidence which 
enables them to interact with aid experts on a par although they have few resources to 
draw on. Yet, what seems far more prevalent among decision makers in government 
authorities is an attitude of resignation which induces senior officials to cede policy-
making and planning to aid experts who feed ‘national’ strategies with their own 
‘solutions’ for development. Overcoming the acquiescence prevailing among leadership 
ranks might be a first step to diminish external actors’ scope of influence despite ad-
verse structural conditions. 
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7 Summary and Conclusion  
This book began with pointing to the repeated critique and persistent failure of expert 
advice that with the rise of the ‘knowledge for development’ paradigm has become a 
prime tool of foreign aid. We argued that the chronic ineffectiveness of ‘technical assis-
tance’ – a notion under which advisory activities are commonly subsumed – does not 
primarily result from deficient implementation (as it is often suggested by evaluation 
studies) but from structural constraints that thwart knowledge transfer in the context of 
development cooperation. Moreover, we deemed the engagement of external experts in 
the policy space of recipient countries to be hazardous for young democracies insofar as 
it opens up room for foreign interference; ultimately, thus our thesis, expert advice from 
outside poses a threat to the legitimacy of recipient governments as the latter risk to lose 
control over their policy agendas. Using South Africa and Tanzania as sites of empirical 
investigation, we aimed to identify the conditions which determine recipients’ ability to 
retain their agenda-setting autonomy; moreover, we sought to reveal general impedi-
ments that explain why aid-related expert advice keeps developing countries in a status 
of dependency rather than making them self-reliant.  
The inherently political nature and vested interests of aid are key explanatory factors in 
this regard (see chapter 4). Given that donor governments use development assistance as 
a device for fostering foreign policy and economic objectives, expertise provided in this 
setting is inherently not as ‘neutral’ as usually claimed by those who emphasise its ‘evi-
dence-based’ grounding. While the extent to which advice is tied to prescribed agendas 
certainly varies depending on donor policies and organisational set-ups, it needs to be at 
least broadly in line with the political views of the funding governments. Due to the fact 
that the preferences of the latter shift with elections and global trends, priorities and 
modalities of aid frequently change. This ephemerality is detrimental to advisory pro-
cesses insofar as they would require a certain degree of continuance if they were to have 
any long-term impact (see chapter 5.1.1).  
The linkage between aid and politics also explains the supply-driven nature of expert 
activities which has consistently been criticised as a major flaw by assessment studies 
(see, for instance, Forss et al. 1988; Berg 1993; Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nor-
way &  Asplan Analyse 1994; Williams et al. 2003; Land 2007; European Commission 
2008; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2008). While most of these reports 
call for a greater involvement of recipients in identifying their needs or defining the 
terms of reference for external support, we argued that such suggestions will not solve 
the root cause of the prevailing mismatch between demand and supply (see chapter 
5.1.3). For donor governments and their respective implementing agencies, placing ex-
perts in recipient authorities not only helps to foster policy ideas conform to their own 
political directions but also to trace the use of taxpayers’ money. To cede decision-
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making over expert assistance to beneficiaries in order to increase local ‘ownership’ and 
commitment would mean to give up control and influence. From donor perspective, this 
would counteract efforts to legitimate aid spending and to prove accountability towards 
domestic constituencies. Therefore, expert advice in aid will remain oriented at funders’ 
interests, even if recipients are formally given more say.   
Another set of problems we identified are flaws pertaining to expert employment: the 
absence of clear concepts of knowledge transfer on donor side, an insufficient fit of ad-
visors’ expertise, experience and competencies, and unconducive employment 
conditions that thwart the building of trust and social ties (see chapter 5.2). Given such 
constraints, external experts at best fill gaps in recipient authorities, but contribute little 
to ‘capacitating’ counterparts as it is purported by aid providers. In actual fact, the latter 
profit from this failure insofar as their support would eventually become obsolete if 
knowledge transfer was achieved.  
As a third root cause of the inefficacy of expert advice, we pointed at the unequal rela-
tions that despite all rhetoric of ‘partnership’ continue to exist in development 
cooperation (see chapter 5.3). The imbalance which derives from the situation that one 
party depends on the assistance of the other – be it financially or in terms of specialist 
knowledge – is reinforced by the fact that advisory relations in aid are structured along a 
knowledge hierarchy which places ‘international’ (i.e. Northern) over ‘local’ 
knowledge; it manifests itself in stark discrepancies concerning the quality and credibil-
ity accredited to expertise. Aid agencies perpetuate this hierarchical classification 
through procurement practices that marginalise expert communities in recipient coun-
tries and solidify the pre-eminence of their own expert cadres. The obvious status 
difference between ‘international’ advisors and their counterparts in government author-
ities hampers the building of relationships which would allow for knowledge transfer, 
exchange and mutual learning.  
The intricacies resulting from hierarchical relations and vested interests underlying aid 
partly explain why decades of ‘technical assistance’ had so little impact in terms of ‘ca-
pacity building’, and why technocratic suggestions are unlikely to increase its 
effectiveness.298 The intrinsic constraints of aid-related expert advice delineated in this 
book account for its failure to help recipient governments in becoming independent. 
Policymakers in developing countries thus continue to rely on experts financed and pro-
vided by donor agencies. The persistent presence of external actors in their policy space, 
however, implies the constant risk of foreign interference in decision-making. The sec-
tor studies from South Africa and Tanzania (see chapter 6.2) documented the close 
involvement of aid experts in policy processes but also showed that the extent to which 
they are able to shape agendas varies considerably. While recipients’ ability to retain the 
lead in decision-making is to some extent dependent on the degree of their financial 
dependence, our analysis revealed that it is also determined by the strength of their ad-
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  A Tanzanian World Bank specialist in Dar es Salaam resignedly commented in this regard: “I’ve 
been really here for many years. I don’t see any capacity building at all.” (Interview 47) 
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ministrations and science communities in the respective fields. Moreover, the finding 
that policymakers who faced similar structural conditions positioned themselves differ-
ently towards the aid community, e.g., by adopting an attitude of resignation or by em-
employing strategies of resistance, hinted at the significance of agency within a given 
context (see chapter 6.3).  
All in all, the case studies showed that external advice has different effects on young 
democracies. The case of the Tanzanian education sector most strongly supports our 
initial thesis that it threatens the legitimacy of governments insofar as it makes decision-
making responsive to the preferences of foreign actors rather than to those of domestic 
stakeholders. While the orientation at donor demands undermines the ‘input’ legitimacy 
of educational governance, ‘output’ legitimacy is subverted since programmes devel-
oped from outside largely fail to bring about substantial change. The fact that the 
government formally bears the blame for policy failure in education although decisions 
are largely driven by donors hints at the accountability problems the reliance on external 
advice entails. Moreover, the dominance of aid experts has narrowed down if not elimi-
nated the space for endogenous policy thinking in responsible authorities. Unable to 
provide a genuine policy vision, leaders seem to have lost the control over the country’s 
education agenda to the expert cadres of foreign funders.  
While the Tanzanian education sector certainly constitutes the most extreme case in our 
sample, indications for a loss of policymaking authority were also found in the fields of 
health and environment. The case studies from Tanzania thus substantiated the claim 
that aid-related expert advice potentially jeopardises the legitimacy of democratic gov-
ernments if these are not able to absorb and use it for advancing their own agendas. That 
the latter is principally possible if recipients possess resources that allow them to scruti-
nise external expertise and adjust it to national policy visions can be seen in South 
Africa; in all three fields under investigation, policymakers have managed to retain the 
lead in decision-making despite drawing on external assistance. Yet, as repeatedly 
pointed out, the country is a rather unusual case given its outstanding financial and insti-
tutional strength. Most young democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa rather face conditions 
as found in Tanzania. Hence, the risk that their governments similarly lose (or have lost) 
legitimacy due to their dependence on donor funding and advice appears high.  
The findings of this study indicate the pertinence of this peril. Yet, we acknowledge 
weaknesses in our argumentation and empirical approach. The first is that we derive the 
loss of legitimacy from theoretical deduction rather than from actual ‘measurement’. 
Due to the necessity to limit the scope of empirical inquiry, we didn’t apply methods 
which would have ascertained the public acceptance of policies or the assessment of 
government performance by citizens, although they surely would have been instructive 
for investigating the legitimacy and responsiveness of decision-making in the different 
sectors. Aside from financial and time constraints, our status as foreign researchers 
would probably have made it difficult to carry out surveys grasping citizens’ percep-
tions of politics. The lack of such material clearly left a void in our analysis. It is 
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important to note that the scarcity of social science research and public opinion polls in 
developing countries not only poses a problem for scholars interested in the link be-
tween government policy positions and citizen preferences. It is also problematic for the 
democratic system insofar as important indicators of representation are missing.299  
An auxiliary approach for investigating to what extent policy agendas reflect local con-
cerns (as opposed to priorities of foreign actors) would have been to include 
parliamentary debates about sectorial challenges and reform proposals into the analysis. 
While this might have been feasible for South Africa where records of parliamentary 
committee meetings are provided online in English language, the absence of Swahili 
skills and the lack of access to Tanzania’s National Assembly made it impossible for us 
to follow discussions taking place in this institution.300 This shortcoming on our side 
hints at the limits of carrying out research ‘from outside’, and at the potential of aca-
demic cooperation with local scientists from which this project certainly would have 
profited.  
Given the constraints outlined above, our research omitted to capture the preferences of 
the electorate in order to contrast them with government policy decisions and thus to 
assess the responsiveness of the latter. We tried to mitigate this gap by including the 
perspectives of academics and civil society activists who, while counting among elites, 
can be deemed part of ‘the public’. The focus of our investigation lay on tracing the 
policy interests of two groups of actors, namely the government (represented by poli-
cymakers and senior bureaucrats) and donors (represented by experts of aid agencies in 
their various roles). Thereby, we classified the interests of the former as ‘local’ and 
those of the latter as ‘external’. Admittedly, this was a wide generalisation that over-
simplified reality. Yet, it helped us to reconstruct policy struggles and to grasp which 
side was more successful in shaping the outcomes of the discourse. The fact that we 
primarily relied on the protagonists involved in such processes to give account of their 
own and others’ roles therein meant that we had no ‘unbiased’ material (if such exists) 
to draw on. Alternative ethnographic methods such as participant observation would 
have provided a more direct access to policy negotiations and related advisory situations 
as the objects under investigation. At the same time, however, they would have nar-
rowed down the scope of the study significantly in terms of the areas and time periods 
covered. Using expert interviews in spite of their methodological limitations (see chap-
ter 2) allowed us to carry out sector studies in two countries, and to include past and 
present policy processes. The variety of cases, in turn, helped to reveal general com-
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  For more detailed deliberations on the significance of public opinion for policymaking in democ-
racies, see Soroka and Wlezien (2010).   
300
  The Parliamentary Monitoring Group, an independent NGO in South Africa, provides sound 
records and minutes of all parliamentary committee proceedings on its website (see 
http://www.pmg.org.za/, last accessed on 10.01.2015). The Parliament of Tanzania releases writ-
ten documentation of ministerial statements, committee meetings, budget speeches etc. in 
Swahili language (see http://www.parliament.go.tz/, last accessed on 10.01.2015); yet, the body 
of reports doesn’t seem to be comprehensive and up to date.  
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plexities of expert advice in the aid setting as well as to identify conditions which de-
termine its effects. Similar empirical research covering other aid receiving countries in 
Africa and other world regions would be instructive to test the generalisability of find-
ings and their validity in differing contexts. It would surely be advantageous if this 
research was carried out by or in collaboration with local scholars who might have a 
deeper understanding of historical developments, social realities and the political scenes 
in their countries than researchers from the North.  
Much literature about aid emanates from political science and economics, and focuses 
on its political and institutional effects in recipient countries. With this book, we hope to 
contribute to the debate with insights from the sociology of science, and to bring in a 
new perspective which highlights the complexities of knowledge transfer as the ultimate 
aim of expert advice. While international organisations have been promoting the latter 
as the new panacea for development, our study has provided explanations why in most 
cases it fails to be of use for recipients, or, even worse, has a detrimental impact on the 
fragile fabric of their democracies.   
It needs to be emphasised at this point that we do not insinuate that harming recipients’ 
institutions is the intention of anyone involved in the aid business. Most experts we met 
in country offices, embassies and government authorities conveyed the impression that 
they truly sought to help their South African or Tanzanian counterparts in coping with 
the massive problems related to health care, education systems or the environment. 
Some advisors were themselves highly critical of their own organisations’ practices, and 
seemed seriously interested in how to bring about change. The findings of our research, 
however, suggest that providing developing countries with experts from outside will not 
achieve this change, irrespective of the commitment and good will of individual actors 
or attempts to refine approaches. This conclusion sounds rather pessimistic and in a way 
prompts to withdraw a large amount of aid immediately. In fact, the results of this study 
tempt us to dissuade donors from continuing to supply advice to countries that obvious-
ly lack the absorptive capacity to adequately deal with it.  
What would – in our view – be more instructive is to use the available means for sup-
porting the knowledge communities in developing countries so that these become able 
to produce a critical mass of local experts who qualify as producers and critical scruti-
nisers of expertise. This support does not necessarily need to (or should better not?) be 
delivered through conventional aid programmes since, as outlined in this book, these are 
invariably affected by conflicts of interests and accountability pressures that undermine 
their actual objectives. It could, instead, take the form of investment that facilitates insti-
tutional cooperation between research centres, be they university-based or ‘think tanks’ 
outside the academic system. It could be provided in the form of educational scholar-
ships that enable students to enter higher education paths, notably not only abroad 
(which, most often, means in the North) but in their own countries. It could mean to 
make funding available for the setup of new university programmes that are locally de-
signed and oriented at the specific country challenges. While none of these suggestions 
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are new, they seem to have faded from the spotlight of foreign funders whereby one 
reason might be the difficulty to gain visible results from such kind of investment. In 
terms of value for the societies of developing countries, however, it is likely to have 
more effect than sticking to ‘parachute experts’ from outside.  
Examples that hint at the potential of science-related initiatives can already be found. In 
Tanzania, a cooperation between the Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences 
in Dar es Salaam, the University of Heidelberg (Germany) and GTZ in the early 2000s 
led to the introduction of a first Master of Public Health Programme. Producing a cru-
cial cadre of public health specialists, the annual course is still being offered by the 
School of Public Health and Social Sciences301, and the two universities have continued 
collaboration and exchange. In South Africa, remarkable achievements regarding the 
transformation of the higher education landscape were accomplished through the so-
called ‘South Africa Norway Tertiary Education Programme’ (SANTED).302 Starting in 
2000, it aimed at improving the access, retention and success of previously disadvan-
taged students, enhancing the administrative and academic capacity of selected 
universities, and facilitating regional cooperation. When the programme formally ended 
in 2010, it had – despite a comparatively small amount of foreign investment – cata-
lysed structural changes and institutional linkages spanning sixteen universities in South 
Africa and the SADC region (see Gibbon 2014: 3–4).  
While it is certainly difficult to directly ‘measure’ the impact of such initiatives, the fact 
that they outlast the timeframes of external support indicates a degree of sustainability 
which many aid projects are lacking. The value of students who benefit from better edu-
cation opportunities in their countries and empower their societies through building an 
endogenous knowledge base should not be under-estimated just because it cannot be 
easily expressed in numerical terms. The long-term profit from building ‘human capital’ 
in developing democracies through strengthening their higher education systems should 
be considered by those who have the means for providing support but also by the gov-
ernments in these countries themselves. Surely, investing into tertiary education may 
seem like an unaffordable luxury for decision makers facing a myriad of social prob-
lems that require attention and budget. This might explain why some science systems in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are underfunded to such an extent that they operate “in a ‘subsist-
ence mode’ where they struggle to reproduce themselves” (Mouton et al. 2008: 200). 
Their absolute dependency on foreign funders in many cases bars them from playing 
their systemic role insofar as they are unable to set their own research agendas inde-
pendently from external influences (Mouton et al. 2008: 204). To carry out science in 
response to local needs, universities would need to be “backed by long-term commit-
                                                          
301
  For details, see the programme outline on the university website: http://sphss.muhas.ac.tz/ in-
dex.php/training-programmes/postgraduate-programs/master-of-public-health-mph (last accessed 
on 08.01.2015).  
302
  For details, see the SANTED website: http://www.santed.org.za/ (last accessed on 08.01.2015).   
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ment of adequate resources from government and the private sector” (Girvan 2007: 33). 
The provision of domestic means for research and higher education is critical because  
only on this basis do external support and collaboration stand a chance of success. In this, 
as in all other areas, external inputs cannot substitute for internal effort. (Girvan 2007: 33) 
It needs to be acknowledged that many African leaders increasingly try to put science 
on their political agendas. Although these endeavours have not always or not yet been 
translated into budgets, newly formulated policy frameworks and intensified efforts to 
produce data on science and technology systems signal rising awareness of their poten-
tial (see NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency 2014).303 At the same time, 
however, it is noticeable that this potential is often reduced to stimulating economic 
growth through innovation, whereas the value of science communities for policymaking 
and governance is neglected. This manifests itself in the weak and sometimes non-
existent links between the political sphere and academia. Various researchers we met 
for this study, particularly in Tanzania, complained about the disinterest of decision 
makers in their findings. Such complaints, of course, are neither new nor confined to 
developing countries, and the tense relationship between science and politics has been a 
topic of debate for a while (see Barker & Peters 1993; Bechmann 2003; Lentsch & 
Weingart 2009b). Yet, the disregard of local knowledge by policymakers in young Afri-
can democracies is specifically concerning insofar as an important resource that could 
strengthen their sovereignty is left unexploited. 
Certainly, expert communities in developing countries are still small in many fields and 
require internal and external support to grow. They nonetheless constitute a source of 
expertise that – if tapped by their governments – could contribute to decrease the de-
pendence on advice from outside. For young democracies, using the knowledge and 
capacity of their own societies seems indispensable if they want to find and realise their 
own policy visions.  
                                                          
303
  The number of countries participating in and delivering statistics for the African Innovation 
Outlook, for instance, increased from 19 in the first round to 35 in the second phase (NEPAD 
Planning and Coordinating Agency 2014: xxviii).  
 305 
 
 
Bibliography 
Adams, J., King, C. & Hook, D. (2010) Global Research Report Africa. Thomson Reuters, Leeds. 
Adamson, M. R. (2006) “The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy”?: The Eisenhower 
Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World. In: Statler, K. C. & Johns, A. L. (eds.) The Eisen-
hower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War. Lanham, Md: 
Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 47–99. 
Adler, P. S. & Kwon, S.-W. (2002) Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept. The Academy of Man-
agement Review 27 (1), pp. 17–40. 
African Development Bank Group (2009) Assessing Governance: Staff Guidance Note on the Govern-
ance Rating of the Bank’s Country Performance Assessment. Operational Guidance Note, Tunis. 
——— (2013) Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. Formatted CPIA Dataset, released 2011, last 
updated 27.01.2013, Abidjan, Tunis. http://cpia.afdb.org/ResourceCenter/Default.aspx. Accessed 
27/02/2014. 
African National Congress (2007) 52nd National Conference: Resolutions, Polokwane. 
African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2010) African Innovation Outlook 2010. 
AU–NEPAD, Pretoria. 
AIDS Healthcare Foundation (2013) South Africa: 1,000 protest U.S. AIDS funding cuts. AFH. 
http://www.aidshealth.org/archives/15911. Accessed 23/01/2014. 
Akida, A., Mnangwone, I. & Lyimo, L. (2012) Financing for Sustainable Forest Management in Tanza-
nia: Country Case Study. Indufor, Helsinki. 
Albertyn, C. & Fakir, S. (2000) Development Cooperation Report II for South Africa 1994–
1999: Evaluation of ODA to the environment sector. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Alesina, A. & Dollar, D. (2000) Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? Journal of Economic 
Growth 5 (1), pp. 33-63. 
Alexander, R. (2008) Education For All, The Quality Imperative and the Problem of Pedagogy. CRE-
ATE Research Monograph (20). Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and 
Equity, London. 
Alexopoulos, A. N. & Buckley, F. (2013) What Trust Matters When: The Temporal Value of Professional 
and Personal Trust for Effective Knowledge Transfer. Group & Organization Management 38 (3), 
pp. 361–391. 
Allais, S. (2010) The changing faces of the South African National Qualifications Framework: NQF 
Country Study. International Labour Organization, Geneva. 
Allais, S. M. (2006) Problems with qualification reform in senior secondary education in South Africa. In: 
Young, M. & Gamble, J. (eds.) Knowledge, curriculum and qualifications for South African further 
education. Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp. 18–45. 
Anderson, T. (2008) South-to-South Consulting: Africans Offer International Perspective. USAID, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2008. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaeb085.pdf. Accessed 5/11/2013. 
Aning, K. (2010) Security, the War on Terror, and Official Development Assistance. Critical Studies on 
Terrorism 3 (1), pp. 7–26. 
Appiah, F., Chimanikire, D. P. & Gran, T. (eds.) (2004) Professionalism and good governance in Africa, 
Oslo: Abstrakt forlag. 
Arencibia-Jorge, R., Araujo Ruíz, J. A., Hung Llamos, B. R., Corera Álvarez, E. & Rodríguez, Z. C. 
(2012) Scientific development in African countries: a scientometric approach 1996–2009. Project re-
port. INASP, Editorial Universitaria, Ministerio de Educación Superior, Oxford, Havana. 
Bibliography 306 
 
Argote, L. & Ingram, P. (2000) Knowledge Transfer: A Basis for Competitive Advantage in Firms. Or-
ganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 82 (1), pp. 150–169. 
Ashwell, A., Sandwith, T., Barnett, M., Parker, A. & Wisani, F. (2006) Fynbos Fynmense: people making 
biodiversity work. SANBI Biodiversity Series (4). South African National Biodiversity Institute, Pre-
toria. 
ASSA AIDS Committee (2011) ASSA2008 AIDS and Demographic model of the Actuarial Society of 
South Africa: ProvOutput. Actuarial Society of South Africa, 2011. 
http://aids.actuarialsociety.org.za/scripts/buildfile.asp?filename=ProvOutput_110216.zip. Accessed 
22/07/2014. 
Assey, P., Bass, S. & Cheche, B. et al. (2007) Environment at the heart of Tanzania’s development: Les-
sons from Tanzania’s National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. Natural Resource 
Issues Series (6). International Institute for Environment and Development, London. 
Assey, S. (2012) A Critical Analysis of the Expulsion of Pregnant Girls from School: A Case Study of 
Temeke District, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Dissertation. Southern and Eastern African Regional Cen-
tre for Women’s Law, University of Zimbabwe, Harare. 
AusAid (2012) Adviser Remuneration Framework: Version 3, February 2012. http://aid.dfat.gov.au/ 
Publications/Documents/adviser-remuneration-framework.pdf. Accessed 14/11/2013. 
Australian Government (2013) AusAID – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade integration. Latest 
News, 31.10.2013, Barton, 31 October 2013. http://aid.dfat.gov.au/LatestNews/Pages/dept-
integration.aspx. Accessed 6/01/2014. 
Ayo, C. K. (2013) Nigeria’s Education System is at the Mercy of Policy Implementation. Covenant Uni-
versity, 18 November 2013. http://covenantuniversity.edu.ng/News/Nigeria-s-Education-System-is-
at-the-Mercy-of-Policy-Implementation#.VIbhN3vh2Sp. Accessed 9/12/2014. 
Aziz, R. (2013) Obama 2014 budget: Continued support for Global Fund, paired with PEPFAR cut leave 
Blueprint goals in question. Center for Global Health Policy, 10 April 2013. 
http://sciencespeaksblog.org/2013/04/10/cut-to-pepfar-support-for-global-fund-in-obama-2014-
budget-leave-blueprint-goals-in-question/. Accessed 23/01/2014. 
Badroodien, A. & McGrath, S. (2005) International influences on the evolution of South Africa’s Nation-
al Skills Development Strategy, 1989–2004. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 
Eschborn. 
Baleta, A. (1999) South Africa’s AIDS care thrown into confusion. The Lancet 354 (9191), p. 1711. 
Barber, J. P. (2004) Mandela’s world: The international dimension of South Africa’s political revolution 
1990-99, Oxford: James Currey. 
Barker, A. & Peters, B. G. (eds.) (1993) The Politics of Expert Advice. Creating, Using and Manipulating 
Scientific Knowledge for Public Policy, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Barrett, A. M., Chawla-Duggan, R., Lowe, J., Nikel, J. & Ukpo, E. (2006) The concept of quality in edu-
cation: a review of the ‘international’ literature on the concept of quality in education. EdQual 
Working Paper (3). University of Bristol, University of Bath, Bristol, Bath. 
Barron, P., Gouws, H. & Loots, B. et al. (2009) Consolidated Report of the Integrated Support Team: 
Review of health overspending and macro-assessment of the public health system in South Africa, 
Pretoria. 
Barry, S. M. L., Mpangile, G. & Loughran, L. (2003) Recommendations for USAID/Tanzania’s 
HIV/AIDS Strategy 2005–2014. USAID; The Synergy Project, Washington D.C. 
Basic Education Development Committee (2001) Primary Education Development Plan (2002–2006). 
Education Sector Development Programme. Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es 
Salaam. 
——— (2006) Primary Education Development Programme II (2007–2011). Education Sector Develop-
ment Programme. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Bass, S. & Renard, Y. (2009) UNDP-UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative (PEI): Evaluation of the 
Partnership with Norway 2004–2008. International Institute for Environment and Development 
(IIED), London. 
Bibliography 307 
 
BBC News (2012) Malawi suspends laws against homosexual relationships, 05 November 2012. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20209802. Accessed 18/12/2013. 
BBC News (2006) SA’s Zuma ‘showered to avoid HIV’. BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
4879822.stm. Accessed 28/07/2014. 
Becerra, M., Lunnan, R. & Huemer, L. (2008) Trustworthiness, Risk, and the Transfer of Tacit and Ex-
plicit Knowledge Between Alliance Partners. Journal of Management Studies 45 (4), pp. 691–713. 
Bechmann, G. I. (ed.) (2003) Expertise and Its Interfaces. The Tense Relationship of Science and Politics, 
Berlin: edition sigma. 
Benatar, S. R. (1997) An old health care system gives place to new. The Lancet 349 (9064), pp. 1537–
1545. 
Berg, E. J. (1993) Rethinking technical cooperation: Reforms for capacity building in Africa, New York: 
Development Alternatives Inc. 
Berger, P. L. & Luckmann, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge, London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014a) BTI 2014: South Africa Country Report. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh. 
——— (2014b) BTI 2014: Codebook for Country Assessments. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh. 
——— (2014c) BTI 2014: Tanzania Country Report. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh. 
Berthélemy, J.-C. (2006) Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Motives in Aid Alloca-
tion: Do All Donors Behave the Same? Review of Development Economics 10 (2), pp. 179–194. 
Berthélemy, J.-C. & Tichit, A. (2004) Bilateral donors’ aid allocation decisions – a three-dimensional 
panel analysis. International Review of Economics & Finance 13 (3), pp. 253–274. 
Besharati, N. A. (2013) The establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency: Insti-
tutional complexities and political exigencies. South African Journal of International Affairs 20 (3), 
pp. 357–377. 
Best Jobs Tanzania Blog (2013) Health Advisor Jobs at DFID Tanzania, 26 February 2013. 
http://bestjobstanzania.blogspot.de/2013/02/health-advisor-jobs-at-dfid-tanzania.html. Accessed 
8/11/2013. 
Bevan, S. (2006) African minister ends decade of denial on Aids. The Telegraph, Pretoria, 11 December 
2006. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/3346075/African-minister-ends-decade-of-
denial-on-Aids.html. Accessed 25/07/2014. 
Bhalalusesa, E. (2003) Education for All: Is Tanzania on Track? NORRAG News (32), pp. 49–53. 
Bickerton, C. J., Cunliffe, P. & Gourevitch, A. (eds.) (2007) Politics without sovereignty: A critique of 
contemporary international relations, Oxon, New York: University College London Press. 
Bierschenk, T. (1988) Entwicklungshilfeprojekte als Verhandlungsfelder strategischer Gruppen oder 
Wieviele Tierhaltungsprojekte gibt es eigentlich im Atakora (VR Benin)? Berlin: FU Berlin Institut 
für Ethnologie Abteilung Sozialanthropologie. 
Biesma, R. G., Brugha, R., Harmer, A., Walsh, A., Spicer, N. & Walt, G. (2009) The effects of global 
health initiatives on country health systems: a review of the evidence from HIV/AIDS control. Health 
Policy and Planning 24 (4), pp. 239–252. 
Bigsten, A. & Danielson, A. (2001) Tanzania: Is the Ugly Duckling Finally Growing Up? NAI Research 
Reports (120). Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala. 
Bird, A. (2001) Knowledge Capacity Building in South Africa: Both Global and Local Strategies. In: 
Gmelin, W., King, K. & McGrath, S. (eds.) Development Knowledge, National Research and Inter-
national Cooperation. Edinburgh, Bonn, Geneva: CAS, DSE, NORRAG, pp. 265–276. 
Bird, A. & Heitmann, W. (2011) Policy transfer or policy learning: Interactions between international and 
national skills development approaches to policy making in South Africa. Paper prepared for the 
NORRAG Conference on ‘Policy transfer or policy learning’, Geneva. 
Birdsall, N., Mahgoub, A., Savedoff, W. D. & Vyborny, K. (2011) Cash on delivery: A new approach to 
foreign aid, Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development. 
Bibliography 308 
 
Blomley, T. & Iddi, S. (2009) Participatory Forest management in Tanzania: 1993–2009: Lessons learned 
and experiences to date. Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Dar es Salaam. 
Blomley, T., Pfliegner, K. I. J., Zahabu, E., Ahrends, A. & Burgess, N. D. (2008) Seeing the wood for the 
trees: an assessment of the impact of participatory forest management on forest condition in Tanza-
nia. Oryx 42 (3), pp. 380–391. 
Blomley, T. & Ramadhani, H. (2006) Going to Scale with Participatory Forest Management: Early Les-
sons from Tanzania. International Forestry Review 8 (1), pp. 93–100. 
BMZ (2011) Forms of Development Cooperation Involving the Private Sector. Strategy Paper (5). Feder-
al Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Bonn, Berlin. 
Bodibe, K. (2011) HCT campaign: the numbers so far. health-e, 30 June 2011. http://www.health-
e.org.za/2011/06/30/hct-campaign-the-numbers-so-far-living-with-aids-478/. Accessed 30/07/2014. 
Bogner, A., Littig, B. & Menz, W. (eds.) (2009) Interviewing Experts, Basingstoke: Palgrave Machmil-
lan. 
Bogner, A. & Menz, W. (2009) The Theory-Generating Expert Interview. In: Bogner, A., Littig, B. & 
Menz, W. (eds.) Interviewing Experts. Basingstoke: Palgrave Machmillan, pp. 43–80. 
Bojö, J. & Reddy, R. C. (2002) Mainstreaming Environment in Poverty Reduction Strategies. Environ-
ment Strategy Note (4). World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Bond, P. (2001) Foreign Aid and Development Debates in Post-apartheid South Africa. Transformation 
(45), pp. 25–36. 
Booth, D. & Cammack, D. (2013) Governance for development in Africa: Solving collective action prob-
lems, London: Zed Books. 
Boseley, S. (2011) Crisis looms as Global Fund forced to cut back on Aids, Malaria and TB grants. The 
Guardian, 23 November 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/society/sarah-boseley-global-
health/2011/nov/23/aids-tuberculosis. Accessed 23/01/2014. 
Botha, M. (2004) Partnerships, Cooperative Management and Incentives to Secure Biodiversity Conser-
vation in Priority Areas in the Cape Floristic Region: Final Project Completion Report. Botanical 
Society of South Africa, Claremont. 
Bradshaw, D., Dorrington, R. & Laubscher, R. (2012) Rapid Mortality Surveillance Report 2011. Medical 
Research Council, Burden of Disease Research Unit, Cape Town. 
Bratton, M. & Landsberg, C. (2000) South Africa. In: Forman, S. & Patrick, S. (eds.) Good intentions: 
Pledges of aid for postconflict recovery. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 259–314. 
Bräutigam, D. (1992) Governance, Economy, and Foreign Aid. Studies in Comparative International 
Development 27 (3), pp. 3–25. 
——— (2000) Aid Dependence and Governance. Expert Group on Development Issues (1). Almqvist & 
Wiksell International, Stockholm. 
Bräutigam, D. & Botchwey, K. (1999) The institutional impact of aid dependence on recipients in Africa. 
CMI Working Papers (1). Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen. 
Bräutigam, D. & Knack, S. (2004) Foreign Aid, Institutions and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Eco-
nomic Development and Cultural Change 52 (2), pp. 255–286. 
Brown, A. (2000) Current Issues in Sector-Wide Approaches For Health Development: Tanzania Case 
Study. Overseas Development Institute, World Health Organization, Geneva. 
Browne, S. (2006) Aid and influence: Do donors help or hinder?, London, Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
Brown, W. (2013) Sovereignty matters: Africa, donors, and the aid relationship. African Affairs 112 
(447), pp. 262–282. 
Buchert, L. (1995) Recent trends in education aid: towards a classification of policies. A Report from the 
IWGE. UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris. 
——— (1997) Education policy formulation in Tanzania: co-ordination between the Government and 
International Aid Agencies. A Report from the IWGE. UNESCO International Institute for Educa-
tional Planning, Paris. 
Bibliography 309 
 
——— (1999) Co-ordination of aid to education at the country level: some experiences and lessons from 
the United Republic of Tanzania in the 1990s. In: King, K. & Buchert, L. (eds.) Changing interna-
tional aid to education. Global patterns and national contexts. Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 
NORRAG, pp. 222–238. 
Bulíř, A. & Hamann, A. J. (2008) Volatility of Development Aid: From the Frying Pan into the Fire? 
World Development 36 (10), pp. 2048–2066. 
Burki, O. (2001) Sector-Wide Approach in Tanzania. The Health Sector Example: Observations from a 
Bi-Lateral. Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation. 
Buss, l., Lames, M., Hustädt, E. & Klinge, B. (2012) Report on the procurement of goods and services 
and the conclusion of financing agreements. GIZ, Eschborn. 
Butler, A. (2005) South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Policy, 1994–2004: How can it be explained? African Affairs 
104 (417), pp. 591–614. 
Cadman, M., Petersen, C., Driver, A., Sekhran, N., Maze, K. & Munzhedzi, S. (2010) Biodiversity for 
Development: South Africa’s landscape approach to conserving biodiversity and promoting ecosys-
tem resilience. South African National Biodiversity Institute, Pretoria. 
Cape Action for People and the Environment (2011) Our Partnership. http://www.capeaction.org.za/ 
index.php/our-partnership. Accessed 8/05/2014. 
Cape Action Plan for the Environment (2000) Implementation Programme Report. CSIR Report (ENV-S-
C 99130 D). 
Cape Nature Conservation (2003) Conservation Stewardship: Pilot projects in the Swartland and Over-
berg, Cape Town. 
CAPE Project Team (2000) Cape Action Plan for the Environment: A Biodiversity Strategy and Action 
Plan for the Cape Floral Kingdom. Summary Report. 
Carlsson, G. (2012) Clear goals to be set for development assistance. Debate article Svd Brännpunkt. 
Government Offices of Sweden, Stockholm, 22 March 2012. http://www.government.se/sb/d/7958/ 
a/189214. Accessed 22/01/2014. 
Carothers, T. & de Gramont, D. (2013) Development aid confronts politics: The almost revolution, Wash-
ington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Carton, M. & King, K. (2004) Transforming the Labour Skills Arena in South Africa: The International 
Dimension. Notes et Travaux (74). Institute Universitaire d’Ètudes du Dèveloppement, Geneva. 
Catherine A. Odora Hoppers (ed.) (2002) Indigenous Knowledge and the Integration of Knowledge Sys-
tems: Towards a Philosophy of Articulation, Claremont: NAE. 
CDU,  CSU &  FDP (2009) Growth, Education, Unity. The coalition agreement between the CDU, 
CSU and FDP for the 17th legislative period, Berlin. 
Celasun, O. & Walliser, J. (2008) Predictability of aid: Do fickle donors undermine aid effectiveness? 
Economic Policy 23 (55), pp. 545–594. 
Chêne, M. (2009) Low salaries, the culture of per diems and corruption. U4 Expert Answer. U4 Anti-
Corruption Resource Centre, Transparency International, Chr. Michelsen Institute. 
Chigwedere, P., Seage, G. R., Gruskin, S., Lee, T.-H. & Essex, M. (2008) Estimating the Lost Benefits of 
Antiretroviral Drug Use in South Africa. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 49 (4), 
pp. 410–415. 
Child, B. (2010) Independent Terminal Evaluation of the ‘UNDP-GEF CAPE Agulhas Biodiversity Initi-
ative (ABI)’. Project Number: SAF/03/G31/A/1G/99. GEF, UNDP. 
Chisholm, L. (2003) The state of curriculum reform in South Africa: The issue of Curriculum 2005. In: 
Daniel, J., Habib, A. & Southall, R. (eds.) State of the nation: South Africa, 2003–2004. Cape Town, 
South Africa: HSRC Press, pp. 268–289. 
——— (2005) The making of South Africa’s National Curriculum Statement. Journal of Curriculum 
Studies 37 (2), pp. 193–208. 
Chorley, M. (2013) UK government gave £80,000 in taxpayers’ money to Zimbabwe government in 
contravention of its own rules. Daily Mail Online, 04 December 2013. 
Bibliography 310 
 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2518131/UK-government-gave-80-000-taxpayers-money-
Zimbabwe-government-contravention-rules.html. Accessed 27/01/2014. 
Christie, P. (2006) Changing regimes: Governmentality and education policy in post-apartheid South 
Africa. International Journal of Educational Development (26), pp. 373–381. 
Christie, P. & Collins, C. (1984) Bantu Education: Apartheid Ideology and Labour Reproduction. In: 
Kallaway, P. (ed.) Apartheid and education: The education of Black South Africans. Johannesburg: 
Ravan Press, pp. 160–183. 
Clay, E. J., Geddes, M. & Natali, L. (2009) Untying aid: Is it working?: An Evaluation of the Implemen-
tation of the Paris Declaration and of the 2001 DAC Recommendation of Untying ODA to the LDCs. 
Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. 
Collins, C. (2013) Zambia: Cutting Pepfar Will Erode Gains Made in HIV/Aids Fight. Times of Zambia, 
19 May 2013. http://allafrica.com/stories/201305270392.html. Accessed 23/01/2014. 
Conservation International (2013) The Biodiversity Hotspots. http://www.conservation.org/ 
where/priority_areas/hotspots/africa/Pages/africa.aspx. Accessed 15/04/2013. 
Coordinating AIDS Technical Support Group (2009) Study on Technical Assistance and Technical Sup-
port to Global Fund Grant Implementation at Country Level. Summary Report. 
Coovadia, H., Jewkes, R., Barron, P., Sanders, D. & McIntyre, D. (2009) The health and health system of 
South Africa: historical roots of current public health challenges. The Lancet 374 (9692), pp. 817–
834. 
Crane, W., Sandwith, T., McGregor, E. & Younge, A. (2009) Where conservation and community coin-
cide: A human rights approach to conservation and development in the Cape Floristic Region, South 
Africa. In: Campese, J., Sunderland, T., Greiber, T. & Oviedo, G. (eds.) Rights-based approaches: 
Exploring issues and opportunities for conservation. Bogor: CIFOR, IUCN, pp. 141–161. 
Crouch, C. (2005) Post-democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Crown Management Consultants (2009) Tanzania Public Service Situation Analysis: Towards a Revised 
Public Service Pay Policy. Draft Report. United Republic of Tanzania, Public Service Management, 
Dar es Salaam. 
Dahl, R. A. (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, London: Yale University 
Press. 
Dahl, R. A. & Levi, M. (2009) A Conversation with Robert A. Dahl. Annual Review of Political Science 
12 (1), pp. 1–9. 
Dalal-Clayton, D. B., Bass, S. & Antonio, E. (2009) The challenges of environmental mainstreaming: 
Experience of integrating environment into development institutions and decisions. International In-
stitute for Environment and Development, London. 
Dale, N. J. (2005) Integrating Environmental Issues into PRSPs in ECA Countries. Environment Strategy 
Note (12). World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Danida, Vice President’s Office, Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government 
&  Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (2010) Annual Sector Review: Tanzania-Denmark: 
Environmental Sector Programme Support: Review Aide Memoire, Dar es Salaam. 
Deacon, R., Osman, R. & Buchler, M. (2009) Audit and Interpretative Analysis of Education Research in 
South Africa: What Have We Learnt? A research report submitted to the National Research Founda-
tion. 
Death, C. (2012) Environmental mainstreaming and post-sovereign governance in Tanzania: Draft paper 
– for panel ‘Governing and contesting African governance’ BISA-ISA Joint International Confer-
ence, Edinburgh, 20-22 June 2012. Aberystwyth University. 
Department of Basic Education (2011) Annual Report 2010/11. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2012) Annual Report 2011/12. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2013) Annual Report 2012/13. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2014a) DBE and researchers exchange views on the South African schooling system, Pretoria. 
http://www.education.gov.za/Home/EducationResearchIndaba/tabid/843/Default.aspx. Accessed 
14/03/2014. 
Bibliography 311 
 
——— (2014b) Education Statistics in South Africa 2012. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2014c) Department of Basic Education hosts Discipline in Education Summit on 7 & 8 March 
2014, Pretoria. http://www.education.gov.za/Newsroom/MediaReleases/tabid/347/ctl/Details/ 
mid/2929/ItemID/3896/Default.aspx. Accessed 14/03/2014. 
Department of Education (1995) White Paper on Education and Training in a Democratic South Africa: 
First Steps to Develop a New System. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Department of Education & Department of Labour (2002) Report of the Study Team on the Implementa-
tion of the National Qualifications Framework. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2003) An Interdependent National Qualifications Framework System: Consultative Document. 
Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Department of Environmental Affairs (2010a) Environmental Sector Skills Plan for South Africa: A sys-
tems approach to human capacity development and sector skills planning. Republic of South Africa, 
Pretoria. 
——— (2010b) National protected area expansion strategy for South Africa 2008: Priorities for expand-
ing the protected area network for ecological sustainability and climate change adaptation. 
Government of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2012a) Annual Report 2011/2012. DEA Chief Directorate: Communications, Pretoria. 
——— (2012b) Environment Sector Research, Development and Evidence Framework: An approach to 
enhance science-policy interface and evidence-based policy making. Republic of South Africa, Preto-
ria. 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (2005) South Africa’s National Biodiversity Strategy 
and Action Plan. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2006) South Africa Environment Outlook. A report on the state of the environment. Republic of 
South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2009a) South Africa’s Fourth National Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Preto-
ria. 
——— (2009b) South Africa’s National Biodiversity Framework 2008 . Government Gazette (32474). 
Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Department of Health (1997) White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa. 
Notice 667 of 1997. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2000) HIV/AIDS & STD Strategic Plan for South Africa 2000–2005. Republic of South Africa, 
Pretoria. 
——— (2010) Delivery Agreement for Outcome 2: A Long and Healthy Life for All South Africans, 
Pretoria. 
——— (2011a) Annual Report 2010/11. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2011b) Human resources for health South Africa: HRH strategy for the health sector 2012/13–
2016/17. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2011c) National Health Insurance Conference: “Lessons for South Africa”: National Consulta-
tive Health Forum (NCHF). December 7th–8th, 2011. Republic of South Africa, Johannesburg, 
Pretoria. 
——— (2011d) National Health Insurance in South Africa: Policy Paper, Pretoria. 
——— (2011e) The Aid Effectiveness Framework for Health in South Africa: Working together to im-
plement the Negotiated Service Delivery Agreement and to attain the Millennium Development 
Goals. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2012) Annual Report 2011/2012. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Department of Higher Education and Training (2011) Annual Report 2010/2011. Republic of South Afri-
ca, Pretoria. 
——— (2012a) Annual Report 2011/2012. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Bibliography 312 
 
——— (2012b) Green Paper for Post-Schooling Education and Training. Government Gazette (No. 
34935). Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2013a) Annual Report 2012/2013. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2013b) Vacancies closing September 2013, Pretoria. http://www.dhet.gov.za/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Y0IxcQ0NHPI%3D&tabid=241. Accessed 8/11/2013. 
——— (2013c) White Paper for Post-School Education and Training: Building an Expanded, Effective 
and Integrated Post-School System. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Department of Labour (1997) Green Paper: Skills Development Strategy for Economic and Employment 
Growth in South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (1998) Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Department of Labour & GTZ (2008) Joint Focal Area Skills Development & Labour Market Midterm 
Progress Report 2008. GTZ Focal Area Secretariat, Pretoria. 
Department of State &  USAID (2010) Leading Through Civilian Power. The First Quadrennial Diplo-
macy and Development Review, Washington D.C. 
Development Partners Group on Health (2006) Terms of Reference for the Development Partners Group 
on Health (DPG Health). Development Partners Group Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2014) The Health Basket Fund. Development Partners Group Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 2014. 
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/dpg-website/sector-groups/cluster-2/health/top-tabs/basket-fund.html. Ac-
cessed 5/11/2014. 
Development Partners Group on HIV/AIDS (2013) Terms of Reference for Development Partners Group 
on HIV/AIDS (DPG-AIDS). Development Partners Group Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Development Partners Group Tanzania Welcome to the DPG-Health Website. 
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/index.php?id=1037. Accessed 29/08/2014. 
——— (2007) Draft Terms of Reference for the Pharmaceuticals Working Group (PWG) of the SWAP 
committee, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2010a) Draft Terms of Reference Human Resources for Health Technical Working Group (Tan-
zania Mainland), Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2010b) Revised Terms of Reference, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012) Final Performance Assessment Framework 2013 (PAF 2013), Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2014a) About DPG AIDS. http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/index.php?id=38. Accessed 29/08/2014. 
——— (2014b) DPG Environment, Natural Resources and Climate Change, Dar es Salaam. 
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/index.php?id=37. Accessed 19/03/2014. 
——— (2014c) Strengthening Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania: Welcome to the Development Partners 
Group in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/dpg-website/dpg-tanzania.html. Accessed 
5/12/2014. 
DFID (2006) Developing Capacity: An Evaluation of DFID-funded Technical Co-operation for Economic 
Management in Sub-Saharan Africa. Synthesis Report (EV667). 
——— (2007) Development on the Record. DFID Annual Report 2007, London. 
——— (2011) The engine of development: The private sector and prosperity for poor people. DFID, 
London. 
——— (2012) How many staff work for DFID? DFID staffing numbers as at 31 December 2012. 
http://old.dfid.gov.uk/About-us/Your-Questions-Answered/How-many-staff-work-for-DFID-/. Ac-
cessed 30/04/2013. 
——— (2013) UK to end direct financial support to South Africa. Press release, London, 30 April 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-end-direct-financial-support-to-south-africa. Accessed 
8/12/2014. 
DFID Tanzania (2011) Operational Plan 2011–2015. 
DFID South Africa (2013) SARRAH 2013 Annual Review, Pretoria. 
Bibliography 313 
 
Dietrich, J. W. (2007) The Politics of PEPFAR: The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Ethics 
& International Affairs 21 (3), pp. 277–292. 
Dietrich, S. (2006) Careers with the World Bank. A study on recruitment strategies and qualification 
requirements at the World Bank. Erfurt School of Public Policy, Erfurt. 
Dijkstra, G. (2005) The PRSP Approach and the Illusion of Improved Aid Effectiveness: Lessons from 
Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua. Development Policy Review 23 (4), pp. 443–464. 
DPG (2010) Comments on MKUKUTA II Priority Results Areas, Dar es Salaam. 
Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E. & Vreeland, J. R. (2009) Development aid and international politics: Does mem-
bership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? Journal of Development 
Economics 88 (1), pp. 1–18. 
Driscoll, R., Christiansen, K. & Booth, D. (2005) Progress reviews and performance assessment in pov-
erty-reduction strategies and budget support: A survey of current thinking and practice. Overseas 
Development Institute, Japan International Cooperation Agency, London. 
Driver, A., Sink, K. J. & Nel, J. et al. (2012) National Biodiversity Assessment 2011: An assessment of 
South Africa’s biodiversity and ecosystems. Synthesis Report. South African National Biodiversity 
Institute, Department of Environmental Affairs, Pretoria. 
Du Plessis, W. (2008) Legal mechanisms for cooperative governance in South Africa: successes and 
failures. SA Publiekreg = SA Public Law 23 (1), pp. 87–110. 
Ear, S. (2013) Aid dependence in Cambodia: How foreign assistance undermines democracy, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Easterly, W. (2002) The Cartel of Good Intentions: Markets vs. Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid. Working 
Paper (4). Center for Global Development, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C. 
——— (2013) The tyranny of experts: Economists, dictators, and the forgotten rights of the poor, New 
York: Basic Books. 
ECDPM & ACE Europe (2006) Changing minds and attitudes: Towards improved Belgian Technical 
Assistance. Reflection and discussion paper. BTC/CTB, Brussels. 
Economic and Social Research Foundation (2010) Assessment of Effectiveness of Development Coopera-
tion/External Resources and Partnership Principles in Context of the MKUKUTA/MKUZA Review. 
Final Report May 2010, Dar Es Salaam. 
ED-DPG (2012) Education Development Partners Group Meeting: Canadian Cooperation Office Confer-
ence Room 17th October 2012, Dar es Salaam. 
Education Development Partners Group in Tanzania (2013) Appraisal of the Tanzania Mainland Educa-
tion Sector Development Plans, Dar es Salaam. 
Education Sector Development Committee (2011) Education Sector Performance Report 2010/11. United 
Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012) Education Sector Performance Report 2011/2012. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es 
Salaam. 
Edwards, K., Lukumbuzya, K. & Kajembe, G. (2012) Capacity Needs Assessment of Government Institu-
tions at Central, Regional, District and Local Levels for the Establishment and Management of a 
REDD+ Scheme in Tanzania. Final Report and Capacity Development Plan Prepared by LTS Inter-
national for the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) and the UN-REDD National 
Programme in Tanzania. LTS International Ltd, Penicuik. 
Elliott-Teague, G. (2007) NGOs in Policymaking in Tanzania: The Relationships of Group Characteris-
tics, Political Participation and Policy Outcomes. Dissertation. School of Public and Environmental 
Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington. 
——— (2011) “Public” Interests and the Development of Tanzanian Environmental Policy. Politics & 
Policy 39 (5), pp. 835–861. 
Embassy of the United States Dar es Salaam (2012) American People Sponsor 21st Century Education 
Program in Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam. http://tanzania.usembassy.gov/pr_02292012.html. Accessed 
8/07/2014. 
Bibliography 314 
 
Eriksson Baaz, M. (2005) The Paternalism of Partnership. A Postcolonial Reading of Identity in Devel-
opment Aid, London, New York: Zed Books. 
European Commission (2008) Reforming Technical Cooperation and Project Implementation Units for 
External Aid provided by the European Commission: A Backbone Strategy, Luxemburg. 
——— (2014) Eurostat: R&D expenditure. Data from October 2012. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
statistics_explained/index.php/R_%26_D_expenditure. Accessed 10/03/2014. 
European Union (2012) Summaries of EU legislation: Public works contracts, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts, 15 February 2012. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/ 
businesses/public_procurement/l22009_en.htm. Accessed 31/10/2013. 
Evers, H.-D. (2005) Wissen ist Macht: Experten als Strategische Gruppe. ZEF Working Paper Series (8). 
Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung, Bonn. 
Evers, H.-D., Kaiser, M. & Müller, C. (2009) Knowledge in development: epistemic machineries in a 
global context. International Social Science Journal 60 (195), pp. 55–68. 
Evers, H.-D. & Menkhoff, T. (2002) Selling Expert Knowledge: The Role of Consultants in Singapore’s 
New Economy. ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy (55). Universität Bonn, Zentrum für 
Entwicklungsforschung, Bonn. 
Evers, H.-D., Schiel, T. & Korff, R. (1988) Strategische Gruppen: vergleichende Studien zu Staat, Bür-
okratie und Klassenbildung in der Dritten Welt, Berlin: D. Reimer. 
Executive Council of the African Union (2006) Decision on the report on the conference of Ministers of 
Science and Technology Doc. EX.CL/224 (VIII), Khartoum. 
Express (2013) Overseas aid is being wasted through Government mismanagement, report says, 17 May 
2013. http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/400392/Overseas-aid-is-being-wasted-through-
Government-mismanagement-report-says. Accessed 27/01/2014. 
FAO (2010a) Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010: Global Tables. FAO, Rome. 
——— (2010b) Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. Main report. FAO, Rome. 
——— (2012) Participatory forestry, 04 April 2012. http://www.fao.org/forestry/participatory/en/. Ac-
cessed 3/04/2014. 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (2002) Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strate-
gy, Addis Ababa. 
File, J., van den Heever, A. & Saunders, S. J. (1989) Towards the day of hard choices. Nature (341), pp. 
96–98. 
Fiske, E. B. & Ladd, H. F. (2005) Elusive equity: Education reform in post-apartheid South Africa, Cape 
Town: HSRC Press. 
Fleck, R. K. & Kilby, C. (2010) Changing aid regimes? U.S. foreign aid from the Cold War to the War on 
Terror. Journal of Development Economics 91 (2), pp. 185–197. 
Fölscher, A., Smith, M. & Davies, T. (2010) Development Cooperation Review III - Final Report. Na-
tional Treasury, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Forss, K., Carlsen, J., Froyland, E., Sitari, T. & Vilby, K. (1988) Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Tech-
nical Assistance Personell financed by the Nordic Countries. A study commissioned by Danida, 
Finnida, NORAD, SIDA. Evaluation reports (5). 
Foster, M. (2000) New approaches to development co-operation: What can we learn from experience with 
implementing sector wide approaches? Working Paper (140). Overseas Development Institute, Lon-
don. 
Foster, M., Brown, A. & Conway, T. (2000) Sector-wide approaches for health development. A review of 
experience. World Health Organization, Geneva. 
Foster, M. & Mwinyimvua, H. (2003) Public Expenditure Review: HIV/AIDS Multi-Sectoral Update for 
2004. DFID Health Systems Resource Centre, London. 
Fourie, P. & Meyer, M. (2010) The Politics of AIDS Denialism. South Africa’s Failure to Respond, Farn-
ham: Ashgate Pub. 
Bibliography 315 
 
Fourie, P., Perche, D. & Schoeman, R. (2010) Donor assistance for AIDS in South Africa: many actors, 
multiple agendas. Strategic Review for Southern Africa 32 (2). 
Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011) Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation. OECD, Busan. 
Fraser-Hurt, N., Zuma, K. & Njuho, P. et al. (2011) The HIV epidemic in South Africa: What do we 
know and how has it changed? Report prepared for SANAC. World Bank; Human Sciences Research 
Council; Health and Development Africa; UNAIDS. 
Gaillard, J. (2010) Measuring Research and Development in Developing Countries: Main Characteristics 
and Implications for the Frascati Manual. Science Technology & Society 15 (1), pp. 77–111. 
Galabawa, C. J. (1990) Implementing educational policies in Tanzania, Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
——— (2001) Developments and Issues Regarding Universal Primary Education (UPE) in Tanzania. 
ADEA Biennial Meeting 2001, Arusha, Tanzania. Association for the Development of Education in 
Africa, Paris. 
Gibbon, T. (2014) Driving change: The story of the South Africa Norway Tertiary Education Develop-
ment Programme, Cape Town: African Minds. 
Gilbert, N. & Cherry, M. (2008) Incoming South African health minister raises hopes on HIV. Nature, 26 
September 2008. http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080926/full/news.2008.1138.html. Accessed 
28/07/2014. 
Gilens, M. (2005) Inequality and democratic responsiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly 69 (5), pp. 778–
796. 
Girvan, N. (2007) Power Imbalances and Development Knowledge: Theme Paper prepared for the project 
Southern Perspectives on Reform of the International Development Architecture. The North-South 
Institute, Ottawa. 
GIZ (n.d.) Selection procedure for consulting firms and suppliers, Eschborn. 
——— (2007) Partnering for regional cooperation and development: South African-German Trilateral 
Cooperation Programme (TriCo). GIZ. http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/17558.html. Accessed 
8/12/2014. 
——— (2011) National personnel (NP) policy, Eschborn. 
——— (2012a) Company Report 2011. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
GmbH, Bonn, Eschborn. 
——— (2012b) Investing in the future – vocational training for climate and environment. 
http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/17848.html. Accessed 10/06/2014. 
——— (2012c) Vocational training in South Africa – greener and more practice-oriented. 
http://www.giz.de/en/mediacenter/9158.html. Accessed 10/06/2014. 
——— (2013a) Company Report 2012: GIZ. Solutions that work. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internatio-
nale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Eschborn. 
——— (2013b) Development Cooperation Trainee Programme, Eschborn. http://www.giz.de/en/ 
jobs/446.html. Accessed 26/09/2013. 
——— (2013c) GIZ in South Africa. Programmes and Projects, Pretoria. 
GIZ Tanzanian German Programme to Support Health (2011) GIZ Professional Group Meeting, Docu-
mentation, White Sands, Dar es Salaam, 6–7 December 2011. 
Glaser, B. G. & Strauss, A. L. (1967) The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative re-
search, Chicago: Aldine. 
Gläser, J. & Laudel, G. (2010) Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als Instrumente rekon-
struierender Untersuchungen, 4th edn.: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
——— (2013) Life With and Without Coding: Two Methods for Early-Stage Data Analysis in Qualita-
tive Research Aiming at Causal Explanations. Forum: Qualitative Social Research (Online Journal) 
14 (2). 
Glennie, J. (2008) The trouble with aid. Why less could mean more for Africa, London (et al.): Zed 
Books. 
Bibliography 316 
 
——— (2011) Is cash on delivery the future for aid? Results-based aid is a welcome innovation, but the 
problem about what to do when targets aren’t met is profound. Poverty matters blog. The Guardian, 
13 May 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/may/13/cash-
delivery-future-results-based-aid. Accessed 21/01/2014. 
Glennie, J. & Prizzon, A. (2012) From high to low aid: a proposal to classify countries by aid receipt. 
ODI Background Note. Overseas Development Institute, London. 
Global Campaign For Education (2013) Education Aid Watch 2013. GCE, Johannesburg. 
Global Environment Facility (2007) National Grasslands Biodiversity Programme (NGBP): Request for 
CEO Endorsement/Approval, Washington D.C. 
——— (2010a) Financing the Stewardship of Global Biodiversity. GEF, Washington D.C. 
——— (2010b) System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR). GEF, Washington D.C. 
——— (2012) South Africa and the GEF: Fact Sheet. GEF, Washington D.C. 
Global Environment Facility Evaluation Office (2008) GEF Country Portfolio Evaluation: South Africa 
(1994–2007). Evaluation reports (43), Washington D.C. 
Gould, J. (2005a) Conclusion: the politics of consultation. In: Gould, J. (ed.) The new conditionality: The 
politics of poverty reduction strategies. London, New York: Zed Books, pp. 135–151. 
——— (2005b) Poverty, politics and states of partnership. In: Gould, J. (ed.) The new conditionality: The 
politics of poverty reduction strategies. London, New York: Zed Books, pp. 1–16. 
Gould, J. & Ojanen, J. (2003) ‘Merging in the Circle’: The Politics of Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy. Policy Papers (2). Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki. 
——— (2005) Tanzania: merging in the circle. In: Gould, J. (ed.) The new conditionality: The politics of 
poverty reduction strategies. London, New York: Zed Books, pp. 17–65. 
Government of Tanzania (2002) Agreed Notes from the Workshop on the Report of Group of Independ-
ent Advisors on Development Co-operation Issues Between Tanzania and its Aid Donors. In: 
Wangwe, S. M. (ed.) NEPAD at Country Level – Changing Aid Relationships in Tanzania. Dar es Sa-
laam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, pp. 125–129. 
——— (2011a) Budget Books 2011–2012 Volume II: Recurrent Expenditures, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2011b) Budget Books 2011–2012 Volume IV: Development Expenditures, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012a) Budget Books 2012–2013 Volume II: Recurrent Expenditure for CFS and Supply Votes, 
Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012b) Budget Books 2012–2013 Volume IV: Development Expenditures for Supply Votes and 
Regions, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2013a) Budget Books 2013–2014 Volume II: Public Expenditure Estimates Supply Votes as 
Passed by the National Assembly, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2013b) Budget Books 2013–2014 Volume IV: Public Expenditure Estimates Development as 
Passed by the National Assembly, Dar es Salaam. 
Government of Tanzania &  Health Basket Partners (2011) Side Agreement between Health Basket Part-
ners and The Government of Tanzania, Fiscal Year 2011/12, Dar es Salaam. 
Government of Tanzania & Danida (2007) Programme Document: Environmental Sector Programme 
Support Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Government of Tanzania & Development Partners (2007) Code of Conduct for the Tanzania Health Sec-
tor Wide Approach (SWAp) between the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW); Prime 
Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG); Ministry of Fi-
nance (MoF); and Development Partners in the Health Sector, Dar es Salaam. 
Government of the Netherlands (2013) New agenda for aid, trade and investment. News item, 09 April 
2013. http://www.government.nl/issues/development-cooperation/news/2013/04/09/new-agenda-for-
aid-trade-and-investment.html. Accessed 25/04/2013. 
Greenhill, R. (2006) Real Aid 2: Making Technical Assistance Work. ActionAid International, Johannes-
burg. 
Bibliography 317 
 
Greenhill, R., Prizzon, A. & Rogerson, A. (2013) The age of choice: developing countries in the new aid 
landscape: A synthesis report. ODI Working Paper (364). Overseas Development Institute, London. 
Grimwood, A., Crewe, M. & Betteridge, D. (2000) HIV/AIDS – current issues. In: Ntuli, A. (ed.) South 
African Health Review. Durban: Health Systems Trust, pp. 287–299. 
GTZ (2007) German Technical Co-operation with South Africa. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit, Pretoria. 
Haan, A. de & Everest-Phillips, M. (2010) Can New Aid Modalities Handle Politics? In: Mavrotas, G. 
(ed.) Foreign Aid for Development. Issues, Challenges, and the New Agenda. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 197–221. 
Haas, P. M. (1992) Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. Interna-
tional Organization 46 (1), pp. 1–35. 
Hagmann, T. (2012) Supporting Stability, Abetting Repression. New York Times, 11 July 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/opinion/abetting-repression-in-ethiopia.html?_r=0. Accessed 
18/12/2013. 
Hajidimitriou, Y. A., Sklavounos, N. S. & Rotsios, K. P. (2012) The Impact Of Trust On Knowledge 
Transfer In International Business Systems. Scientific Bulletin - Economic Sciences 11 (2), pp. 39–49. 
HakiElimu (2011) Education Sector Budget 2011/2012. Is there any hope for improving education? 
HakiElimu Brief (6E), Dar es Salaam. 
Hamman, K. (2009) CapeNature: building institutional capacity. M&E case study (15). Cape Action for 
People and the Environment, Cape Town. 
Hansen, M. T. (1999) The Search-Transfer Problem: The Role of Weak Ties in Sharing Knowledge 
across Organization Subunits. Administrative Science Quarterly 44 (1), pp. 82–111. 
Harrison, G. (2004) The World Bank and Africa. The construction of governance states., London (et al.): 
Routledge. 
Harrison, G. & Mulley, S. (2009) Tanzania: A Genuine Case of Recipient Leadership in the Aid System? 
In: Whitfield, L. (ed.) The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors. New York: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 271–298. 
Health Systems Trust (2010) The 10 Point Plan. Kwik Skwiz (Vol. 2 No. 1), Westville. 
Heitmann, W. (2010) Systems building and consulting through networking with social partners. In: Ze-
hender, W. (ed.) Networking with Partners. Wiesbaden: Universum Verlagsanstalt, pp. 99–123. 
Helen Suzman Foundation (2011) Submission to National Department of Health: National Health Insur-
ance Green Paper, Parktown. 
Helleiner, G. K. (2000) External Conditionality, Local Ownership, and Development. In: Freedman, J. 
(ed.) Transforming Development: Foreign Aid for a Changing World. Toronto, Buffalo, London: 
University of Toronto Press, pp. 82–97. 
Helleiner, G. K., Killick, T., Lipumba, N., Ndulu, B. J. & Svendsen, K. E. (1995) Report of the Group of 
Independent Advisers on Development Cooperation Issues between Tanzania and its Aid Donors. 
Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen. 
Hepworth, N. (2009) Capacity building or capacity demolition? Rethinking donor support to unlock self-
determined and sustainble water resource management in East Africa. mimeo, n.p. 
Heywood, M. (2003) Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in South Africa: background, strate-
gies and outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign case against the Minister of Health. Current 
Developments. South African Journal on Human Rights 19 (2), pp. 278–315. 
High-Level Committee on Management (2011) Personnel Statistics - Data as at 31 December 2010 
(CEB/2011/HLCM/HR/13). UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination. 
Hingora, A. Developments of Health Sector Reforms in Tanzania. Ministry of Health, Dar es Salaam. 
Hjelmåker, L. (2013) Opening Statement at the 2013 GBS Annual Review, Dar es Salaam. 
Hobbs, G. (2001) The Health Sector-Wide Approach and Health Sector Basket Fund. Economic and 
Social Research Foundation, Dar es Salaam. 
Bibliography 318 
 
Hoeffler, A. & Outram, V. (2008) Need, Merit or Self-Interest – What Determines the Allocation of Aid? 
CSAE WPS (19). Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford, Oxford. 
——— (2011) Need, Merit, or Self-Interest-What Determines the Allocation of Aid? Review of Devel-
opment Economics 15 (2), pp. 237–250. 
Holtom, D. (2002) Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ‘Everyone Wants a Success Story’: 
Feedback Report for Interviewees. Centre For Development Studies, Swansea. 
——— (2007) The challenge of consensus building: Tanzania’s PRSP 1998–2001. The Journal of Mod-
ern African Studies 45 (02), pp. 233–251. 
Hood, C. (1991) A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration Review 69 (1), pp. 3–19. 
Hood, C. & Peters, G. (2004) The Middle Aging of New Public Management: Into the Age of Paradox? 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 14 (3), pp. 267–282. 
Howell, J. & Lind, J. (2009a) Changing Donor Policy and Practice in Civil Society in the Post-9/11 Aid 
Context. Third World Quarterly 30 (7), pp. 1279–1296. 
——— (2009b) Counter-terrorism, aid and civil society: Before and after the war on terror, Basing-
stoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Human Sciences Research Council (1995) Ways of Seeing the National Qualifications Framework. 
HSRC, Pretoria. 
——— (2011) Highlights from TIMSS 2011: The South African Perspective, Pretoria. 
Hunsmann, M. (2013) Depoliticising an epidemic – International AIDS control and the politics of health 
in Tanzania. Dissertation. Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. 
Huntley, B. J. & Redford, K. H. (2014) Mainstreaming biodiversity in Practice: a STAP advisory docu-
ment. Global Environment Facility, Washington D.C. 
Hüsken, T. (2006) Der Stamm der Experten. Rhetorik und Praxis des Interkulturellen Managements in 
der deutschen staatlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. 
Hutton, G. (2004) Global Health Initiatives in HIV/AIDS in Tanzania: Situation analysis and review of 
key issues: A briefing paper established in the frame of the SCD-STI SWAp Mandate 2003-4. Swiss 
Agency for Development and Co-operation, Swiss Tropical Institute, Bern, Basel. 
Hyden, G. & Karlstrom, B. (1993) Structural adjustment as a policy process: The case of Tanzania. World 
Development 21 (9), pp. 1395–1404. 
ICAI (2014) DFID’s Private Sector Development Work. Report (35). Independent Commission for Aid 
Impact, London. 
Ifakara Health Institute (2014) Frequently Asked Questions: Where does IHI get its funding from? 
http://www.ihi.or.tz/about/faq#q3. Accessed 12/03/2014. 
Inka Consult (2008) Final Report on Needs Assessment for Strengthening National Capacity to Adapt to 
the Adverse Impact of Climate Change. August 2008. 
Inkpen, A. C. & Tsang, E. W. K. (2005) Social Capital, Networks, and Knowledge Transfer. The Acade-
my of Management Review 30 (1), pp. 146–165. 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (2012a) Financing Global Health 2012: Methods Annex. IH-
ME, Seattle. 
——— (2012b) Financing Global Health 2012: The End of the Golden Age? IHME, Seattle. 
Institutional Profiles Database (2012). AFD;  DG Trésor;  CEPII;  University of Maastricht, 2012. 
http://www.cepii.fr/institutions/data/IPD_2012_%20EN.xlsx. Accessed 26/02/2014. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2013) Voting Power of Executive Directors. 
Corporate Secretariat, Washington D.C. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,  International Finance Corporation &  Interna-
tional Development Association (2013) Executive Directors and Alternates. Corporate Secretariat, 
Washington D.C. 
International Civil Service Commission (2013) United Nations common system of salaries, allowances 
and benefits. United Nations, New York. 
Bibliography 319 
 
International Development Cooperation Unit (2003) Policy Framework and Procedural Guidelines for the 
Management of Official Development Assistance: 1st Edition. National Treasury, Pretoria. 
Irikefe, V., Vaidyanathan, G., Nordling, L., Twahirwa, A., Nakkazi, E. & Monastersky, R. (2011) Science 
in Africa: The view from the front line. Nature 474 (7353), pp. 556–559. 
IRIN news (2002) South Africa: Defiant province to give AIDS drugs to mothers, Johannesburg, 22 Feb-
ruary 2002. http://www.irinnews.org/report/30414/south-africa-defiant-province-to-give-aids-drugs-
to-mothers. Accessed 25/07/2014. 
——— (2006) Tanzania: ARV roll-out slowly improving, Dar es Salaam, 25 October 2006. 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/62627/tanzania-arv-rollout-slowly-improving. Accessed 6/10/2014. 
——— (2011a) South Africa: Country launches new HIV, TB plan, East London, 01 December 2011. 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/94365/south-africa-country-launches-new-hiv-tb-plan. Accessed 
31/07/2014. 
——— (2012) Guinea-Bissau: HIV/AIDS fight hit by Global Fund cuts, Dakar/Bissau, 12 December 
2012. http://www.irinnews.org/report/97029/guinea-bissau-hiv-aids-fight-hit-by-global-fund-cuts. 
Accessed 23/01/2014. 
——— (2013a) Concerns over HIV/AIDS funding cuts, Addis Ababa, 09 January 2013. 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/97204/ethiopia-concerns-over-hiv-aids-funding-cuts. Accessed 
23/01/2014. 
——— (2013b) Vietnam concerned over HIV donor funding cuts, Bangkok, 12 July 2013. 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/98402/vietnam-concerned-over-hiv-donor-funding-cuts. Accessed 
23/01/2014. 
IRIN news (2007a) South Africa: Activists welcome ambitious new AIDS plan, Johannesburg, 15 March 
2007. http://www.irinnews.org/report/70725/south-africa-activists-welcome-ambitious-new-aids-
plan. Accessed 25/07/2014. 
——— (2007b) Tanzania: Concern over school drop-out rate, Dar es Salaam, 08 June 2007. 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/72628/tanzania-concern-over-school-drop-out-rate. Accessed 
10/07/2014. 
——— (2011b) HIV/AIDS: Global Fund cancels funding, Johannesburg, 24 November 2011. 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/94293/hiv-aids-global-fund-cancels-funding. Accessed 6/11/2014. 
IUCN (2012a) The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version 2012.2. Number of extinct, threatened 
and other species of animals in each Red List Category in each country. IUCN. 
——— (2012b) The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species. Version 2012.2. Number of extinct, threat-
ened and other species of plants in each Red List Category in each country. IUCN. 
IUCN & UNEP-WCMC (2011) The World Database on Protected Areas (WDPA). UNEP-WCMC, Cam-
bridge (UK) , January 2011. http://www.wdpa.org/resources/statistics/2011MDG_National_Stats.xls. 
Accessed 16/04/2013. 
Jadoo, Y. (2014) ‘No delays’ in roll-out of NHI. The Citizen. http://citizen.co.za/166771/no-delays-in-
roll-out-of-nhi/. Accessed 25/08/2014. 
Jansen, E. G. (2009) Does aid work? Reflections on a natural resources programme in Tanzania. U4 issue 
(2). Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen. 
Jaycox, E. V. (1993) Capacity building: the missing link in African development. Address to the African-
American Institute, Reston, Virginia. 
Jepma, C. (1991) The Tying of Aid. Development Centre Studies. OECD, Paris. 
Jerve, A. M. (2006) Exploring the Research-Policy Linkage: The Case of Reforms in Financing Primary 
Education in Tanzania. Working Paper (3). Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen. 
JICA (2008) Effective Technical Cooperation for Capacity Development: Key findings. Japan Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency, Tokyo. 
Johansson, L. M. & Pettersson, J. (2005) Tied Aid, Trade-Facilitating Aid or Trade-Diverting Aid? Work-
ing Paper (5). Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala. 
Johnson, R. W. & Schlemmer, L. (1996) Launching democracy in South Africa: The first open election, 
April 1994, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Bibliography 320 
 
Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania Working Group &  Independent Monitoring Group (2010) Joint 
Government and Development Partners Roadmap to Improve Development Cooperation in Tanzania. 
United Republic of Tanzania, Development Partners Group Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Jolly, R. (1989) A Future for UN Aid and Technical Assistance? Development (4), pp. 21–26. 
Kagame, P. (2007) Making Aid Work for Africa. Brenthurst Paper (7). The Brenthurst Foundation, Jo-
hannesburg. 
Kahn, T. (2012) Anxious times for HIV patients as US cuts aid. Business Day Live, 28 August 2012. 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/health/2012/08/28/anxious-times-for-hiv-patients-as-us-cuts-aid. 
Accessed 23/01/2014. 
——— (2014a) Motsoaledi pledges NHI white paper is ‘imminent’. Business Day Live, 30 January 2014. 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/health/2014/01/30/motsoaledi-pledges-nhi-white-paper-is-
imminent-. Accessed 8/08/2014. 
——— (2014b) NHI still a priority despite finance plan delays. Business Day Live, 23 October 2014. 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/economy/2014/10/23/nhi-still-a-priority-despite-finance-plan-delays. Ac-
cessed 27/10/2014. 
Kaijage, E. & Kuhanwa, Z. (2013) Tanzania: Mapping REDD+ Finance Flows 2009–2012. A Forest 
Trends REDDX Report. 
Kaijage, J. (2013) Tanzania: Poor Performances Worry Education Stakeholders. Daily News, Dar es 
Salaam, 21 October 2013. http://allafrica.com/stories/201310211838.html. Accessed 30/06/2014. 
Kapp, C. (2009) Barbara Hogan: South Africa’s Minister of Health. The Lancet 373 (9660), p. 291. 
Karani, I. (2010) Evaluation: Finnish Support to Forestry and Biological Resources: Country Reports Part 
3. Tanzania. Evaluation report (5/II). Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki. 
Kassim, M. (2014) Govt for formation of Aids Trust Fund. IPP media news, 26 February 2014. 
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php/.itm.c/2.au/articles107818/javascript/page_home.js?l=
65209. Accessed 6/11/2014. 
Katila, M., Williams, P. J., Ishengoma, R. & Juma, S. (2003) Three Decades of Swedish Support to the 
Tanzanian Forestry Sector: Evaluation of the period 1969–2002. Sida Evaluation (03/12). Department 
for Natural Resources and Environment, Stockholm. 
Katz, I. T., Bassett, I. V. & Wright, A. A. (2013) PEPFAR in Transition — Implications for HIV Care in 
South Africa. New England Journal of Medicine 369 (15), pp. 1385–1387. 
Kavanagh, M. M. (2014) The Politics of Transition & the Economics of HIV: AIDS and PEPFAR in 
South Africa. Health Global Access Project/UPenn, Philadelphia. 
Keevy, J. (2013) The National Qualifications Framework in South Africa: 1995–2013. International 
Journal of Continuing Education and Lifelong Learning 6 (1), pp. 19–35. 
Kelland, K. (2011) AIDS, TB, Malaria fund forced to cut grants. Reuters, London, 23 November 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/23/us-aids-malaria-tb-fund-idUSTRE7AM23F20111123. 
Accessed 23/01/2014. 
Kenya Ministry of Education (2012) Accelerating 21st Century Education, Nairobi. 
http://www.education.go.ke/News.aspx?nid=401. Accessed 9/07/2014. 
Khumalo, G. (2009) Education stakeholders welcome department split. South African Government News 
Agency, Pretoria, 11 May 2009. http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/education-stakeholders-
welcome-department-split. Accessed 9/06/2014. 
Kingdon, J. W. (1984) Agendas, alternatives and public policies, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 
King, K. (1999) Aid to South African education: a case of the reluctant recipient? In: King, K. & Buchert, 
L. (eds.) Changing international aid to education. Global patterns and national contexts. Paris: 
UNESCO Publishing, NORRAG, pp. 257–279. 
——— (2004) Development Knowledge and the Global Policy Agenda. Whose Knowledge? Whose 
Policy? United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva. 
Kisting, D. (2012) Namibia’s language policy is ‘poisoning’ its children. The Guardian, 10 January 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2012/jan/10/namibia-english-crisis. Accessed 9/12/2014. 
Bibliography 321 
 
Knack, S. (2001) Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests. 
Southern Economic Journal 68 (2), pp. 310–329. 
Knack, S. & Rahman, A. (2007) Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients. Journal 
of Development Economics 83 (1), pp. 176–197. 
Knorr-Cetina, K. (1981) The manufacture of knowledge: An essay on the constructivist and contextual 
nature of science, Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press. 
Knorr-Cetina, K. (1984) Die Fabrikation von Erkenntnis. Zur Anthropologie der Naturwissenschaft, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Knorr-Cetina, K. D. (2007) Culture in global knowledge societies: knowledge cultures and epistemic 
cultures. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 32 (4), pp. 351–375. 
Kötschau, K. & Marauhn, T. (2008) Good governance and developing countries: Interdisciplinary per-
spectives, Frankfurt am Main, New York: Lang. 
Kotze, L. J. (2006) Improving Unsustainable Environmental Governance in South Africa: The Case for 
Holistic Governance. PER 9 (1), pp. 75–118. 
Kraak, A. (2004) The National Skills Development Strategy: a new institutional regime for skills for-
mation in post-apartheid South Africa. In: McGrath, S. A. (ed.) Shifting understandings of skills in 
South Africa: Overcoming the historical imprint of a low regime. Cape Town: Human Sciences Re-
search Council, pp. 116–139. 
——— (2008) A critical review of the National Skills Development Strategy in South Africa. Journal of 
Vocational Education & Training 60 (1), pp. 1–18. 
Kulindwa, K., Lokina, R. & Hepelwa, A. (2010) Poverty-Environment Policy Analysis. Department of 
Economics, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam. 
Kumaranayake, L., Lake, S., Mujinja, P., Hongoro, C. & Mpembeni, R. (2000) How do countries regulate 
the health sector? Evidence from Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Health Policy and Planning 15 (4), pp. 
357–367. 
Kwesigabo, G., Mwangu, M. A. & Kakoko, D. C. et al. (2012) Tanzania’s health system and workforce 
crisis. Journal of Public Health Policy 33, pp. S35. 
Lamtey, G. (2012) Govt out to set up Aids Trust Fund. IPP media news, 18 February 2012. 
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=38585. Accessed 23/01/2014. 
Lancaster, C. (2007) Foreign aid: Diplomacy, development, domestic politics, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Land, T. (2007) Joint Evaluation Study of Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel: What can we 
learn from promising experiences? Synthesis Report. Discussion Paper (78). The European Centre for 
Development Policy Management, Maastricht. 
Languille, S. (2013) Managing Quality Education by Numbers: the Case of Tanzania. NORRAG News 
(49), Geneva. 
Lentsch, J. & Weingart, P. (2009a) Introduction: the quest for quality as a challenge to scientific policy 
advice: an overdue debate? . In: Lentsch, J. & Weingart, P. (eds.) Scientific Advice to Policy Making. 
International Comparison. Opladen, Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich, pp. 3–18. 
——— (2009b) Scientific Advice to Policy Making. International Comparison, Opladen, Farmington 
Hills: Barbara Budrich. 
——— (2011) Introduction: the quest for quality as a challenge to scientific policy advice: an overdue 
debate? In: Lentsch, J. & Weingart, P. (eds.) The politics of scientific advice: Institutional design for 
quality assurance. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–18. 
Lesink, R. & White, H. (1999) Aid dependence. Issues and indicators. Expert Group on Development 
Issues (2), Stockholm. 
Levin, D. Z. & Cross, R. (2004) The Strength of Weak Ties You Can Trust: The Mediating Role of Trust 
in Effective Knowledge Transfer. Management Science 50 (11), pp. 1477–1490. 
Levin, D. Z., Cross, R. & Abrams, L. C. (2003) Why Should I Trust You? Predictors of Interpersonal 
Trust in a Knowledge Transfer Context. Working Paper. Academy of Management meetings, Denver. 
Bibliography 322 
 
Levine, A. (2002) Convergence or Convenience? International Conservation NGOs and Development 
Assistance in Tanzania. World Development 30 (6), pp. 1043–1055. 
Littig, B. (2008) Interviews mit Eliten - Interviews mit ExpertInnen: Gibt es Unterschiede? Forum Quali-
tative Sozialforschung/ Forum: Qualitative Social Research (Online Journal) 9 (3). 
Lochner, P., Weaver, A., Gelderblom, C., Peart, R., Sandwith, T. & Fowkes, S. (2003) Aligning the di-
verse: the development of a biodiversity conservation strategy for the Cape Floristic Region. 
Biological Conservation 112 (1-2), pp. 29–43. 
Lockheed, M. E. & Hanushek, E. (1994) Concepts of educational efficiency and effectiveness. Human 
resources development and operations policy working papers (24). World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Loomis, R. A. (1968) Why Overseas Technical Assistance Is Ineffective. American Journal of Agricul-
tural Economics 50 (5), pp. 1329–1341. 
Luttrell, C. & Pantaleo, I. (2008) Budget Support, Aid Instruments and the Environment: The Country 
Context. Tanzania Country Case Study. Overseas Development Institute, Economic and Social Re-
search Foundation. 
Magesa, S. M., Mwape, B. & Mboera (2011) Challenges and opportunities in building health research 
capacity in Tanzania: a case of the National Institute for Medical Research. Tanzania Journal of 
Health Research 13 (Suppl. 1). 
Mandela, N. (1993) South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy. Foreign Affairs 72 (5), pp. 86–94. 
Manyika, F., Kajembe, G. C., Silayo, D. S. A. & Vatn, A. (2013) Strategic Power and Power Struggles in 
the National REDD+ Governance Process in Tanzania: Any Effect on its Legitimacy? Tanzania 
Journal Of Forestry And Nature Conservation 83 (1). 
Mapunda, M. (2003) Towards Partnership in Health: Experiences in resource allocation in Tanzania, 
focusing on Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) and Health Basket Fund. Bulletin of Medicus Mundi 
Switzerland (91). 
Martens, B. (2008) Why do aid agencies exist? In: Easterly, W. (ed.) Reinventing foreign aid. Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, pp. 285–311. 
Massero, L. (2013) Tanzania to Cut Malaria Deaths By 2015. All Africa, Dar es Salaam, 27 May 2013. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201305281233.html. Accessed 29/08/2014. 
Mattheyse, M. (2007) Prevalence versus incidence of HIV - What do they tell us? South African Medical 
Research Council. http://www.mrc.ac.za/public/facts11.htm. Accessed 28/01/2014. 
Mayosi, B. M., Lawn, J. E., van Niekerk, A., Bradshaw, D., Abdool Karim, S. S. & Coovadia, H. M. 
(2012) Health in South Africa: changes and challenges since 2009. The Lancet 380 (9858), pp. 2029–
2043. 
Mayosi, B. M., Mekwa, N. J., Blackburn, J. &   et al (2011) 2011 National Health Research Summit Re-
port: Strengthening Research for Health, Development and Innovation in South Africa. Department 
of Health, Pretoria. 
Mbengashe, T. (2012) The national HIV counselling and testing campaign and treatment expansion in 
South Africa: a return on investments in combination prevention: XIX International AIDS Confer-
ence, 26 July 2012, Washington D.C. 
Mbilinyi, M. (2003) Equity, Justice and Transformation in Education: The Challenge of Mwalimu Julius 
Nyerere Today. Working Paper Series (2003.5). HakiElimu, Dar es Salaam. 
McDonald, D. A. (2002) What is Environmental Justice? . In: McDonald, D. A. (ed.) Environmental 
justice in South Africa. Athens, Cape Town: Ohio University Press; University of Cape Town Press, 
pp. 1–12. 
McIntyre, D. (2010) National Health Insurance: Providing a Vocabulary for Public Engagement. In: Sha-
ron, F. & Padarath, A. (eds.) South African Health Review 2010. Durban: Health Systems Trust, pp. 
145–156. 
McIntyre, D., Garshong, B. & Mtei, G. et al. (2008) Beyond fragmentation and towards universal cover-
age: insights from Ghana, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania. Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 86 (11), pp. 871–876. 
Bibliography 323 
 
Mendizabal, E., Jones, H. & Clarke, J. (2012) Review of emerging models of advisory capacity in health 
and education sectors: Final Report. Overseas Development Institute. 
Meuser, M. & Nagel, U. (2009) The Expert Interview and Changes in Knowledge Production. In: Bogner, 
A., Littig, B. & Menz, W. (eds.) Interviewing Experts. Basingstoke: Palgrave Machmillan, pp. 17–42. 
Mgaya, G. (2013) Tanzania: In Education, Quality Is the Catchword. Tanzania Daily News, Dar es Sa-
laam, 29 October 2013. http://allafrica.com/stories/201310290028.html. Accessed 30/06/2014. 
Mhonyiwa, J. E., Ponera, G. & Mrutu, A. S. (2011) The SACMEQ III project in Tanzania. A study of the 
conditions of schooling and the quality of education. The Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium 
for Monitoring Educational Quality, Paris. 
Microsoft News Center (2009) Cisco, Intel, Microsoft, Government of Kenya and USAID Launch Joint 
Project to Enable 21st-Century Education in Kenya Schools, New York, 23 September 2009. 
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2009/sep09/09-23cgikenyapr.aspx. Accessed 9/07/2014. 
Milledge, S., Gelvas, I. K. & Ahrends, A. (2007) Forestry, Governance and National Development: Les-
sons Learned from a Logging Boom in Southern Tanzania. TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa, Tanzania 
Development Partners Group, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salaam. 
Mills, A., Ally, M., Goudge, J., Gyapong, J. & Mtei, G. (2012) Progress towards universal coverage: the 
health systems of Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania. Health Policy and Planning 27 (suppl 1), pp. 
i4. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2003) Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development. 
Government Bill 2002/03:122. Government of Sweden, Stockholm. 
——— (2008a) Global Challenges - Our Responsibility: Communication on Sweden’s policy for global 
development. Government Communication 2007/08:89. Government Offices of Sweden, Stockholm. 
——— (2008b) Sweden and Africa – a policy to address common challenges and opportunities. Govern-
ment Communication 2007/08: 67. Government of Sweden, Stockholm. 
Ministry of Education and Culture (1995) Education and Training Policy. United Republic of Tanzania, 
Dar Es Salaam. 
——— (2004) Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) 2004–2009. Education Sector Develop-
ment Programme. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (2007) Information & Communication Technology 
(ICT) Policy for Basic Education. ICT for Improved Education. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es 
Salaam. 
——— (2008) Evaluation of the Impact of the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) 2002–2006. 
United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2010a) Higher Education Development Programme 2010–2015: Enhanced Relevance, Access 
and Quality in Higher Education. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2010b) Secondary Education Development Programme II (July 2010–June 2015). Education 
Sector Development Programme. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012a) Evaluation of the Impact of the Primary Education Development Programme Phase Two 
(PEDP II) 2007–2011. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012b) Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP) Phase III (2012–2016). Education 
Sector Development Programme. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2014) Introduction to MoEVT, Dar es Salaam. http://www.moe.go.tz/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=1577&Itemid=629. Accessed 11/07/2014. 
Ministry of Finance (2012) Government Budget for Financial Year 2012/2013: Citizens’ Budget Edition. 
United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) International Relations: The Principles of Ethiopia’s Foreign Policy. 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. http://www.mfa.gov.et/internationalMore.php?pg=27. Ac-
cessed 10/12/2013. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2009) Guidelines for technical assistance, Copenhagen. 
——— (2013) Annual Report 2012, Copenhagen. 
Bibliography 324 
 
——— (2014) About Danida, Copenhagen. http://um.dk/en/danida-en/about-danida/. Accessed 
10/01/2014. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark & Government of Tanzania (2009) United Republic of Tanzania 
Health Sector Programme Support HSPS IV (2009–2014). Annex 1: Support to the health sector in 
Mainland. 
Ministry of Health (1999) Health Sector Reform Programme of Work 1999–2002. United Republic of 
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2003) Second Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) (July 2003–June 2008): “Reforms towards 
delivering quality health services and clients satisfaction”. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Sa-
laam. 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (2009) Health Sector Strategic Plan III: July 2009 - June 2015. 
United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012) Health Sector Public Expenditure Review 2010/2011. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar 
es Salaam. 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Prime Minister’s Office for Regional Administration and Local 
Government & Development Partners (2009) Health Basket Fund Generic Document: Final Draft. 
Government of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (2006) Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania: Facts 
and Figures. Extension and Publicity Unit, Forestry and Beekeeping Division, Dar es Salaam. 
Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment (2006) MKUKUTA Monitoring Master Plan and 
Indicator Information. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Mkandawire, T. (2010) Aid, Accountability, and Democracy in Africa. Social Research 77 (4), pp. 1149–
1182. 
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2013) 2013 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). 
http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/downloads/2013/2013-IIAG.xls. Accessed 26/02/2014. 
Moleke, P. (2003) The state of the labour market in contemporary South Africa. In: Daniel, J., Habib, A. 
& Southall, R. (eds.) State of the nation: South Africa, 2003–2004. Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC 
Press, pp. 204–224. 
Moloi, K., Mkwanazi, T. & Bojabotseha, T. (2014) Higher Education in South Africa at the Crossroads. 
Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 5 (2), pp. 469–475. 
Moloi, M. Q. & Chetty, M. (2010) The SACMEQ III Project in South Africa: A Study of the Conditions 
of Schooling and the Quality of Education. Department of Basic Education, Pretoria. 
Moodley, J. & Vawda, S. (2000) Development Cooperation Report II for South Africa 1994–
1999: Evaluation of ODA to the Skills Development Sector. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Morgan, P. (2010) AusAID’s approach to technical assistance: getting beyond ‘good enough’. Report 
prepared for AusAid Office of Development Effectiveness. 
Morss, E. R. (1984) Institutional destruction resulting from donor and project proliferation in Sub-
Saharan African countries. World Development 12 (4), pp. 465–470. 
Mosoba, T. & Mugarula, F. (2013) Donors want Dar to hand back stolen aid millions. The Citizen, 24 
November 2013. http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Donors-demand-Sh644m-from-govt/-
/1840392/2086214/-/item/1/-/yiodra/-/index.html. Accessed 9/12/2013. 
Moss, T., Pettersson, G. & van Walle, N. de (2008) An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid 
dependency and state building in sub-saharan Africa. In: Easterly, W. (ed.) Reinventing foreign aid. 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, pp. 255–281. 
Moss, T., Roodman, D. & Standley, S. (2005) The Global War on Terror and U.S. Development Assis-
tance: USAID allocation by country, 1998–2005. Working Paper (62). Center for Global 
Development. 
Mouton, J. (2007) Study on National Research Systems: A Meta-Review. Regional Report on Sub Sa-
haran Africa. UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge. 
Bibliography 325 
 
——— (2008) Mapping research systems in developing countries: Regional report on Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca. Centre for Research on Science and Technology, Institute for Research on Development, 
UNESCO, Paris. 
Mouton, J., Boshoff, N. & de Waal, L. et al. (2008) The State of Public Science in the SADC Region. In: 
Kotecha, P. (ed.) Towards a Common Future: Higher Education in the SADC Region. Research 
Findings from Four SARUA Studies. Johannesburg, pp. 199–302. 
Msila, V. (2007) From Apartheid Education to the Revised National Curriculum Statement: Pedagogy for 
Identity Formation and National Building in South Africa. Nordic Journal of African Studies 16 (2), 
pp. 146–160. 
Müller, K. & Fourie, A. (2011) Innovations for Biodiversity Conservation: the Case of the Conservation 
Stewardship Programme, Western Cape, South Africa. Stellenbosch University, School of Public 
Management & Planning, Stellenbosch. 
Mummenthey, C. (2008) Implementing efficient and effective learnerships in the construction industry: A 
study on the learnership system in the building/civil sector of the Western Cape. Department of La-
bour, German Technical Co-operation, Pretoria. 
Mummert, U. (2013) Multiple Prinzipale, Agenten und Ziele: Konsequenzen für die Entwicklungspolitik. 
In: Faust, J. (ed.) Politische Ökonomie der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, 1st edn. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, pp. 51–87. 
Mushi, P. A. K. (2009) History and development of education in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Dar 
es Salaam University Press. 
Mwalyosi, R. & Sosovele, H. (2001) The Integration of Biodiversity into National Environmental As-
sessment Procedures: Case Study Tanzania. Produced for the Biodiversity Planning Support 
Programme. National Case Studies (12). UNDP, UNEP, GEF. 
Mwenda, A. (2006) Foreign Aid and the Weakening of Democratic Accountability in Uganda. Foreign 
Policy Briefing (88). Cato Institute, Washington. 
Nahapiet, J. (2011) A Social Perspective: Exploring the Links between Human Capital and Social Capital. 
In: Burton‐Jones, A. & Spender, J. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Human Capital. Oxford (et al.): 
Oxford University Press. 
Nahapiet, J. & Ghoshal, S. (1998) Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage. 
The Academy of Management Review 23 (2), pp. 242–266. 
NAM aidsmap (2014) CD4 cell counts. NAM Publications, London. 
National AIDS Control Programme (2008) National Guidelines for the Management of HIV and AIDS: 
Third edition (revised February 2009). Government of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
National Audit Office (2012) Briefing to support the International Development Committee’s inquiry into 
the Department for International Development’s Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12, London. 
National Statistics System (N/A) Statistical Reform in South Africa. Republic of South Africa. 
National Training Board (1994) A Discussion Document on a National Training Strategy Initiative: A 
Preliminary Report by the National Training Board, Pretoria. 
Nattrass, N. (2006a) Antiretroviral Treatment and the Problem of Political Will in South Africa. The 
Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 7 (2), pp. 29–31. 
——— (2006b) South Africa’s ‘Rollout’ of highly active antiretroviral therapy: A critical assessment. 
CSSR Working Paper (158). Centre for Social Science Research (University of Cape Town), Cape 
Town. 
——— (2008) Aids and the scientific governance of medicine in post-apartheid South Africa. African 
Affairs 107 (429), pp. 157–176. 
Ndinda, L. (2010) Under international pressure, Uganda mulls amending anti-gay bill. Deutsche Welle, 
17 February 2010. http://www.dw.de/under-international-pressure-uganda-mulls-amending-anti-gay-
bill/a-5242627-1. Accessed 18/12/2013. 
Ndlovu, M. E. (2013) Zimbabwe’s Educational Legacy from the 1980s: was it all so rosy? Sokwanele 
Civic Action Support, 21 May 2013. http://www.sokwanele.com/zimbabwe%E2%80%99s-
educational-legacy-1980s-was-it-all-so-rosy/21052013. Accessed 9/12/2014. 
Bibliography 326 
 
Ndlovu, N. (2005) An exploratory analysis of HIV and AIDS donor funding in South Africa. Budget 
Brief (155). IDASA Budget Information Service. 
NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (2014) African Innovation Outlook II. NPCA, Pretoria. 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010) Letter to the House of Representatives outlining devel-
opment cooperation policy. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. 
——— (2011) Letter to the House of Representatives presenting the spearheads of development coopera-
tion policy. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague. 
Neumayer, E. (2003) What Factors Determine the Allocation of Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral 
Agencies? Journal of Development Studies 39 (4), pp. 134–147. 
Nevondwe, L. & Odeku, K. O. (2013) Constitutional Right to Education in South Africa: A Myth or a 
Reality? Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 4 (13), pp. 847–860. 
Ngaga, Y. M., Treue, T. & Meilby, H. et al. (2014) Participatory forest management for more than a dec-
ade in Tanzania: does it live up to its goals? Tanzania Journal Of Forestry And Nature Conservation 
83 (1). 
Ngeleza, B., Chabane, S. & Dlamini, D. (2000) Development Coorporation Report II for South Africa 
1994–1999. Section II: Evaluation of ODA to the Education Sector. International Organisation De-
velopment Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Ngirwa, C. C., Euwema, M., Babyegeya, E. & Stouten, J. (2013) Managing change in higher education 
institutions in Tanzania: A historical perspective. Higher Education Management & Policy 24 (3), pp. 
127–144. 
Nielinger, O. (2006) Information and communication technologies (ICT) for development in Africa: An 
assessment of ICT strategies and ICT utilisation in Tanzania, Frankfurt am Main, New York: Peter 
Lang. 
Nindi, S. J. (2012) Final Report on Institutional Capacity Needs and Entry Points for Mainstreaming 
Climate Change Adaptation into Development Planning in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Niskanen, W. A. (1971, repr. 2007) Bureaucracy and representative government, New Brunswick, NJ: 
Aldine Transaction. 
Nissanke, M. (2010) Reconstructing the Aid Effectiveness Debate. In: Mavrotas, G. (ed.) Foreign Aid for 
Development. Issues, Challenges, and the New Agenda. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 57–
93. 
Nkosi, S. (2012) Tanzania’s schools go backwards. Mail & Guardian, Dar es Salaam, 17 August 2012. 
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-08-17-00-tanzanias-schools-go-backwards. Accessed 5/02/2013. 
Nordeco & Arcacia (2013) National REDD+ Strategy Development and Implementation Process in Tan-
zania - Mid-Term Review: Final Report. 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (2014) Tanzania. Norad, Oslo, 04 September 2014. 
http://www.norad.no/en/countries/africa/tanzania. Accessed 5/11/2014. 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009) Climate, Conflict and Capital: Norwegian development 
policy adapting to change: Report No. 13 (2008–2009) to the Storting. Recommendation from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 13 February 2009, approved in the Council of State on the same date. 
(Stoltenberg II Government). Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo. 
Nunnenkamp, P. & Thiele, R. (2006) Targeting Aid to the Needy and Deserving: Nothing But Promises? 
The World Economy 29 (9), pp. 1177–1201. 
Nuscheler, F. (2005) Entwicklungspolitik, 5th edn., Bonn: Bundeszentrale für polit. Bildung. 
Nyerere, J. K. (1967) Education for self-reliance. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (1973) Freedom and development: Uhuru na Maendeleo. A selection from writings and speeches 
1968–1973, Nairobi, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ocheni, S. & Nwankwo, B. C. (2012) Analysis of Colonialism and Its Impact in Africa. Cross-Cultural 
Communication 8 (3), pp. 46–54. 
OECD (2005) The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Bibliography 327 
 
——— (2008) The Challenge of Capacity Development. OECD Journal on Development 8 (3), pp. 233–
276. 
——— (2009a) Managing Aid: Practices of DAC Member Countries. OECD Publishing, Paris. 
——— (2009b) Survey on the levels of decentralisation to the field in DAC members’ development co-
operation systems. Report (DCD(2009)3/FINAL). OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, 
Paris. 
——— (2011a) 2011 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid. OECD Publishing, Paris. 
——— (2011b) Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Fourth High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011, Busan. 
——— (2011c) Denmark: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review 2011. 
OECD Publishing, Paris. 
——— (2011d) The Netherlands: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review 2011. 
OECD Publishing, Paris. 
——— (2012a) 2012 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid. OECD Publishing, Paris. 
——— (2012b) Development Co-operation Report 2012: Lessons in Linking Sustainability and Devel-
opment. OECD Publishing, Paris. 
——— (2012c) The list of CRS purpose codes taking effect in 2012 reporting on 2011 flows. 
OECD DAC Secretariat, Paris. 
——— (2013a) OECD Development Co-operation Peer Review: Sweden 2013. OECD Publishing, Paris. 
——— (2013b) Aid to poor countries slips further as governments tighten budgets, 03 April 2013. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm. Ac-
cessed 11/12/2013. 
OECD.Stat (2014a) Aid (ODA) by sector and donor. OECD, Paris. http://stats.oecd.org/. Accessed 
16/01/2014. 
——— (2014b) Aid activities targeting Global Environmental Objectives. OECD, Paris. 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RIOMARKERS. Accessed 21/01/2014. 
OECD/DAC Capacity Development Team (2009) Inventory of donor approaches to capacity develop-
ment: What we are learning. OECD, Paris. 
Olukoshi, A. O. (1998) The elusive prince of Denmark: Structural adjustment and the crisis of govern-
ance in Africa, Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet. 
Omari, I. M. & Baser, H. (2012) Education Sector Human Resources Situation Analysis: A Consultancy 
Report for The Ministry of Education and Vocational Training. Ministry of Education and Vocational 
Training, Dar es Salaam. 
Omari, I. M., Mbise, A., Mahenge, S. T., Malekela, G. & Besha, M. (1983) Universal Primary Education 
in Tanzania. IDRC-TS (42). International Development Research Centre, Ottawa. 
Pallangyo, D. M. (2011) Tanzania’s framework environmental law and the balancing of interests. In: 
Faure, M. & Du Plessis, W. (eds.) The balancing of interests in environmental law in Africa. Pretoria: 
Pretoria University Law Press, pp. 485–518. 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2009) Budget Speech of Honourable Dr. A. Motsoaledi, MP, Minister 
of Health, Delivered to the National Assembly, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa on June 
30 2009, Cape Town, 30 June 2009. http://www.pmg.org.za/briefing/20090630-health-ministers-
budget-speech. Accessed 1/08/2014. 
——— (2012) Department of Environmental Affairs Annual Report 2011/12, Cape Town, 16 October 
2012. http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20121016-department-environmental-affairs-their-annual-report-
and-audited-fina. Accessed 14/02/2014. 
Parmanand, S. (2013) Top AusAID private sector partners: 2012 updates. Devex, 03 June 2013. 
https://www.devex.com/en/news/top-ausaid-private-sector-partners-2012-updates/81112. Accessed 
13/12/2013. 
Pearson, M. (2011) Results based aid and results based financing: What are they? Have they delivered 
results? HLSP Institute, London. 
Bibliography 328 
 
Pender, J. (2007) Country ownership: the evasion of donor accountability. In: Bickerton, C. J., Cunliffe, 
P. & Gourevitch, A. (eds.) Politics without sovereignty: A critique of contemporary international re-
lations. Oxon, New York: University College London Press, pp. 112–130. 
PER Macro Group (2013) Rapid Budget Analysis 2013: Synoptic note. Draft, Dar es Salaam. 
Peta, B. (2006) ANC’s Zuma cleared of rape charge but rebuked by judge. The Independent, Johannes-
burg, 09 May 2006. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ancs-zuma-cleared-of-rape-
charge-but-rebuked-by-judge-477374.html. Accessed 28/07/2014. 
Petermann, J.-H. (2013) Between export promotion and poverty reduction: The foreign economic policy 
of untying official development assistance, Wiesbaden: Springer. 
Petersen, C. & Huntley, B. (2005) Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Production Landscapes. Working Paper 
(20). Global Environment Facility, Washington D.C. 
Piccio, L. (2013) Top USAID contract awardees: A primer. Devex, 10 June 2013. 
https://www.devex.com/en/news/top-usaid-contract-awardees-a-primer/81198. Accessed 12/12/2013. 
Pincin, J. A. (2012) Foreign Aid and Political Influence of the Development Assistance Committee Coun-
tries. MPRA Paper (39668). University Library of Munich, Munich. 
Plank, D. N. (1993) Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donors. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 31 (3), pp. 407–430. 
Policy Forum (2009) Reforming Allowances: A Win-Win Approach to Improved Service Delivery, High-
er Salaries for Civil Servants and Saving Money. Policy Brief (9), Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2010a) Are we investing enough on Education? Education Development Budget 2010/2011. 
Policy Brief (3:10), Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2010b) Dependency on Foreign Aid: How the situation could be saved: An analysis of Tanza-
nia’s Budget 2010/2011. Policy Brief (3:10), Dar es Salaam. 
Policy Forum & HakiElimu (2011) 2011/2012 Education Budget. Does it lead to quality education? Poli-
cy Brief (1), Dar es Salaam. 
Polidano, C. (2000) Measuring Public Sector Capacity. World Development 28 (5), pp. 805–822. 
Preisendörfer, P. (1995) Vertrauen als soziologische Kategorie: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer 
entscheidungstheoretischen Fundierung des Vertrauenskonzept. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 24 (4), pp. 
263–272. 
President’s Office Public Service Management (2011) The Functions and Organisation Structure of the 
Prime Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Governance: Approved by the President 
on 3rd June,2011, Dar es Salaam. 
President’s Office, P. C. (2012) The Tanzania Five Year Development Plan 2011/12-2015-16: Unleashing 
Tanzania’s Latent Growth Potentials. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Prime Minister’s Office (2001) National Policy on HIV/AIDS. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Sa-
laam. 
——— (2009) National Multisectoral HIV Prevention Strategy 2009–2012: ‘Towards achieving Tanza-
nia without HIV’. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Provost, C. (2013) UK’s trade development programme failed to prioritise poor – aid watchdog. The 
Guardian, 06 December 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/dec/06/trade-
development-failed-poor-trademark-southern-africa-aid. Accessed 27/01/2014. 
Provost, C. & Hughes, N. (2012) Why is so much UK aid money still going to companies based in Brit-
ain?: ‘Untied’ aid is thought to benefit local firms in developing countries, but the lucrative DfID 
contracts end up in UK hands. The Guardian, London, 21 September 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/datablog/2012/sep/21/why-is-uk-aid-going-to-uk-
companies. Accessed 13/12/2013. 
Psacharopoulos, G. (1994) Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update. World Development 22 
(9), pp. 1325–1343. 
Puren, A. (2011) The HIV-1 epidemic in South Africa: The leading edge and the measurement of inci-
dence. Southern African Journal of Epidemiology and Infection 46 (4), pp. 198–201. 
Bibliography 329 
 
Radetzki, M. (1973) Aid and development: A handbook for small donors. Foreword by Erik Lundberg, 
New York: Praeger. 
Ramkolowan, Y. & Stern, M. (2011) The Developmental Effectiveness of Untied Aid: Evaluation of the 
Implementation of the Paris Declaration and of the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to 
the LDCs. South Africa Country Study, Pretoria. 
Rasool, F. & Botha, C. J. (2011) The nature, extent and effect of skills shortages on skills migration in 
South Africa. South African Journal of Human Resource Management 9 (1), pp. 1–12. 
Republic of South Africa (1995) South African Qualifications Authority Act: No. 58 of 1995, Pretoria. 
——— (1996) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act: No. 108 of 1996, Pretoria. 
——— (1998a) National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998, Pretoria. 
——— (1998b) Skills Development Act No. 97 of 1998, Pretoria. 
——— (1999) Skills Development Levies Act, Pretoria. 
——— (2003) National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act (57 of 2003), Pretoria. 
——— (2004a) National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act (10 of 2004), Pretoria. 
——— (2004b) National Health Act: No. 61 of 2003. Government Gazette (Vol. 469, No. 26595), Cape 
Town. 
——— (2008a) Higher Education Amendment Act, No. 39 of 2008. Government Gazette (Vol. 521, No. 
31651). Republic of South Africa, Cape Town. 
——— (2008b) Skills Development Amendment Act, No. 37 of 2008. Government Gazette (Vol. 521, 
No. 31666), Pretoria. 
——— (2009a) Biodiversity Fiscal Incentives: A Framework on Fiscal Incentives for Biodiversity, Preto-
ria. 
——— (2009b) General and Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Amendment Act, No. 50 
of 2008. Government Gazette (Vol. 523, No. 31785). Republic of South Africa, Cape Town. 
——— (2009c) National Qualifications Framework Act, No. 67 of 2008. Government Gazette (Vol. 524, 
No. 31909). Republic of South Africa, Cape Town. 
——— (2012) Global AIDS Response Progress Report 2012, Pretoria. 
Ridde, V. (2010) Per diems undermine health interventions, systems and research in Africa: burying our 
heads in the sand. Editorial. Tropical Medicine & International Health Early View, 28.06.2010 
(online version of record published before inclusion in an issue). 
Riedel, D. (2010) „Entwicklungspolitik darf auch interessengeleitet sein”. Handelsblatt online, 26 July 
2010. http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/dirk-niebel-entwicklungspolitik-darf-auch-
interessengeleitet-sein/v_detail_tab_print/3498804.html. Accessed 22/01/2014. 
Robi, A. (2012) Tanzania: 5,000 Pregnant Girls Drop Out of School. AllAfrica Global Media, Dar es 
Salaam, 16 December 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201211160227.html. Accessed 11/07/2014. 
Rottenburg, R. (2000) Accountability for development aid. In: Kalthoff, H., Rottenburg, R. & Wagener, 
H.-J. (eds.) Facts and figures. Economic representations and practices. Marburg: Metropolis Verlag, 
pp. 143–173. 
——— (2009) Far-fetched facts: A parable of development aid, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway &  Asplan Analyse (1994) Technical Cooperation in Transi-
tion. Review of Norwegian Policy in Light of DAC Principles on Technical Cooperation, Oslo. 
Rubin, E. (2012) Assessment of DP practices in Tanzania in financing allowances, salary top-ups, civil 
servant salary payments, and parallel and/or integrated PIUs: Assessment Report January 2012. 
Rugonzibwa, P. (2012) Tanzania: State Wants NEMC to Become Financially Independent. All Africa, 
Dar es Salaam, 11 June 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201206111136.html. Accessed 17/02/2014. 
Rutasitara, L., Lokina, R. B. & Yona, F. (2010) Mainstreaming Environment into MKUKUTA II Process: 
Interim Report to Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. University of Dar es Salaam, Depart-
ment of Economics. 
Bibliography 330 
 
Rwamucyo, E. (2012) Rwanda: Implication of Donor Suspension of Aid to Rwanda Over DRC Crisis. All 
Africa, The New Times, 03 December 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201212030223.html. Ac-
cessed 18/12/2013. 
Samoff, J. (1992) The Intellectual/Financial Complex of Foreign Aid. Review of African Political Econ-
omy (53), pp. 60–75. 
——— (2009) The Fast Track to Planned Dependence: Education Aid to Africa. Stanford University. 
Samoff, J. w. B. C. (2003) Education for All in Africa: Still a Distant Dream. In: Arnove, R. F. & Torres, 
C. A. (eds.) Comparative education: The dialectic of the global and the local, 2nd edn. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 357–388. 
Samoff, J. w. S. S. (1994) From Planning to Marketing: Making Education and Training Policy in Tanza-
nia. In: Samoff, J. (ed.) Coping with Crisis. Austerity, Adjustment and Human Resources. London (et 
al.): Cassell (et al.), pp. 134–172. 
SANAC HIV & AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007–2011, Pretoria. 
——— (2010) National Strategic Plan 2007–2011 Mid Term Review 2010, Pretoria. 
——— (2011a) Getting to Success: Improving HIV Prevention Efforts in South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2011b) Know Your Epidemic, Know Your Reponse: Summary Report 2011: Simplified Version 
of the Analysis of South Africa’s HIV and AIDS Epidemic and the Reponse, Pretoria. 
——— (2012) National Strategic Plan on HIV, STIs and TB 2012–2016. Republic of South Africa, Pre-
toria. 
——— (2013) South Africa’s National Aids Spending Assessment Brief (2007/08–2009/10) (Based on 1 
July 2012 report). April 2013, Pretoria. 
SANAC Secretariat (2010) The National HIV Counselling and Testing Campaign Strategy. SANAC, 
Pretoria. 
SANBI (2013) Final Strategic Plan 2013–2018, Pretoria. 
Santos, B. d. S. (ed.) (2007) Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies, London: 
Verso. 
Sapa & AFP (2007) UN praises SA Aids plan. Health 24, 06 June 2007. 
http://www.health24.com/Medical/HIV-AIDS/News/UN-praises-SA-Aids-plan-20120721. Accessed 
25/07/2014. 
SARRAH (2011a) Project Brief: Project Team for Planning the Implementation of the NHI. 
——— (2011b) South African Minister of Health visit to UK, 15th & 16th September 2011: Report & 
follow up actions. 
——— (2012a) Minister and Deputy Minister’s visits to London, July & August 2012. Report. 
——— (2012b) NHS Trust Hospitals: Visit by Director-General, National Department of Health, South 
Africa 9th & 10th October 2012. Report. 
Scharpf, F. W. (2005) Legitimationskonzepte jenseits des Nationalstaats. In: Schuppert, G. F., Pernice, I., 
Haltern, U. R. & Bach, M. (eds.) Europawissenschaft, 1st edn. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 705–742. 
Schneider, C. J. & Tobin, J. L. (2010) Tying the Hands of its Masters? Interest Coalitions and Multilateral 
Aid Allocations in the European Union. Working Paper. University of California, Georgetown Uni-
versity, San Diego. 
Schneider, H. (2002) On the fault-line: The politics of AIDS policy in contemporary South Africa. Afri-
can Studies 61 (1), pp. 145–167. 
Schneider, H. & Gilson, L. (1999) Small Fish in a Big Pond?: External Aid and the Health Sector in 
South Africa. Health Policy and Planning 14 (3), pp. 264–272. 
Schneider, H. & Stein, J. (2001) Implementing AIDS policy in post-apartheid South Africa. Social Sci-
ence & Medicine (52), pp. 723–731. 
School of Public Health and Allied Sciences (2009) Analysis of the constraints in human resource availa-
bility (training, recruitment, deployment, and retention) especially in hard to reach areas. Final 
Report. Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences, Dar es Salaam. 
Bibliography 331 
 
Schütz, A. (1953) Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action. Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research 14 (1), pp. 1–38. 
Section27 (2011) An assessment of the draft NSP for HIV/AIDS (II), Johannesburg. 
Semali, I. A. J. (2003) Understanding Stakeholders’ Roles in Health Sector Reform Process in Tanzania: 
The Case of Decentralizing the Immunization Program. Dissertation. Universität Basel, Basel. 
Senkubuge, F. & Mayosi, B. M. (2013) The State of the National Health Research System in South Afri-
ca. In: Padarath Ashnie & English Rene (eds.) South African Health Review 2012/13. Durban, pp. 
141–150. 
Shija, A. E., Msovela, J. & Mboera, L. E. (2012) Maternal health in fifty years of Tanzania independence: 
Challenges and opportunities of reducing maternal mortality. Tanzania Journal of Health Research 
13 (Suppl 1)  (5). 
Shikwati, J. (2006) The Future of Africa in the World. Inter Region Economic Network, Nairobi. 
Sida (2013a) Our work in Tanzania, 20 November 2013. http://www.sida.se/English/Countries-and-
regions/Africa/Tanzania/Our-work-in-Tanzania/. Accessed 29/01/2014. 
——— (2013b) Working at Sida: Are you interested in working with development cooperation?, 27 Au-
gust 2013. http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/Working-at-Sida/. Accessed 29/10/2013. 
——— (2013c) Working at Sida: Vacancies, 27 August 2013. http://www.sida.se/English/About-
us/Working-at-Sida/Vacancies-/. Accessed 31/10/2013. 
——— (2014) About us: Organisation, 23 May 2014. http://www.sida.se/English/About-
us/Organization/. Accessed 13/01/2015. 
Sikika (2011) 2010/2011 Health Sector Budget Analysis, Dar es Salaam. 
Simmel, G. (1950) The sociology of Georg Simmel, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press. 
Smith, B. C. (2007) Good governance and development, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Smith, D. (2009) South African health minister sacked as Jacob Zuma names first cabinet. The Guardian, 
10 May 2009. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/10/jacob-zuma-barbara-hogan. Accessed 
28/07/2014. 
——— (2013) South Africa warns aid cut means change in relationship with UK. The Guardian, Johan-
nesburg, 30 April 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/apr/30/south-africa-
aid-cut-uk. Accessed 8/12/2014. 
Smith, D. J. (2003) Patronage, Per Diems and the “Workshop Mentality”: The Practice of Family Plan-
ning Programs in Southeastern Nigeria. World Development 31 (4), pp. 703–715. 
Smith, M. J., Jennings, R. & Solanki, G. (2005) Perspectives on learnerships: a critique of South Africa’s 
transformation of apprenticeships. Journal of Vocational Education & Training 57 (4), pp. 537–561. 
Sokoine University of Agriculture Directorate of Research & Postgraduate Studies (2014) Funding Of 
Research. http://www.suanet.ac.tz/drpgs/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout= 
blog&id=98&Itemid=124. Accessed 12/03/2014. 
Soni, R. (2000) Development Coorporation Report II for South Africa 1994–1999.: DCR Synthesis Re-
port. Section I. International Organisation Development Ltd., Johannesburg. 
Søreide, T., Tostensen, A. & Aagedal Skage, I. (2012) Hunting for Per Diem. The Uses and Abuses of 
Travel Compensation in Three Developing Countries. Norad Evaluation Department, Oslo. 
Soroka, S. N. & Wlezien, C. (2010) Degrees of democracy: Politics, public opinion, and policy, Cam-
bridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Sosibo, K. (2007) Madlala-Routledge forced to pay for Spain trip. Mail&Guardian, 24 August 2007. 
http://mg.co.za/article/2007-08-24-madlala-routledge-forced-to-pay-for-spain-trip. Accessed 
25/07/2014. 
Sosovele, H. (2011) Governance challenges in Tanzania’s environmental impact assessment practice. 
African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology 5 (2), pp. 126–130. 
South African Private Practitioner Forum (2011) SAPPF submissions on the Green Paper on National 
Health Insurance, Johannesburg. 
Bibliography 332 
 
South African Qualifications Authority (2012) Key readings: the South African NQF 1995 - 2011: Spe-
cial edition in recognition of the contribution of Samuel BA Isaacs to the development of the NQF in 
South Africa, 12th edn., Waterkloof. 
Southern African Development Community (2012) Member States. SADC. http://www.sadc.int/member-
states/. Accessed 10/03/2014. 
Spaull, N. (2012) Poverty & Privilege: Primary School Inequality in South Africa. Stellenbosch Econom-
ic Working Papers (13). Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch. 
——— (2013) South Africa’s Education Crisis: The quality of education in South Africa 1994–2011. 
Centre for Development & Enterprise, Johannesburg. 
Statistics South Africa (2004) Primary Tables South Africa: Census ‘96 and 2001 compared. Statistics 
South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2012) Census 2011: Statistical Release. Statistics South Africa, Pretoria. 
——— (2013) Statistical Release: Mid-year population estimates 2013. Statistics South Africa, Pretoria. 
Stehr, N. (2010) Knowledge, Democracy and Power. Central European Journal of Public Policy 4 (1), 
pp. 14–35. 
Stickler, A. & Barr, C. (2011) Revealed: Aid to Ethiopia increases despite serious human rights abuses. 
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 06 August 2011. 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/06/revealed-britain-and-eu-increase-aid-to-ethiopia-
despite-serious-human-rights-abuses/. Accessed 18/12/2013. 
Stoppard, A. (2002) Health-South Africa: Doctors Defy Ban on Anti-retroviral Drugs. Inter Press Service 
News Agency, Johannesburg, 18 January 2002. http://www.ipsnews.net/2002/01/health-south-africa-
doctors-defy-ban-on-anti-retroviral-drugs/. Accessed 25/07/2014. 
Stovel, K. & Shaw, L. (2012) Brokerage. Annual Review of Sociology 38 (1), pp. 139–158. 
Stuart, M. (2014) The White Paper on Post School Education & Training. The Skills Handbook Blog, 16 
January 2014. http://www.skillshandbook.co.za/2014/01/the-white-paper-on-post-school.html. Ac-
cessed 10/06/2014. 
Stumm, M. (2011) More responsibility for developing countries. D+C (3), pp. 118–120. 
Sumra, S. & Rajani, R. (2006) Secondary Education in Tanzania: Key Policy Challenges. Working Paper 
(4). HakiElimu, Dar es Salaam. 
Szulanski, G. (2000) The Process of Knowledge Transfer: A Diachronic Analysis of Stickiness. Organi-
zational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 82 (1), pp. 9–27. 
TACAIDS (2003) National Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework on HIV/AIDS 2003–2007. United Re-
public of Tanzania, Prime Minister’s Office, Dar Es Salaam. 
——— (2007) The Second National Multi-Sectoral Strategic Framework on HIV and AIDS (2008–
2012). United Republic of Tanzania, Prime Minister’s Office, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2010) Public Expenditure Review 2007–2009 HIV and AIDS. Tanzania Mainland. TACAIDS, 
Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2011) Medium Term Review of the Second National Multi Sectoral Strategic Framework 2008–
2012: Programmatic Assessment. United Republic of Tanzania, Prime Minister’s Office, Dar es Sa-
laam. 
——— (2012) Public Expenditure Review 2011, HIV and AIDS: Tanzania Mainland. TACAIDS, Dar es 
Salaam. 
——— (2014a) Functions of TACAIDS. http://www.tacaids.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=174:goals-objectives-functions&catid=24:what-we-do&Itemid=126. Accessed 
29/08/2014. 
——— (2014b) Global Fund. http://www.tacaids.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=97:global-fund&catid=39&Itemid=89. Accessed 29/08/2014. 
——— (2014c) Historical Background. http://www.tacaids.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content& 
amp;view=article&amp;id=102&amp;Itemid=53. Accessed 24/09/2014. 
Bibliography 333 
 
——— (2014d) Treatment and Care. http://www.tacaids.go.tz/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=56:treatment-and-care&catid=31&Itemid=161. Accessed 20/10/2014. 
TACAIDS, Zanzibar Aids Commission, National Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Chief Government 
Statistician &  IFC International (2013) Tanzania HIV/AIDS and Malaria Indicator Survey 2011-12. 
TACAIDS, ZAC, NBS, OCGS, ICF International, Dar es Salaam. 
Tacconi, L. (2012) Redefining payments for environmental services. Ecological Economics 73, pp. 29–
36. 
Tambwe, A. (2013) Time for a critical look at Tanzania’s education system. Daily News, Dar es Salaam, 
07 September 2013. http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/features/21967-time-for-a-critical-look-at-
tanzania-s-education-system. Accessed 5/02/2014. 
Tanzania Daily News (2012) Tanzania: Legislators Divided Over Readmitting ‘Mother’ Students. Al-
lAfrica Global Media, 05 November 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201211050157.html. Accessed 
11/07/2014. 
——— (2013) Tanzania: HIV/Aids Fight in Tanzania Under Siege As Donors Pull Out. All Africa, Dar 
es Salaam, 22 August 2013. http://allafrica.com/stories/201308220106.html. Accessed 21/02/2014. 
Tanzania Institute of Education (2014) Research Information and Publications (RIP), Dar es Salaam. 
http://www.tie.go.tz/index.php/departments-and-sections/rip. Accessed 13/03/2014. 
Tanzania Ministry of Finance (2013) Speech by the Minister for Finance Hon. Dr. William Augustao 
Mgimwa (MP) introducing to the National Assembly, the estimates of government revenue and ex-
penditure for fiscal year 2013/2014, Dodoma. 
Taylor, N., van der Berg, S. & Mabogoane, T. (2012) What Makes Schools Effective? Report of South 
Africa’s National School Effectiveness Study. Pearson Education, Cape Town. 
TEEB (2011) The economics of ecosystems and biodiversity in national and international policy making: 
Edited by Patrick ten Brink, London, Washington D.C.: Earthscan. 
Temba, P. (2012) Kilimanjaro RC prepares circular for priority of environmental conservation. DailyN-
ews, 12 February 2012. http://www.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/local-news/1798-kilimanjaro-rc-
prepares-circular-for-priority-of-environmental-conservation. Accessed 29/05/2013. 
Terzi, C. (2012) Review of individual consultancies in the United Nations System. United Nations, Joint 
Inspection Unit, Geneva. 
The Lancet (2008) Can Zuma lead South Africa to a healthy future? The Lancet 371 (9607), p. 90. 
——— (2011) HIV treatment as prevention-it works. The Lancet 377 (9779), p. 1719. 
The Lancet South Africa Series Executive Summary Core Group (2009) Health in South Africa: Execu-
tive Summary for the Series. The Lancet (August 2009). 
The Presidency (2009) Address by President Jacob Zuma on the occasion of World Aids Day: Pretoria 
Showgrounds. Republic of South Africa, Pretoria. http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp? 
relid=576. Accessed 28/07/2014. 
Thede, N. (2013) Policy Coherence for Development and Securitisation: competing paradigms or stabilis-
ing North–South hierarchies? Third World Quarterly 34 (5), pp. 784–799. 
Therkildsen, O. (2002) Keeping the state accountable: is aid no better than oil? IDS Bulletin 33 (3), pp. 1–
17. 
Therkildsen, O. & Tidemand, P. (2007) Staff Management and Organisational Performance in Tanzania 
and Uganda: Public Servant Perspectives. Danish Institute for International Studies. 
Timberg, C. (2006) In South Africa, a Dramatic Shift on AIDS. Washington Post Foreign Service, Johan-
nesburg, 27 October 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/26/ 
AR2006102601874.html. Accessed 25/07/2014. 
Tjønneland, E. N., Pillay, P., Slob, A., Willemsen, A. & Jerve, A. M. (2008) Managing Aid Exit and 
Transformation: South Africa Country Case Study. Joint Donor Evaluation. Sida, Netherlands Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, Danida, Norad, Stockholm. 
Torres, R.-M. (2001) “Knowledge-Based International Aid” Do we Want it, do we Need it? In: Gmelin, 
W., King, K. & McGrath, S. (eds.) Development Knowledge, National Research and International 
Cooperation. Edinburgh, Bonn, Geneva: CAS, DSE, NORRAG, pp. 103–124. 
Bibliography 334 
 
Tortell, P. (2010) C.A.P.E. Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development Project: Terminal 
Evaluation Report. Cape Action for People and the Environment, Wellington. 
——— (2011) UNDP/GEF/SANBI National Grasslands Biodiversity Programme (PIMS 2929): Mid-
Term Evaluation Report, Wellington. 
Tran, M. (2014) UK MPs censure DfID over decision to end aid to India and South Africa: Department 
for International Development accused of political expediency and ignoring recommended review 
procedures. The Guardian, 08 January 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2014/jan/08/uk-mps-dfid-end-aid-india-south-africa. Accessed 10/02/2014. 
Treatment Action Campaign (2008) Health Minister Barbara Hogan delivers landmark speech at HIV 
Vaccine Conference. TAC, 16 October 2008. http://www.tac.org.za/community/node/2421. Accessed 
25/07/2014. 
Treatment Action Campaign & Section27 (2011) NSP Review: Engaging with South Africa’s National 
Strategic Plan for HIV, STIs and TB. NSP Review (1). TAC, Section27, Johannesburg. 
Treue, T., Ngaga, Y. & Meilby, H. et al. (2014) Does participatory forest management promote sustaina-
ble forest utilisation in Tanzania? International Forestry Review 16 (1), pp. 23–38. 
Truman, H. S. (1947) Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine. 12 
March 1947. Online published by The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846. Accessed 18/12/2013. 
Tsai, W. & Ghoshal, S. (1998) Social Capital and Value Creation: The Role of Intrafirm Networks. The 
Academy of Management Journal 41 (4), pp. 464–476. 
Turpie, J. K., Marais, C. & Blignaut, J. N. (2008) The working for water programme: Evolution of a 
payments for ecosystem services mechanism that addresses both poverty and ecosystem service de-
livery in South Africa. Ecological Economics 65 (4), pp. 788–798. 
Twaweza (2013) Form Four Examination Results: Citizens report on the learning crisis in Tanzania. Brief 
(2), Dar es Salaam. 
UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (2013) Under-five mortality rate: Estimates gen-
erated by the UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME) in 2013. 
http://www.childmortality.org/files_v16/download/U5MR.xlsx. Accessed 28/08/2014. 
UN-REDD Programme (2011) The UN-REDD Programme Strategy 2011–2015. FAO, UNDP, UNEP, 
Geneva. 
UN Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group (2010) Maternal Mortality in 1990–2010: United 
Republic of Tanzania. http://www.who.int/gho/maternal_health/countries/tza.xls. Accessed 
28/08/2014. 
UNAIDS (2010a) Getting to Zero: UNAIDS 2011–2015 Strategy. Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS, Geneva. 
——— (2010b) Request For Proposal, 23. April 2010. UNAIDS, Geneva. 
UNDP (2012) UNDP Jobs: Programme Specialist, Energy and Climate Change. 
http://jobs.undp.org/cj_view_job.cfm?cur_job_id=33704. Accessed 22/10/2013. 
——— (2013a) Presentation of the JPO Programme. 
http://www.jposc.org/content/programme/presentation-en.html. Accessed 25/09/2013. 
——— (2013b) Individual Consultant Procurement Notice for individual consultants and individual con-
sultants assigned by consulting firms/institutions. Project “Support the effective implementation of 
National Mine Action Programme”. 
UNDP &  UNEP (2014) Improved monitoring of poverty-environment objectives in Tanzania. UNEP-
UNDP Poverty Environment Initiative. http://www.unpei.org/our-stories/improved-monitoring-of-
poverty-environment-objectives-in-tanzania. Accessed 26/03/2014. 
UNEP (2013) Green Economy Scoping Study: South African Green Economy Modelling Report 
(SAGEM): Focus on Natural Resource Management, Agriculture, Transport and Energy Sectors. 
United Nations Environment Programme; Department of Environmental Affairs. 
UNEP - Convention on Biological Diversity (2014) United Republic of Tanzania - Country Profile. 
http://www.cbd.int/countries/profile/default.shtml?country=tz#status. Accessed 19/03/2014. 
Bibliography 335 
 
UNESCO (1999) Declaration on science and the use of scientific knowledge. World Conference on Sci-
ence, Budapest. 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2014) United Republic of Tanzania, Montréal. 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/DataCentre/Pages/country-profile.aspx?code=TZA&regioncode=40540. 
Accessed 11/07/2014. 
UNESCO Office Dakar and Regional Bureau for Education in Africa,  UNESCO Office Dar es Salaam & 
Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (2011) Tanzania Education Sector Analysis: Beyond 
Primary Education, the Quest for Balanced and Efficient Policy Choices for Human Development 
and Economic Growth. UNESCO, United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (2008) Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth ses-
sion, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007. Addendum. Part Two: Action taken by the 
Conference of the Parties at its thirteenth session. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1. 
UNICEF Tanzania (2010) Children and Women in Tanzania: Volume I Mainland, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2014) Children and AIDS - Overview. http://www.unicef.org/tanzania/6912_10620.html. Ac-
cessed 29/08/2014. 
United Nations (1997) Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 37 ILM 22 (1998). 
——— (2012) Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) National Officer Category - Annual Salaries and Allowances. 
http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salaries/salaryscale/gs/daresale/dare38n.xls. 
Accessed 5/11/2013. 
——— (2013a) Pay and benefits. https://careers.un.org/lbw/home.aspx?viewtype=SAL. Accessed 
5/11/2013. 
——— (2013b) Pay and benefits: National Professional Officers. 
https://careers.un.org/lbw/home.aspx?viewtype=SAL. Accessed 31/10/2013. 
United Nations Economic and Social Council (1971) Science in Underdeveloped Countries: World Plan 
of Action for the Application of Science and Technology to Development. Minerva 9 (1), pp. 101-
121. 
United Republic of Tanzania (1997) National Environmental Policy. Vice President’s Office, Dar es 
Salaam. 
——— (1998) National Forest Policy, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2000) Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2001) The Education and Training Sector Development Programme Document: Final Draft, Dar 
es Salaam. 
——— (2002) The Forest Act, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2003) HIV/AIDS Care and Treatment Plan 2003–2008. Developed in Collaboration with The 
William J. Clinton Foundation, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2004) The Environmental Management Act, 2004, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2005) National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). Vice President’s Of-
fice, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2006a) Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2006b) Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2008a) Education Sector Development Programme (2008-17): Revised edition, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2008b) Memorandum of Understanding between the Partners (Government of Tanzania & De-
velopment Partners) participating in the pooled funding (“Basket”) of the Health Sector: July 1, 2008 
– June 30, 2015, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2009) Fourth National Report on Implementation of Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 
Vice President’s Office-Division of Environment, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2010) National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II (NSGRP II). Ministry of Fi-
nance and Economic Affairs, MKUKUTA Secretariat, Dar es Salaam. 
Bibliography 336 
 
——— (2011) Partnership Framework Memorandum Governing General Budget Support (GBS) for 
Implementation of MKUKUTA II. Ministry of Finance, Dar Es Salaam. 
——— (2012a) Country Progress Reporting. Part A: Tanzania Mainland. TACAIDS, Zanzibar 
AIDS Commission, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012b) Education Sector Development Programme: Joint Education Sector Review 2012: Aide 
Memoire, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012c) National Report for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 
Rio+20. Vice President’s Office-Division of Environment, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2012d) National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation: 
2nd draft. Vice President’s Office, Dar es Salaam. 
United States of America, Department of State (2012) PEPFAR Blueprint: Creating an AIDS-free Gener-
ation. The Office of the Global Aids Coordinator, Washington D.C. 
University of Cape Town (2007) Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making in the new 
South Africa: A Research Project to Identify Practical Lessons Learned: Final Research Project Re-
port. UCT, UNITAR, Geneva. 
USAID (2009) USAID/Tanzania Education Strategy for Improving the Quality of Education FY 2009–
2013. USAID, Washington D.C., Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2011) USAID Education Strategy 2011–2015: Opportunity Through Learning. USAID, Wash-
ington D.C. 
——— (2013) Tanzania: HIV/AIDS, 16 December 2013. http://www.usaid.gov/tanzania/hivaids. Ac-
cessed 29/01/2014. 
USAID & Creative Associates International (2014) TZ21 - Community Engagement in Reading and ICT 
Installation Mtwara. http://crea-tz21.com/community-engagement-in-reading-and-ict-installation-
mtwara/. Accessed 9/07/2014. 
Uwezo (2013) Are Our Children Learning? Annual Learning Assessment Report 2012. Uwezo Tanzania, 
Dar es Salaam. 
van Cranenburgh, O. (1996) Tanzania’s 1995 Multi-Party Elections: The Emerging Party System. Party 
Politics 2 (4), pp. 535–547. 
van den Heever, A. M. (2011) Evaluation of the Green Paper on National Health Insurance, Johannes-
burg. 
van der Berg, S. (2007) Apartheid’s Enduring Legacy: Inequalities in Education. Journal of African 
Economies 16 (5), pp. 849–880. 
van der Berg, S., Taylor, S., Gustafsson, M., Spaull, N. & Armstrong, P. (2011) Improving Education 
Quality in South Africa: Report for the National Planning Commission. September 2011. Department 
of Economics, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch. 
van der Veen, A. M. (2011) Ideas, interests and foreign aid, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Venkatesh, K. K., Mayer, K. H. & Carpenter, C. C. J. (2012) Low-Cost Generic Drugs Under The Presi-
dent’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief Drove Down Treatment Cost; More Are Needed. Health 
Affairs 31 (7), pp. 1429–1438. 
Venter, F. (2007) The South African National strategic plan: what does it mean for our health system? 
Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 8 (2). 
——— (2013) HIV Treatment in South Africa: The challenges of an increasingly successful antiretroviral 
programme. In: Padarath Ashnie & English Rene (eds.) South African Health Review 2012/13. Dur-
ban, pp. 37–48. 
Vestergaard, J. (2011) The World Bank and the Emerging World Order. Adjusting to Multipolarity at the 
Second Decimal Point. DIIS Report. Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. 
Vian, T., Miller, C., Themba, Z. & Bukuluki, P. (2013) Perceptions of per diems in the health sector: 
evidence and implications. Health Policy and Planning 28 (3), pp. 237–246. 
Vice President’s Office (2004) Public Expenditure Review of Environment Financial Year 2004. United 
Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Bibliography 337 
 
——— (2005) The Development of Indicators of Poverty-Environment Linkages: Final Report. United 
Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2007) National Capacity Self Assessment Report and Action Plan for the Implementation of Post 
Rio Conventions. United Republic of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. 
Villarino, E. (2011) Top USAID private sector partners: A primer. Devex, 06 September 2011. 
https://www.devex.com/en/news/top-usaid-private-sector-partners-a-primer/75832. Accessed 
12/12/2013. 
Wagner, D. (2003) Aid and trade – an empirical study. Journal of the Japanese and International Econo-
mies 17 (2), pp. 153–173. 
Walt, G. & Gilson, L. (1994) Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the central role of 
policy analysis. Health Policy and Planning 9 (4), pp. 353–370. 
Wangwe, S. (2004) The politics of autonomy and sovereignty: Tanzania’s aid relationship. In: Bromley, 
S., Mackintosh, M., Brown, W. & Wuyts, M. (eds.) Making the International: Economic Interde-
pendence and Political Order. London: The Open University, Pluto Press, pp. 379–411. 
Wangwe, S. M. & Rweyemamu, D. C. (2001) The State of Tanzania’s Social Sector in the Development 
Context: Paper Presented During the CSSC Stakeholders Consultation in Bagamoyo, Tanzania. Eco-
nomic and Social Research Foundation, Dar es Salaam. 
Warren, D. M., Slikkerveer, L. J., Brokensha, D. & Dechering, W. (eds.) (1995) The Cultural Dimension 
of Development: Indigenous Knowledge Systems, London: Intermediate Technology Publications. 
Wedgwood, R. (2006) Education and Poverty Reduction in Tanzania. Working Paper (9). HakiElimu. 
Weingart, P. (2002) African solutions for African problems: Science and political legitimacy. In: Mouton, 
J., Waast, R. & Ritchie, F. (eds.) Science in Africa: Proceedings of a symposium held on 17 & 18 Oc-
tober 2001. Stellenbosch, pp. 199–216. 
——— (2003) Paradox in Scientific Advising. In: Bechmann, G. I. (ed.) Expertise and Its Interfaces. The 
Tense Relationship of Science and Politics. Berlin: edition sigma, pp. 53–89. 
——— (2006) Knowledge and Inequality. In: Therborn, G. (ed.) Inequalities of the world. London, New 
York: Verso, pp. 163–190. 
Weissman, S. R. (1990) Structural adjustment in Africa: Insights from the experiences of Ghana and 
Senegal. World Development 18 (12), pp. 1621–1634. 
White House (2010) Fact Sheet: US Global Development Policy. Office of the Press Secretary, The 
White House, Washington. 
Whitfield, L. (2009a) Aid and Power: A Comparative Analysis of the Country Studies. In: Whitfield, L. 
(ed.) The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors. New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 329–360. 
——— (2009b) The Politics of Aid. African Strategies for Dealing with Donors, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
Whitfield, L. & Fraser, A. (2009) Negotiating Aid. In: Whitfield, L. (ed.) The Politics of Aid. African 
Strategies for Dealing with Donors. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 27–44. 
——— (2010) Negotiating Aid: The Structural Conditions Shaping the Negotiating Strategies of African 
Governments. International Negotiation 15 (3), pp. 341–366. 
WHO (2014) Global Health Expenditure Database: Table of key indicators, sources and methods by 
country and indicators: Tanzania. http://apps.who.int/nha/database/StandardReport.aspx?ID= 
REP_WEB_MINI_TEMPLATE_WEB_VERSION&COUNTRYKEY=84664. Accessed 20/02/2014. 
Williams, G., Jones, S., Imber, V. & Cox, A. (2003) A Vision for the Future of Technical Assistance in 
the International Development System. Oxford Policy Management. 
Wines, M. (2004) South Africa: Minister Defends Garlic Aids Diet. The New York Times, 10 February 
2004. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/10/world/world-briefing-africa-south-africa-minister-
defends-garlic-aids-diet.html. Accessed 23/07/2014. 
Wood, B., Betts, J. & Etta, F. et al. (2011) The evaluation of the Paris Declaration. Phase 2: Final report. 
Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. 
Bibliography 338 
 
Woods, N. (2005) The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid. International Affairs (Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs 1944-) 81 (2), pp. 393–409. 
World Bank (1988) Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies for Adjustment, Revitalization, and Ex-
pansion. A World Bank Policy Study. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (1989) Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth. A long-term perspective study, 
2nd edn., Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
——— (1992) Governance and development, Washington, D.C: World Bank. 
——— (1993) World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
——— (1995) Priorities and strategies for education: a World Bank review. Development in practice. 
World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (1996) Toward environmentally sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A World Bank 
agenda. Development in practice. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (1999a) Education Sector Strategy. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (1999b) South Africa Country Assistance Strategy: Building a Knowledge Partnership. World 
Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (1999c) World Development Report 1998/99: Knowledge for Development, Washington D.C.: 
Oxford University Press. 
——— (2001) Making Sustainable Commitments: An Environment Strategy for the World Bank. World 
Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2003) Tanzania - Multi-Sectoral AIDS Project: Project Appraisal Document. World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
——— (2005a) Capacity Enhancement through Knowledge Transfer. A Behavioral Framework for Re-
flection, Action and Results. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2005b) Tanzania - Primary Education Development Program. Implementation Completion Re-
port (32071). World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2006) South Africa - Cape Peninsula Biodiversity Conservation Project.: Implementation Com-
pletion and Results Report. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2010a) African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) Regional Capacity Building Project: 
Project Information Document. Concept Stage. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2010b) Country Office Annual Salary Review 2010. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2010c) Tanzania - Forest Conservation and Management Project, and Eastern Arc Forests Con-
servation and Management Project. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2011a) Guidelines for the selection and employment of consultants under IBRD loans and IDA 
credits & grants by World Bank Borrowers. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2011b) South Africa - Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development Project: Imple-
mentation Completion and Results Report. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2012a) FAQs: About The World Bank. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTSITETOOLS/0,,contentMDK:20147466~men
uPK:344189~pagePK:98400~piPK:98424~theSitePK:95474,00.html#8. Accessed 30/04/2013. 
——— (2012b) How The Project Cycle Works. http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,menuPK:258677~pagePK:64087557~piPK:6
4087559~theSitePK:258644,00.html#approval. Accessed 21/08/2012. 
——— (2012c) IBRD Articles of Agreement (As amended effective June 27, 2012): Article V. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,c
ontentMDK:20049604~noSURL:Y~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~is 
CURL:Y~isCURL:Y,00.html#3. Accessed 29/04/2013. 
——— (2012d) Professional and Technical Opportunities, Washington D.C. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTJOBSNEW/0,,contentMDK:23123966~menuP
K:8453473~pagePK:8453902~piPK:8453359~theSitePK:8453353,00.html. Accessed 25/09/2013. 
Bibliography 339 
 
——— (2012e) Toward a Green, Clean, and Resilient World for All: A World Bank Group Environment 
Strategy 2012–2022. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
——— (2012f) YPP at a glance, Washington D.C. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTJOBSNEW/0,,contentMDK:23124011~menuP
K:8526385~pagePK:8453902~piPK:8453359~theSitePK:8453353,00.html. Accessed 26/09/2013. 
——— (2012g) Comprehensive Climate Change Planning in Tanzania: South-South Knowledge Ex-
change Hub. World Bank, Dar es Salaam. 
——— (2013a) Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development Project. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:23169150~menuPK:14131
0~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html. Accessed 6/05/2014. 
——— (2013b) Tanzania Overview: Strategy. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tanzania/overview. 
Accessed 8/01/2014. 
——— (2013c) The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2013 Update: Aggregate Indicators of Govern-
ance 1996–2012. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/wgidataset.xlsx. Accessed 26/02/2014. 
——— (2014a) World Development Indicators: Net ODA received (% of GNI). 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS. Accessed 12/02/2014. 
——— (2014b) World Development Indicators: Net official development assistance received (current 
US$). http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/dt.oda.odat.cd?downloadformat=excel. Accessed 
3/12/2014. 
——— (2014c) World Development Indicators: Aid dependency. http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/6.11#. 
Accessed 3/12/2014. 
——— (2014d) World Development Indicators: Life expectancy at birth, total (years). 
http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/indicator/sp.dyn.le00.in?downloadformat=excel. Accessed 
28/08/2014. 
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2008) Using knowledge to improve development effective-
ness: An evaluation of the World Bank economic and sector work and technical assistance, 2000–
2006. World Bank, Washington D.C. 
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) Our Common Future, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford (et al.). 
World Conference on Education for All (1990) Meeting Basic Learning Needs: A Vision for the 1990s: 
Background Document. Inter-Agency Commission (UNDO, UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank) for 
the World Conference on Education for All, New York. 
World Health Organisation South Africa (2009) 2009 Annual Report. WHO, Pretoria. 
World Health Organization (1946) Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the In-
ternational Health Conference, New York, 19 June - 22 July 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the 
representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and 
entered into force on 7 April 1948., New York. 
——— (2006) Engaging for Health: Eleventh General Programme of Work 2006–2015. A Global Health 
Agenda. WHO, Geneva. 
——— (2008) Medium-Term Strategic Plan 2008–2013 and Programme Budget 2008–2009. WHO, 
Geneva. 
——— (2009a) Rapid Advice: Antiretroviral therapy for HIV infection in adults and adolescents. 
WHO Press, Geneva. 
——— (2009b) WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2008–2013: South Africa. WHO Regional Office 
for Africa, Brazzaville. 
——— (2009c) WHO Country Cooperation Strategy 2010–2015: Tanzania. WHO Regional Office for 
Africa, Brazzaville. 
——— (2010) Achieving Sustainable Health Development in the African Region: Strategic Directions 
for WHO 2010–2015. WHO Regional Office for Africa, Brazzaville. 
——— (2013) Composition of the Executive Board. http://www.who.int/governance/eb/ 
eb_composition/en/index.html. Accessed 29/04/2013. 
Bibliography 340 
 
World Health Organization, UNICEF & UNAIDS (2013) Global Update on HIV Treatment 2013: Re-
sults, Impact and Opportunities. WHO report in partnership with UNICEF and UNAIDS, Geneva. 
Wouters, E., van Rensburg, H. J. & Meulemans, H. (2010) The National Strategic Plan of South Afri-
ca: What are the prospects of success after the repeated failure of previous AIDS policy? Health 
Policy Plan 25 (3), pp. 171–185. 
Wright, C. (2012) DFID South Africa: Review of the SARRAH Programme: November 2011 - January 
2012. 
Wright, S. (ed.) (1999) African foreign policies, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 
Wunder, S. (2005) Payments for Environmental Services: Some nuts and bolts. CIFOR Occassional Paper 
(42). Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia. 
WYG International Limited (2011) Phase Two Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration 
and Accra Agenda in South Africa: Final Country Evaluation Report. 
Yamauchi, F. (2005) Race, equity, and public schools in post-Apartheid South Africa: Equal opportunity 
for all kids. Economics of Education Review 24 (2), pp. 213–233. 
——— (2011) School quality, clustering and government subsidy in post-apartheid South Africa. Eco-
nomics of Education Review 30 (1), pp. 146–156. 
Younas, J. (2008) Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits. European Journal of 
Political Economy 24 (3), pp. 661–674. 
Younge, A. & Fowkes, S. (2003) The Cape Action Plan for the Environment: overview of an ecoregional 
planning process. Biological Conservation 112 (1-2), pp. 15–28. 
Youssef, C. (2005) World Bank Priorities in Education Lending: An Ever-Changing Endeavour. Paterson 
Review - A Graduate Journal of International Affairs 6, pp. 1–29. 
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B. & Perrone, V. (1998) Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of Interorganiza-
tional and Interpersonal Trust on Performance. Organization Science 9 (2), pp. 141–159. 
Ziai, A. (2010) Zur Kritik des Entwicklungsdiskurses. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (10), pp. 23–29. 
——— (2011) Some reflections on the concept of ‘development’. Working Paper Series (81). Center for 
Development Research, University of Bonn, Bonn.            
 
 
 341 
 
 
Appendices 
A Interview Guidelines 
The interview guidelines were slightly modified during the course of fieldwork; the fol-
lowing are the final versions used for aid experts in their various roles (representatives 
of country offices and embassies, advisors, consultants), government officials in recipi-
ent authorities, and academics/civil society activists.   
A1 Aid Experts  
– Please be kind enough to briefly outline your work experience and the scope of 
your responsibilities in your institution.  
– How do you interact with South African/Tanzanian policymakers/senior offi-
cials? What kind of expertise do you provide?  
– Why is there a need for advice from outside? To what extent is there a demand 
for it on the part of your counterpart ministry?  
– How receptive are your South African/Tanzanian counterparts to advice?  
– What kind of difficulties come up in the context of advisory processes? Please 
give examples.  
– To what extent is the government setting the agenda, i.e. formulating clear poli-
cy priorities?  
– Have there been any contentious issues in policy discussions? Please give exam-
ples.  
– How do the South African/Tanzanian policymakers deal with conflicting advice? 
Please give examples.  
– To what extent is your advice shaped by priorities of your sending organisation?  
– Do you see problematic issues related to your role in the policy process?  
– How do you assess the capacity of the local science community? Does any kind 
of knowledge exchange take place?   
– Final question: How would you assess the overall impact of expert advice – what 
are the benefits and limits?   
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A2 Government Officials  
– Please be kind enough to briefly outline your work experience and the scope of 
your responsibilities in your institution.  
– How do you interact with experts/consultants of development organisations?  
– What kind of expertise do these experts provide? Is there a need for their advice?  
– To what extent does expert advice relate to the ministry’s priorities? Does it 
support the government’s agenda?  
– Do external experts have sufficient knowledge of the local context and the poli-
cy environment to provide advice that is relevant and feasible?   
– What kind of difficulties come up in the context of advisory processes? Please 
give examples.  
– Have there been any contentious issues in recent policy discussions? Please give 
examples.  
– How do you deal with conflicting advice? Please give examples. 
– How do you assess external experts’ role and influence in policy processes? 
– To what extent are external experts strengthening the capacity within your de-
partment?  
– How do you interact with local scientists? To what extent is local research taken 
up into the policy process?  
– Final question: How would you assess the overall impact of external experts – 
what are the benefits and limits of their advice?   
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A3 Academics/Activists 
– Please be kind enough to briefly outline your work experience and current re-
sponsibilities in your institution.  
– How do you interact with policymakers? To what extent are you involved in pol-
icy processes?   
– How receptive are policymakers to advice? To what extent does local and exter-
nal expertise inform policymaking?   
– Why is there a need for experts from outside? What kind of knowledge do for-
eign experts provide that is not in the country?   
– Are there differences in the perception of local and external expertise?  
– Do external experts have sufficient knowledge of the local context and the poli-
cy environment to provide useful support?   
– Have there been any contentious issues in the discussion of _______? Please 
give examples.  
– How does the government deal with conflicting advice? Please give examples.  
– How do you assess the role and influence of foreign experts in shaping policy 
processes? 
– To what extent are external experts strengthening local capacity?  
– What needs to be done to strengthen the local knowledge base and the science-
policy exchange?  
– Final question: How would you assess the overall impact of external experts – 
what are the benefits and limits of their advice?   
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B Questionnaire 
The questionnaires were slightly modified during the course of fieldwork; the following 
are the final versions used for aid experts in their various roles (representatives of coun-
try offices and embassies, advisors, consultants), government officials in recipient 
authorities, and academics/civil society activists. All questionnaires had the following 
introduction:  
 
Dear Participant:  
We kindly thank you for your collaboration in this academic study to help us better   
understand the role and interaction of external and local experts in South Afri-
ca/Tanzania.  
This brief questionnaire covering general questions on your professional background, 
institutional setting and experience in development cooperation will take not more than 
15 minutes to complete. 
We would like to emphasize that all information will exclusively be used for scientific 
purposes. All data will be treated confidentially and we fully guarantee the anonymity 
of all participants. 
Thank you for your kind support.  
Best regards,  
Prof. Peter Weingart (Project leader Bielefeld)  
Susanne Steiger (Scientific fellow)   
 
 
Annex B4 provides a table reflecting the response. 
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B1 Aid Experts  
I. GENERAL INFORMATION 
Please answer the following questions on your personal and professional background: 
 
1. Title/Position:         
2. Gender:    male      female 
3. Country of origin:          
4. Nationality:           
5. Please indicate your highest accredited level of education and name your subjects:  
a.  vocational training 
b.  2 years of College completed, subject(s):_____________________________ 
c.  BA, subject(s):_________________________________________________ 
d.  Master-level (incl. J.D.), subject(s):_________________________________ 
e.  PhD, subject(s): ________________________________________________ 
 
6. Please indicate where you have acquired your highest accredited level of education:   
a.  in South Africa/Tanzania, please specify:_____________________________  
b.  abroad, please specify:____________________________________________ 
 
7. Please indicate your language proficiency: 
a. mother language(s):_____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
excellent good basics no proficiency 
b.  English  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. French  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d.  Africaans/Kiswahili  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e. other, please specify:______________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f. other, please specify:______________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Employer/contracting institution:        
9. Please indicate your level of seniority within your institution: 
a.  head of organisation/mission to South Africa/Tanzania 
b.  high ranking manager (e.g., vice-president, vice-chairperson, director) 
c.  senior member of staff (e.g., head of department, team leader) 
d.  medium level of seniority (e.g., attaché, advisor, project manager) 
e.  junior member of staff 
f.  other, please specify ________________________________ 
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10. How broad is your experience in international development cooperation:  
Experience in number of years        
thereof number of years spent in developing countries      
 
11. Since when have you been working in the field of development cooperation in South 
Africa/Tanzania?     
Please indicate month and year in numbers (e.g., month: 11 = November; year: 2006): 
 
       month ______ year _______ 
 
12. How long does your contract of employment require you to work in South Africa/Tanzania? Please 
indicate the number of weeks, months or years:  
a. _______  week(s)   
b. _______  month(s)   
c. _______  month(s)   
d.  for an unlimited period 
 
13. If you are a South African/Tanzanian national, why did you choose to work for an international 
development organisation, please rate on a scale of 1 to 4: 
 (1 = fully applicable,  2 = partly applicable,  3 = marginally applicable,  4 = not at all applicable 
 
a.  _____  positive leverage with regards to career development 
b.  _____  interest in the project/programme you are involved in 
c.  _____  financial incentives   
d.  _____  other reasons, please specify:_____________________________________ 
 
 
14. If you are not a South African/Tanzanian national, why did you come to work in South Africa/South 
Africa/Tanzania, please rate on a scale of 1 to 4: 
 (1 = fully applicable,  2 = partly applicable,  3 = marginally applicable,  4 = not at all applicable) 
 
a.  _____  positive leverage with regards to career development 
b.  _____  interest in South Africa/Tanzania/the region 
c.  _____  interest in the project you are involved in 
d.  _____  financial incentives   
e.  _____  followed employer’s demand 
f.  _____  other reasons, please specify:_____________________________________ 
 
15. If you are not a South African/Tanzanian national, how did you prepare for working in development 
cooperation in South Africa/Tanzania: 
a. technical training: time spent in weeks:   ______ 
b. cultural training: time spent in weeks:    _______ 
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c. language course: time spent in weeks:    _______ 
d. other, please specify ________________time spent in weeks: ______ 
e.   no specific training  
 
16. How would you assess your institution’s impact in the field of development cooperation in South 
Africa/Tanzania?   
a.  most influential key player 
b.  amongst the most influential key players 
c.  middle range impact 
d.  low impact 
 
17. How would you rate your institution’s impact on policy processes in South Africa/Tanzania: 
a.  most influential key player 
b.  amongst the most influential key players 
c.  middle range impact 
d.  low impact 
 
18. How would you describe your individual role in development cooperation in South Africa/Tanzania? 
                                
 
 
II. COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS  
19. Who are your main South African/Tanzanian (institutional) counterparts, please rate:  
 key 
counterpart 
important 
counterpart 
marginal 
counterpart 
no counterpart 
 
 
a. governmental institutions     
b. non-governmental organisations     
c. private sector-related institutions     
d. other:          
 
20. Which language is primarily spoken in cooperation with your local counterparts? Multiple answers 
allowed:  
a.  Africaans/Kiswahili, with the help of a translator 
b.  Africaans/Kiswahili, without the help of a translator 
c.  English with the help of a translator 
d.  English, without the help of a translator 
e.  other, with the help of a translator:  ________________ 
f.  other, without the help of a translator: ______________ 
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21. Which are the most important means of communication in your cooperation with the following 
actors? Please rate: 
       (1 = most important,   2 = important,   3 = rather unimportant,   4 = not at all important/not used) 
 
21.1. with your local counterparts: 
a.         telephone conferences 
b.         individual phone conversations  
c.         email 
d.         offical meetings 
e.         informal personal meetings  
f.         other, please specify:                
21.2. with your country office superior (in case you are head of the office yourself, with the 
employees you supervise):  
a.         telephone conferences 
b.         individual phone conversations  
c.         email 
d.         offical meetings 
e.         informal personal meetings  
f.         other, please specify:            
21.3. with your institution’s headquarters: 
a.           telephone conferences 
b.           individual phone conversations  
c.           email 
d.           offical meetings 
e.           informal personal meetings  
f.           other, please specify:             
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22. How frequently do you contact the following actors on average? 
22.1. your local counterparts: 
       
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
22.2. your country office superior (in case you are head of the office yourself, with the   
         employees you supervise):  
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
22.3. your institution’s headquarter: 
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
23. How often are you required to write reports to: 
23.1. your local counterparts: 
       
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
23.2. your country office superior: 
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
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23.3. your institution’s headquarter: 
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
23.4. other, please specify  ________________ 
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
24. Based on your experience, how are concepts of development project or programmes generated:  
 definitely 
appropriate 
partly 
appropriate 
rather 
inappropriate 
not  
appropriate 
 
 
a. on the spot by local stakeholders     
b. in a process of mutual exchange 
between local and international partners  
    
c. in a process of mutual exchange 
between country office and 
headquarters of international partner 
    
d. decided upon at headquarters of 
international partner  
    
e. other:         
25. In your daily work and communication with local counterparts, which of the following do you 
consider problematic issues:  
(1 = extremely problematic,   2 = problematic,   3 = rather unproblematic,   4 = definitely unproblematic) 
 
a.   language barrier  
b.             cultural differences 
c.             gender issues 
d.             different level of work experience 
e.             different level of technical competence 
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f.             different styles of communication  
g.             sharing a common vision and similar motivation 
h.             sharing similar interests in reaching targets 
i.             adherence to hierarchies 
j.             pressure from institutions/organs at a higher hierarchical level 
k.             corruption 
l.             differences in the standard of living/salary level 
m.             other, please specify:      
 
26. Who is evaluating the cooperation with your local partner? Multiple answers allowed:   
a.    yourself   
b.    project team members of your local partner 
c.    project team members of your institution  
d.    project team members of your institution together with local partner 
e.    internal evaluators of your local partner 
f.    internal evaluators of your institution 
g.    external evaluators assigned by local partner  
h.    external evaluators assigned by your institution   
i.    other, please specify:      
27. How important do you rate evaluation reports for: 
(1 = very important,    2 = important,   3 = less important,   4 = not important) 
 
a.             your individual learning process 
b.             your professional advancement with regard to your career 
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III. ACCESS AND MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 
28. Which are the main sources of information you use for your professional activity, please rate: 
 primary 
source 
important 
source 
minor source no source 
 
     
a. own empirical findings/ measurements     
b. internal sources/ databases of your 
institution 
    
c. consultation with other consultants and 
counterparts 
    
d. World Bank reports and material     
e. material from other dev. organisations, 
please specify: 
 __________________________ 
    
f. scientific journals/publications     
g. scientific internet-sources     
h.  other internet-sources, please specify: 
____________________ 
    
i. South African/Tanzanian media      
j. international media      
 
29. Within your employing institution(s), how strongly are you encouraged to share knowledge   
amongst colleagues, departments and offices? 
a.  very strongly 
b.  strongly 
c.  occassionally 
d.  not at all 
 
30. How frequently do you participate  in conferences/panels/workshops etc. where knowledge sharing 
between local and foreign experts takes place?  
a.  _____ per week 
b.  _____ per month 
c.  _____ per year 
d.  not at all 
 
 
Thank you very much for support! 
Appendices 353 
 
B2 Government Officials  
I. GENERAL INFORMATION 
Please answer the following questions on your personal and professional background: 
 
1. Title/Position:           
2. Gender:    male      female 
3. Country of origin:          
4. Nationality:            
5. Please indicate your highest accredited level of education and name your subjects:  
a.  vocational training 
b.  2 years of College completed, subject(s):_________________________ 
c.  BA, subject(s):______________________________________________ 
d.  Master-level (incl. J.D.), subject(s):_____________________________ 
e.  PhD, subject(s):_____________________________________________ 
 
6. Please indicate where you have acquired your highest accredited level of education:   
a.  in South Africa/Tanzania, please specify:___________________________________ 
b.  abroad, please specify:_______________________________________ 
 
7. Please indicate your language proficiency: 
a. mother language(s):____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
excellent good basics no proficiency 
b.  Africaans/Kiswahili  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c.  English  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d. French  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e. other, please specify:______________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f. other, please specify:______________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Employer/contracting institution:         
9. Please indicate your level of seniority within your institution: 
a.  head of ministry/institution   
b.  high ranking manager (e.g., vice-president, vice-chairperson, director) 
c.  senior member of staff (e.g., head of department, team leader) 
d.  medium level of seniority (e.g., attaché, advisor, project manager) 
e.  junior member of staff 
f.  other, please specify:_____________________________________ 
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10. Since when have you been employed in your current position? Please indicate month and year in 
numbers (e.g., month: 11 = November; year: 2006): 
        month ______  year _______ 
 
11. For how long will you be working in this position according to your contract of employment? 
Please indicate the number of weeks, months or years:  
a.  _______  week(s)   
b.  _______  month(s)   
c.  _______  month(s)   
d.  for an unlimited period 
 
12. How would you rate your institution’s impact on policy processes in South Africa/Tanzania: 
a.  most influential key player 
b.  amongst the most influential key player 
c.  middle range impact 
d.  low impact 
 
13. How would you describe your individual role in the field of development cooperation?  
________________________________________ 
 
14. How broad is your experience in working with international development partners:   
Experience in number of years:         
 
thereof number of years spent in other developing countries:  
 
II. COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS  
15. Who are your international (institutional) counterparts, please rate: 
 key 
counterpart 
important 
counterpart 
marginal 
counterpart 
no counterpart 
 
 
a. bi- and multilateral governmental 
institutions 
    
b. non-governmental organisations     
c. private sector-related institutions     
d. other:           
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16. Which language is primarily spoken in cooperation with your international partners: 
a.  Africaans/Kiswahili, with the help of a translator 
b.  Africaans/Kiswahili, without the help of a translator 
c.  English with the help of a translator 
d.  English, without the help of a translator 
e.  other, with the help of a translator  ________________ 
f.  other, without the help of a translator ______________ 
 
17. Which are the most important means of communication in your cooperation with the following 
actors?  Please rate:   (1 = most important,   2 = important,   3 = rather unimportant,   4 = not at 
all important/not used) 
17.1.  with your superior authority: 
 
a.         telephone conferences 
b.         individual phone conversations  
c.         email 
d.         offical meetings 
e.         informal personal meetings  
f.         other, please specify:             
  
17.2.   with your direct international counterparts in South Africa/Tanzania:  
 
a.         telephone conferences 
b.         individual phone conversations  
c.         email 
d.         offical meetings 
e.         informal personal meetings  
f.         other, please specify:             
17.3     with the headquarters of your international partner : 
a.         telephone conferences 
b.         individual phone conversations  
c.         email 
d.         offical meetings 
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e.         informal personal meetings  
f.         other, please specify:             
 
18. How frequently do you contact the following actors on average? 
18.1. your superior authority: 
       
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
18.2. your direct international counterparts in South Africa/Tanzania: 
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
18.3. headquarters of your international partners: 
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
19. How often are your required to write reports to:  
19.1. your superior authority: 
       
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
19.2. your direct international counterparts in South Africa/Tanzania: 
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
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19.3. headquarters of your international partners: 
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
19.4.  other, please specify:        ___________________ 
 
a.  daily 
b.  _____ per week 
c.  _____ per month 
d.  _____ per year 
e.  never 
 
 
20. Based on your experience, where/how are concepts of development projects or programmes 
generated:  
 definitely 
appropriate 
partly 
appropriate 
rather 
inappropriate 
not  
appropriate 
 
 
a. on the spot by local stakeholders     
b. in a process of mutual exchange 
between local and international partners  
    
c. in a process of mutual exchange 
between country office and headquarters 
of international partner 
    
d. decided upon at headquarters of 
international partner  
    
e. other:         
 
21. In your daily work and communication with international counterparts, which of the following 
do you consider problematic issues: (1 = extremely problematic,   2 = problematic,   3 = rather 
unproblematic,   4 = definitely unproblematic) 
a.    language barrier  
b.              cultural differences 
c.              gender issues 
d.              different level of work experience 
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e.              different level of technical competence 
f.              different styles of communication  
g.              sharing a common vision and similar motivation 
h.              sharing similar interests in reaching targets 
i.              adherence to hierarchies 
j.              pressure from institutions/organs at a higher hierarchical level 
k.              corruption 
l.              differences in the standard of living/salary level 
m.              other, please specify:      
 
22. In cooperation with international partners, who is evaluating your work? Multiple answers 
allowed: 
a.    yourself   
b.    project team members of your institution  
c.    project team members of your international partner 
d.    project team members of your institution together with international partner 
e.    internal evaluators of your institution 
f.    internal evaluators of your international partner 
g.    external evaluators assigned by your institution   
h.    external evaluators assigned by your international partner 
i.    other, please specify:      
 
23. How important do you rate evaluation reports for:  (1 = very important,    2 = important,   3 = 
less important,   4 = not important) 
a.   your individual learning process 
b.   your professional advancement with regard to your career 
Appendices 359 
 
III. ACCESS AND MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 
24. Which are the main sources of information you use for your professional activity, please rate: 
 primary 
source 
important 
source 
 
minor source no source 
 
a. own empirical findings/ measurements     
b. internal sources/databases of your 
institution 
    
c. consultation with other consultants and 
counterparts 
    
d. World Bank reports and material     
e. material from other dev. organisations, 
please specify: 
__________________________ 
    
f. scientific journals/publications     
g. scientific internet-sources     
h. other internet-sources, please specify: 
____________________ 
    
i. South African/Tanzanian media      
j. international media      
 
25. Within your employing institution(s), how strongly are you encouraged to share knowledge 
amongst colleagues, departments and offices? 
a.  very strongly  
b.  strongly 
c.  occassionally 
d.  not at all 
 
26. How frequently  do you participate in conferences/panels/workshops etc. where knowledge 
sharing between local and foreign experts takes place?   
a.  _____  per week 
b.  _____  per month 
c.  _____  per year 
d.  not at all 
 
Thank you very much for support! 
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B3 Academics/Activists 
I. GENERAL INFORMATION 
1. Title/Position:           
2. Gender:    male      female 
3. Country of origin:          
4. Nationality:            
5. Please indicate your highest accredited level of education and name your subjects:  
a.  vocational training 
b.  2 years of College completed, subject(s):_____________________ 
c.  BA, subject(s): _________________________________________ 
d.  Master-level (incl. J.D.), subject(s):_________________________ 
e.  PhD, subject(s):_________________________________________    
 
6. Please indicate where you have acquired your highest accredited level of education:   
a.  in South Africa/Tanzania, please specify:________________________________   
b.  abroad, please specify:____________________________________ 
 
7. Please indicate your language proficiency: 
a.    mother language(s):_____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
excellent good basics no proficiency 
b.  Africaans/Kiswahili  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c.  English  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d. French  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e. other, please specify:__________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f. other, please specify:__________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Employer/contracting institution:       
9. Please indicate your level of seniority within your institution: 
a.  head of institution   
b.  high ranking manager (e.g., vice-president, vice-chairperson, director) 
c.  senior member of staff (e.g., head of department, team leader) 
d.  medium level of seniority (e.g., Attaché, Advisor, project manager) 
e.  junior member of staff 
f.  other, please specify:_____________________________________ 
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10. Since when have you been employed in your current position? Please indicate month and year in 
numbers (e.g., month: 11 = November; year: 2006): 
month  ______ year ______ 
 
11. For how long will you be working in this position according to your contract of employment? 
Please indicate the number of weeks, months or years:  
 _______  week(s)   
 _______  month(s)   
 _______  month(s)   
 for an unlimited period 
 
12. How would you rate your institution’s impact on policy processes in South Africa/Tanzania: 
a.  most influential key player 
b.  amongst the most influential key player 
c.  middle range impact 
d.  low impact 
 
II. COOPERATION WITH PARTNERS  
13. Who are the main local (institutional) partners you cooperate with? Please rate: 
 key 
partner 
important 
partner 
marginal 
partner 
no partner 
 
 
a. governmental institutions     
b. non-governmental organisations     
c. private sector-related institutions     
d. other:         
 
14. Who are the main international (institutional) partners you cooperate with? Please rate: 
 key 
partner 
important 
partner 
marginal 
partner 
no partner 
 
 
a. bi- and multilateral governmental 
institutions 
    
b. non-governmental organisations     
c. private sector-related institutions     
d. other:         
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15. How broad is your experience in the field of international development cooperation:   
Experience in number of years         
thereof number of years spent in other developing countries  
 
16. In which context/role(s) have you been involved in international development cooperation? 
      ___________________________________________ 
 
17. Based on your experience, where/how are concepts of development projects or programmes 
generated: 
 definitely 
appropriate 
partly 
appropriate 
rather 
inappropriate 
not  
appropriate 
 
a. on the spot by local stakeholders     
b. in a process of mutual exchange between 
local and international partners  
    
c. in a process of mutual exchange between 
country office and headquarters of 
international partner 
    
d. decided upon at headquarters of 
international partner  
    
e. other:         
 
 
18. In the cooperation and communication between local and international partners, which of the 
following do you consider problematic issues, please rate:                                   
(1 = extremely problematic,   2 = problematic,   3 = rather unproblematic,   4 = definitely 
unproblematic) 
a. _____  language barrier  
b. _____  cultural differences 
c. _____  gender issues 
d. _____  different level of work experience 
e. _____  different level of technical competence 
f. _____  different styles of communication  
g. _____  sharing a common vision and similar motivation 
h. _____  sharing similar interests in reaching targets 
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i. _____  adherence to hierarchies 
j. _____  pressure from institutions/organs at a higher hierarchical level 
k. _____  corruption 
l. _____  differences in the standard of living/salary level 
m. _____  other, please specify:      
 
III. ACCESS AND MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
19. Which are the main sources of information you use for your professional activity, please rate: 
 primary 
source 
important 
source 
minor source no source 
 
a. own empirical findings/ measurements     
b. internal sources/databases of your 
institution 
    
c. consultation with other consultants and 
counterparts 
    
d. World Bank reports and material     
e. material from other dev. organisations, 
please specify: 
__________________________ 
    
f. scientific journals/publications     
g. scientific internet-sources     
h. other internet-sources, please specify: 
____________________ 
    
i. South African/Tanzanian media      
j. international media      
 
20. Within your employing institution(s), how strongly are you encouraged to share knowledge 
amongst colleagues, departments and offices? 
a.    very strongly 
b.    strongly 
c.    occasionally 
d.    not at all 
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21. How frequently do you participate in conferences/panels/workshops etc. where knowledge 
sharing between local and foreign experts takes place?  
a.  _____ per week 
b.  _____ per month 
c.  _____ per year 
d.  not at all 
 
Thank you very much for support! 
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B4 Questionnaire Response 
At the end of the survey period which lasted from September 2011 to May 2013, 60 of 
73 interviewees had fully completed the questionnaire, which is equivalent to a response 
rate of 82%. Three informants (4%) had abandoned it before completion, and ten in-
formants (or 14%) provided no answer.   
Table 21: Questionnaire response 
Questionnaire version Completed Abandoned Not answered 
Aid experts 26 1 3 
Government officials 29 2 4 
Academics/Activists 5 0 3 
Total in numbers 60 3 10 
Share of total in %  82 4 14 
Source: Authors’ own empirical material.  
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C List of Interviewees 
The following table provides a detailed list of interviews carried out in the context of 
this study. For reasons of anonymity, we do not provide names of informants but their 
official position, the organisation they were affiliated with at the time of the interview, 
and the sector they were engaged in. If more than one position is listed, the interview 
was carried out with two or three persons. The reference numbers on the right are the 
ones used for marking citations in the text.  
Table 22: List of interviewees 
Date Organisation Position  Sector  No. 
SOUTH AFRICA  
02.11.11 DFID  Senior Health Advisor Health 1 
31.10.11 GIZ  Programme Director Skills Development Programmes, 
Interview 1 
Education 2 
21.11.12 GIZ  Programme Director Skills Development Programmes, 
Interview 2 
Education  3 
02.11.11 GIZ  Programme Manager Multisectoral HIV/AIDS Pro-
gramme 
Health 4 
02.11.11 Swedish    
Embassy 
Senior HIV/AIDS Advisor & Programme Officer Health 5 
03.11.11 UNAIDS Senior Policy & Programme Advisor Health 6 
02.11.11 UNDP Principal Technical Advisor: Ecosystems and Environ-
ment  
Environment 7 
03.11.11 UNDP Programme Manager Environment and Energy Environment 8 
04.11.11 US Embassy Health Attaché Health 9 
19.11.12 World Bank Regional Coordinator General 10 
01.11.11 WHO Medical Officer HIV Health 11 
31.10.11 WHO  WHO Representative Health 12 
08.11.11 CapeNature Executive Director: Environment Support Services Environment  13 
20.11.12 DEA Chief Directorate – Environment Specialist Environment  14 
22.11.12 DEA Head: Environment Planning  Environment  15 
19.11.12 DEA Director for Sustainable Development & Green Economy Environment  16 
23.11.12 DoH Senior M&E and Research Specialist Health 17 
19.11.12 DoH Director: Development Cooperation - International Rela-
tions 
Health 18 
19.11.12 DoH Chief Director HIV and AIDS, STI Health 19 
21.11.12 DHET DDG: Special Projects Unit  Education 20 
21.11.12 DHET Chief Director: International Relations Education 21 
20.11.12 DoL DDG: Public Employment Services Education 22 
22.11.12 National 
Treasury 
Chief Director International Development Cooperation General 23 
01.11.11 SANBI Chief Executive Officer SANBI  Environment  24 
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09.11.11 SANBI Director SANBI Fynbos Programme - CAPE Coordinator Environment  25 
04.11.11 SANBI SANBI National Grasslands Programme Officer Environment  26 
01.11.11 Section27 Executive Director Health 27 
10.11.11 University of 
Western Cape 
Professor, School of Public Health  Health 28 
23.11.12 University of 
Witwatersrand 
Professor, Wits Reproductive Health and HIV Institute Health 29 
     
TANZANIA 
12.03.13 CIDA First Secretary Development/Education Sector Team 
Leader 
Education 30 
09.05.12 CIDA Education Advisor  Education 31 
12.03.13 Consultant Education expert  Education 32 
07.05.12 Danida Programme Officer Environment Environment  33 
06.03.13 Danida Senior Advisor Health Policy, Planning and Management Health 34 
04.03.13 DFID  Education Advisor  Education 35 
07.03.13 Finnish    
Embassy 
Counsellor Natural Resources Environment  36 
10.05.12 GIZ  Programme Manager Health Coordination  Health 37 
07.03.13 Netherlands 
Embassy 
First Secretary Health & HIV/AIDS Health 38 
04.05.12 Norway   
Embassy  
Counsellor Environment and Climate Change Environment  39 
07.05.12 Swedish   
Embassy 
First Secretary Education & Research  Education 40 
08.05.12 UNDP Practice Specialist Environment Environment  41 
08.05.12 USAID Team Leader Education  Education 42 
13.03.13 USAID Health Office Director Health 43 
09.05.12 WHO National Professional Officer Health Service Delivery 
National Professional Officer Managerial Processes for 
National Health Systems 
Health 44 
05.03.13 World Bank Education Specialist Education 45 
03.05.12 World Bank Senior Environmental Specialist Environment  46 
03.05.12 World Bank Senior Health Specialist Health 47 
15.03.13 MoEVT Officer Higher Education Department  Education 48 
12.03.13 MoEVT Director of Primary Education Education 49 
11.03.13 MoEVT Assistant Director Monitoring & Evaluation 
Assistant Director Policy and Planning  
Education 50 
15.03.13 MoEVT Assistant Director Teacher Education Department  
Officer Teacher Education 
Principal Education Officer 
Education 51 
10.05.12 MoHSW prev. Chief Medical Officer Health 52 
01.05.12 MoHSW prev. Chief Medical Officer  Health 53 
04.03.13 MoHSW Head of Health Care Financing Health 54 
13.03.13 MNRT National Forest and Beekeeping Programme Environment  55 
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05.03.13 MNRT Assistant Director Policy and Planning  Environment  56 
11.03.13 MNRT Tanzania Forest Services, Publicity officer  Environment  57 
14.03.13 MNRT prev. Director Forest and Beekeeping Division Environment  58 
07.03.13 NEMC Senior Environment Management Officer Environment  59 
11.03.13 PMO-RALG Permanent Secretary  Education 60 
04.03.13 TACAIDS Director of Finance and Administration  Health 61 
08.03.13 TACAIDS Director of Policy and Planning  Health 62 
04.03.13 TACAIDS Executive Chairman TACAIDS Health 63 
08.05.12 TACAIDS prev. Executive Chairman TACAIDS  Health 64 
05.03.13 TACAIDS prev. Director of Policy and Planning TACAIDS Health 65 
09.05.12 VPO-DoE prev. Director of Environment; Consultant Environment  66 
11.03.13 VPO-DoE Director of Environment Environment  67 
07.03.13 Ifakara Health 
Institute 
Lead Policy Translation Thematic Group Health 68 
06.03.13 University of 
Dar es Salaam  
Professor, Institute for Resource Assessment Environment  69 
07.05.12 Twaweza Head of Twaweza Education 70 
13.03.13 University of 
Bagamoyo 
 
Professor, Educational Research and Psychology Education 71 
GERMANY 
17.01.12 GIZ  prev. Tanzania Portfolio Manager General 72 
06.02.12 GIZ  Public Health Consultant - prev. GIZ  Health 73 
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D Code System 
Final version of the code system used to structure the interview material:  
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E Staffing Levels of Aid Organisations 
Table 23: Staffing levels of aid organisations 
 
Headquarters Field Share of staff 
in field as % 
Total  Year  
Bilaterals 
Canada 1 769  1 069 38 2 838  2009  
Denmark 261 585 69 846 2011  
Finland 170 190 53 360 2009  
Germany 3 241 13 944 81 17 185 2011  
Netherlands 600 900 60 1 500 2009  
Norway 584 592 50 1 176 2009  
Sida (Sweden)  538 140 21 678 2014  
DFID  1 268 1 423 53 2 691 2012  
USAID 1 700 6 300 79 8 000 2011  
Multilaterals  
UNDP  981 5 286 84 6 267 2010  
UNAIDS 350 650 65 1 000 2010  
WHO  1 967 4 004 67 5 971 2010  
World Bank   6 000 3 000 33 9 000 2012  
Source: OECD (2009a: 40); UNAIDS (2010b: 9); High-Level Committee on Management (2011: 1); 
OECD (2011c: 55/56); DFID (2012); GIZ (2012a: 15); World Bank 2012a; Sida (2014). 
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